In re Spoon

185 B.R. 758, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 1507, 1995 WL 518737
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Tennessee
DecidedJuly 14, 1995
DocketBankruptcy No. 92-27884-K
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 185 B.R. 758 (In re Spoon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Spoon, 185 B.R. 758, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 1507, 1995 WL 518737 (Tenn. 1995).

Opinion

SUA SPONTE ORDER RE DEBTOR’S “APPLICATION FOR WAIVER OF THE CHAPTER 7 FILING FEE FOR INDIVIDUAL WHO CANNOT PAY THE FILING FEE IN FULL OR IN INSTALLMENTS” COMBINED WITH RELATED ORDERS AND NOTICE OF THE ENTRY THEREOF

DAVID S. KENNEDY, Chief Judge.

In this consumer no-asset chapter 7 case the instant matter before the Court arises out of an application filed by the above-named debtor, Linda L. Spoon (“Debtor”), styled “Application for Waiver of the Chapter 7 Filing Fee for Individual Who Cannot Pay the Filing Fee in Full or in Installments” (“Application”). Based on the following, the Court, on an ex parte basis, provisionally denies the debtor’s application as being moot.

Jurisdiction exists over the debtor and the subject matter herein by virtue of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b) and 157(a) and ostensively under H.R. 2519, cited as the “Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1994” (Pub.L. No. 103-121; 107 Stat. 1153) (hereinafter “H.R. 2519”).

An application filed by an individual debtor for waiver of the chapter 7 filing fee pursuant to the provisions of H.R. 2519 is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A). In re Clark, infra.

Based on the existing case record as a whole including consideration of “Attachment A” hereto, the following shall constitute the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7052.

The relevant background facts are not in dispute and may be briefly summarized as follows: On July 24,1992, the debtor filed an original petition under chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. The debtor paid in full the $120.00 filing fee then required by 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(1). On September 4, 1992, the Court confirmed the debtor’s chapter 13 repayment plan.

[760]*760On October 27, 1993, H.R. 2519 was enacted. Section 111(d) of H.R. 2519 requires the Judicial Conference of the United States to study the effect of waiving filing fees in chapter 7 cases for individual debtors who are unable to pay such fees in installments. Specifically, section 111(d) of H.R. 2519 provides and requires that:

* no later than March 31,1998, the Judicial Conference shall submit to the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report relating to the bankruptcy fee system and the impact on the system on various participants in bankruptcy cases including an estimate of the costs and benefits that would result from waiving chapter 7 filing fees payable by individual debtors; recommendations regarding revenue sources to offset the net cost of waiving such fees; an evaluation of the effects that would result in cases under chapters 11 and 13 from using a graduated bankruptcy fee system based on the debtor’s assets, liabilities or both; and recommendations regarding various methods to implement such a graduated bankruptcy fee system, section 111(d)(1) and (2);
* a pilot fee waiver program be implemented by the Judicial Conference on October 1,1994, and studied for a three-year period in not more than six judicial districts under which such fees may be waived in chapter 7 cases for individual debtors who are unable to pay the fees in installments, section 111(d)(3); and
* A system of graduated fees be studied by the Judicial Conference in not fewer than six judicial districts in order to estimate the results of a graduated fee system in chapter 11 and 13 cases, section 111(d)(4).

At its March 1994 meeting the Judicial Conference approved the selection of the following six judicial districts to participate in the statutory pilot program and study in chapter 7 cases of the impact of in forma pauperis relief in the bankruptcy courts: the Southern District of Illinois, the District of Montana, the Eastern District of New York, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the Western District of Tennessee, and the District of Utah.

In proceedings filed by individual chapter 7 debtors under H.R. 2519 seeking in forma pauperis relief, this Court ordinarily applies a totality of the pre- and postpetition facts and circumstances analysis in determining whether or not to waive the filing fee. The chapter 7 debtor has the burden of proof and must demonstrate by the preponderance standard that he or she is unable to pay the filing fee in installments. See, e.g., In re Clark, 173 B.R. 142 (Bankr.W.D.Tenn.1994).

It is noted that subsequent to the filing of this chapter 13 case on July 24,1992, the following bankruptcy fees were established or amended:

(a) The Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, Item 8, accompanying 28 U.S.C. § 1930(b), now provides that in all chapter 7 and 13 cases filed on or after December 1, 1992, the clerk shall collect from the debtor a new miscellaneous administrative fee of $30.00, in lieu of certain notice fees;1 and
(b) the $120.00 fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(1) which existed at the time of the filing of this chapter 13 case was increased to $130.00. See 107 Stat. 1164, “Sec. 111. Bankruptcy Fees ...;” Pub.L. 103-121 (Oct. 27, 1993) (effective 30 days after enactment).

On June 21,1995, the debtor herein filed a notice of conversion from chapter 13 to chapter 7, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1307(a) and Fed.R.Bankr.P. 1017(d). On June 28, 1995, [761]*761the debtor filed the instant application stating, in relevant part, as follows: “I ... cannot currently afford to pay the [chapter 7] filing fee in full or in installments.... ”

Section 348(a) of the Bankruptcy Code governs the effect of the conversion of a case from one chapter of the Bankruptcy Code to another chapter and provides that while such conversion constitutes an order for relief under the chapter to which the ease is converted, the conversion itself does not affect the date of the filing of the petition,2 the commencement of the case, or the order for relief (except as provided in subsections (b) and (e) of this section). That is, subject to limited exceptions not applicable here, where an originally filed chapter 13 ease is converted to a case under chapter 7, it is deemed to have commenced on the date the chapter 13 case was filed. See, e.g., Genova v. Thurman, 43 B.R. 108 (Bankr.D.Colo.1984); In re Langholf, 37 B.R. 414 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1984).

Accordingly, it is not appropriate to charge the debtor herein either the new $30.00 miscellaneous fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
185 B.R. 758, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 1507, 1995 WL 518737, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-spoon-tnwb-1995.