In re Spencer

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: September 2, 2014
• Docket: 14-142
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA14-142 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 2 September 2014

IN THE MATTER OF:

JAMES SPENCER Wake County No. 13 SPC 05

Appeal by respondent from order entered 27 June 2013 by

Judge Jacqueline Brewer in Wake County District Court. Heard in

the Court of Appeals 11 August 2014.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Josephine Tetteh, for the State.

Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein LLP, by Matthew W. Wolfe and Robert A. Leandro, for petitioner Holly Hill Hospital.

Appellate Defender Staples S. Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Mary Cook, for respondent.

McCULLOUGH, Judge.

Respondent James Spencer appeals from a trial court’s

order, involuntarily committing him to an inpatient facility for

a period not to exceed sixty (60) days. Based on the reasons

stated herein, we reverse the order of the trial court and

remand this case to the trial court for the making of

appropriate findings of fact. -2- I. Background

On 19 June 2013, Arlene Midgett filed an affidavit and

petition for involuntary commitment in Tyrrell County District

Court. The affidavit and petition for involuntary commitment

stated that respondent James Edward Spencer was “mentally ill

and dangerous to self or others or mentally ill and in need of

treatment in order to prevent further disability or

deterioration that would predictably result in dangerousness.”

The affidavit also provided that the Sheriff’s Department had

received numerous calls from respondent’s family about

respondent’s erratic behavior. Respondent had walked to a

cemetery where his mother and brother are buried and told

deputies that “he was going to sleep on the graves tonight.”

When deputies attempted to return respondent to his home,

respondent replied that “they had just as well call Hitler from

the dead and draw guns and go ahead and kill him now.”

A hearing was held at the 27 June 2013 session of Wake

County District Court. Dr. Muhammed Saeed examined respondent

at Holly Hill Hospital on 24 and 25 June 2013. Dr. Saeed

determined that respondent was mentally ill and suffered from

chronic schizophrenia with an acute exacerbation. Dr. Saeed

testified that respondent was “very paranoid” and had “grandiose -3- delusions.” According to Dr. Saeed, respondent threatened the

staff of Holly Hill Hospital as they were attempting to give

respondent his medication. Consistent with reports contained in

respondent’s medical records, respondent threatened that he

would stab the staff with a pen. Dr. Saeed recommended that

respondent be committed to inpatient care for a period of sixty

(60) days.

Respondent’s sister, Auray Midgett, testified that she had

a healthcare power of attorney to act on behalf of respondent.

In May 2013, respondent was committed for six (6) days at

Washington County Hospital in Plymouth, North Carolina.

Respondent was released to outpatient treatment, but began

calling various state prisons, offices in Washington, D.C. and

President Barack Obama. Respondent seemed agitated, and based

on his behavior, Ms. Midgett petitioned for involuntary

commitment on 19 June 2013.

Angela Spencer, respondent’s daughter, testified that one

evening prior to his commitment in June 2013, respondent was at

her home. Respondent was agitated and paranoid, and Ms. Spencer

saw him pushing a fingernail file through her cable box. She

called the police and respondent voluntarily left her home. -4- Respondent also testified at his hearing. He did not

believe he needed to be treated at Holly Hill Hospital, but

rather, preferred to be treated by a psychiatrist he had seen in

the past.

The trial court entered an order on 27 June 2013, finding

“by clear, cogent and convincing evidence” that “the respondent

contests commitment. Stipulate to mental illness, a danger to

self, and others, and in need of treatment.” The trial court

concluded that respondent was mentally ill and dangerous to

himself and others. Based on the foregoing, respondent was

involuntarily committed to an inpatient facility for a period

not to exceed sixty (60) days.

From this order, respondent filed notice of appeal on 25

July 2013.

II. Discussion

Respondent’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial

court erred by involuntarily committing him when the 27 June

2013 order was not supported by sufficient written findings of

fact. The State and petitioner Holly Hill Hospital agree with

respondent that the findings made in the involuntary commitment

order were insufficient and urge our Court to reverse the trial -5- court’s order and remand this case to the trial court for the

making of appropriate findings of fact.

We first note that

even though the term for respondent’s involuntary commitment has passed, a prior discharge will not render questions challenging the involuntary commitment proceeding moot. When the challenged order may form the basis for future commitment or may cause other collateral legal consequences for the respondent, an appeal of that order is not moot.

In re Allison, 216 N.C. App. 297, 299, 715 S.E.2d 912, 914

(2011) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

On appeal of a commitment order our function is to determine whether there was any competent evidence to support the “facts” recorded in the commitment order and whether the trial court’s ultimate findings of mental illness and dangerous to self or others were supported by the “facts” recorded in the order. We do not consider whether the evidence of respondent’s mental illness and dangerousness was clear, cogent and convincing. It is for the trier of fact to determine whether the competent evidence offered in a particular case met the burden of proof.

In re Collins, 49 N.C. App. 243, 246, 271 S.E.2d 72, 74 (1980)

(citations omitted).

Section 122C-268(j) of the North Carolina General Statutes

provides that

[t]o support an inpatient commitment order, -6- the court shall find by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the respondent is mentally ill and dangerous to self, as defined in G.S. 122C-3(11)a., or dangerous to others, as defined in G.S. 122C-3(11)b. The court shall record the facts that support its findings.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-268(j) (2013).

In the case sub judice, the trial court checked the box on

the printed form that reads “[b]ased on the evidence presented,

the Court by clear, cogent and convincing evidence finds these

other facts: the respondent contests commitment. Stipulate to

mental illness, a danger to self, and others, and in need of

treatment.” The trial court did not make additional findings of

fact or record any facts to supporting these findings.

It is well established that we may not determine whether

the evidence was sufficient because the trial court failed to

make any findings of fact based on the evidence presented at the

27 June 2013 hearing for us to review. See In re Booker, 193

N.C. App. 433, 437, 667 S.E.2d 302, 304-305 (2008). Thus,

because the trial court’s order is insufficient to support the

trial court’s determination that respondent was dangerous to

himself and to others, we reverse the trial court’s order and

appropriate findings of fact. See In re Allison, 216 N.C. App. -7- at 300, 715 S.E.2d at 915 (reversing and remanding for

appropriate findings when the trial court failed to make written

findings of fact or failed to incorporate by reference a

physician’s report in the respondent’s involuntary commitment

order).

III. Conclusion

Because the involuntary commitment order contained

insufficient findings of fact to support its determination that

respondent was mentally ill and dangerous to himself and others,

we reverse the order of the trial court and remand this case to

the trial court for the making of appropriate findings.

Reversed and remanded.

Judges STEELMAN and ERVIN concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).