In re Southern Land Title Corp.

316 F. Supp. 1059, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10305
District Court, E.D. Louisiana·Decided September 9, 1970·No. No. 67-135·Published·Cited by 5 cases

Opinion

HEEBE, District Judge:

This is a reclamation suit by the trustee, Albert J. Ward, Jr., and certain debt- or corporations herein against 225 Baronne Street, Inc., for the return of the building generally known as “225 Baronne Building” to the Five Flags Building, Inc. (one of the debtor corporations), and the return of the land on which the building is situated to Southern Land Title Corporation (another debtor corporation). By means of this same suit Mr. Ward, acting as trustee for Plaza Towers, Inc., another debtor corporation, was seeking reclamation of another piece of property in downtown New Orleans, commonly referred to as the “Goldberg Tract.” We do not have to pass upon the reclamation of the Goldberg Tract because the defendant, 225 Baronne Street, Inc., has agreed to re-convey that property to the trustee under a consent judgment upon payment to the defendant of its investment.

We, therefore, focus our attention on the testimony and documents which relate to the attempts to reclaim the land and building located at 225 Baronne Street in the City of New Orleans.

On May 3, 1968, James J. Morrison, attorney for the debtor corporations herein, filed a document entitled, “Further objections to proposed disclaimers.” Subsequently, on May 6, 1968, Mr. Morrison filed a document entitled, “Memorandum in opposition to disclaimers and adjudication in bankruptcy.” Shortly after the above two documents were filed, the trustee filed a petition for the examination of designated persons under §§21 and 167 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. §§44 and 567). The trustee’s pe[1061]*1061tition was set for hearing on May 23, 1968, at which time Mr. Morrison and Mr. Sam J. Recile testified. At the beginning of the hearing on May 24, 1968, Mr. Cicero C. Sessions addressed two questions to Mr. Morrison which helped to clarify the purpose behind Mr. Morrison’s pleadings and eventually led to the present reclamation suit.1 After the exchange between Mr. Sessions and Mr. Morrison, it was perfectly clear to all the parties at interest herein what the purpose of Mr. Morrison’s pleadings were, and at that point Mr. Sessions moved to terminate the hearing (see footnote 1, supra). The motion by Mr. Sessions to terminate the proceedings was denied. It was stipulated and agreed by counsel for the debtor corporations, for 225 Baronne Street, Inc., and the trustee that the Court could try the question of whether or not title to 225 Baronne Street should be reclaimed by the trustee.

Mr. Sessions moved that the proceedings of May 23, 1968, be excluded from the record of the present proceedings except to the extent that it be considered in light of a deposition. That motion was granted.

When we began hearing testimony on the morning of May 24, 1968, the case was in the following posture. The hearing on the petition of the trustee to examine designated persons under §§ 21 and 167 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. §§44 and 567) had been converted into a summary-plenary hearing on reclamation of title to the land and building known as the 225 Baronne Building and title to the Goldberg Tract under §§ 67d(2) and 70 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. §§ [1062]*1062107d(2) and 110), just as if a plenary-suit had been filed by the trustee; the findings of the Court were to be dispositive of the issues involved in the reclamation proceedings and the results at the conclusion of the hearing would be binding on all parties at interest.

The Court heard testimony on May 24, 25, 26, 27, and October 21, 22, and 24, 1968. The hearing was then continued pending the results of compromise negotiations. The hearing resumed on April 21, 23, 24, May 14, 15, and June 4, 5, and 6, 1970. The matter was taken under submission on July 1, 1970, when all parties were supposed to file their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Section 67 d(2) of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. § 107 d(2)) provides :

“(2) Every transfer made and every obligation incurred by a debtor within one year prior to the filing of a petition initiating a proceeding under this title by or against him is fraudulent (a) as to creditors existing at the time of such transfer or obligation, if made or incurred without fair consideration by a debtor who is or will be thereby rendered insolvent, without regard to his actual intent; or (b) as to then existing creditors and as to other persons who become creditors during the continuance of a business or transaction, if made or incurred without fair consideration by a debtor who is engaged or is about to engage in such business or transaction, for which the property remaining in his hands is an unreasonably small capital, without regard to his actual intent; or (c) as to then existing and future creditors, if made or incurred without fair consideration by a debtor who intends to incur or believes that he will incur debts beyond his ability to pay as they mature; or (d) as to then existing and future creditors, if made or incurred with actual intent as distinguished from intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay, or defraud either existing or future creditors.” 2

That section of the Bankruptcy Act sets out four situations in which a transfer is fraudulent. The first three situations, from which fraud is conclusively presumed, regardless of actual intent, have one common prerequisite of an absence of “fair consideration” to the debtor in return for his conveyance.3 Lack of proof that there was an absence of “fair consideration” is fatal to the presumption raised by the first three subsections of § 67 d(2). See, In Re Quaker Room, 90 F.Supp. 758 (S.D.Cal.1950); Nicholson v. Scott, 50 F.Supp. 209 (E.D.Mieh. 1943); and Matter of Roark, 28 F.Supp. 515 (E.D.Ky.1939).

In Cohen v. Sutherland, 257 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1958), the court stated at 742:

“The ‘fair consideration,’ absence of which brings into operation the first three clauses of § 107, sub. d(2), is not merely the good and valuable consideration necessary to sustain a simple contract. See Cole v. Loma Plastics, Inc., D.C.N.D.Tex.1953, 112 F.Supp. 138, 141. As defined in 11 U.S.C.A. § 107, sub. d(l), ‘consideration given for the property or obligation of a debtor is “fair” (1), when, in good faith, in exchange and as a fair equivalent therefor, property is transferred or an antecedent debt is satisfied. * * *' ‘Fair consideration’ requires both a fair equivalent and good [1063]*1063faith. See In Re Messenger, D.C.E.D. Pa.1940, 32 F.Supp. 490, 494.” (emphasis added)

The first issue we must resolve in determining whether or not 225 Baronne Street, Inc., paid a fair consideration for the property in question is whether the amount paid was a fair equivalent for the property conveyed.

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In re Southern Land Title Corp., 316 F. Supp. 1059, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10305 (E.D. La. 1970).

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