In Re Solly

392 B.R. 692, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 3256, 2008 WL 3200851
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Texas
DecidedAugust 7, 2008
Docket19-31145
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 392 B.R. 692 (In Re Solly) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Solly, 392 B.R. 692, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 3256, 2008 WL 3200851 (Tex. 2008).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION ON TRUSTEE’S OBJECTION TO DEBTOR’S CLAIMED EXEMPTION

[Doc. No. 16]

JEFF BOHM, Bankruptcy Judge.

I. Introduction

Kimberly Solly (Debtor) voluntarily filed a Chapter 13 petition on March 7, 2008. On her Schedule C, Debtor listed a potential malpractice claim (Malpractice Claim) with a value of “unknown.” The Chapter 13 trustee objected to Debtor listing the Malpractice Claim as “unknown” and fur *694 ther argued that 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5) 1 caps the amount of money Debtor is able to exempt from the Malpractice Claim at $11,200. Debtor argued that § 522(d)(5) does not limit recovery from any subsequent lawsuit to $11,200 but, instead, limits Debtor’s interest in the Malpractice Claim. To determine Debtor’s interest, Debtor further argued that the Court should divide the amount Debtor has claimed exempt by the value of the Malpractice Claim as of the petition date, thereby resulting in the percentage which Debtor may exempt once the lawsuit is liquidated. The Court agrees. Consequently, Debtor is ordered to amend her Schedules to list the value of the Malpractice Claim at a specific dollar amount. In the event that an objection is filed to Debtor’s value of the Malpractice Claim, this Court will set a valuation hearing.

II. Findings of Fact

1) On March 7, 2008, Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 13 petition. [Doc. No. 1.]

2) On March 7, 2008, Debtor also filed her Schedules. On Schedule B, she listed the Malpractice Claim as having a value of “unknown.” On Schedule C, she exempted the Malpractice Claim and set forth that the value of the claimed exemption is “unknown” and that the value of this Malpractice Claim, without deducting the exemption, is “unknown.” [Doc. No. 1.]

3) On May 15, 2008, the Chapter 13 trustee filed an objection to Debtor’s exemption (the Objection). [Doc. No. 16.]

4) On May 19, 2008, the case was converted to Chapter 7. [Doc. No. 19.]

5) On May 21, 2008, Joseph Hill was appointed as the Chapter 7 Trustee (the Trustee). [Doc. No. 22.]

6) On June 5, 2008, Debtor filed a response in opposition to the Objection. [Doc. No. 26.]

7) On June 25, 2008, the Trustee filed a Motion to Intervene in the Objection and adopted the allegations and arguments made by the Chapter 13 trustee. [Doc. No. 29.]

8) On June 26, 2008, this Court granted the Motion to Intervene. [Doc. No. 31.]

III. Conclusions of Law

A. Jurisdiction and Venue

This Court has jurisdiction over this dispute pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) and (b). This dispute is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) and (B). Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1408.

B. It is inconsistent with the objectives of the Bankruptcy Code to permit a debtor to exempt a lawsuit the value of which Debtor has scheduled as “unknown.”

Section 522(d)(5) allows a debtor to exempt “the debtor’s aggregate interest in any property, not to exceed in value $1,075 plus up to $10,125 of any unused amount” of the debtor’s homestead exemption. In the case at bar, Debtor claims no homestead exemption and thus is able to exempt the full amount&emdash;$11,200&emdash;under § 522(d)(5). [Doc. No. 12.]

The first issue is whether Debtor may list the value of her exemption as “unknown.” In In re Forti, the court was concerned that listing the value of an asset *695 as “unknown” meant that the debtors may have claimed the value of their entire interest as exempt. In re Forti, 224 B.R. 323, 329 (Bankr.D.Md.1998). The Court believes this is a valid concern in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 112 S.Ct. 1644, 118 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992). In Taylor, the Supreme Court held that if a debtor schedules an exempt asset as having an “unknown” value, and no objection is filed, then the debtor may exempt the entire value of that asset, regardless of the ultimate amount actually generated from the liquidation of the asset. See Taylor, 503 U.S. at 641, 112 S.Ct. 1644. This Court believes it would encourage abuse to permit a debtor, after a trustee’s objection, to exempt a potentially valuable interest in its entirety simply because the debtor claimed the value as “unknown.” See Forti 224 B.R. at 329. Exempting the value of the entire interest would frustrate the trustee’s main objective&emdash;to liquidate nonexempt property to pay allowed claims.

For these reasons, the court in Forti ruled that the debtors could not list the value of their assets as “unknown.” Id. However, the debtors were granted leave to amend the value of their claim to specific dollar amounts within the statutory exemption limitations. Id. The court held that the asset should be valued at either (1) the entire value of the debtors’ interest on the petition date; (2) zero value; or (3) the entire value of the interest on the petition date not exceeding the maximum exemption. Id. at 328. Similarly, this Court believes that allowing Debtor to claim the value of the Malpractice Claim as “unknown” is an abuse of the system. Therefore, Debtor must amend her Schedules to set forth the value of the Malpractice Claim in a specific dollar amount. 2 The Debtor must not resort to use of the word “unknown,” or words to that effect.

C. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5) limits Debt- or’s interest in the Malpractice Claim, not the potential recovery of the lawsuit itself.

The Trustee contends that a debtor’s exemption under § 522(d)(5) is capped at the specified dollar amount of $11,200. This Court disagrees. Again, § 522(d)(5) states that a debtor may exempt “the debtor’s aggregate interest in any property, not to exceed in value $1,075 plus up to $10,125 of any unused amount” of the debtor’s homestead exemption. The key term in § 522(d)(5) is “value,” which implies an amount capable of fluctuation, rather than a fixed dollar amount. See Polis v. Getaways, Inc. (In re Polis), 217 F.3d 899, 902 (7th Cir.2000). This language differs from the language in other subsections of § 522. For example, § 522(d)(11)(D) provides that a debtor may exempt any right to receive a payment not to exceed $20,200 from a personal injury claim, (emphasis added).

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
392 B.R. 692, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 3256, 2008 WL 3200851, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-solly-txsb-2008.