In Re Smith

142 B.R. 334, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 949, 1992 WL 152274
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Missouri
DecidedJune 24, 1992
Docket19-40636
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 142 B.R. 334 (In Re Smith) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Smith, 142 B.R. 334, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 949, 1992 WL 152274 (Mo. 1992).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DAVID P. MCDONALD, Chief Judge.

JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334,151, and 157 and Local Rule 29 of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. This is a “core proceeding” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B), which the Court may hear and determine.

*335 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Debtor voluntarily filed a petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on January 28, 1991. The Trustee filed his timely objection which was designated: Motion A — Trustee’s Objection To Claim Of Exemption, to which the Debtor responded. The trustee objected to Debtor’s claimed exemption of his I.R.A. on the grounds that the it was neither a spendthrift trust, nor payable upon account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service, nor reasonably necessary for the support of the Debt- or and his dependents. In response to the trustee’s objection, the Debtor sought to apply $1,750 in miscellaneous exemptions available to him under Mo.Rev.Stat. §§ 513.430(3) 1 and 513.440 2 to the I.R.A. and sought to exempt the balance of $3,508.00 pursuant to Mo.Rev.Stat. § 513.-430(10)(e). 3

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Upon consideration of the testimony, record and argument of counsel the Court finds:

(1) At the time of his filing, Debtor was 34 years old and employed for over three years as a physician, specializing in radiology, at Washington University in Saint Louis. His income in 1989 was $39,350 and his estimated income for 1990 was $37,000. In the near future he is scheduled to enter the Air Force for a four year term, where he anticipates an annual income of $30,000.

(2) Debtor is divorced and has custody of two children from his former marriage. Debtor’s ex-wife does not pay him child support.

(3) On his Schedule B-j — Property claimed as exempt, Debtor listed money in his I.R.A. as exempt pursuant to Mo.Rev. Stat. §§ 513.427 and 513.430(10)(e).

(4)The balance in the I.R.A. at filing was $5,258.00. This represents his sole savings, assets and retirement benefits. DISCUSSION

Upon a debtor’s filing of a bankruptcy petition, § 541 of the Bankruptcy Code creates an estate comprised of “all the legal and equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988). A debtor can insulate property in which he has an interest at the commencement of his case, from the claims of his creditors, by proving that the property qualifies as property which is either excluded from inclusion in the estate by § 541(b) or (c) of the Bankruptcy Code or which is statutorily exempt from the creditors’ claims. The debtor in this case asserts that his I.R.A. qualifies for an exemption from the claims of his creditors under Missouri law.

The Bankruptcy Code provides a set of exemptions in § 522(d) but gives the option of limiting debtors to exemptions created by their state legislatures and exemptions created by non-bankruptcy, federal law. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (1988). Missouri has chosen to opt-out of the federal system of exemptions. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 513.427 (Vernon’s Supp.1991). The enabling legislation which opts Missouri out of the federal system of exemptions provides that:

“Every person by or against whom an order is sought for relief under Title 11, United States Code, shall be permitted to exempt from property of the estate any property that is exempt from attachment and execution under the law of the state of Missouri or under any federal law, other than, Title 11, United States Code, Section 522(d), and no such person is authorized to claim as exempt the property that is specified under Title 11, United *336 States Code, Section 522(d).” Mo.Rev. Stat. § 513.427 (Vernon’s Supp.1991).

Debtor claims that Mo.Rev.Stat. § 513.430(10), exempts his I.R.A. from inclusion in his bankruptcy estate. Section 513.430(10)(e) of Missouri’s Revised Statutes provides that “[a] payment under a stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing, annuity or similar plan or contract on account of illness, disability, death, age or length of service, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of such person or any dependent of such person ...” is exempt from attachment and execution. Mo.Rev. Stat. § 513.430(10)(e) (Vernon’s Supp.1991). As one court has noted, ambiguity exists as to whether § 513.430(10)(e)’s “similar plan” language encompasses I.R.A.’s. See In re Gaines, 106 B.R. 1008, 1020 n. 12 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1989), quashed by 121 B.R. 1015 (W.D.Mo.1990). However, given this court’s conclusion that the Debtor’s I.R.A. in this case is not reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and his dependents, the question of applicability of the Missouri exemption provisions to an I.R.A. loses relevance.

To be exempt under § 513.430(10), the funds claimed as exempt must be reasonably necessary to the support of the debtor and such a question is a factual matter for courts to decide on a case by case basis. In re Boykin, 118 B.R. 716, 719 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1990). Missouri courts have referred to eleven factors set forth in In re Bartlett, 67 B.R. 455, 457 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1986), to determine whether funds are reasonably necessary for the support of a debtor. See In re Boykin, 118 B.R. 716, 719 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1990); In re Gaines, 106 B.R. 1008, 1020 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1989), quashed by, 121 B.R. 1015 (W.D.Mo.1990); In re Gallagher, 101 B.R. 594, 602 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1989). The factors considered in Bartlett include:

(1) Debtor’s present and anticipated living expenses;
(2) Debtor’s present and anticipated income from all sources;
(3) Age of debtor and dependents;
(4) Health of debtor and dependents;
(5) Debtor’s ability to work and earn a living;
(6) Debtor’s job skills;
(7) Debtor’s other assets, including exempt assets:
(8) Liquidity of other assets;
(9) Debtor’s ability to save for retirement;
(10) Special needs of the debtor and dependents;

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Related

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206 B.R. 958 (W.D. Missouri, 1997)
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
142 B.R. 334, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 949, 1992 WL 152274, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-smith-moeb-1992.