In re S.M.

2026 Ohio 319

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 2, 2026
• Docket: 2025CA0020
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as In re S.M., 2026-Ohio-319.]

COURT OF APPEALS COSHOCTON COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

IN THE MATTER OF: Case No. 2025CA0020

S.M. (DOB: 1/22/2024) Opinion And Judgment Entry

Appeal from the Coshocton County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, Case No. 20243005

Judgment: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry: February 2, 2026

BEFORE: Craig R. Baldwin; William B. Hoffman; David M. Gormley, Judges

APPEARANCES: KATELYNN R. DAVIS, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee- Coshocton County JFS; RICHARD HIXSON, for Appellant-Father N.M.; JEANNETTE MOLL, Appellee-Guardian Ad Litem

Baldwin, P.J.

{¶1} Appellant N.M., the biological father of minor children S.M. and M.M.,

appeals the decision of the trial court terminating his parental rights and granting

permanent custody of S.M. and M.M. to appellee Coshocton County JFS ("appellee

JFS"). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THE CASE

{¶2} Twins S.M. and M.M. were born on January 22, 2024. At the time of their

birth, the appellant was under a case plan with appellee JFS with regard to the older siblings of S.M. and M.M. The appellant had not completed plan services for the older

siblings’ case plans at the time of the twins’ birth.1

{¶3} On January 22, 2024, the day of S.M. and M.M.’s birth, appellee JFS

requested and was granted an ex parte order placing S.M. and M.M. into the emergency

temporary custody of appellee JFS. Appellee JFS then placed S.M. and M.M. into a foster

home.

{¶4} On January 23, 2024, appellee Guardian Ad Litem Jeanette M. Moll

(“appellee GAL”), who had also served as the GAL for some of S.M. and M.M.’s older

siblings, filed complaints regarding S.M. and M.M. alleging dependency and neglect. A

shelter care hearing was conducted, and S.M. and M.M. were continued in the emergency

temporary custody of appellee JFS. A follow-up shelter care hearing was scheduled for

January 29, 2024, after which S.M. and M.M. remained in the emergency temporary

custody of appellee JFS. S.M. and M.M. were moved to the foster home of B.T. and his

wife B.T. at the beginning of February, 2024.

{¶5} On February 20, 2024, an adjudicatory hearing took place at which S.M.

and M.M. were adjudicated dependent pursuant to R.C. 2151.04(C) by agreement, and

the neglect allegations were dismissed. A dispositional hearing was continued to a later

date so that a case plan could be filed for S.M. and M.M. A case plan was filed on March

18, 2024, and the dispositional hearing took place on March 25, 2024, at which time S.M.

and M.M. remained in the temporary custody and protective supervision of appellee JFS.

1 The biological mother of S.M. and M.M., who has not filed an appeal herein, was also subject to the older siblings’ case plan, and had also not completed plan services at the time of the twins’ birth. {¶6} On May 16, 2024, the appellee GAL filed motions for permanent custody of

S.M. and M.M., as well as their older siblings. The trial court conducted a permanent

custody hearing on August 12-13, 2024. The appellee GAL presented testimony from the

following individuals: B.Y., a foster parent for the older siblings; B.T., a foster parent for

S.M. and M.M.; Elizabeth Ballantine, an appellee JFS caseworker; Lexi Thompson, an

appellee JFS caseworker; Aleisha Youngen, an appellee JFS caseworker; Deputy Albert

Havranek of the Coshocton County Sheriff's Office; L.M., a paternal aunt and placement

for the older siblings; Cheryl Mullet, a counselor for one of the older siblings; Abigail Miller,

a counselor for two of the older siblings; V.B., foster parent for three of the older siblings;

and, Katie Barnett, an appellee JFS caseworker. Numerous exhibits were entered into

evidence. Neither the appellant, S.M. and M.M.’s biological mother, nor appellee JFS

presented evidence at the August 12-13, 2024, hearing. All parties submitted written

summations. The permanent custody motions filed by the appellee GAL were granted as

to the older siblings. However, the permanent custody motions for S.M. and M.M. were

denied, in part because statutory timelines had not been met.

{¶7} On January 14, 2025, appellee JFS requested a six-month extension of

temporary custody of S.M. and M.M., and filed a case plan. The requested extension was

granted at the annual court review on January 15, 2025, and all prior orders were

continued.

{¶8} On January 17, 2025, the appellant, together with S.M. and M.M.’s mother,

filed a joint motion for unsupervised visits. The joint motion was scheduled for hearing on

March 26, 2025, together with the hearing on the case plan that had been filed January 14, 2025. The trial court denied the motion for unsupervised visitation following the

hearing.

{¶9} On March 27, 2025, the appellee GAL again filed motions for permanent

custody requesting that permanent custody of S.M. and M.M. be granted to appellee JFS.

The matter proceeded to hearing on July 10, 2025. The trial court took judicial notice of

all testimony and evidence presented at the August 12-13, 2024, permanent custody

hearing.2 The appellee GAL then presented the testimony of B.T., a foster parent for S.M.

and M.M., and Katie Barnett, an appellee JFS caseworker, as well as the appellee GAL’s

own testimony. The appellee GAL described concerns that were present with regard to

S.M. and M.M.’s older siblings, including: domestic violence in the home; use of one of

the older siblings as a shield in the middle of the domestic violence; bed bugs (the older

siblings described hiding in a closet to escape being bitten by bed bugs); locking the older

siblings out of the home; medical neglect; educational neglect and truancy issues; and,

instability and substance abuse issues. Permanent custody of the older siblings had been

granted to appellee JFS. The appellee GAL was concerned that S.M. and M.M. were too

young to self-report or self-protect in the face of the risk factors which had been present

on multiple fronts with regard to S.M. and M.M.’s older siblings. Furthermore, the appellee

GAL noted the appellant’s poor attendance at supervised visits with S.M. and M.M.

Neither the appellant, S.M. and M.M.’s mother, nor the appellee JFS presented evidence

at the July 10, 2025, hearing. Numerous exhibits were admitted into evidence.

2 The July 10, 2025, hearing transcript is the only transcript contained in the record before this Court in this case. {¶10} On September 5, 2025, the trial court issued a Judgment Entry granting the

appellee GAL’s motion for permanent custody, finding, inter alia, that S.M. and M.M. had

been in the temporary custody of the appellee JFS for twelve (12) months of a twenty-

two (22) month period, and that it was in their best interests for permanent custody to be

granted to appellee JFS.

{¶11} The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal in which he sets forth the

following sole assignment of error:

{¶12} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT PERMANENT

CUSTODY WAS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF S.M. AND M.M., AS SUCH A FINDING

WAS UNSUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND AGAINST THE MANIFEST

WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.”

STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶13} “[T]he right to raise a child is an 'essential' and 'basic' civil right." In re

Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157 (1990), citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).

A parent's interest in the care, custody and management of his or her child is

"fundamental." Id., citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). The permanent

termination of a parent's rights has been described as, "* * * the family law equivalent to

the death penalty in a criminal case." In re Smith, 77 Ohio App.3d 1, 16 (6th Dist. 1991).

Therefore, parents "must be afforded every procedural and substantive protection the law

allows." Id.

{¶14} The Ohio Supreme Court addressed the standard of review in permanent

custody cases in the case of In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703: Under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), a juvenile court may grant permanent

custody of a child to the agency that moved for permanent custody if the

court determines, “by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best

interest of the child” to do so and that any of five factors enumerated in R.C.

2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (e) applies. “Clear and convincing evidence is

that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere ‘preponderance

of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of such certainty as is required

‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in the

mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to

be established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954),

paragraph three of the syllabus.

We have described an appellate court's task when reviewing a trial

court's application of the clear-and-convincing-evidence burden of proof as

follows: “Where the proof required must be clear and convincing, a

reviewing court will examine the record to determine whether the trier of

facts had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of

proof.” State v. Schiebel, 55 Ohio St.3d 71, 74, 564 N.E.2d 54 (1990), citing

Ford v. Osborne, 45 Ohio St. 1, 12 N.E. 526 (1887), paragraph two of the

syllabus; accord Cross at 477, 120 N.E.2d 118.

* * *

. . . sufficiency-of-the-evidence and/or manifest-weight-of-the-

evidence standards of review are the proper appellate standards of review of a juvenile court's permanent-custody determination, as appropriate

depending on the nature of the arguments that are presented by the parties.

Id. at ¶7-8, 11.

{¶15} The Z.C. Court went on to define sufficiency of the evidence and manifest

weight as follows:

Sufficiency of the evidence and manifest weight of the evidence are

distinct concepts and are “ ‘both quantitatively and qualitatively different.’ ”

Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517,

¶ 10, quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541

(1997), paragraph two of the syllabus. We have stated that “sufficiency is a

test of adequacy,” Thompkins at 386, 678 N.E.2d 541, while weight of the

evidence “ ‘is not a question of mathematics, but depends on its effect in

inducing belief’ ” (emphasis sic), id. at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541, quoting Black's

Law Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed.1990). “Whether the evidence is legally

sufficient to sustain a verdict is a question of law.” Id. at 386, 678 N.E.2d

541. “When applying a sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard, a court of

appeals should affirm a trial court when “ ‘the evidence is legally sufficient

to support the jury verdict as a matter of law.” ’ ” Bryan-Wollman v.

Domonko, 115 Ohio St.3d 291, 2007-Ohio-4918, 874 N.E.2d 1198, ¶ 3,

quoting Thompkins at 386, 678 N.E.2d 541, quoting Black's at 1433.

But “even if a trial court judgment is sustained by sufficient evidence,

an appellate court may nevertheless conclude that the judgment is against

the manifest weight of the evidence.” Eastley at ¶ 12. When reviewing for manifest weight, the appellate court must weigh the evidence and all

reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and

determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact

clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that

the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered. Id. at ¶ 20. “In

weighing the evidence, the court of appeals must always be mindful of the

presumption in favor of the finder of fact.” Id. at ¶ 21. “The underlying

rationale of giving deference to the findings of the trial court rests with the

knowledge that the trial judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe

their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations

in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.” Seasons Coal Co.,

Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984). “ ‘If the

evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, the reviewing court

is bound to give it that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict and

judgment, most favorable to sustaining the verdict and judgment.’ ” Id. at fn.

3, quoting 5 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Appellate Review, Section 603, at 191-

192 (1978).

Id. at ¶ 13-14.

ANALYSIS

{¶16} R.C. 2151.414 sets forth the guidelines a trial court must follow when

deciding a motion for permanent custody. R.C. 2151.414(A)(1) mandates that the trial

court schedule a hearing and provide notice upon the filing of a motion for permanent

custody of a child. {¶17} R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) authorizes the juvenile court to grant permanent

custody of the child to the public or private agency if the court determines, by clear and

convincing evidence, that 1) it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent

custody to the agency; and, 2) that any of the following apply:

(a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the

temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or

private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive

twenty-two-month period, or has not been in the temporary custody of one

or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies

for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period if, as

described in division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the

child was previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in

another state, and the child cannot be placed with either of the child's

parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child's

parents;

(b) the child is abandoned;

(c) the child is orphaned and there are no relatives of the child who are

able to take permanent custody; or

(d) the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public

children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or

more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child has

been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services

agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period and, as described in division (D)(1) of

section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the

temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state.

Thus, R.C. 2151.414(B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial court must apply

when ruling on a motion for permanent custody.

{¶18} In practice, the trial court will usually determine whether one of the four

circumstances delineated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (d) is present before

proceeding to a determination regarding the best interests of the child. The Court in In re

C.R.M., 2024-Ohio-2279 (5th Dist.) stated:

This Court has adopted the position that proof of temporary custody

with an agency for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-

month period alone is sufficient to award permanent custody. In re: D.H.,

5th Dist., Licking No. 2022 CA 00025, 2022-Ohio-4495, ¶ 59. Therefore, a

finding that grounds existed for permanent custody cannot be against the

manifest weight of the evidence.

Id. at ¶62. In this case, the trial court found that the R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) factor applied,

as S.M and M.M. had been in the temporary custody of appellee JFS for more than twelve

(12) months of a twenty-two (22) month period. Moreover, the appellant concedes in his

appellate brief that S.M. and M.M. “were in fact placed in the temporary custody of the

agency and remained so for twelve (12) months of a twenty-two (22) month period, as

that matter is evident from the record.”

{¶19} The trial court also considers all relevant evidence before determining that

the children cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the parents. See, R.C. 2151.414(E). The statute also provides that if the

trial court makes a finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1)-(15), the court shall determine that

the children cannot or should not be placed with the parent. The trial court may determine

that a child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable time, or should not be

placed with a parent, upon the existence of any one of the factors listed in R.C.

2151.414(E). Thus, the existence of just one factor will support a finding that the child

cannot be placed with the parent within a reasonable time. See, In re William S., 75 Ohio

St.3d 95, 99 (1996).

{¶20} R.C. 2151.414(E) states in pertinent part:

In determining at a hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this

section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the

Revised Code whether a child cannot be placed with either parent within a

reasonable period of time or should not be placed with the parents, the court

shall consider all relevant evidence. If the court determines, by clear and

convincing evidence, at a hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this

section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the

Revised Code that one or more of the following exist as to each of the child's

parents, the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with

either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either

parent:

(1) Following the placement of the child outside the child's home and

notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency

to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially caused the child to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed continuously and

repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be

placed outside the child's home. In determining whether the parents have

substantially remedied those conditions, the court shall consider parental

utilization of medical, psychiatric, psychological, and other social and

rehabilitative services and material resources that were made available to

the parents for the purpose of changing parental conduct to allow them to

resume and maintain parental duties.

(11) The parent has had parental rights involuntarily terminated with

respect to a sibling of the child pursuant to this section or section 2151.353

or 2151.415 of the Revised Code, or under an existing or former law of this

state, any other state, or the United States that is substantially equivalent

to those sections, and the parent has failed to provide clear and convincing

evidence to prove that, notwithstanding the prior termination, the parent can

provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the

health, welfare, and safety of the child.

(16) Any other factor the court considers relevant.

{¶21} In this case, the record establishes the appellant’s parental rights were

involuntarily terminated with respect to four of the appellant’s other biological children.

Because the existence of one R.C. 2151.414(E) factor alone supports the finding that

S.M. and M.M. cannot be placed with the appellant within a reasonable time, the best interest analysis need not go any further. The appellant’s argument that there is little

evidence of maltreatment of S.M. and M.M. is disingenuous in light of the fact that, due

to the maltreatment of the older siblings, S.M. and M.M. were removed from the appellant

immediately following their birth and he has had only supervised visitation with them.

Further, the appellant’s characterization of the concerns as merely historical is also

disingenuous in light of the temporal proximity of the older siblings’ case to the case sub

judice.

{¶22} Moreover, the evidence presented at the July 10, 2025, hearing also

established that the appellant failed to demonstrate a commitment to S.M. and M.M. The

testimony was unrefuted that the appellant only attended 28 out of 51 scheduled

supervised visits with S.M. and M.M. at one location, and only attended 38 out of 52

scheduled supervised visits with S.M. and M.M. at another location, failing to engage in

supervised visits with S.M. and M.M. for over one-third of the time.

{¶23} The trial court properly found by clear and convincing evidence that

permanent custody was in the best interests of S.M. and M.M. due the involuntary

termination of the appellant’s parental rights with regard to four of his other children, and

the appellant’s continued demonstration of a lack of commitment to S.M. and M.M. as

evidenced by his cancellation of multiple supervised visits.

CONCLUSION

{¶24} Based upon the foregoing, we find that the trial court's decision to award

permanent custody of S.M. and M.M. to appellee Coshocton County JFS was warranted,

was in the best interest of S.M. and M.M., was based upon competent, credible evidence, and was not against the sufficiency or manifest weight of the evidence. The evidence

contained in the record supports the trial court's judgment. We therefore overrule the

appellant’s sole assignment of error and affirm the decision of the Coshocton County

Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division.

{¶25} Costs to appellant.

By: Baldwin, P.J.

Hoffman, J. and

Gormley, J. concur.