Filed 12/4/25 In re S.M. CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re S.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E085657
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. DPRI2400311)
v. ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND DENYING PETITION M.M. et al., FOR REHEARING [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT] Defendants and Appellants.
The petition for rehearing is denied. The opinion filed in this matter on
November 7, 2025, is modified as follows:
On page 2, section II first full paragraph the second sentence should read as
follows:
S.M. had a skull fracture and apparent fractures on both wrists, but the
parents claimed they did not know what happened.
1 On page 5, the following sentence and paragraph should be added to the end of the
first full paragraph.
Dr. Dantuma acknowledged, however, that S.M.’s skull fracture could have
been accidental.
The parents’ physician, Dr. Hyman, testified that S.M.’s skull fracture was
fully consistent with an accidental injury. In particular, he found that S.M.’s head
injury was consistent with a fall from the parents’ bed, as Father claimed had
happened. He also opined that S.M. had not even suffered wrist fractures.
On page 6, the following should be added to the end of the second paragraph:
The court also found DPSS failed to satisfy its burden on two other
allegations (b-1 and e-1) that asserted S.M.’s head injuries were nonaccidental
(i.e., intentionally caused by Mother and/or Father’s abuse). The court therefore
did not sustain those allegations.
On page 8, last paragraph should read as follows:
Substantial evidence supports both allegations the juvenile court found true
here.
As to the b-1 allegation, there was sufficient evidence for the juvenile to
find that S.M. suffered a fractured skull because of the parents’ negligent behavior.
S.M., an infant, presented with a fractured skull for which the parents initially had
no explanation. They consistently denied that S.M. had fallen until after the
jurisdiction hearing, when Father told the social worker—for the first time—that
2 Mother told him that S.M. had fallen out of the parents’ bed about a week before
they took him to the emergency room. The parents’ shifting explanation (or lack
of any explanation) for S.M.’s serious head injury reasonably led the juvenile court
to find that, at a minimum, the parents’ “unreasonable or neglectful acts” caused
the injury. From this, the court could have reasonably concluded that S.M. was at
substantial risk of suffering similar physical harm in the future due to the parents’
failure or inability to adequately supervise or protect him. The juvenile court’s
finding the b-1 allegation true was therefore appropriate. (See In re Rocco M.
(1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 824 [collecting cases upholding jurisdiction that
“involve[d] children of such tender years that the absence of adequate supervision
and care poses an inherent risk to their physical health and safety”].)
On page 12, first full paragraph should read as follows:
The juvenile court’s removal order was proper. S.M. suffered a skull
fracture while in the parents’ care, yet both parents denied S.M. had an accident,
even though they initially had no explanation for his injuries. Mother never gave
an explanation for S.M.’s injury, and Father only offered one after S.M. was
detained. The severity of S.M.’s injury and the parents’ inconsistent statements
about its cause was enough for the juvenile court to find that it was highly
probable that S.M. would remain at a substantial risk of serious harm if he were
not removed from the parents’ care and that there were no reasonable means to
protect him without removal. Coupled with the parents’ later incident of domestic
3 violence, the juvenile court permissibly found that removing S.M. from the
parents’ care was appropriate.
Except for this modification, the opinion remains unchanged. These modifications
do not effect a change in the judgment.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
FIELDS J.
4 Filed 11/7/25 In re S.M. CA4/2 (unmodified opinion) NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E085657
v. OPINION
M.M. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Dorothy McLaughlin,
Judge. Affirmed.
Tracy M. De Soto, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant, Y.R.
Jill Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant, M.M.
1 Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Teresa K.B. Beecham, and Julie Jarvi, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Defendants and appellants, M.M. (Father) and Y.R. (Mother) appeal the juvenile
court’s orders asserting jurisdiction over their minor son, S.M., and removing him from
their care. We affirm.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The parents took S.M. to the emergency room in July 2024, when S.M. was about
eight months old. S.M. had a skull fracture and fractures on both wrists, but the parents
claimed they did not know what happened. Law enforcement and a Riverside County
Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) social worker spoke with the parents at the
hospital, and they maintained that they did not know what caused S.M.’s injuries.
Father and Mother told the social worker what led to bringing S.M. to the
emergency room, and their stories were largely consistent. Father explained that he left
for work before S.M. and Mother woke up. Before leaving, he checked on S.M. in his
crib and he seemed fine. About 10 minutes after he left, however, Mother called him and
told him to come back because she saw a bump on S.M.’s head. When he came back, he
observed a bump on S.M.’s head, so they took S.M. to the hospital. Hospital staff
examined S.M. and he appeared normal, so they sent him home with orders to follow up
2 with his pediatrician. The parents later took S.M. to his pediatrician, who took x-rays.
Later that day, the pediatrician called Father and told him to take S.M. to the emergency
room because the x-rays revealed that he had a skull fracture.
The social worker spoke with two forensic physicians at the hospital, Dr. Siccama
and Dr. Dantuma. Dr. Siccama found S.M.’s injuries to be suspicious for abuse,
particularly because the parents had no explanation for what happened. S.M.’s skull
fracture was consistent with blunt force trauma from a fall or being hit, and his left wrist
injury was likely caused by trauma, but it needed more imaging. Dr. Dantuma explained
that hospital staff had scheduled an MRI for S.M., but the parents did not want to wait for
it and planned to leave, which was against S.M.’s physicians’ advice.
Because of these concerns, the social worker placed S.M. in protective custody
and filed a petition on his behalf under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,
subdivisions (a), (b), and (e). About a week later, the juvenile court found that DPSS
made a prima facie showing that S.M. came within the court’s jurisdiction and detained
S.M., who remained at the hospital.
In the following days, the social worker spoke with Dr. Dantuma again. Dr.
Dantuma explained that MRI results of S.M.’s head and wrists were suspicious for abuse.
In Dr. Dantuma’s opinion, S.M.’s wrist fractures could only have been the result of
shaking or pulling. Thus, in her view, the left wrist fracture was “without a doubt”
caused by intentional force, while the right fracture was “‘very likely’” caused by
intentional force, but further testing was needed. Dr. Dantuma further opined that S.M.’s
3 skull fracture could not have been caused by a fall on a carpeted floor, such as the floor in
the parents’ bedroom. Nor could S.M.’s wrist fractures have been caused by a fall.
At a detention hearing in August 2024, the juvenile court ordered S.M. detained
from Mother, but not Father. The court ordered a safety plan put into place, which
directed the paternal grandmother to be in the home and that S.M. could not be left alone
with Father.
A few weeks later, the social worker interviewed the Father again. For the first
time, Father reported that S.M. fell off the bed about a week before they took him to the
emergency room because of the skull fracture. Father explained that Mother told him that
she woke up in the middle of the night, took S.M. out of the crib and put him in her bed,
fell asleep, and woke up to S.M. crying on the floor next to the bed. She picked him up
and he seemed fine after crying for a short time.
The social worker never had a chance to talk to Mother about this because her
attorney precluded her from talking with the social worker due to a pending criminal
investigation into S.M.’s injuries. Mother thus never explained to DPSS how S.M.’s
injuries could have occurred.
In September 2024, Dr. Dantuma told the social worker that further testing on
S.M.’s right wrist confirmed that the injury could have been caused by shaking, traction,
or twisting of the wrist—in other words, by intentional force. Dr. Dantuma also opined
that the bump on S.M.’s head would not have taken a week to develop, so it was not
plausible that S.M. fell off the bed a week before the parents took him to the emergency
4 room. Dr. Dantuma thus maintained her opinion that S.M.’s injuries were the result of
abuse, not an accident.
At a contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing in December 2024 (which
concluded after another hearing date in January 2025), the social worker testified that the
parents had yet to provide a plausible explanation for S.M.’s injuries. In the social
worker’s view, the parents refused to take any accountability and failed to understand
DPSS’s concerns. Dr. Dantuma also testified at the hearing and explained in detail why
she concluded that S.M.’s wrist injuries were “highly suspicious for abuse” and his skull
fracture was suspicious for abuse because the parents had no explanation other than
Father’s claim that S.M. fell off the bed, which Dr. Dantuma found implausible.
In mid-January 2025, DPSS received a referral concerning the parents and S.M.
As part of the investigation into the referral, the social worker interviewed the paternal
grandmother. She claimed that in late December 2024, Mother “barged into the home”
and began arguing with Father. During that argument, the paternal grandmother saw
Mother slap Father in the face three times. The paternal grandmother called the police
and Mother was arrested. Father confirmed that this happened when the social worker
interviewed him.
In response, DPSS filed an amended petition on S.M.’s behalf. The amended
petition added an allegation concerning this recent domestic violence incident.
After concluding the contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the juvenile court
found true two allegations. As modified, the first (b-1) allegation reads in full: “While in
5 the care and custody of the parents, the child was found to have a fractured skull. A CAN
exam was completed on July 31, 2024, wherein the child’s injuries were found to be
suspicious for abuse. Further, the parents are unable to provide an explanation for the
injuries and the injuries sustained by the child are of a nature as would ordinarily not be
sustained except as a result of the unreasonable or neglectful acts or omissions, of either 1 parent as set forth under Welfare and Institutions Code Section 355.1.” The second (b-2)
allegation reads in full: “The mother neglects the health, safety, and well-being of the
child in that she engages in acts of domestic violence against the father with the most
recent incident occurring on or about January 9, 2025, where the mother slapped the
father in the face multiple times, while the child . . . was present in the home, after the
father had invited her to spend the night at the home. Additionally, the mother was
arrested for charges of Battery on Spouse/Person Whom Defendant is Cohabitating with.”
The juvenile court then ordered S.M. removed from the parents’ care and ordered
reunification services for them. The parents timely appealed.
III.
DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdictional Findings
The parents first contend insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional findings. We disagree.
Welfare and Institutions Code, section 300, subdivision (b) provides that a child is
1 The juvenile court struck language in the allegation about S.M.’s wrist injuries.
6 within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction if the “child has suffered, or there is a substantial
risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . [t]he
failure or inability of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the
child . . . or by the inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the child
due to the parent’s or guardian’s . . . substance abuse.” DPSS had the burden to show the
following three elements by a preponderance of the evidence: “(1) neglectful conduct,
failure, or inability by the parent; (2) causation; and (3) serious physical harm or illness
or a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.” (In re L.W. (2019) 32
Cal.App.5th 840, 848.) “[T]he court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or
injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the child. [Citation.]
The court may consider past events in deciding whether a child presently needs the
court’s protection. [Citation.] A parent’s ‘“[p]ast conduct may be probative of current
conditions” if there is reason to believe that the conduct will continue.’” (In re
Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1216, disapproved on another ground by In
re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 560, fn. 18.)
We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings for substantial evidence. (In
re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633.) If substantial evidence supports them, we must
affirm. (Ibid.) “‘In making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from
the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the
record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of
fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.’” (Ibid.) “To be sufficient to
7 sustain a juvenile dependency petition the evidence must be ‘“reasonable, credible, and of
solid value”’ such that the court reasonably could find the child to be a dependent of the
court . . . . [Citation.]” (In re R.M. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 986, 988.) The parent
challenging the jurisdictional finding bears “the burden of showing there is no evidence
of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the findings or orders.” (In re E.E. (2020)
49 Cal.App.5th 195, 206.)
Substantial evidence supports both allegations the juvenile court found true here.
As to the b-1 allegation, there was sufficient evidence for the juvenile to find that
S.M. suffered a fractured skull as a result of the parents’ negligent or intentional behavior.
To begin with, S.M.’s skull fracture was consistent with blunt force trauma from being
hit. At the same time, S.M. suffered two broken wrists, injuries that Dr. Dantuma
believed could only have been caused by intentional force. The fact that the parents had
no explanation for any of these injuries reasonably led Dr. Dantuma to find that S.M.’s
skull fracture was non-accidental. That, in turn, provided substantial evidence for the
juvenile court to find that the parents’ negligent or intentional behavior caused S.M. to
suffer a skull fracture, which necessarily placed S.M. at substantial risk of serious
physical harm. (See In re Marriage of Fregoso & Hernandez (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 698,
703 [“The testimony of one witness . . . may constitute substantial evidence”]; accord In
re Frederick G. (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 353, 366 [“The testimony of a single witness is
sufficient to uphold a judgment even if it is contradicted by other evidence, inconsistent
8 or false as to other portions.”].) The juvenile court’s finding the b-1 allegation true was
therefore appropriate.
Substantial evidence likewise supports the juvenile court’s finding the b-2
allegation true. Domestic violence is harmful to children and places them at a substantial
risk of serious harm when it occurs in their presence. (See In re Heather A. (1996) 52
Cal.App.4th 183, 194.) Domestic violence between a child’s parents thus may support a
jurisdictional finding “‘if there is evidence that the violence is ongoing or likely to
continue and that it directly harmed the child physically or placed the child at risk of
physical harm.’” (In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227, 239.)
The b-2 allegation here states Mother had engaged in domestic violence in S.M.’s
presence, which led to charges being filed against her in the weeks between the first and
second day of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing. The fact that the domestic violence
occurred during that time suggested that it was “ongoing or likely to continue” when the
juvenile court found the b-2 allegation true.
The juvenile court received evidence about this incident, including a police report
and statements from Father and the paternal grandmother, which revealed that Mother
had slapped Father in the face several times during a heated argument, the paternal
grandmother called the police, and Mother was arrested and charged. This evidence was
sufficient for the juvenile court to find that Mother engaged in domestic violence, which
placed S.M. at a substantial risk of serious physical harm. (See In re T.V. (2013) 217
Cal.App.4th 126, 134; In re Heather A., supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at pp. 193-194, abrogated
9 on another ground in In re R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 628-629.) The juvenile court thus
appropriately found the b-2 allegation true.
B. Removal
The parents next argue that the juvenile court erred by removing S.M. from their
care. We disagree.
To order a child removed from a parent’s physical custody, the juvenile court must
find by clear and convincing evidence that (1) there “would be a substantial danger to the
physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being” of the child in the
parent’s home, and (2) “there are no reasonable means by which the [child’s] physical
health can be protected without” removal. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361, subd. (c)(1);
Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995.) “‘The parent need not be dangerous
and the minor need not have been actually harmed before removal is appropriate. The
focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child.’ [Citation.] The court may consider
a parent’s past conduct as well as present circumstances. [Citation.]” (In re N.M. (2011)
197 Cal.App.4th 159, 169-170.)
We review the removal findings for substantial evidence, “taking into account the
level of confidence that the ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard demands.” (In re
Zoe H. (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 58, 71; Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp.
995-996.) In doing so, we “view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing
party below and give appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated
10 the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable
inferences from the evidence.” (Conservatorship of O.B., supra, at pp. 1011-1012.)
The juvenile court’s removal order was proper. S.M. suffered a skull fracture
while in the parents’ care, and there is strong evidence that the injury was non-accidental,
meaning that Mother or Father (or both) caused it by abusing S.M. Yet both parents
denied S.M. had an accident, even though they initially had no explanation for his
injuries. Mother never gave an explanation for S.M.’s injuries, and Father only offered
one after S.M. was detained, which Dr. Dantuma found medically implausible. The
severity of S.M.’s injuries and the parents’ lack of an explanation for them (or an
implausible explanation for them) was enough for the juvenile court to find that it was
highly probable that the physical abuse would continue if S.M. were not removed from
the parents’ care and that there were no reasonable means to protect him without removal.
Coupled with the parents’ later incident of domestic violence, the juvenile court
permissibly found that removing S.M. from the parents’ care was appropriate.
The parents argue that S.M. could have safely stayed in the home in Father’s care
with the paternal grandmother, consistent with the safety plan put in place after S.M.’s
detention. But the paternal grandmother’s visa had expired and, by the time of the
removal order, it was unclear whether her visa would be renewed. It was thus uncertain
whether the paternal grandmother could have cared for S.M. Because the paternal
grandmother would no longer be available to care for S.M.’s safety and ensure that he
11 was not left alone with Father, the juvenile court reasonably found that S.M.’s removal
from the parents’ care was the only available option to ensure his safety.
Father alternatively asserts for the first time on appeal that family friends could
have cared for S.M. Father forfeited the argument by failing to make it at the disposition
hearing. (In re Aaron B. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 843, 846.)
IV.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders are
affirmed.