In re S.L.B.B.

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: June 17, 2014
• Docket: 14-116
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA14-116 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 17 June 2014

IN THE MATTER OF:

S.L.B.B. Catawba County No. 11 JA 177

Appeal by respondent-mother from order entered 6 November

2013 by Judge J. Gary Dellinger in Catawba County District

Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 May 2014.

Staff Attorney Valeree R. Adams, for petitioner-appellee Catawba County Department of Social Services.

Alston & Bird LLP, by Matthew P. McGuire, for guardian ad litem.

Levine & Stewart, by James E. Tanner, III, for respondent- appellant mother.

CALABRIA, Judge.

Respondent-mother (“respondent”) appeals from the trial

court’s order terminating her parental rights to her minor child

“Shaney.”1 We affirm the trial court’s order.

1 A pseudonym is used to protect the identity and privacy of the juvenile. -2- Respondent was fourteen years old when she gave birth to

Shaney in 2009. Respondent was unable to identify Shaney’s

biological father. When Shaney was approximately eight months

old, respondent assaulted her by shaking her excessively.

Respondent was subsequently adjudicated delinquent for the

assault.

On 29 June 2011, the Catawba County Department of Social

Services (“DSS”) filed a juvenile petition alleging Shaney was

abused, neglected, and dependent. On 30 June 2011, the trial

court entered a non-secure custody order placing Shaney in DSS

custody. On 8 November 2011, the trial court adjudicated Shaney

as an abused and neglected juvenile. The court ordered

respondent to enter into and comply with a family services case

plan. The case plan required respondent to obtain a

psychological evaluation and comply with all recommendations;

obtain a parenting assessment and follow the recommendations;

obtain an assessment of her intellectual functioning; comply

with mental health services; demonstrate improved capacity as a

result of participation in services; and attend school daily.

On 4 June 2012, the trial court conducted a permanency

planning hearing. The court found that “[i]t is uncertain

whether the minor child will return to the home of her mother -3- within six months due to the uncertainty regarding

[respondent’s] ability to learn and demonstrate parenting

skills.” The trial court implemented a concurrent permanent

plan of adoption and reunification.

Another permanency planning hearing was conducted on 10

September 2012. Respondent had failed to take her medications

as directed, and the trial court found that “[d]espite the

services offered to her and the various parenting classes in

which she has participated, [respondent] is unable to care for

herself, let alone provide care for her minor child.” The court

changed the permanent plan to adoption.

On 9 November 2012, DSS filed a motion to terminate

respondent’s parental rights on the grounds of neglect,

willfully leaving the minor child in foster care for more than

twelve months without making reasonable progress to correct the

conditions which led to the removal of the child from the home,

and incapability of providing for the proper care and

supervision of the minor child. After a hearing, the trial

court found the existence of all grounds alleged by DSS and

concluded that termination of respondent’s parental rights was

in the best interests of the minor child. On 6 November 2013, -4- the trial court entered its order terminating respondent’s

parental rights. Respondent appeals.

Respondent argues that the trial court erred by finding and

concluding that grounds existed for terminating her parental

rights. We disagree.

“The standard for review in termination of parental rights

cases is whether the findings of fact are supported by clear,

cogent and convincing evidence and whether these findings, in

turn, support the conclusions of law.” In re Clark, 72 N.C.

App. 118, 124, 323 S.E.2d 754, 758 (1984). Unchallenged

findings of fact are deemed supported by competent evidence and

are binding on appeal. Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408

S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991). In the instant case, respondent does

not challenge any of the trial court’s findings. Thus, we must

only determine if these unchallenged findings support the trial

court’s conclusion that grounds existed to terminate

respondent’s parental rights.

A trial court may terminate parental rights based on a

finding that the parent has neglected the juvenile. N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1). A neglected juvenile is defined, in

part, as one who “does not receive proper care, supervision, or

discipline” from a parent or caretaker, or “who lives in an -5- environment injurious to the juvenile’s welfare[.]” N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 7B-101(15) (2013). Generally, “[a] finding of neglect

sufficient to terminate parental rights must be based on

evidence showing neglect at the time of the termination

proceeding.” In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 248, 485 S.E.2d 612,

615 (1997) (citation omitted). However, when

there is no evidence of neglect at the time of the termination proceeding . . . parental rights may nonetheless be terminated if there is a showing of a past adjudication of neglect and the trial court finds by clear and convincing evidence a probability of repetition of neglect if the juvenile were (sic) returned to her parents.

In re Reyes, 136 N.C. App. 812, 815, 526 S.E.2d 499, 501 (2000)

(citation omitted).

Respondent contends the trial court erred in terminating

her parental rights based on neglect because there was no

evidence “that suggested [respondent] posed any threat of anger

or violence toward Shaney at the time of the termination

hearing[,]” nor was there evidence that respondent’s parents’

home “posed the same risk of neglect to a three-year-old Shaney

with an almost 18-year-old [respondent] in it as it did when

Shaney was an infant and [respondent] was a misbehaving and

unruly 14-year-old.” -6- Contrary to respondent’s contentions, the trial court’s

order includes ample findings that would support a conclusion

that she would continue to neglect Shaney if the child was

returned to respondent’s care. The court specifically found

that respondent did not believe she needed to correct her

behavior, that respondent’s intellectual disabilities and

behavioral problems would make it difficult for respondent to

put Shaney’s needs before her own, and that respondent did not

have the financial resources to care for Shaney or herself. The

trial court also found that respondent’s therapist did not

observe any improvement in her behavior following respondent’s

participation in therapy. Finally, the trial court found that

respondent

is not a fit and proper person to have custody of the minor child . . . . She continues, to this date, to engage in the same behaviors which led to the adjudication of neglect. She has not taken seriously the efforts to correct her behaviors and the likelihood of continued neglect is high if the child were to return home.

We conclude that the trial court’s unchallenged findings of fact

support the court’s conclusion that respondent’s neglect of

Shaney would likely be repeated if she was returned to

respondent’s care. Accordingly, respondent’s contention that -7- the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights on the

ground of neglect is overruled.

Since we have determined that termination was proper on the

ground of neglect, it is unnecessary for us to consider the

additional grounds for termination found by the trial court.

See In re Humphrey, 156 N.C. App. 533, 540, 577 S.E.2d 421, 426

(2003) (a finding of one statutory ground is sufficient to

support the termination of parental rights). We affirm the

trial court’s order terminating respondent’s parental rights.

Affirmed.

Judges STROUD and DAVIS concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).