[Cite as In re Skeens, 2011-Ohio-3424.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT HIGHLAND COUNTY
IN THE MATTER OF: : : The change of name of Logan Wade Skeens.1 : : Case No. 11CA2 : : DECISION AND : JUDGMENT ENTRY : : File stamped date: 7-05-11 ________________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
John W. Judkins, Greenfield, Ohio, for Appellant.
Michael T. Campbell, ROSE & DOBYNS Co., L.P.A., Wilmington, Ohio, for Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Kline, J.:
{¶1} Isaiah Skeens (hereinafter “Father”) appeals the decision of the Highland
County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, which denied his application to
change the surname of his son, Logan Wade Rolfe, from Rolfe to Skeens. On appeal,
Father contends that the trial court abused its discretion. Because Father failed to meet
his burden of demonstrating that a name change was in Logan’s best interest, we
disagree. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I.
{¶2} Logan is the child of Rachael Rolfe (hereinafter “Mother”) and Father. When
Logan was born, in July 2010, Mother and Father were married but separated. They
1 For consistency and clarity, we use the case caption used by the trial court. We note, however, that Isaiah Skeens applied to change his minor child’s name from Logan Wade Rolfe to Logan Wade Skeens. Because the trial court denied the name-change application, and because we affirm the decision of the trial court, the minor child’s name remains Logan Wade Rolfe. Highland App. No. 11CA2 2
divorced shortly after Logan’s birth. Mother gave Logan her maiden name as his
surname because, at the time of Logan’s birth, Mother had planned on divorcing Father.
{¶3} On October 26, 2010, Father filed an application to have Logan’s surname
changed from Rolfe to Skeens. In the application, Father noted that he and Mother
were married when Logan was born and that Mother does not deny that he is Logan’s
father. And Father also stated that “Logan should carry the fathers [sic] last name as
that is the tradition.”
{¶4} The trial court held a hearing on December 15, 2010. At the hearing, Father
testified that his problem in the marriage was with Mother, not Logan. Father also
testified that he believed that Mother chose to give Logan her maiden name as his
surname “out of spite.” Tr. at 8. Father contended that Mother asked him not to be
present at Logan’s birth and that Mother refused to allow Father to see Logan for the
first six months following the birth. Father also testified that he now has parenting time
rights every other weekend and that he pays child support. Finally, Father
acknowledged that Mother is Logan’s residential parent.
{¶5} In its December 16, 2010 judgment entry, the trial court denied Father’s
application to change Logan’s name. The trial court noted that Father had failed to
satisfy his burden of demonstrating that a name change was in Logan’s best interest.
{¶6} Father appeals and assigns the following assignment of error: I. “The trial
court erred in failing to consider the effect that the minor child’s name change would
have on fostering a relationship with his father and identifying the child as part of a
family unit.”
II. Highland App. No. 11CA2 3
{¶7} Father contends that the trial court erred in denying his application to change
Logan’s surname from Rolfe to Skeens.
{¶8} We use an abuse-of-discretion standard to review a trial court’s name-change
decision. Jones v. Smith, Lawrence App. No. 10CA4, 2010-Ohio-4461, at ¶5. We will
not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, and we will reverse only if the trial
court abused its discretion. Id. “An abuse of discretion is more than an error of
judgment; it is an attitude on the part of the court that is unreasonable, unconscionable,
or arbitrary.” Id.; In re Change of Name of Simers, Washington App. No. 06CA30,
2007-Ohio-3232, at ¶8.
{¶9} Father filed his application to change Logan’s last name under R.C. 2717.01.
“An application for change of name may be made on behalf of a minor by either of the
minor’s parents[.]” R.C. 2717.01(B). And the court may order the change of name upon
a showing of “reasonable and proper cause.” R.C. 2717.01(A). “When deciding
whether to permit a name change for a minor child * * *, the trial court must consider the
best interest of the child in determining whether reasonable and proper cause has been
established.” In re Willhite, 85 Ohio St.3d 28, 1999-Ohio-201, at paragraph one of the
syllabus. “Father, who was the party moving for the name change of the minor, bore
the burden of showing the name change would be in the child’s best interest.” In re
A.B., Cuyahoga App. No. 93693, 2010-Ohio-2227, at ¶11 (citations omitted).
{¶10} As stated, a request to change a child’s name “should be granted only upon
finding that it is ‘in the best interest of the child.’” Bobo v. Jewell (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d
330, 334 (citations omitted). When determining the best interests of the child in a
name-change case, “the trial court should consider the following factors: the effect of Highland App. No. 11CA2 4
the change on the preservation and development of the child’s relationship with each
parent; the identification of the child as part of a family unit; the length of time that the
child has used a surname; the preference of the child if the child is of sufficient maturity
to express a meaningful preference; whether the child’s surname is different from the
surname of the child’s residential parent; the embarrassment, discomfort, or
inconvenience that may result when a child bears a surname different from the
residential parent’s; parental failure to maintain contact with and support of the child;
and any other factor relevant to the child’s best interest.” Willhite at paragraph two of
the syllabus.
{¶11} Additionally, in Bobo, the Court warned against favoring the father’s interests
when applying the best-interest-of-the-child test. Specifically, the Court stated, “[w]e
caution the courts * * * to refrain from defining the best-interest-of-the-child test as
purporting to give primary or greater weight to the father’s interest in having the child
bear the paternal surname.” Bobo at 334. The Court noted that arguing that a child
“should bear the paternal surname based on custom is another way of arguing that it is
permissible to discriminate because the discrimination has endured for many years.” Id.
In Bobo, however, the parents of the child had never been married. Even though the
parents in this case were married at the time of Logan’s birth, the reasoning of Bobo
applies. See Willhite at 31-32.
{¶12} Father argues that the trial court had evidence before it that a name change
was in Logan’s best interest. Father states that Mother chose Logan’s surname and
that there was evidence that Mother had obstructed Father’s relationship with Logan. Highland App. No. 11CA2 5
On appeal, Father contends changing Logan’s name would help Logan and Father
develop a deeper bond.
{¶13} We note that little, if any, evidence presented at trial supports the argument
that a name change is in Logan’s best interest. At the hearing, Father, acting pro se,
explained to the trial court that he wanted Logan’s last name changed because he had
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[Cite as In re Skeens, 2011-Ohio-3424.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT HIGHLAND COUNTY
IN THE MATTER OF: : : The change of name of Logan Wade Skeens.1 : : Case No. 11CA2 : : DECISION AND : JUDGMENT ENTRY : : File stamped date: 7-05-11 ________________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
John W. Judkins, Greenfield, Ohio, for Appellant.
Michael T. Campbell, ROSE & DOBYNS Co., L.P.A., Wilmington, Ohio, for Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Kline, J.:
{¶1} Isaiah Skeens (hereinafter “Father”) appeals the decision of the Highland
County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, which denied his application to
change the surname of his son, Logan Wade Rolfe, from Rolfe to Skeens. On appeal,
Father contends that the trial court abused its discretion. Because Father failed to meet
his burden of demonstrating that a name change was in Logan’s best interest, we
disagree. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I.
{¶2} Logan is the child of Rachael Rolfe (hereinafter “Mother”) and Father. When
Logan was born, in July 2010, Mother and Father were married but separated. They
1 For consistency and clarity, we use the case caption used by the trial court. We note, however, that Isaiah Skeens applied to change his minor child’s name from Logan Wade Rolfe to Logan Wade Skeens. Because the trial court denied the name-change application, and because we affirm the decision of the trial court, the minor child’s name remains Logan Wade Rolfe. Highland App. No. 11CA2 2
divorced shortly after Logan’s birth. Mother gave Logan her maiden name as his
surname because, at the time of Logan’s birth, Mother had planned on divorcing Father.
{¶3} On October 26, 2010, Father filed an application to have Logan’s surname
changed from Rolfe to Skeens. In the application, Father noted that he and Mother
were married when Logan was born and that Mother does not deny that he is Logan’s
father. And Father also stated that “Logan should carry the fathers [sic] last name as
that is the tradition.”
{¶4} The trial court held a hearing on December 15, 2010. At the hearing, Father
testified that his problem in the marriage was with Mother, not Logan. Father also
testified that he believed that Mother chose to give Logan her maiden name as his
surname “out of spite.” Tr. at 8. Father contended that Mother asked him not to be
present at Logan’s birth and that Mother refused to allow Father to see Logan for the
first six months following the birth. Father also testified that he now has parenting time
rights every other weekend and that he pays child support. Finally, Father
acknowledged that Mother is Logan’s residential parent.
{¶5} In its December 16, 2010 judgment entry, the trial court denied Father’s
application to change Logan’s name. The trial court noted that Father had failed to
satisfy his burden of demonstrating that a name change was in Logan’s best interest.
{¶6} Father appeals and assigns the following assignment of error: I. “The trial
court erred in failing to consider the effect that the minor child’s name change would
have on fostering a relationship with his father and identifying the child as part of a
family unit.”
II. Highland App. No. 11CA2 3
{¶7} Father contends that the trial court erred in denying his application to change
Logan’s surname from Rolfe to Skeens.
{¶8} We use an abuse-of-discretion standard to review a trial court’s name-change
decision. Jones v. Smith, Lawrence App. No. 10CA4, 2010-Ohio-4461, at ¶5. We will
not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, and we will reverse only if the trial
court abused its discretion. Id. “An abuse of discretion is more than an error of
judgment; it is an attitude on the part of the court that is unreasonable, unconscionable,
or arbitrary.” Id.; In re Change of Name of Simers, Washington App. No. 06CA30,
2007-Ohio-3232, at ¶8.
{¶9} Father filed his application to change Logan’s last name under R.C. 2717.01.
“An application for change of name may be made on behalf of a minor by either of the
minor’s parents[.]” R.C. 2717.01(B). And the court may order the change of name upon
a showing of “reasonable and proper cause.” R.C. 2717.01(A). “When deciding
whether to permit a name change for a minor child * * *, the trial court must consider the
best interest of the child in determining whether reasonable and proper cause has been
established.” In re Willhite, 85 Ohio St.3d 28, 1999-Ohio-201, at paragraph one of the
syllabus. “Father, who was the party moving for the name change of the minor, bore
the burden of showing the name change would be in the child’s best interest.” In re
A.B., Cuyahoga App. No. 93693, 2010-Ohio-2227, at ¶11 (citations omitted).
{¶10} As stated, a request to change a child’s name “should be granted only upon
finding that it is ‘in the best interest of the child.’” Bobo v. Jewell (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d
330, 334 (citations omitted). When determining the best interests of the child in a
name-change case, “the trial court should consider the following factors: the effect of Highland App. No. 11CA2 4
the change on the preservation and development of the child’s relationship with each
parent; the identification of the child as part of a family unit; the length of time that the
child has used a surname; the preference of the child if the child is of sufficient maturity
to express a meaningful preference; whether the child’s surname is different from the
surname of the child’s residential parent; the embarrassment, discomfort, or
inconvenience that may result when a child bears a surname different from the
residential parent’s; parental failure to maintain contact with and support of the child;
and any other factor relevant to the child’s best interest.” Willhite at paragraph two of
the syllabus.
{¶11} Additionally, in Bobo, the Court warned against favoring the father’s interests
when applying the best-interest-of-the-child test. Specifically, the Court stated, “[w]e
caution the courts * * * to refrain from defining the best-interest-of-the-child test as
purporting to give primary or greater weight to the father’s interest in having the child
bear the paternal surname.” Bobo at 334. The Court noted that arguing that a child
“should bear the paternal surname based on custom is another way of arguing that it is
permissible to discriminate because the discrimination has endured for many years.” Id.
In Bobo, however, the parents of the child had never been married. Even though the
parents in this case were married at the time of Logan’s birth, the reasoning of Bobo
applies. See Willhite at 31-32.
{¶12} Father argues that the trial court had evidence before it that a name change
was in Logan’s best interest. Father states that Mother chose Logan’s surname and
that there was evidence that Mother had obstructed Father’s relationship with Logan. Highland App. No. 11CA2 5
On appeal, Father contends changing Logan’s name would help Logan and Father
develop a deeper bond.
{¶13} We note that little, if any, evidence presented at trial supports the argument
that a name change is in Logan’s best interest. At the hearing, Father, acting pro se,
explained to the trial court that he wanted Logan’s last name changed because he had
not abandoned Logan, and he felt that Mother “did this out of spite.” Tr. at 8. Father
also noted that “I’m in his life as much as I can be.” Id. Father then answered the trial
court’s questions, which established that Father was Logan’s father and that Father
exercised his visitation rights. The trial court then asked Father: “And because you are
and have been found to be Logan’s father, you would like Logan to have your last
name?” Id. 11. Father responded: “Yes.” Id. Next, the court asked: “Basically that’s
your case?” Id. Again, Father responded: “Yes.” Id.
{¶14} After acknowledging, on cross-examination, that Mother was Logan’s
residential parent, the trial court asked Father if there was anything he would like to add
as to why Logan’s surname should be changed. Father stated as follows: “No, I mean I
can’t think of anything else. I’m his father, I’m in his life, I pay child support, I’m doing
as much as I can at this point, I mean * * * there’s absolutely no reason why he should
not have my name.” Tr. at 12.
{¶15} Finally, following Mother’s testimony as to why she felt Logan’s last name
should not be changed, the court offered Father an opportunity to provide a rebuttal
statement. Father’s rebuttal focused on the acrimonious nature of Father’s relationship
with Mother, not whether changing Logan’s last name would be in Logan’s best interest. Highland App. No. 11CA2 6
{¶16} The trial court, in its judgment entry, noted that Father had not carried his
burden to show that a name change was in Logan’s best interest. The judgment entry
states that “[w]hen applying the reasons submitted by [Father] for the proposed change
of surname to the standards outlined in Willhite, the Court cannot find it is in the ‘best
interest’ of Logan to change his surname to Skeens.”
{¶17} We cannot substitute our judgment for that of the court below. “Whether or
not we would have arrived at a different conclusion if we were undertaking a de novo
review is not the issue.” Jones at ¶17. The trial court applied the proper test, and we
find nothing unreasonable, unconscionable, or arbitrary about the trial court’s decision.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Father’s name-
change request, and we overrule Father’s sole assignment of error.
{¶18} Therefore, having overruled Father’s assignment of error, we affirm the
decision of the trial court.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. Highland App. No. 11CA2 7
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED. Appellant shall pay the costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Highland County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions.
Harsha, P.J. and McFarland, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court
BY:_____________________________ Roger L. Kline, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.