In Re Shelor

391 F. Supp. 384, 4 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 311, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12966
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Virginia
DecidedApril 8, 1975
Docket74-412
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 391 F. Supp. 384 (In Re Shelor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Shelor, 391 F. Supp. 384, 4 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 311, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12966 (W.D. Va. 1975).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

TURK, Chief Judge.

This case is before the court pursuant to the appeal of Beneficial Finance Company of Roanoke, Inc. (“Beneficial”) from the opinion and order of the Bankruptcy Court dated November 25, 1974. The Trustee of the bankrupt estate of Roy Shelor, Jr. (“bankrupt”) also initially appealed the decision of the Bankruptcy Court but has now abandoned this appeal.

The pertinent facts have been stipulated by the parties. On November 18, 1973, Beneficial loaned the bankrupt $1,-348.50 and accepted a negotiable note from the bankrupt which was signed by his wife and mother as co-makers. On May 22, 1974, the bankrupt filed a petition in the Bankruptcy Court for relief under Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., *385 (Wage Earners’ Plans). At that time, the note had an unpaid balance of $920.-21 and was secured by the bankrupt’s personal property. The bankrupt’s creditors including Beneficial received notice of the bankruptcy proceeding, and the first meeting of creditors was held on July 16, 1974. Beneficial appeared at this first meeting but did not participate or accept the wage earner’s plan. By order of the Bankruptcy Judge, dated July 16, 1974, the bankrupt’s plan was confirmed and all creditors were prohibited from proceeding against the bankrupt or an endorser or co-maker without first obtaining approval of the Bankruptcy Court.

Thereafter, Beneficial made demand on the bankrupt’s mother for payment of the note. Counsel for the Trustee wrote to the Credit Manager for Beneficial enclosing a copy of the July 16, 1974 Order of the Bankruptcy Court and advising him that this order required approval of the Bankruptcy Court before proceeding against an endorser. No reply to this letter was received, and on September 30, 1974 a civil warrant was issued in the Salem General District Court by Beneficial against the bankrupt’s mother for the unpaid balance on the note.

On October 4, 1974, the Bankruptcy Judge ordered that Beneficial appear before the Bankruptcy Court to show cause why it should not be held in contempt for violating the July 16, 1974 order. Meanwhile, the proceedings in the Salem General District Court were continued. The show cause hearing was held on November 6, 1974 and testimony was received from the bankrupt, his mother and the Credit Manager from Beneficial. The evidence revealed that at the time the action was commenced in the Salem General District Court against the bankrupt’s mother by Beneficial’s Credit Manager, he had received the July 16, 1974 Order of the Bankruptcy Court and the letter from counsel for the Trustee. In proceeding as he did, the Credit Manager relied upon a company manual which advised that bankruptcy proceedings did not bar actions against endorsers or co-makers of notes who were not parties to the bankruptcy proceedings. He did not rely on advice from counsel or his superiors.

In his opinion and order, the Bankruptcy Judge concluded that the explanation offered by the Credit Manager was sufficient to purge Beneficial of contempt but ordered that Beneficial bear the costs of the witness fees to be paid to the bankrupt and his mother for their attendance at the hearing. The Bankruptcy Judge further held that the bankrupt’s mother was a bona fide co-maker of the note; that Beneficial was permitted to effect recovery from her on the note; that Beneficial was prohibited from participating in or receiving payments through the bankruptcy proceeding because of its election to proceed against the bankrupt’s mother; and that the bankrupt’s mother would be subrogated to the rights of Beneficial in the bankruptcy proceeding. Although as of the date of the opinion and order of the Bankruptcy Judge, the co-maker had not made any payments on the note, the Trustee has informed this court the debt to Beneficial has now been paid in full by the co-maker.

Beneficial here contends that the Bankruptcy Court was without jurisdiction to prohibit it from proceeding against the co-maker of the note and thus could not enforce its order by contempt proceedings. Beneficial further challenges the authority of the Bankruptcy Judge to assess the witness attendance fees against it and to prohibit it from participating in the bankruptcy because of its election to proceed against the comaker of the note.

In Reed v. General Finance Company of Norfolk, 394 F.2d 509 (4th Cir. 1968) (per curiam) the court affirmed the denial of a restraining order which would have prevented garnishment proceedings against the wife of a Chapter XIII wage earner on account of the joint debt of the wage earner and his wife. The court noted that the garnishment would “seriously affect the operation of the debtor’s *386 extension plan” but agreed that the creditor’s action against her could not be restrained because she had not filed a petition under Chapter XIII and was thus not a party to the proceedings. The decision in Reed is dispositive of the present case so far as limiting the authority of the Bankruptcy Court in enjoining Beneficial from prosecuting an action against the co-maker of the note. The suit against the bankrupt’s mother did not directly involve the bankrupt, his property or his wages and earnings and was thus not subject to restraint by the Bankruptcy Court. 1 Accord, In Re Magnus Harmonica Corp., 237 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1956). See also Hallenbeck v. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co., 323 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963).

However, in concluding that Beneficial could not be enjoined from proceeding against a co-maker, this court does not condone the action of its Credit Manager in ignoring the order of the Bankruptcy Court. Section 657 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1057 provides :

“Upon confirmation of a plan, the plan and its provisions shall be binding on the debtor and upon all creditors of the debtor, whether or not they are affected by the plan or have accepted it or have filed their claims, and whether or not their claims have been scheduled or allowed or are allowable.”

Thus Beneficial as a creditor of the bankrupt was bound by the plan including the disputed portion requiring approval of the Bankruptcy Court before proceeding against a eo-maker of a note. The appropriate means for challenging this provision was by timely objection to the Bankruptcy Judge or this court. CF. In Re Hawks, 471 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1973).

Since the Bankruptcy Judge purged Beneficial of contempt and the Trustee has abandoned his appeal from this portion of the order, the court need not decide whether contempt would have been appropriate in the circumstances of this case.

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Bluebook (online)
391 F. Supp. 384, 4 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 311, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12966, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-shelor-vawd-1975.