In re Sheldon
This text of 196 B.R. 551 (In re Sheldon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
BancBoston Mortgage Corporation objects to confirmation2 on the ground that the Debtors’ plan does not include “anti-Peters ” language. The reference is to In re Peters, 184 B.R. 799 (9th Cir. BAP 1995), a Chapter 13 (of the Bankruptcy Code: 11 U.S.C.3) ease in which the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held a lender’s postconfirmation continuances of its nonjudicial foreclosure sale violated the automatic stay, and stated that the prepetition defaults were cured on the confirmation of the debtors’ plan.
While the BAP’s effect of confirmation analysis may well be dicta, as the opinion seems to indicate the prepetition delinquencies had been paid, its conclusion has provoked numerous objections to confirmation such as this one. Additionally, Peters is on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
I am aware of Judge Glover’s conclusion that Peters is wrongly decided, and that anti-Peters language is unnecessary, but have not seen a transcript of his oral ruling in In re Brooks, No. 95-08776.4 A written decision is, I understand, forthcoming.
Debtors’ contention that the objection is moot is not well taken: although no foreclosure was pending at the time of their petition, they were delinquent on their obligation to BancBoston. If Sheldons default postconfirmation and relief from stay (rather than dismissal) is granted, the Peters effect of foreclosure analysis would limit the default which BancBoston could notice under RCW 61.24.030(6)5 to the postconfirmation delinquency. That amount (plus accruing payments and costs) would be necessary to cure the default and stop the sale under state law. If Peters does not apply, BancBoston could notice the whole delinquency, increasing the probability that the foreclosure will be completed, and increasing Debtors’ incentives to avoid postconfirmation default. Of course, [553]*553BancBoston could foreclose judicially6 to preclude cure and reinstatement, but that process is significantly more expensive and, taking into account the redemption period, slower.
The question here presented differs from those before the BAP in Peters: there it was the effect of confirmation and of the stay; here, it is what the plan (or confirmation order) should say.
Under §§ 1321 and 1323 of the Code, only the debtors may file or propose modifications to a Chapter 13 plan preconfirmation. Thus, BancBoston cannot succeed on its objection to the plan’s text, but it can object to confirmation, and thus the substance of its position is properly before the court. The fundamental question for resolution is: what effect should confirmation have on the lender’s state law foreclosure rights? As the BAP noted in Peters, 184 B.R. at 802, § 1327 provides that the confirmation order may affect the answer.
Neither party points to any basis in the Code for inclusion or exclusion of the language requested by BancBoston in the plan, and neither directly addresses the confirmation order. I know of no reason why the text of the confirmation order is not within the discretion of the court, so long as it does not conflict with the Code, the rules, or controlling authority.
In exercising that discretion, I can properly consider the impact of various alternatives on judicial economy and the public, including other borrowers and lenders. A mechanical application of Peters would increase a lender’s time to realization after a postconfirmation default when a nonjudicial foreclosure sale had been noticed prepetition, because of the unavailability of a continued or short-notice nonjudicial foreclosure sale under RCW 61.24.040(6)7 or .130(4)8. Further, as noted above, the Peters analysis would reduce the state law cure amount. Taken together, these. effects will tend to reduce and delay lenders’ recoveries, effectively increasing their costs, and pushing them to scrutinize Chapter 13 plans more rigorously, which will also increase their costs. Lenders will compensate by marginally increasing interest rates and other charges (or denying credit) to borrowers such as the Sheldons, and by objecting on good faith and feasibility grounds more frequently in Chapter 13 eases.
To avoid these adverse impacts on borrowers, lenders, and judicial economy, and because the plan does not explicitly provide for BancBoston to retain its lien, which it must to comply with § 1325(a)(5)(B), BancBoston’s objection is SUSTAINED. Its counsel shall propose language for the confirmation order.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
196 B.R. 551, 1996 WL 316762, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-sheldon-wawb-1996.