IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA 25-343
Filed 18 March 2026
Vance County, Nos. 21JA000004-900, 21JA000005-900, 21JA000006-900, 24CV003244-900
IN THE MATTER OF:
S.H., S.H., T.H.
Appeal by Respondent-Mother from orders entered 19 December 2024 by
Judge Adam S. Keith in Vance County District Court.1 Heard in the Court of Appeals
29 January 2026.
Tiffanie C. Meyers, for petitioner-appellee Vance County Department of Social Services.
Rebekah W. Davis, for respondent-appellant mother.
Q Byrd Law, by Quintin D. Byrd, for appellee guardian ad litem.
No brief filed for respondent-appellee father.
FLOOD, Judge.
Respondent-Mother appeals from the trial court’s permanency planning order
and permanent custody order awarding sole legal and primary physical custody of
three of her minor children, Steve, Sam, and Theo,2 to Respondent-Father. Mother
1 The case caption for the order in the civil case reflects the parties as follows: Jamon Hargrove, Sr.,
Plaintiff, v. Shannon Hargrove, Defendant. 2 We use pseudonyms to protect the identity of the minor children. See N.C. R. App. P. 42.
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Opinion of the Court
argues that the trial court’s custody and visitation determinations are unsupported
by the findings and evidence and contrary to the children’s best interest. For the
following reasons, we affirm both orders in full.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Mother and Father are the biological parents of Steve, Sam, and Theo, who are
the subjects of this appeal. Mother and Father are also the biological parents of John,
who is in foster care. Mother has two other children in foster care, Zack and Sean, by
different fathers. Mother and Father separated and live in different residences.
In May 2020, the Vance County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) received
a neglect report alleging Theo was improperly supervised and lived in an injurious
environment. The report specifically alleged that Theo was hospitalized after being
hit by a car “while wandering the streets[,]” and that both Mother and Father were
intoxicated when Theo was hit. At the time, Steve, Sam, and Theo were living with
Mother and her three other children. Mother entered into a family services agreement
with DSS in July 2020, and Father entered into a services agreement with DSS in
September 2020. After October 2020, neither Mother nor Father were in compliance
with their services agreements.
DSS received a second neglect report in October 2020 alleging that Mother and
Father failed to manage the children’s medication. While investigating the second
report, DSS discovered that the children had excessive absences from school, Zack
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and Sean were not being treated for their mental illnesses,3 referrals for Theo to be
evaluated for cardiac disease had gone ignored, and a referral for Sam to be evaluated
for hearing loss had likewise gone ignored. During a home visit in December 2020, a
DSS social worker discovered that Mother had been evicted from her residence, and
that Steve, Sam, Theo, and John had gone to live with Father. Mother, Zack, and
Sean were living in and out of hotels and with relatives.
Because neither parent had made sufficient progress on their case plan, DSS
filed juvenile petitions on 9 February 2021 alleging Steve, Sam, and Theo were
neglected juveniles. On 7 July 2022, the trial court adjudicated all three children
neglected, and they were placed in foster care. In February 2023, the trial court
entered disposition orders; it adopted a primary plan of reunification for all three
children and ordered Mother and Father to comply with their case plans. The trial
court granted Mother unsupervised visits and Father supervised visits.
In May 2023, the subject children began a trial home placement with Mother.
Father was granted alternating weekend visits. Both Mother and Father were
making progress on their case plans. During the trial home placement, Mother
engaged DSS in identifying potential summer programs and schools for the children
and ensured that the children attended school and were clothed and fed. Mother lost
her housing in July 2023, however, and the children returned to foster care.
3 Zack and Sean suffer from mental illnesses that have resulted in their involuntary commitment on
several occasions and requires treatment and medication management.
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In November 2023, the children began a trial home placement with Father.
Father has been diagnosed with multiple sclerosis and resides with his grandmother,
who helps care for the children. DSS initially expressed concerns about Father’s
resistance to therapy for the children and himself, the children’s uncle physically
disciplining the children, and Father’s drug use. After monitoring the situation, DSS
deemed the placement appropriate.
In March 2024, Mother obtained stable housing. John and Zack began a trial
home placement with her in June 2024. Mother was subsequently granted weekend
overnight visits with Steve, Sam, and Theo. Both John and Zack have behavioral
issues and had expressed feelings of being unwanted and left out of their parents’
lives. DSS was concerned that adding Steve, Sam, and Theo to Mother’s household
permanently would disrupt the dynamic as the other children adjusted. Steve, Sam,
and Theo have expressed that they do love Father but would prefer to live with
Mother or return to their previous foster home until they can live with Mother.
In July 2024, after Steve, Sam, and Theo had been in Father’s home for
approximately eight months, the trial court held a permanency planning hearing for
Steve, Sam, and Theo as well as John and Zack. At the hearing, DSS did not make a
recommendation as to whether the permanent plan for Steve, Sam, and Theo should
remain with Father or be placed with Mother. Instead, DSS asked the trial court to
determine what would be in the best interest of each child. The trial court entered a
permanency planning order on 19 December 2024, giving Father custody of the three
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children and Mother visitation every other weekend from Friday at six p.m. to
Sunday at six p.m. The trial court terminated its juvenile jurisdiction, ordered the
matter closed with no future hearings scheduled, and ordered a Chapter 50 custody
order to be entered.
Also on that date, the trial court entered a Chapter 50 custody order. The facts
supporting the custody order were incorporated from the permanency planning order,
and the custody order awarded sole legal custody and primary physical custody of the
children to Father. The trial court awarded Mother secondary physical custody with
visitation every other weekend from Friday at six p.m. to Sunday at six p.m. and
“additional custodial periods” from “time to time” that the parties mutually agreed
upon.
Mother timely appealed.
II. Analysis
On appeal, Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion with respect
to (A) the custody order and (B) the visitation order. For the reasons elaborated upon
below, Mother has failed to show an abuse of discretion in either order.
A. Legal and Physical Custody
Mother first argues that the trial court’s custody determination4 is not
4 Although Mother challenges the trial court’s custody determination in both the permanency planning
order and the permanent custody order, she does not challenge the trial court’s decision to terminate the juvenile proceedings and initiate a civil custody action. Accordingly, the operative order on appeal is the permanent custody order.
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supported by its findings of fact and is contrary to the children’s best interest.
An appellate court reviews a civil custody order to determine “whether there
was competent evidence to support the trial court’s findings of fact and whether its
conclusions of law were proper in light of such facts.” Burger v. Smith, 243 N.C. App.
233, 236 (2015) (citation omitted). “[T]he trial court’s findings of fact are conclusive
on appeal if supported by substantial evidence, even if there is sufficient evidence to
support contrary findings.” Id. (citation omitted). “Unchallenged findings of fact are
binding on appeal.” Id. (citation omitted).
“N.C.[G.S.] § 7B-911 specifically provides the procedure for transferring a
Chapter 7B juvenile proceeding to a Chapter 50 civil action.” McMillan v. McMillan,
267 N.C. App. 537, 543 (2019) (citation omitted). When entering a civil custody order
under section 7B-911, the trial court must “[m]ake findings and conclusions that
support the entry of a custody order in an action under Chapter 50 of the General
Statutes[.]” N.C.G.S. § 7B-911(c)(1) (2023).
Relevant here, N.C.G.S. § 50-13.2(a) states that a trial court “shall award
[custody] to such person, agency, organization or institution as will best promote the
interest and welfare of the child.” N.C.G.S. § 50-13.2(a) (2023). “In making the [best
interest] determination, the court shall consider all relevant factors including acts of
domestic violence between the parties, the safety of the child, and the safety of either
party from domestic violence by the other party.” Id.
The trial court explicitly incorporated the findings of fact from the December
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2024 permanency planning order and specifically found that Father “is a fit and
proper person to have custody of the minor children” and that “[i]t is in the best
interest of the minor children” that Father have custody.
Mother argues that the trial court’s custody determination is not supported by
competent evidence due to inaccuracies in the following four findings of fact:
9. The schools report that each of the juveniles [is] doing well in school.
10. There have been recent issues with [Theo] at school. [] Father called [] Mother to seek her assistance by requesting that she sit in the classroom to determine what was going on with the juvenile. [] Mother advised him that she would not sit in the classroom as it was his responsibility since the juveniles were placed in his home.
....
13. [Mother] has a three (3) bedroom home that she shares with her older daughter and grandson, two older sons, and her three-year-old son.
30. [Steve] also had an issue with his finger. [] [M]other took him [to] the ER[,] where he received antibiotics. [] [M]other did not advise [F]ather of the ER visit.
The trial court’s unchallenged findings of fact, however, include the following:
16. [] Father has been in a trial home placement with each of the juveniles since November 13, 2023 and is supported by his grandmother . . . and other family members.
23. [Father’s grandmother] is able and willing to continue to support [Father] in caring for the children.
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24. The department also has concerns with [Mother].
25. The older two children, [Zack and John,] had expressed that they felt left out of this process because they had not had the opportunity to return home. The department wanted to allow [Mother] to focus on them.
26. The department continues to have concerns about [Mother’s] ability to manage her children’s behaviors if they were to become extreme and her unstable employment history.
31. Conversations with each child indicate[] that they do love their father but would prefer to live with their mother or return to their previous foster home until they can live with their mother.
35. The juvenile[s] ha[ve] been in a trial home placement [with Father] for thirteen (13) months. The trial home placement is meeting the needs of each of the juveniles.
38. There is not a need for continued State intervention on behalf of each of the juveniles through [] juvenile court proceeding[s].
39. . . . . The placement is stable, and continuation of the placement is in each of the juvenile[s’] best interest.
The trial court’s unchallenged findings of fact are deemed supported by
competent evidence, see Burger, 243 N.C. App. at 236, and consider the relevant
factors in making a best interest determination under N.C.G.S. § 50-13.2(a).
Disregarding the challenged findings of fact, the trial court’s remaining findings
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demonstrate its consideration of all relevant factors and provide sufficient support
for its custody determination.
B. Visitation
Mother next argues that the custody order’s visitation schedule is not
supported by the findings or evidence and is contrary to the children’s best interest.
Specifically, Mother argues the trial court’s factfinding was internally conflicting
because it found Mother was a fit and proper parent with mutual love for the children,
yet it only allowed Mother weekend visitation without the guarantee of holiday
visitation. She also argues the household decision-making power of Father’s
grandmother rendered the visitation scheme outside of the children’s best interest;
argues the children had a good relationship with her and her family; and emphasizes
DSS’s reservations regarding placing the children with Father. In essence, Mother
challenges the order on the basis that the trial court improperly weighed the interests
at play in its ultimate determination.
“Any order for custody shall include such terms, including visitation, as will
best promote the interest and welfare of the child.” N.C.G.S. § 50-13.2(b) (2023).
“Although the trial judge is not required to find all the facts shown by the evidence,
the judge must find at least enough material facts to support the judgment.” Lamond
v. Mahoney, 159 N.C. App. 400, 407 (2003) (citation modified). “A trial court’s order
regarding visitation rights is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” In re R.J.P., 284
N.C. App. 53, 60 (2022) (citations omitted). Although the court has broad discretion
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in selecting an appropriate visitation arrangement, the exercise of the discretion
must be supported by findings of fact and evidence along with conclusions of law.
Lamond, 159 N.C. App. at 407–08.
Here, in arguing the visitation order reflected an abuse of discretion, Mother
points us to In re Custody of Stancil, a case in which we held that the total delegation
of visitation by a parent to the whims of the child’s primary custodian is
impermissible, constituting a per se abuse of discretion. 10 N.C. App. 545, 551–52
(1971). In Stancil, we partially vacated the trial court’s order and remanded with
directions for a clearer visitation schedule where the order delegated visitation with
the child’s mother entirely to the discretion of the child’s primary custodian, the
child’s grandmother. Id. at 553. We did so on the basis that the visitation of a child
by a parent is a natural right that must be safeguarded by judicial oversight:
[A] parent’s right of visitation with his or her child is a natural and legal right and that when awarding custody of a child to another, the court should not deny a parent’s right of visitation at appropriate times unless the parent has by conduct forfeited the right or unless the exercise of the right would be detrimental to the best interest and welfare of the child. The court should not assign the granting of this privilege of visitation to the discretion of the party awarded custody of the child.
When the custody of a child is awarded by the court, it is the exercise of a judicial function. In like manner, when visitation rights are awarded, it is the exercise of a judicial function. We do not think that the exercise of this judicial function may be properly delegated by the court to the custodian of the child. Usually those who are involved in a controversy over the custody of a child have been unable to
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come to a satisfactory mutual agreement concerning custody and visitation rights. To give the custodian of the child authority to decide when, where and under what circumstances a parent may visit his or her child could result in a complete denial of the right and in any event would be delegating a judicial function to the custodian.
Id. at 551–52 (internal citation omitted).
Stancil is distinguishable from this case, however. The order in this case,
unlike the order in Stancil, did provide for specific, regular visitation periods—
namely, from Fridays at 6:00 p.m. to Sundays at 6:00 p.m. every other weekend—and
did not entirely delegate the function of creating a visitation schedule to the primary
custodian. Thus, while the visitation schedule in this case may have contemplated
some degree of supplemental visitation pursuant to the consent and coordination of
the parties, it did not delegate visitation in the manner we held to constitute per se
abuse of discretion in Stancil—namely, wholly delegating all visitation rights to the
primary custodian. Accordingly, Stancil does not control our holding in this case.
Recognizing Stancil as inapposite, we further hold that the trial court’s
balancing of interests, while perhaps not favorable to Mother, reflected an
appropriate exercise of discretion as contemplated by the trial court’s ordinary role
in our custody and visitation scheme. Without further argumentation from Mother
as to other ways in which the trial court may have abused its discretion, the visitation
order—while perhaps lacking some detail common to other orders of its type—
reflected a reasoned exercise of discretion as to the best interest determination
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naturally predicate to its findings of fact and other conclusions of law. See Peters v.
Pennington, 210 N.C. App. 1, 12 (2011) (“[W]e ascertain (1) whether the challenged
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence; (2) whether the trial court’s
findings of fact support its conclusions of law; and (3) whether the trial court abused
its discretion in fashioning the custody and visitation order.”). Thus, based on the
arguments before us, the trial court also did not abuse its discretion with respect to
the visitation order.
III. Conclusion
As we have no basis to believe the trial court abused its discretion in either the
custody or visitation orders, either on a fact-specific or per se basis, we affirm the trial
court in full.
AFFIRMED.
Judge MURRY concurs.
Judge COLLINS concurs in part and dissents in part in separate opinion.
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COLLINS, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court’s legal and physical
custody determination is supported. But because I believe the custody order’s
visitation schedule is not supported by the findings or evidence and is contrary to the
children’s best interests, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority’s
opinion.
“Any order for custody shall include such terms, including visitation, as will
best promote the interest and welfare of the child.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.2(b)
(2024). “Although the trial judge is not required to find all the facts shown by the
evidence, the judge must find at least enough material facts to support the judgment.”
Lamond v. Mahoney, 159 N.C. App. 400, 407 (2003) (cleaned up).
[A] parent’s right of visitation with his or her child is a natural and legal right and that when awarding custody of a child to another, the court should not deny a parent’s right of visitation at appropriate times unless the parent has by conduct forfeited the right or unless the exercise of the right would be detrimental to the best interest and welfare of the child. The court should not assign the granting of this privilege of visitation to the discretion of the party awarded custody of the child.
In re Custody of Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 551-52 (1971). Although the court has
broad discretion in selecting an appropriate visitation arrangement, the exercise of
the discretion must be supported by findings of fact and evidence along with
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COLLINS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
conclusions of law. Lamond, 159 N.C. App. at 407-08.
The trial court incorporated the findings of fact from the December 2024
permanency planning order into its custody order. It specifically found that Mother
“is a fit and proper person to have [] visitation” of the children, and that visitation as
set forth in the order “is in the best interest of the children.” The trial court awarded
Mother “secondary [physical] custody of the minor children every other weekend from
Friday at 6:00p[.]m[.] until Sunday at 6:00p.m.” and provided that “from time to time”
the parties may “agree to additional custodial periods for [Mother] with the minor
children.” The trial court made no provisions for holidays or vacations.
At the conclusion of the permanency planning hearing, which reviewed the
permanent plan for Steve, Sam, and Theo, as well as for John and Zack, the trial
court announced that Mother should have “reasonable visitation.” After some
discussion with the attorneys about what the current visitation schedule was, and
determining that more structure was needed, the trial court announced “[t]hat the
minor children shall be on an every-other-weekend schedule with []Mother.” The
trial court then noted its concern that Mother did not have a driver’s license and
ordered her to arrange transportation for the children with a licensed driver. The
trial court also ordered that the children not be around individuals using illegal
substances.
Mother’s attorney and the trial court then clarified that this visitation schedule
was only temporary:
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[MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: . . . . Now, is this just -- this is for a permanency planning order. We’re going to have a review date.
Is that my understanding?
THE COURT: Oh, yeah. Absolutely.
[MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: Okay.
THE COURT: Yeah. We will need a review date for this matter. Because it’s permanency planning, though, that can be within a few months. Let’s see. I will be back in February. Let’s set it for the second session of February.
Thereafter, a good deal of confusion ensued about whether there would be a
future hearing as to all five children, or just the two older children; whether the
guardian ad litem could be released from the case as to any or all of the children; and
what the next steps were. The guardian ad litem’s attorney asked, “So -- or is it §
7B-911, or is it just a permanency plan and we’re going that route? Because that
would be a different set of reviews and so forth.”
After more discussion, the guardian ad litem’s attorney asked, “So we are §
7B-911?” The trial court responded, “U[h]-huh. Yes. . . . Chapter 50 as to the younger
three.” More discussion ensued and apologies were made for the confusion. At the
very conclusion of the hearing, Mother’s attorney asked if it could be included in the
order that the parties could agree on extra time. The trial court stated that “there’s
nothing to stop any further consideration for visitation between the parties.”
The trial court’s permanency planning order terminated its juvenile
jurisdiction, ordered the matter closed with no future hearings scheduled, and
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ordered a Chapter 50 custody order to be entered.
It is apparent from the transcript that the trial court announced its visitation
schedule as a permanency planning order to be reviewed “within a few months” under
a best interests of the child standard. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-905.1 (2024). It did
not announce a permanent visitation schedule with no scheduled review date that
could be modified only as a result of a substantial change of circumstances. See N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 50-13.7(a) (2024); Shipman v. Shipman, 357 N.C. 471, 473 (2003).
Furthermore, the trial court’s findings of fact do not support the permanent visitation
schedule that fails to address holidays and vacation.
I would thus vacate the trial court’s permanent custody order as to visitation
and remand the matter to the trial court for a revised visitation schedule or for
further findings of fact that support the schedule imposed.
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