In re S.H.

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: June 26, 2026
• Docket: 4-26-0266
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2026 IL App (4th) 260266-U NOTICE FILED This Order was filed under June 25, 2026 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-26-0266 Carla Bender not precedent except in the 4th District Appellate limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1). OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re S.H., a Minor ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Rock Island County Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 25JA48 v. ) Solomon P., ) Honorable Respondent-Appellant). ) Tionn F. Carter, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Zenoff and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court granted appointed appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

¶2 Respondent, Solomon P., appeals the trial court’s order adjudicating his son, S.H.

(born May 2022), neglected and the court’s dispositional order making S.H. a ward of the court,

finding respondent unable to care for him, and granting custody and guardianship to the Illinois

Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). Appointed appellate counsel has moved to

withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting there is no issue of

arguable merit that may be raised on appeal. We grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw

and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On May 25, 2025, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship concerning S.H. The petition alleged that S.H. was neglected pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the

Juvenile Court Act (Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2024)) in that he was in an environment

injurious to his welfare. Specifically, the petition alleged that in March 2025, DCFS received a

report of a domestic violence incident involving S.H.’s parents that occurred in the presence of

S.H. and his older sister, K.H. (The record indicates that S.H. and K.H. have the same mother,

but K.H. is not respondent’s biological child.) The petition alleged that S.H.’s mother told police

officers that, during the March 2025 incident, respondent yelled at her, shoved her, grabbed her

by the neck, and threw her against a wall in their home. She ran outside, and respondent followed

her and hit her in the face in front of K.H. Respondent left the area with her phone, and she

realized respondent had locked her out of the house while S.H. remained inside. Respondent was

subsequently charged with domestic battery. The petition alleged that the police department had

a history of calls to respondent’s residence related to domestic disputes and respondent had one

prior indicated report of neglect.

¶5 On August 28, 2025, the trial court entered an order awarding temporary custody

of S.H. to DCFS.

¶6 On January 22, 2026, the trial court held an adjudicatory hearing. At the State’s

request, the court admitted into evidence a DCFS report from 2024 showing an indicated finding

of neglect against respondent relating to an incident of domestic violence between respondent

and S.H.’s mother. The report indicated that, during that incident, respondent choked S.H.’s

mother and left the house with her keys and phone. S.H.’s mother followed him outside. She

tried to reenter the home, but the door was locked, with S.H. inside sleeping.

¶7 Rejoice Hernandez, a DCFS investigator, testified that on March 3, 2025, DCFS

received a report of domestic violence concerning respondent and S.H.’s mother, during which

-2- S.H. and K.H. were present. Respondent refused to speak with her concerning the incident, and

S.H.’s mother was not home when Hernandez attempted to interview her. Hernandez spoke to

seven-year-old K.H. at her school. K.H. told Hernandez that respondent and her mother got into

an argument and she saw respondent slap her mother in the face. K.H. and her mother went

outside, and respondent followed them. Respondent then locked the house and went to the store,

while two-year-old S.H. was sleeping in the locked house. K.H. said she had seen respondent hit

her mother on 7 to 10 occasions. After several unsuccessful attempts to contact the children’s

mother, Hernandez indicated the report and recommended that the family receive intact services.

The children’s mother agreed to engage in intact services, but respondent did not, telling

Hernandez not to contact him when she texted him about engaging in services.

¶8 Hernandez testified that in May 2025, DCFS received another report of domestic

violence, which involved respondent choking S.H.’s mother in S.H.’s presence. Hernandez again

attempted to contact respondent and S.H.’s mother by calling them and visiting their home, but

they did not respond. She again interviewed K.H. at school. K.H. told her that she was not at

home during the incident, but her mother had told her that respondent choked her.

¶9 Hernandez stated she eventually interviewed S.H.’s mother in June 2025, after

receiving a third report of domestic violence. S.H.’s mother reported that she had been in an

abusive relationship with respondent “off and on.” She stated that whenever there was an

incident of domestic violence, she would leave with the children. However, she always went

back because she had nowhere else to live. She stated respondent had choked her multiple times.

She stated that, during the June 2025 incident, respondent choked her and she believed she was

going to die because there was no one around to get him off of her. She stated S.H. was standing

nearby crying while respondent was choking her. S.H.’s mother obtained an order of protection

-3- against respondent, and DCFS determined it was safe for the children to remain with their

mother at that time.

¶ 10 Stacy Bogguess testified that she was a caseworker for DCFS. She stated that she

was assigned to S.H.’s case in June 2025. She met with S.H.’s mother, who was living with the

children in a domestic violence shelter, and recommended services. She attempted to meet with

respondent, but he told her not to contact him. The children were taken into protective custody in

August 2025. Bogguess testified that K.H. told her in August 2025 that she and S.H. had been

spending time with respondent. Bogguess indicated that there was still an active order of

protection against respondent at that time.

¶ 11 Marlena Atkinson-Niemeier testified that she was an investigator with DCFS. She

was assigned to S.H.’s case in August 2025. DCFS had received a report of risk of harm due to

the children being present during a domestic violence situation involving their parents. The

report also identified a risk due to the children being around respondent when they were listed as

protected parties in an order of protection. Atkinson-Niemeier attempted to contact the children’s

mother, but she would not answer her phone. Atkinson-Niemeier interviewed K.H. at her school,

and K.H. reported that she, her mother, and S.H. had been living with respondent, and she had

been having contact with him regularly. K.H. also stated she had recently seen respondent punch

her mother in the chest. Atkinson-Niemeier spoke with her supervisor, and they agreed they had

exhausted all avenues to protect the children while keeping them in the home.

Atkinson-Niemeier took protective custody of K.H. at school that day. Respondent and the

children’s mother initially refused to bring S.H. to Atkinson-Niemeier, though respondent

brought him to court the next day.

¶ 12 The trial court took judicial notice of a plenary order of protection (set to expire in

-4- July 2027) that was in place involving the parents and children in the instant case. At

respondent’s counsel’s request, the court also took judicial notice of three domestic violence

cases against respondent that had been dismissed.

¶ 13 After hearing arguments, the trial court found that the State had proven by a

preponderance of the evidence that the minors were neglected in that there was a substantial risk

of physical injury to them based on their environment. The court found that the minors were to

remain placed outside the home because it was contrary to their health, welfare, and safety to

remain in the home. The court entered an adjudicatory order finding that S.H. was neglected.

¶ 14 On February 17, 2026, a dispositional hearing report and integrated assessment

were filed. The dispositional report recommended, inter alia, that S.H. be made a ward of the

court, DCFS be granted custody and guardianship, S.H. remain placed in relative foster care, and

respondent obtain assessments for mental health, domestic violence, and anger management and

follow all treatment recommendations. The dispositional hearing report stated respondent had

admitted that his relationship with S.H.’s mother had “domestic violence concerns.” The report

also stated there were “collateral police reports of physical aggression and temporary orders of

protection.” The integrated assessment stated that, during his interview, respondent refused to

discuss his recent domestic violence charges. In the “prognosis” section, the integrated

assessment stated:

“There have been numerous reports of Domestic Violence between

[respondent and S.H.’s mother], some charges have been dismissed due to [S.H.’s

mother] not following through or being unreachable. At the time of the interview

[respondent] stated he was not supposed to speak with [S.H.’s mother], and did

not share anything else.”

-5- ¶ 15 On February 26, 2026, the trial court held a dispositional hearing. At the State’s

request, the court took judicial notice of the dispositional report, the integrated assessment filed

February 17, 2026, and an updated dispositional report and integrated assessment filed after

S.H.’s mother’s interview. At respondent’s request, the court also took judicial notice of the three

criminal cases against him that had been dismissed. During argument, respondent’s counsel

indicated that respondent disagreed with certain aspects of the dispositional report and integrated

assessment. Counsel noted that the integrated assessment stated that most of respondent’s

criminal charges had been dismissed, but respondent reported they had all been dismissed and

that he had no domestic battery convictions. Counsel also stated the dispositional hearing report

indicated respondent had admitted to having domestic violence issues with S.H.’s mother, but

respondent denied ever saying that.

¶ 16 The trial court entered a dispositional order finding it was in S.H.’s best interest to

be made a ward of the court. The court found respondent was unable, for other than financial

reasons alone, to care for, protect, train, or discipline S.H. in that he needed to engage and make

progress in visits and court-ordered reunification services. The court ordered that guardianship of

S.H. be given to DCFS, with the right to place the minor. The court orally stated that custody

would be granted to DCFS, and it indicated in the written order that custody would be placed

with relative foster care with S.H.’s paternal grandmother. This appeal followed.

¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 18 On appeal, appointed appellate counsel has moved to withdraw pursuant to

Anders, asserting there is no issue of arguable merit that may be raised on appeal. Specifically,

counsel indicates that he considered arguing that the trial court’s adjudication of neglect and

dispositional order were erroneous but determined that both arguments would be frivolous.

-6- Counsel indicates that he informed respondent of his conclusion and mailed him a copy of the

motion to withdraw. Respondent has not filed a response.

¶ 19 “The Act sets forth the procedures the trial court must follow in determining

whether a minor should be removed from his or her parents’ custody and made a ward of the

court.” In re Z.L., 2021 IL 126931, ¶ 58. First, the court holds an adjudicatory hearing on the

petition for adjudication of wardship, where the court considers only the question of whether the

minor is abused, neglected, or dependent. Id. ¶ 59. If the trial court determines the minor is

abused or neglected, the court holds a dispositional hearing to determine whether it is consistent

with the health, safety, and best interests of the minor and the public that the minor be made a

ward of the court. Id. ¶ 60.

¶ 20 The procedure for appellate counsel to withdraw set forth in Anders applies to

proceedings under the Act. See In re J.P., 2016 IL App (1st) 161518, ¶ 8. Under this procedure,

counsel’s request to withdraw must “ ‘be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the

record that might arguably support the appeal.’ ” In re S.M., 314 Ill. App. 3d 682, 685 (2000)

(quoting Anders, 386 U.S. at 744). Counsel must (1) set forth the argument in support of the

issues that he or she could conceivably be raised on appeal, (2) explain why he or she believes

such issues to be frivolous, (3) conclude the case presents no viable grounds for appeal, and

(4) include the transcripts of the relevant hearings. Id.

¶ 21 We first address counsel’s assertion that he considered arguing that the trial

court’s adjudication of neglect was erroneous but determined any such argument would be

frivolous. At the adjudicatory hearing, the State must prove the allegations of abuse or neglect by

a preponderance of the evidence—i.e., that the allegations are more probably true than not. Z.L.,

2021 IL 126931, ¶ 61. “We will not reverse a trial court’s finding of abuse or neglect unless it is

-7- against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Id. “A finding is against the manifest weight of the

evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident.” Id.

¶ 22 In this case, the State alleged that S.H. was neglected in that he was in an

environment injurious to his welfare. See 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2024). “[T]he term

‘injurious environment’ has been recognized by our courts as an amorphous concept that cannot

be defined with particularity.” In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d 441, 463 (2004). However, it “has

been interpreted to include the breach of a parent’s duty to ensure a safe and nurturing shelter for

his or her children.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

¶ 23 We agree with counsel that there is no nonfrivolous argument to be made that the

trial court’s adjudication of neglect was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The

evidence at the adjudicatory hearing showed that S.H. was in an unsafe environment due to

multiple instances of domestic violence between his parents, at least some of which occurred in

his presence. K.H. told a DCFS investigator about an incident in March 2025 during which

respondent slapped S.H.’s mother and locked her and K.H. out of the house while S.H. was still

inside. An indicated DCFS report concerning a similar incident in 2024 was also admitted into

evidence. Hernandez testified that S.H.’s mother told her in June 2025 that respondent had

recently choked her in front of S.H., who was crying during the incident. Both S.H.’s mother and

K.H. reported to DCFS personnel that there had been multiple instances of domestic violence.

The evidence also showed that the children continued to reside with respondent, despite an order

of protection being in place.

¶ 24 While some of the evidence at the adjudicatory hearing consisted of K.H.’s

hearsay statements, these statements were corroborated by S.H.’s mother in her statements to

Hernandez concerning ongoing domestic violence in her relationship with respondent. See 705

-8- ILCS 405/2-18(4)(c) (West 2024) (“Previous statements made by the minor relating to any

allegations of abuse or neglect shall be admissible in evidence. However, no such statement, if

uncorroborated and not subject to cross-examination, shall be sufficient in itself to support a

finding of abuse or neglect.”).

¶ 25 We now turn to counsel’s assertion that any argument that the trial court’s

dispositional order was erroneous would be frivolous.

“At the dispositional hearing, the court shall determine whether it is in the best

interests of the minor and the public that the minor be made a ward of the court,

and, if the minor is to be made a ward of the court, the court shall determine the

proper disposition best serving the health, safety and interests of the minor and the

public.” Id. § 2-22(1).

One of the kinds of dispositional orders the court can make with respect to wards of the court is

granting custody or guardianship to DCFS or a “suitable relative” if the court determines the

parents of the minor are unfit or unable, for some reason other than financial circumstances

alone, to care for, protect, train, or discipline the minor. Id. § 2-23(1), 2-27. “The court’s decision

will be reversed only if the findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence or the

court committed an abuse of discretion by selecting an inappropriate dispositional order.” In re

J.W., 386 Ill. App. 3d 847, 856 (2008).

¶ 26 We agree with counsel that there is no arguably meritorious argument to be made

that the trial court’s factual findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence or that the

court abused its discretion by selecting an inappropriate dispositional order. The dispositional

hearing report and integrated assessment indicated there was a history of domestic violence in

respondent’s relationship with S.H.’s mother and they recommended that he be evaluated for

-9- services (including mental health, domestic violence, and anger management services) to address

this. Accordingly, the court did not err by making S.H. a ward of the court or determining

respondent was unable to care for, protect, train, or discipline S.H. because he needed to engage

in and make progress in services.

¶ 27 While respondent presented evidence that several criminal cases against him

involving allegations of domestic violence had been dismissed, the integrated assessment stated

that some of the cases were dismissed because S.H.’s mother was uncooperative or unreachable.

Also, though respondent’s counsel indicated that respondent denied saying that there were

“domestic violence concerns” in his relationship with S.H.’s mother (as the dispositional hearing

report stated), appellate counsel notes that these assertions were not presented as evidence at the

dispositional hearing. We also note that even if the trial court were to consider trial counsel’s

representations, it was not required to accept them over the contents of the report. See Prairie

Eye Center, Ltd. v. Butler, 329 Ill. App. 3d 293, 298-99 (2002) (“It is the province of the finder

of fact to resolve conflicts in the evidence.”).

¶ 28 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 29 For the reasons stated, we grant appointed appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw

¶ 30 Affirmed.

- 10 -