In re S.G. CA4/2

• Court: California Court of Appeal
• Decided: April 24, 2023
• Docket: E080119
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Filed 4/24/23 In re S.G. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re S.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE, E080119 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. J293980) v. OPINION S.G.,

Minor and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Tony Raphael,

Judge. Affirmed.

Marilee Marshall, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor and

Appellant.

1 Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Melissa A. Mandel

and Joseph C. Anagnos, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Minor and appellant, 15-year-old S.G., was caught in the driver’s seat of a car that

did not belong to him. The San Bernardino County District Attorney filed a juvenile

wardship petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 against S.G., alleging

he received a stolen car. The juvenile court found the allegation true. S.G. argues there

was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s true finding because there was

insufficient evidence the car was stolen. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Janelle A. lives in an apartment complex with her now 15-year-old son B.G. She

did not know S.G. and did not know whether B.G. and S.G. knew each other.

On July 29, 2022, B.G. was not home. At around 9:00 p.m., Janelle A. saw her

car, a Lexus, parked in her spot. When she looked again around 11:00 p.m. the car was

not there. She had two keys for the missing car, both of which were still in the

apartment. She did not give a key to her son, or otherwise allow anyone to take the car.

Police located the car around 6:00 the next morning. The car was parked with

S.G. in the driver’s seat and another minor, V.L., in the passenger’s seat. The arresting

officer approached the car with his gun drawn and ordered S.G. to get out of the car.

S.G. initially stared at the officer rather than immediately complying, but he eventually

exited the car. S.G. had a Lexus key fob in his pocket, but at trial the police did not or

2 could not confirm whether it was the key fob for the car the minors were in. The police

found no physical evidence the car was stolen; there was no shaved key, broken window,

or damage to any ignition port.

At trial, minor V.L. testified that he saw B.G. hand a car key to S.G. on July 28,

the day before Janelle A. reported the car stolen. S.G. testified that B.G. agreed to let

him borrow the car for a night and gave him the car key. He said he took the car July 29

around 10:00 p.m. and called B.G. before he did. He said he intended to return the car.

In August 2022, the San Bernardino County District Attorney filed a juvenile

wardship petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging S.G. received

a stolen motor vehicle in violation of Penal Code section 496d, subdivision (a). After a

bench trial, the court found the allegation true.

ANALYSIS

S.G. argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s

finding that he received a stolen car because there was insufficient evidence the car was

stolen. We affirm.

“[O]n this appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a juvenile

court judgment sustaining the criminal allegations of a petition made under the provisions

of section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, we must apply the same standard of

review applicable to any claim by a criminal defendant challenging the sufficiency of the

evidence to support a judgment of conviction on appeal.” (In re Ryan N. (2001) 92

Cal.App.4th 1359, 1371.) Under this standard of review we “ ‘must review the whole

3 record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses

substantial evidence⸺that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid

value⸺such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.’ ” (Ibid.) “Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it appears

‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the

true finding].’ ” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331, quoting People v. Redmond

(1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755.) “We resolve all evidentiary conflicts . . . ‘in favor of the

verdict, drawing every reasonable inference the [trier of fact] could draw from the

evidence.’ ” (People v. Brady (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1008, 1014, quoting People v.

Cardenas (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 220, 226-227.) “The trial court, not the reviewing

court, ‘is vested with the power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any

conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences . . . .’ ”

(People v. Duncan (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1018, quoting People v. Woods (1999)

21 Cal.4th 668, 673.)

To sustain a conviction for receiving stolen property, the prosecution “must prove

(1) the property was stolen; (2) the defendant knew it was stolen; and (3) the defendant

had possession of it.” (In re Anthony J. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 718, 728.)

S.G. argues there was insufficient evidence of the first element, that the vehicle

was stolen. This is because, “[u]nder California law, theft requires an intent to

permanently deprive another of property.” (People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 52.)

S.G. argues there is no evidence that anyone involved intended to permanently deprive

4 Janelle A. of the car. Indeed, S.G. contends B.G. gave him the key and permission to

take the car, and that both he and B.G. understood he would return the car.

However, the juvenile court made clear that it did not believe S.G.’s version of

events. The only evidence that B.G. gave S.G. the key and permission to take the car

came from S.G. and V.L.’s testimony. In contrast, Janelle A. testified that nobody gave

S.G. permission to take the car and that both keys to the car were in the apartment on

July 29, contradicting the story that B.G. gave S.G. a key the day before. The court made

clear which of these versions of events it believed, stating that “having watched the

testimony of all of the witnesses in this case, their demeanor on the stand, the Court

credits the testimony of Ms. [A.] . . . and just watching the demeanor during the

testimony of [S.G.] and of [V.L.], the Court does not credit their testimony.” By

crediting Janelle A.’s testimony, the court implicitly concluded that B.G. did not give

S.G. a key. We cannot and do not reassess this credibility determination or theory of the

case.

Given this, the court could rightfully conclude the evidence was sufficient to find

all three elements of the crime that S.G. received stolen property. Janelle A. testified that

she did not permit anybody to use her car and that she did not know S.G. The trial court

rejected as not credible S.G.’s explanation for gaining possession of the car, and an

unsatisfactory explanation can be enough to establish that a person knew property was

stolen. (People v. Alvarado (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 1003, 1019-1020 [holding the

knowledge element can be “inferred from the defendant’s failure to explain how he came

5 to possess a stolen item or his offer of an unsatisfactory explanation or from suspicious

circumstances attendant upon his possession of the item”].) Finally, S.G. was in the

driver’s seat when the car was found. These circumstances meet the three elements for

receipt of a stolen vehicle: that the vehicle was stolen, that S.G. knew it was stolen, and

that he possessed it.

S.G. argues People v. MacArthur (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 275 (MacArthur)

compels a different result. In MacArthur the defendant’s girlfriend took her mother’s

jewelry and left it for the defendant, who sold it at a pawn shop. (Id. at p. 277.) He was

convicted of receiving stolen property. (Id. at pp. 278-279.) On appeal, he argued there

was insufficient evidence he knew the property was stolen, because his girlfriend had a

history of pawning her mother’s jewelry only to recover it shortly afterward. (Id. at

pp. 277-279, 280.)

The court “saw a more basic concern,” in that the trial court “failed to provide any

guidance to the jury for determining whether property had, in fact, been stolen.”

(MacArthur, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 279.) The court concluded that the girlfriend’s

pattern of taking jewelry, pawning it, then getting it back “called into question whether

any relevant participant had the requisite intent” to permanently deprive the mother of the

jewelry since “pawning property does not transfer ownership or necessarily deprive the

owner of possession permanently,” and the property was usually returned. (Id. at

pp. 280-281.) Accordingly, the reviewing court reversed, concluding the trial court

6 “should have instructed the jury sua sponte with a definition of ‘stolen’ and ‘theft.’ ” (Id.

at p. 280.)

MacArthur is not relevant here because the court expressly rejected the theory that

S.G. received the key or permission to take the car from B.G. MacArthur might be

relevant if B.G. did give S.G. the key and permission to take the car. But the court,

sitting as factfinder, did not believe that is what happened.

As well, MacArthur’s circumstances are distinguishable from the circumstances

here. In that case, the accomplice admitted taking the property and testified that it was

the girlfriend’s practice to take the victim’s property and then help recover it later. This

meant that not only was it possible to assess the accomplice’s intent, but reason to believe

she might have intended to return the property. Here, we do not know who took the car.

The only evidence that S.G. might have received the property from someone who did not

intend to steal it was the testimony the court expressly found not credible. Without

evidence that a person did not intend to take the car permanently, and the presence of

evidence that the car was taken without permission or any reason to believe it would be

returned, the court permissibly inferred the property was stolen.

We agree with S.G. that the evidence here is slim and contradictory as to some

matters. Discrediting S.G. and V.L.’s testimony, and crediting all other testimony, leaves

unanswered questions. For instance, Janelle A. testified she had both keys to the car the

night of the alleged theft, but police found S.G. with a key fob to a Lexus. The police

never confirmed that was the key to the stolen car, but also did not find evidence S.G.

7 obtained access and control over the car through other means. Crediting Janelle A.’s and

the police officers’ testimony provided no satisfactory explanation for how S.G. came to

possess the car or where he got the key they found him with.

But the People need not prove exactly how S.G. received stolen property, only that

he did. Here, they met that burden.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

RAPHAEL J. We concur:

MILLER Acting P. J.

SLOUGH J.