In Re Seck

905 P.2d 122, 258 Kan. 530, 1995 Kan. LEXIS 135
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedNovember 3, 1995
Docket73,196
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 905 P.2d 122 (In Re Seck) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Seck, 905 P.2d 122, 258 Kan. 530, 1995 Kan. LEXIS 135 (kan 1995).

Opinion

Per Curiam:

This is an original proceeding in discipline filed by the office of the Disciplinary Administrator against Kenneth P. Seck, of Overland Park, an attorney admitted to the practice of law in Kansas. A hearing was held before a panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys. The respondent appeared pro se and the Disciplinary Administrator appeared by and through Marty M. Snyder, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator. The respondent’s motion for continuance and his objection to the makeup of the panel were denied. After the hearing, the panel concluded that the following findings of fact were established by clear and convincing evidence:

“1. Respondent is an attorney at law; his Kansas Attorney Registration number is 6974, and his last registration address for the Clerk of the Appellate Courts of Kansas is: 8600 W. 95th Street, Suite 104, Overland Park, Kansas 66212.
“2. Respondent has engaged in the active practice of law in Kansas and Missouri for 25 years. His practice was initially concentrated in the domestic relations and divorce area, but in the last 6 to 8 years has been concentrated in the areas of workers’ compensation and personal injury.
“3. Respondent’s client, Ms. Hager-Early, was injured in an accident on January 12, 1990, and employed Respondent to represent her in filing a lawsuit. A contingent fee based upon the amount of the recovery was agreed upon but never put into writing. The lawsuit was filed January 10, 1992, by Respondent.
“4. Ms. Hager-Early’s insurance company sent Respondent a standard letter notifying him of the insurance company’s personal injury protection (PIP) hen. Some 10 months later the lawsuit was settled for $25,000, which included the PIP hen, plus $1,700 for property damages.
*531 “5. Respondent attempted to negotiate with his chent’s insurance company concerning repayment of the PIP hen in the amount of $3,489.36, from the proceeds of settlement; the insurance company refused to negotiate, and insisted upon being paid the amount of its PIP hen.
“6. Upon settlement of the case, Respondent received three checks, including a check for $3,489.36 made payable jointly to his chent, her insurance company, and Respondent.
“7. On March 3 Respondent had the representative for his chent’s insurance company endorse the PIP hen check. Respondent deposited the check into his trust account and withdrew the amount of his contingency fee, leaving a net deposit of $2,326.24. Respondent wrote a letter to die insurance company advising that he would remit the amount of the PIP hen forthwith to his chent’s insurance company.
“8. Despite the assurances to his chent and her insurance company, Respondent failed to remit the amount of the PIP hen to the insurance company and failed to respond to telephone calls and letters from the insurance company. Respondent failed to notify his chent that he took this action.
“9. The amount of die PIP hen proceeds due to his chent’s insurance company, $2,326.24, initially remained in respondent’s trust account; however, respondent withdrew portions of this amount from his trust account and spent it personally. Respondent admitted that he knew that no portion of die PIP hen proceeds could possibly have been payable to him since he had previously withheld from the deposit the amount of his contingent fee for collecting the PIP proceeds. Respondent knew that the full amount of such PIP hen proceeds were payable and belonged to either his chent or her insurance company. As the result of having ignored the telephone calls and letters from his chent’s insurance company, the insurance company retained the service of a law firm which wrote to the Respondent and made demand on him for the amount of the PIP hen. Respondent neglected to respond to this demand letter for several months, with the result that he and his chent had suit filed against them by his chent’s insurance company.
“10. Respondent met with his chent and advised her that he would take care of the lawsuit and then filed an answer with multiple counterclaims against the insurance company. Respondent did not consult with his chent before filing the answer or before filing the counterclaims and did not furnish his chent with copies of the answer and counterclaims or the subsequently amended answer and counterclaims until several months after having filed them.
“11. When his chent obtained new counsel the lawsuit was finally settled. Respondent paid his chent’s insurance company $2,326.24 to satisfy its PIP hen and paid $1,163.12 to his chent to compensate for the added attorney’s fees and inconvenience caused by his actions.
“12. Respondent admitted that he had handled only one previous case involving a PIP hen and that he was unfamiliar with how to handle a PIP hen claim.”

Based upon the above findings, the panel concluded:

*532 “Respondent undertook to handle a matter for which he was not competent, he made false statements to his client’s insurance company, and he failed to keep his chent advised of the developments in the matter he was handling. He was not diligent in -responding to the inquiries of his chent’s insurance company, he filed an answer and counterclaims in a lawsuit without consulting his chent and without revealing to her that he and the chent had both been named in the lawsuit, creating a conflict of interest in the representation, and he knowingly withdrew funds from his trust account for his personal use knowing that tire funds belonged to others. Respondent failed to reduce to writing his contingent fee agreement with his chent.”

The panel concluded that clear and convincing evidence established that the respondent violated the following provisions of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct: MRPC 1.1 (1994 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 292), MRPC 1.2(a) (1994 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 295), MRPC 1.3 (1994 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 297), MRPC 1.4 (1994 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 302), MRPC 1.5(d) (1994 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 306), MRPC 1.15 (1994 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 332), MRPC 3.7 (1994 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 357), MRPC 4.1 (1994 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 360), and MRPC 8.4(c), (d), and (g) (1994 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 379).

The panel found the following aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

Aggravating circumstances:

“1. Prior disciplinary offenses. Respondent has received two previous informal admonitions and two previous orders of pubhc censure.
“2. Dishonest or selfish motive. The amount of the PIP hen proceeds withdrawn from the trust account were knowingly withdrawn for the benefit of Respondent at a time when he knew that no portion of the PIP hen proceeds belonged to him.
“3. Pattern of Misconduct.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

In re Harrington
Supreme Court of Kansas, 2016
In re Wiles
210 P.3d 613 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 2009)
State v. Seck
58 P.3d 730 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 2002)
In Re Wall
38 P.3d 640 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 2002)
In Re Seck
949 P.2d 1122 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1997)
In Re Harris
934 P.2d 965 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1997)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
905 P.2d 122, 258 Kan. 530, 1995 Kan. LEXIS 135, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-seck-kan-1995.