In re Se.B.

2024 IL App (4th) 240707-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: September 11, 2024
• Docket: 4-24-0707
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2024 IL App (4th) 240707-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is September 11, 2024 not precedent except in the NOS. 4-24-0707, 4-24-0708, 4-24-0709 cons. Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re Se. B., Sh. B., and St. B., Minors ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Logan County Petitioner-Appellee, ) Nos. 22JA4 v. ) 22JA5 Andrea B., ) 22JA6 Respondent-Appellant). ) ) Honorable ) Jonathan C. Wright, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Steigmann and Vancil concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court granted appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirmed the trial court’s judgment terminating respondent’s parental rights.

¶2 Respondent Andrea B. appeals from the trial court’s judgment terminating her

parental rights to her three minor children, Se. B. (born in 2010), Sh. B. (born in 2009), and St. B.

(born in 2007). Counsel appointed to represent respondent on appeal now moves to withdraw

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), arguing respondent’s appeal presents no

issues of arguable merit for review. See In re S.M., 314 Ill. App. 3d 682, 685-86 (2000) (holding

Anders applies to termination of parental rights cases and providing the proper procedure to be

followed by appellate counsel). We agree, grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw, and

affirm the trial court’s judgment. ¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 A. Adjudication of Wardship

¶5 In February 2022, the State filed petitions for adjudication of wardship, alleging the

minors were neglected pursuant to section 2-3(1)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile

Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(a) (West 2022)) because they were not receiving the proper or

necessary support or care necessary for their well-being, specifically that their father, Sean B., did

not make a proper care plan for the minors. As to Se. B. and Sh. B., the petitions also alleged the

minors were neglected in that they were under the age of 14 and left without supervision for an

unreasonable period of time (id. § 2-3(1)(d)).

¶6 Following a shelter care hearing, the trial court found probable cause to support the

allegations of neglect and placed temporary guardianship and custody with the Illinois Department

of Children and Family Services (DCFS). Respondent appeared at a subsequent hearing in April

2022 by video and was appointed counsel.

¶7 The adjudicatory hearing was held in July 2022, with respondent in attendance via

video. Sean B. admitted to the allegation the minors were neglected due to not receiving proper or

necessary support or care necessary for their well-being. The State presented a factual basis to

support the admission, and the trial court adjudicated the minors neglected pursuant to the

admission.

¶8 Respondent was not present at the August 2022 dispositional hearing. The trial

court found respondent unfit to care for the minors. The finding was consistent with a prior order

in an ongoing Winnebago County case finding respondent unfit, and she remained unfit in that

case at the time of the dispositional hearing. The court made the minors wards of the court and

placed guardianship and custody with the guardianship administrator of DCFS.

-2- ¶9 B. Petition for Termination of Parental Rights

¶ 10 In November 2023, the State filed petitions to terminate parental rights as to each

minor. The petitions alleged respondent was an unfit person under the Adoption Act (750 ILCS

50/1(D) (West 2022)) in that she had (1) abandoned the minors (id. § 1(D)(a)); (2) failed to

maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the minors’ welfare (id.

§ 1(D)(b)); (3) deserted the minors for more than three months preceding the commencement of

the termination proceedings (id. § 1(D)(c)); (4) failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the

conditions that were the basis for the removal of the minors during any nine-month period

following the adjudication of neglect, specifically, July 29, 2022, to April 29, 2023, and February

21, 2023, to November 21, 2023 (id. § 1(D)(m)(i)); (5) failed to make reasonable progress towards

the return of the minors during any nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect,

alleging the same nine-month periods (id. § 1(D)(m)(ii)); and (6) intended to forgo her parental

rights, as evidenced by her failure for a period of 12 months to (a) visit the minors,

(b) communicate with the minors or agency, although able to do so and not prevented by the

agency or a court order, or (c) maintain contact with or plan for the future of the minors, although

able to do so (id. § 1(D)(n)(1)).

¶ 11 1. The Fitness Hearing

¶ 12 In March 2024, the trial court conducted the fitness hearing. Respondent was

present via Zoom.

¶ 13 Ashley Brinner testified she was assigned as the caseworker for the minors in

February 2022. She was the caseworker from February 2022 to June 2023 and December 2023 to

the present date. Brinner testified an integrated assessment was completed for the family, but

respondent was not interviewed. Brinner spoke on the phone with respondent at the beginning of

-3- the case in spring 2022, and there was some communication, but respondent had not returned calls,

e-mails, or text messages since then. In April 2023, Brinner sent copies of letters written by St. B.

and Se. B. to the same e-mail address she had previously contacted, and respondent replied

requesting a meeting. The meeting was scheduled and canceled three times by respondent, and

respondent then ceased communication. Brinner had no contact with respondent after April 2023.

¶ 14 Respondent was required to engage in services, including cooperating with the

agency, obtaining stable housing and employment, and completing mental health and substance

abuse services. Brinner was not able to review the service plan with respondent because she was

not in contact with her, so she sent a copy of the service plan to her by either mail or e-mail. She

did not receive a response. Respondent never verified her housing situation. When Brinner visited

respondent’s last known residence, in Rockford, Illinois, the house was empty. Respondent did not

verify her employment. She did not sign any consents for referrals for mental health or substance

abuse services. Overall, respondent’s progress was “completely unsatisfactory.”

¶ 15 Brinner also testified respondent had not had any contact with the children during

the life of the case. Brinner had been told the last time respondent had any sort of contact with the

children was at St. B.’s eighth-grade graduation, approximately three years prior. DCFS had placed

a restriction on visits in respondent’s file, but only in-person contact was restricted.

¶ 16 Bailey Volle testified she was the caseworker from June 2023 to December 2023.

While Volle was managing the case, respondent made no efforts to “cooperate with the agency,

contact [her], or contact anybody within the department.”

¶ 17 Respondent testified she lived in Rockford and had been employed as a certified

nursing assistant for about 23 years and had worked at her present employer for 6 or 7 years.

Respondent was confident she had informed a caseworker of where she worked. She was receiving

-4- mental health counseling at “Remedy” in the Winnebago County courthouse, and she had sought

out substance abuse counseling on her own at Rosecrance. She was looking for proper housing for

herself and the minors. Respondent stated she was “participating in [her] own way.” She had not

personally seen the children in three years.

¶ 18 Respondent disconnected from the proceeding after her testimony. She informed

her counsel she had accidentally disconnected, and counsel directed her to rejoin the hearing. She

did not, however, reappear, and the hearing continued in her absence. During closing arguments,

respondent rejoined the hearing.

¶ 19 The trial court found respondent unfit for (1) failing to make reasonable efforts

during the relevant time periods, (2) failing to make reasonable progress during the relevant time

periods, (3) failing to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the

minors’ welfare, and (4) showing her intent to forgo her parental rights, as evidenced by her failure

for a period of 12 months to communicate with the children while able to do so and not prevented

by the agency or a court order. The court also found that the State did not meet its burden of proof

on the allegations that respondent (1) abandoned the minors or (2) deserted the minors.

¶ 20 2. The Best Interest Hearing

¶ 21 The trial court proceeded directly to the best interest hearing.

¶ 22 David B. testified he was the foster father for the minors. This was the third time

he and his wife, Nicole B., were fostering the minors. David worked from home and was “always

available,” and he and Nicole split primary care responsibilities. David expressed that he and

Nicole would like to adopt the minors, and the minors had expressed to him that they wished to be

adopted. The children had “zero contact” with respondent since St. B. graduated eighth grade.

-5- ¶ 23 St. B. testified she was 16 years old and a junior in high school. She had been in

and out of her current foster placement for seven years, with the current placement being for a little

over two years. She called her foster parents “mom” and “dad,” and she had started referring to

them as her parents before the current placement. St. B. wished to stay with her foster parents and

be adopted by them. She believed her siblings felt the same way. She felt their foster parents took

care of them, and she felt safe in their home. The last time St. B. saw respondent was at her eighth-

grade graduation, and she had not had any contact with respondent since then.

¶ 24 Respondent testified she wanted to remain the mother of the minors, and she

believed it was in their best interest for her to remain their mother.

¶ 25 The trial court considered this was the fourth time the minors had been in care and

the third time they had been in the care of David and Nicole. The court opined it was “clear they

put down roots” and that the foster parents were “for all practical purposes, their mother and

father.” The court found the foster parents provided physical and emotional support, and the best

interest report noted that all three minors wished to be adopted by the foster parents. The court

determined it was in the best interest of the minors to terminate respondent’s parental rights.

¶ 26 This appeal followed.

¶ 27 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 28 Appellate counsel now moves to withdraw on appeal pursuant to Anders and argues

that the appeal of this case presents no potentially meritorious issues for review. See S.M., 314 Ill.

App. 3d at 685-86. Counsel states he has reviewed the common law record and report of

proceedings for the termination proceedings, and he has identified two potential issues for review:

(1) whether the trial court’s determination that respondent was unfit was against the manifest

weight of the evidence and (2) whether the court’s determination that termination of respondent’s

-6- parental rights was in the best interest of the minors was against the manifest weight of the

evidence. Counsel provided respondent notice of the motion to withdraw, and respondent has not

filed a response. After reviewing the record and appellate counsel’s memorandum, we agree with

counsel that this appeal presents no issues of potential merit, and therefore we grant the motion to

withdraw and affirm the court’s judgment.

¶ 29 A. Unfitness Finding

¶ 30 Section 2-29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2022))

provides for a two-step process to involuntarily terminate parental rights. The State must first prove

by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is “unfit” as defined in section 1(D) of the

Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2022)). In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 28.

¶ 31 In this case, the trial court determined respondent was unfit for (1) failing to

maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the minors’ welfare (750

ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2022)); (2) failing to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that

were the basis for the removal of the minors during the relevant nine-month time periods (id.

§ 1(D)(m)(i)); (3) failing to make reasonable progress towards the return of the minors during the

relevant nine-month time periods (id. § 1(D)(m)(ii)); and (4) showing her intent to forgo her

parental rights, as evidenced by her failure for a period of 12 months to communicate with the

minors, although able to do so and not prevented by the agency or a court order (id. § 1(D)(n)(1)).

However, a “parent’s rights may be terminated if a single alleged ground for unfitness is supported

by clear and convincing evidence.” In re D.C., 209 Ill. 2d 287, 296 (2004). Therefore, we focus

only on the first ground, that respondent failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern,

or responsibility as to the minors’ welfare.

-7- ¶ 32 The Illinois Supreme Court has held that, in addressing a parent’s fitness under

section 1(D)(b), the trial court “is to examine the parent’s efforts to communicate with and show

interest in the child, not the success of those efforts.” In re Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 279

(1990). The trial court is in a superior position to observe witnesses and evaluate their credibility.

In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 498-99 (2002). Accordingly, the court’s findings regarding parental

unfitness are afforded great deference and will not be reversed unless they are against the manifest

weight of the evidence. Id. “A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the

opposite conclusion is clearly evident.” In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 208 (2001).

¶ 33 Here, the evidence demonstrated that respondent failed to make any efforts to

communicate with or show any interest, concern, or responsibility as to the minors. Brinner

testified that although there was “some communication” at the beginning of the case, respondent

then failed to respond to calls, text messages, and e-mails. While Volle was handling the case, she

had no contact with respondent outside of a court hearing, which respondent attended by video. In

April 2023, respondent reached out to Brinner for a meeting after receiving copies of letters from

two of the minors, but she then rescheduled that meeting three times before once again falling out

of contact.

¶ 34 By her own admission, respondent last spoke with the minors three years prior to

the hearing, well before the incident which led to the minors being taken into care. Although DCFS

had placed a restriction on in-person visits for respondent, there were no restrictions preventing

other forms of contact, and respondent knew the foster parents. Brinner testified respondent had

no contact with the minors by e-mail, phone, letter, or any other form of communication. At the

time of the fitness hearing, the case had been ongoing for a little over two years; however,

-8- respondent was still “looking for proper housing” suitable for the minors. Instead of working with

DCFS, respondent believed she was participating “in [her] own way.”

¶ 35 In sum, respondent had been out of contact with the minors before this case began,

and nothing presented demonstrated she made any attempts to reform a relationship with her

children during the life of the case. Therefore, it would be frivolous to argue the trial court’s finding

of respondent’s unfitness was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 36 B. Best Interest Determination

¶ 37 If a trial court finds a parent to be unfit, it then determines whether the best interest

of the children requires that parental rights be terminated. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 352 (2004).

At the best interest stage of termination proceedings, the State bears the burden of proving by a

preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in the children’s best interest.

In re C.P., 2019 IL App (4th) 190420, ¶ 71. In reaching a best interest determination, the trial court

must consider, for each child and within the context of that child’s age and developmental needs,

the following factors, which are derived from section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act (705

ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2022)):

“(1) the child’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the child’s

identity; (3) the child’s familial, cultural[,] and religious background and ties;

(4) the child’s sense of attachments, including love, security, familiarity, continuity

of affection, and the least disruptive placement alternative; (5) the child’s wishes

and long-term goals; (6) the child’s community ties; (7) the child’s need for

permanence, including the need for stability and continuity of relationships with

parent figures and siblings; (8) the uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the

risks related to substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the person available to

-9- care for the child.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re J.B., 2019 IL App (4th)

190537, ¶ 32.

“The court’s best interest determination [need not] contain an explicit reference to each of these

factors, and a reviewing court need not rely on any basis used by the trial court below in affirming

its decision.” In re Tajannah O., 2014 IL App (1st) 133119, ¶ 19. Additionally, a trial court “may

consider the nature and length of the child’s relationship with his present caretaker and the effect

that a change in placement would have upon his emotional and psychological well-being.” In re

Jaron Z., 348 Ill. App. 3d 239, 262 (2004). On review, “[w]e will not disturb a court’s finding that

termination is in the children’s best interest unless it was against the manifest weight of the

evidence.” In re T.A., 359 Ill. App. 3d 953, 961 (2005).

¶ 38 As the trial court opined, it is clear from the record the minors had “put down roots”

with their foster parents. They had been in and out of foster care with these foster parents for much

of their lives. The minors considered the foster parents to be their parents and referred to them as

“mom” and “dad.” The foster parents provided physical and emotional care for the minors and

were supportive of them. They had also expressed their intent to adopt the minors. St. B. testified

she considered the foster parents her parents before this case was opened. She felt cared for and

safe in the foster home. She wished to remain with the foster family and be adopted, and she

believed her siblings shared her sentiment. The court acknowledged that all three minors were old

enough to express their wishes and that it would consider their wishes in its determination.

Meanwhile, respondent had absolutely no contact with the minors for three years, and there was

no evidence she was attempting to reform a relationship with her children.

¶ 39 Given the stable and loving relationship the minors had in the foster home, their

express wishes to remain in the home, and respondent’s complete lack of contact with them, it

- 10 - would be frivolous to argue the best interest finding was against the manifest weight of the

evidence.

¶ 40 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 41 For the reasons stated, we grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm

the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 42 Affirmed.

- 11 -