In Re Sea Island Motor Sales, Inc.

72 B.R. 170, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 1566, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 6317
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. South Carolina
DecidedApril 8, 1986
Docket19-00915
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 72 B.R. 170 (In Re Sea Island Motor Sales, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Sea Island Motor Sales, Inc., 72 B.R. 170, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 1566, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 6317 (S.C. 1986).

Opinion

J. BRATTON DAVIS, Bankruptcy Judge.

South Carolina National Bank (SCN) has filed, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d), a motion for relief from the automatic stay afforded by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). The trustee opposes the granting of the motion. The debtor has neither objected to, nor appeared to contest, the motion.

For the reasons hereinafter stated, the motion is granted.

FACTS

The debtor, a used car dealership, filed a petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.) on March 25,1985. A trustee of the debtor estate was appointed and is now serving.

The debtor executed a promissory note on June 29, 1984 in favor of SCN. SCN claims a security interest in all equipment, furniture, fixtures, and inventory of the debtor by virtue of a security agreement dated June 29, 1984. SCN filed financing statements with the Secretary of State of South Carolina and the Clerk of Court of Beaufort County on July 13, 1984.

Claiming the debtor to be in default on the note, SCN repossessed some of the debtor’s automobile inventory before the petition for relief was filed.

Although SCN neither recorded its security interest on the certificate of title of any vehicle nor applied to the South Carolina Department of Highways for new titles, it has retained the original titles.

The trustee has stipulated that there is no equity in the property. Because this is a Chapter 7 case the property is not necessary for an effective reorganization. Also, cause for. relief has been shown in that SCN’s interest is not adequately protected. Therefore, it would appear that SCN might be entitled to relief from the automatic stay pursuant to § 362(d)(1) and § 362(d)(2). However, the trustee contends that SCN is not a secured creditor, ergo it is not entitled to relief under § 362.

*172 ISSUE

Thus, the issue is whether SCN has a perfected security interest in the automobiles which it has repossessed.

DISCUSSION

I

“A moving creditor seeking relief from the stay, in addition to carrying the ultimate burden of proof with respect to equity, must establish the validity and perfection of its security interest_” . In re Greiman, 45 B.R. 574, 579 (Bankr.N.D. Iowa 1984). See also, In re Satterfield, Case No. 82-02150 (Bankr.D.S.C. January 27, 1984); MacGregor v. Ostrander (In re Ostrander), Case No. 82-01164, Complaint No. 83-0486 (Bankr.D.S.C. May 6, 1982).

A party, secured by a lien on property, seeking § 362(d)(1) relief from the stay on the ground of lack of adequate protection satisfies its burden of proof on the issue of the debtor’s equity in the property by showing that the debtor has no equity in the collateral above its secured claim.

In re Satterfield.

II

SCN and the trustee disagree as to the effects of SCN’s filing the financing statements in the office of the Secretary of State and in the office of the Clerk of Court.

The trustee contends that SCN has not perfected properly its security interest because South Carolina Code § 56-19-10, et seq., (1976, as amended) 1 (Protection of Titles to and Interests in Motor Vehicles) applies in this case and that SCN has not complied therewith.

Section 56-19-620 states:
Unless excepted by § 56-19-610, a security interest in a vehicle of a type for which a certificate of title is required is not valid against creditors of the owner or subsequent transferees or lienholders of the vehicle unless perfected as provided in this article. No other recordation shall be necessary to protect the interest of the lienholder.

To determine if § 56-19-620 applies, the court must examine the exception to that section, § 56-19-610, which provides: “This chapter does not apply to or affect: ... (3) a security interest in a vehicle created by a manufacturer or dealer who holds the vehicle for sale.”

In this case, the debtor in possession, a dealer, created the security interest. Therefore, it is excepted from § 56-19-620.

Ill

For SCN, as the provider of inventory financing to a dealer, the method of perfection is found in § 36-9-302(1) which provides, in effect, that a security interest in inventory is perfected by the filing of a financing statement.

Section 9-302(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code, which is embodied in § 36-9-302(1) of the South Carolina Code, and its relationship with state certificate of title statutes is discussed in In re Vaughn, 283 F.Supp. 730, 732, 5 UCCRS 71, 75 (D.C.M. D.Tenn.1968):

Although § 9-302(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code conditions the perfection of security interests in chattels upon the filing of financing statements, the draftsmen of the Code, due to the widespread existence of state title acts governing the perfection of security interests in motor vehicles, concluded that security interests in vehicles covered by such title acts were to be excluded from the basic filing requirement of Article 9. Uniform Commercial Code § 9-302, Comment 8; 1 Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property, § 20.8. This exemption provision was inserted in § 9-302(3)(b) in the following two alternative forms:
(3)The filing provisions of this Article do not apply to a security interest in property subject to a statute # * * * * *

*173 [Alternative A:]

(b) of this state which provides for central filing of, or which requires indication on a certificate of title of, such security interest in such property. 2 ******

The status of motor vehicles held by a dealer in an Alternative A jurisdiction is clearly stated in Professor Gilmore’s recently published treatise:

Alternative A adopts the coverage of the certificate of title act, whatever that coverage may be. For example, if the title act ... does not cover dealer inventory then the filing exemption would not extend to such inventory; on the other hand, if the title act does cover inventory, so does the filing exemption. (citations omitted).

Vaughn, 283 F.Supp. at 732, 5 UCCRS at 73 — 74.

Because the vehicles in question originally were held by the debtor as inventory, the provisions of the South Carolina Protection of Titles laws are inapplicable (§ 56-19-610); therefore, § 36-9-302(1) applies which requires the proper filing of a financing statement in order to perfect the security interest.

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Bluebook (online)
72 B.R. 170, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 1566, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 6317, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-sea-island-motor-sales-inc-scb-1986.