In re S.C.R.

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: July 1, 2014
• Docket: 14-80
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA14-80 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 1 July 2014

IN THE MATTER OF: Rockingham County Nos. 13 J 82–84 S.C.R., A.C.R., & G.C.W.

Appeal by respondent-mother from orders entered 24 October

2013 by Judge James A. Grogan in Rockingham County District

Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals on 16 June 2014.

No brief filed for petitioner-appellee Rockingham County Department of Social Services.

Leslie Rawls for respondent-appellant mother.

Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein LLP, by Eric D. Welsh, for guardian ad litem.

HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.

Respondent-mother appeals from the district court’s

adjudication order concluding that her children S.C.R.

(“Scott”),1 A.C.R. (“Amy”), and G.C.W. (“Gail”) were neglected

1 Pseudonyms are used for ease of reading and to protect the identity of the juveniles. -2- juveniles, as well as the court’s resulting disposition order.

After careful review, we affirm.

On 10 June 2013, the Rockingham County Department of Social

Services (“DSS”) obtained nonsecure custody of Scott, Amy, and

Gail and filed a juvenile petition alleging that they were

neglected and dependent juveniles. DSS filed an amended

petition the same day with more detailed factual allegations.

According to the petition, respondent-mother left the children

with her mother (hereinafter, the “grandmother”) on 3 May 2013.

One-year-old Scott became ill, and the grandmother took Scott to

the emergency room. However, the grandmother had difficulty

obtaining medical treatment for him because respondent-mother

failed to make necessary arrangements, and DSS was notified.

Additionally, all three children were behind on their

vaccinations and had not seen a physician in a year.

The petition also alleged that respondent-mother’s home was

unfit for the children. According to the petition, it lacked

electricity and respondent-mother had no income to have it

restored or to pay rent. Respondent-mother kept four dogs and

two cats in the home, and allowed them to urinate and defecate

inside. A social worker visited the home and advised

respondent-mother not to bring the children back, given the -3- home’s condition. The social worker reported that the odor of

animal feces and urine was so strong he had to leave the

residence. Following this visit, DSS and respondent-mother

agreed that the children would remain in a placement with the

grandmother.

According to the petition, respondent-mother was offered

in-home services in mid-May 2013, but respondent-mother missed

the meetings to discuss a service agreement with Lacey Johnston,

a social worker. Respondent-mother then became uncooperative

with DSS and unsupportive of the children’s placement. The

petition further alleged that on 6 June 2013, respondent-mother

attempted to forcibly remove her children from the grandmother’s

home and physically assaulted her teenage brother in the

process.

Following a hearing, the trial court adjudicated the

children neglected after concluding that DSS had proven the

allegations contained in the petition by clear, cogent, and

convincing evidence. The court, however, dismissed the

dependency allegation, determining the children were not in need

of assistance or placement because there was an appropriate

alternative child care arrangement with the grandmother and

stepfather. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(9) (2013). The trial -4- court entered a written order on 24 October 2013 containing

findings of fact that closely tracked the allegations contained

in DSS’s amended petition. In a separate disposition order, the

trial court continued custody of Scott and Gail with DSS. Amy’s

father had been given temporary custody of Amy on 1 July 2013,

and the trial court gave him full custody in the disposition

order. Respondent mother gave notice of appeal on 13 November

2013.

Respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred by

failing to make proper findings of fact to support its

adjudication of neglect. Specifically, respondent-mother argues

that the trial court’s substantive findings of fact are copied

almost verbatim from the allegations contained in the petition.

We have previously held that Rule 52 of the North Carolina

Rules of Civil Procedure “requires three separate and distinct

acts by the trial court: (1) find the facts specially; (2) state

separately the conclusions of law resulting from the facts so

found; and (3) direct the entry of the appropriate judgment.”

In re Anderson, 151 N.C. App. 94, 96, 564 S.E.2d 599, 601–02

(2002) (citing N.C. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1)). “Thus, the trial

court must, through ‘processes of logical reasoning,’ based on

the evidentiary facts before it, ‘find the ultimate facts -5- essential to support the conclusions of law.’” In re O.W., 164

N.C. App. 699, 702, 596 S.E.2d 851, 853 (2004) (quoting In re

Harton, 156 N.C. App. 655, 660, 577 S.E.2d 334, 337 (2003)).

The findings “must be the ‘specific ultimate facts . . .

sufficient for the appellate court to determine that the

judgment is adequately supported by competent evidence.’”

Anderson, 151 N.C. App. at 97, 564 S.E.2d at 602 (citation

omitted). As a result of the foregoing principles, we have

stated that “the trial court’s findings must consist of more

than a recitation of the allegations” contained in the juvenile

petition. O.W., 164 N.C. App. at 702, 596 S.E.2d at 853 (citing

Anderson, 151 N.C. App. at 97, 564 S.E.2d at 602).

Respondent-mother cites to both O.W. and Anderson in

support of her argument. In each case, this Court reversed the

adjudication order. Id. at 704, 596 S.E.2d at 854; Anderson,

151 N.C. App. at 100, 564 S.E.2d at 603. In O.W., fifteen of

the trial court’s twenty findings were “a verbatim recitation of

the facts stated in DSS’s petition for abuse and neglect, some

of which [were] unsupported by any evidence.” Id. at 702, 596

S.E.2d at 854. Moreover, several of the findings “[were] not

even really facts as they simply recite[d] what some unknown

source said . . . .” Id. Another finding was similarly -6- deficient in that it merely recited a social worker’s testimony.

Id. at 703, 596 S.E.2d at 854. In Anderson, the trial court’s

order contained only three findings of fact, two of which

“merely recite[d] that DSS filed a petition and that service was

proper . . . .” Anderson, 151 N.C. App. at 97, 564 S.E.2d at

602. The third finding stated that “[t]he grounds alleged for

terminating the parental rights are as follows” and proceeded to

list the grounds and case history. Id. at 97, 564 S.E.2d at

602. In each instance, this Court held that the findings of

fact were a mere recitation of the allegations in the petition.

Id. at 97, 564 S.E.2d at 602; O.W., 164 N.C. App. at 702–03, 596

S.E.2d at 854.

We find O.W. and Anderson to be distinguishable from the

instant case. We acknowledge that several of the trial court’s

findings are verbatim recitations of DSS’s petition allegations.

However, some of the allegations were omitted entirely from the

order, and several findings contain language which was altered

from that of the petition. Unlike O.W. and Anderson, all of the

trial court’s findings are phrased as findings of fact, not

allegations or statements that recite what an unknown source

said. See O.W., 164 N.C. App. at 702–03, 596 S.E.2d at 854;

Anderson, 151 N.C. App. at 97, 564 S.E.2d at 602. Most notably, -7- the trial court specifically declined to find that the children

were dependent juveniles, and the corresponding allegation was

omitted from the order.

Most importantly, all of the trial court’s findings of fact

are supported by evidence in the record, and respondent-mother

does not challenge the evidentiary support for any of the

findings. During the adjudicatory phase of the hearing, six

witnesses testified for DSS: two social workers involved in the

case, respondent-mother, the children’s grandmother, the

grandmother’s husband, and the father of Scott and Amy. The

testimony of DSS’s witnesses provide ample support for the

findings contained in the trial court’s order, despite the fact

that they closely track, or repeat, the allegations contained in

the petition.

We therefore find the trial court’s findings sufficient to

support the adjudication of neglect. The trial court found that

respondent-mother had taken her three children to live with the

grandmother because she could no longer care for them. A social

worker confirmed that respondent-mother’s residence was not

suitable, as respondent-mother allowed her dogs and cats to

urinate and defecate inside. Additionally, the residence did

not have electricity, respondent-mother did not have income to -8- restore it, and she also had been evicted from her previous

apartment.

In addition to the problems with her home, the trial

court’s findings show that respondent-mother failed to provide

her children with medical care, despite having Medicaid coverage

for them. At the time of the petition, the children had not

seen a physician in a year and were behind on their

vaccinations. While acknowledging that her children were not up

to date on vaccinations, respondent-mother informed the social

worker that her animals were up to date on their shots.

Additionally, the grandmother needed to take Scott to the

emergency room and had difficulty obtaining treatment because

respondent-mother failed to make appropriate arrangements for

his care.

Lastly, the trial court found that respondent-mother was

interfering with the children’s placement. She was hostile to

her mother and threatened to remove the children. Respondent-

mother’s hostility culminated in an incident on 6 June 2013,

during which respondent-mother attempted to forcibly remove the

children and assaulted her teenage brother in the process.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court’s

findings of fact are sufficiently specific for this Court to -9- determine that the order is supported by competent evidence.

See Anderson, 151 N.C. App. at 97, 564 S.E.2d at 602. We

therefore reject respondent-mother’s argument.

In her second argument, respondent-mother contends that the

trial court erred by entering a dispositional order where there

was no proper adjudication order. Because we affirm the trial

court’s adjudication, we need not address this argument.

Affirmed.

Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge ELMORE concur

Report per Rule 30(e).