In Re Schmidt

145 B.R. 983, 1991 WL 419989
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. South Dakota
DecidedJune 11, 1991
Docket19-50015
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 145 B.R. 983 (In Re Schmidt) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. South Dakota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Schmidt, 145 B.R. 983, 1991 WL 419989 (S.D. 1991).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: MOTION FOR DISCHARGE

IRVIN N. HOYT, Chief Judge.

The matter before the Court is Debtors’ Motion for Discharge and the objections thereto. This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). This ruling shall constitute Findings and Conclusions as required by Bankr.R. 7052.

I.

Debtors Donald E. and Helen M. Schmidt (Debtors) filed a Chapter 12 petition for debt adjustment on January 26, 1987. Their plan was confirmed on August 27, 1987. On November 28, 1990, they filed a Motion for Discharge 1 claiming all plan payments had been made. Creditor Farmers Home Administration objected to the Motion on the grounds that Debtors had not made disposable income payments, as required by 11 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b) and 1228(a) and the terms of their plan. Chapter 12 Trustee A. Thomas Pokela (Trustee) also objected. He argued Debtors had failed to disclose the proceeds of their 1990 crop.

A hearing was held May 3, 1991. Debtors presented testimony and exhibits on their post-petition credit history and financial status. Much of their presentation focused on whether Debtors should be required to borrow funds for 1991 crop expenses or use cash on hand for these expenses in lieu of making disposable income payments to unsecured claim holders.

Debtors’ 1987, 1988, and 1989 tax returns, two Annual Reports of Operations for 1988 (an original and an amended report), Annual Report of Operations for 1989, and Report of Operations for 1990 (through October, 1990) were received into evidence. Testimony by Debtor-husband established that Debtors had received approximately $177,000.00 in income since November, 1990 when regular plan payments were completed. It was also shown that Debtors had expanded their farming operation from 500 to 600 acres in 1987 and 1988 to 1,100 acres in 1990. The additional acres were rented. Debtors testified that the added farm ground was needed to insure adequate income to meet plan payments.

*986 Debtor-husband stated they had borrowed operating expenses from Farmers Home Administration for twelve to fifteen years prior to their Chapter 12 filing. Although Debtors had not obtained a line of credit from a financial institution for operating expenses during their plan, they had received fertilizer and other “inputs” on credit at the local elevator for several years. Debtors attempted to get an operating loan once during their plan. That potential lender, referred by the local elevator, refused to give Debtors any credit because of Debtors’ pending bankruptcy.

Debtors introduced a recently compiled summary and some supporting documents on their 1990 corn, sunflower, and barley production levels, which were lower than those reported in their 1990 annual report. Debtor-husband testified that the 1990 annual report filed in October, 1990 contained only production estimates. Debtors also introduced three additional expense reports that summarized Debtors’ total crop production expenses for January through August of 1988, 1989, and 1990 and for January through April of 1991; presented November and December, 1990 expenses related to the 1990 crop year; and detailed their 1991 crop input expenses for January through April, 1991. Other than the exhibits that restated Debtors’ actual crop production levels for 1990, neither Debtors nor Trustee disputed the income and expenses reported on Debtors’ annual reports to Trustee.

II.

Disposable income is the difference between available income and allowed expenses during the repayment period. 11 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Necessary expenses are those “reasonably necessary ... for the maintenance or support of the debtor [and his family]” or “the continuation, preservation, and operation of the debtor’s business” [hereinafter “necessary expenses”]. Id. The disposable income payment period begins on the date that the first payment is due under the plan and ends three years later or longer, if the term of the plan has been extended. 11 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B).

Chapter 12 debtors and Standing Trustees should not treat the disposable income payment period as a finite term during which a debtor’s income and expenses are examined. As a fiduciary, a Chapter 12 debtor-in-possession must prudently operate the debtor’s farm and other businesses for the benefit of all creditors. Income generated and expenses incurred during the post-petition, pre-confirmation period should inure to the creditors’ benefit under the best interest of creditors test pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(4). Similarly, income generated during the plan should be recognized as potential disposable income. For example, if the first regular payment under a plan is made one year after confirmation, income during that year (before the disposable income payment period begins) should not be disregarded. Instead, a debtor’s use of these funds must be examined since any amount remaining after payment of allowed expenses should be available for unsecured creditors when the disposable income payment period begins. In re Wood, 122 B.R. 107, 114-15 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1990). Further, a Chapter 12 debtor should not manipulate post-confirmation income and expenses in order to avoid the disposable income payment “window.” Such endeavors may result in the denial of discharge. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1208(c)(4), 1208(d), and 1228(d); In re Kuhlman, 118 B.R. 731, 739 (Bankr.D.S.D.1990).

If a creditor or the trustee successfully argues that all disposable income has not been paid under the plan, a debtor may not receive a discharge unless he can show that there was no available income in excess of necessary expenses. While a party objecting to discharge has the burden of proving the merits of their objection, Bankr.R. 4005 and Education Assistance Corp. v. Zellner, 827 F.2d 1222, 1226 (8th Cir.1987), the debtor has the ultimate burden of persuasion to show that all payments under the plan have been made, including payments of disposable income. In re Kuhlman, 118 B.R. 731, 738 (Bankr.D.S.D.1990). Further,

*987 [w]hen a determination of disposable income is presented to the Court as a contested matter, each case must be examined upon the evidence presented.

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Bluebook (online)
145 B.R. 983, 1991 WL 419989, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-schmidt-sdb-1991.