In Re Schleifer

170 B.R. 283, 31 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1146, 1994 WL 394768, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 1084
CourtDistrict Court, Virgin Islands
DecidedJuly 26, 1994
DocketBankruptcy 392-00021
StatusPublished

This text of 170 B.R. 283 (In Re Schleifer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, Virgin Islands primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Schleifer, 170 B.R. 283, 31 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1146, 1994 WL 394768, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 1084 (vid 1994).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JOSEPH L. COSETTI, Bankruptcy Judge.

On October 5, 1992, John Coleridge Schleifer (“Debtor”) obtained a Chapter 7 discharge pursuant to Section 727 of the Bankruptcy Code (Title 11, United States Cpde). Debtor’s case was closed on October 6,1992. Pending before the court is a pro se motion by the debtor to reopen the bankruptcy case to determine the dischargeability of certain debts. For the reasons stated below, the relief requested is denied.

I. FACTS

The debtor has been employed by the Government of the Virgin Islands since before the filing of his bankruptcy petition. As a condition of such employment, the debtor is required to participate in the “Employees Retirement System of the Government of the Virgin Islands” (“System”). 1 The System is a retirement and benefit plan for officials and *284 employees of the Government of the Virgin Islands and for their dependents and beneficiaries. The System allows its members to borrow against their contributions and statutorily defines the period and method of repayment. Additionally, in the event that a member separates from government service, the balance due on the loan, and any accrued interest thereon, shall be deducted from any refund of contributions, annuity, death benefit or any other benefit due to the member or to his beneficiary. 2

During the course of his employment, Debtor borrowed funds from the System. After the debtor received his Chapter 7 discharge, he attempted to secure additional amounts from the System. The System refused to lend the debtor any more funds. As of late April, 1994, the debtor had an outstanding principal balance of approximately $4,596.31. The System continues to automatically deduct loan repayments from his pay and his biweekly salary deduction is $70.90. As a result, debtor has moved to reopen his bankruptcy case, seeking this court to declare that the loan from the System was a debt discharged in the Chapter 7 Bankruptcy proceeding, and requiring the System, therefore, to discontinue the automatic salary deductions it continues to make.

II. DISCUSSION

In In re Villarie, 648 F.2d 810 (2d Cir.1981), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was faced with a situation quite analogous to the one sub judi-ce. In Villarie, the debtor was a member of the New York City Employee’s Retirement System (“NYCERS”) and contributed to his annuity savings fund by authorizing NY-CERS to deduct an actuarially determined amount from his weekly paycheck. Villarie, 648 F.2d at 811. Membership in NYCERS entitled the debtor to obtain a loan, but the amount of the allowance was not to be greater than fifty percent of the debtor’s previous contributions to the fund. Id. at 811. In effect, this loan was an advance against the debtor’s future retirement benefits. Id. Nonetheless, the New York City Administrative Code required the debtor to repay the loan, with interest, through payroll deductions in excess of the member’s ordinary contribution. Id. If a member of NYCERS failed to replenish the fund before they retired, their benefits were to be reduced by the amount of the outstanding balance. Id. Similarly, if a member resigned from their employment with the City of New York, the unpaid amount was to be deducted from the sum they were due to receive from NY-CERS. Id.

The Court of Appeals held that a loan from NYCERS to a member does not constitute a “debt” that can be discharged in bankruptcy. Therefore, NYCERS could continue to de *285 duct from the member’s weekly compensation an amount sufficient to recoup the advance to the member, notwithstanding the member’s filing of bankruptcy. Id. at 811. Reasoning that only “debts” could be discharged in bankruptcy, the court turned to the definitions found in 11 U.S.C. § 101. Section 101(12) of the Code defines “debt” as “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). Turning to section 101(5)(A), the Code defines a “claim” as a “right to payment ...” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A).

Noticing that the New York City Administrative Code did not give NYCERS the right to sue a member for the amount of the advance, 3 and that NYCERS could only offset the amount borrowed against future benefits, the court concluded that the “claim [was] unenforceable against the debtor ...” within the context of 11 U.S.C. § 502(b). 4 Villarie, 648 F.2d at 811. Because only “debts” can be discharged in bankruptcy, and because the circuity of the definition of “debt” requires an enforceable “right to payment,” the NYCERS loan provisions did not give rise to a debt that could be discharged in bankruptcy. Id. Consequently, the Court of Appeals held that NYCERS could continue to deduct from the debtor’s weekly compensation an amount sufficient to recoup the advance. Id.

As in Villarie, the debtor in the instant case is required to participate in the System pursuant to 3 V.I.C. § 703(b). Membership in the System entitles the debtor to obtain a loan pursuant to 3 V.I.C. § 717(b)(10). Section 717(b)(10) provides, “In case of separation from service for any reason, including death or disability of the member, the balance due on the loan and any accrued interest thereon, shall be deducted from any refund of contributions, annuity, death benefit or any other benefit due to the member or his beneficiary.” 3 V.I.C. § 717(b)(10).

This court does not find that 3 V.I.C. § 717(b)(10) authorizes the System, upon severance of the employment relationship, to sue the debtor for the amount of any outstanding portion of an advance, but merely authorizes the System to offset the outstanding amount against future benefits. Consequently, as in Villarie, the statutory provisions governing the loan do not give the System a “right to payment”. Without such a right, the System cannot hold a valid claim in the debtor’s bankruptcy estate as defined in Section 101(5)(A). Without an enforceable claim, the advance from the System is not properly dischargeable in bankruptcy.

Additionally, this court is of the opinion that the employment relationship between the Virgin Islands Government and the debtor can be viewed as. an executory contract that was assumed by the debtor in his bankruptcy. By virtue of the fact that the debtor remained an employee of the Virgin Islands Government, the debtor assumed the statutorily defined conditions of his employment.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
170 B.R. 283, 31 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1146, 1994 WL 394768, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 1084, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-schleifer-vid-1994.