[Cite as In re S.B., 2016-Ohio-7732.]
COURT OF APPEALS RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
IN THE MATTER OF: S.B. : JUDGES: : Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, P.J. ALLEGED DELINQUENT CHILD : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J. : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. : : Case No. 16CA27 : : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, Case No. 2016DEL45
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: November 9, 2016
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendant-Appellee
DANIEL M. ROGERS DAVID M. WATSON 38 South Park Street 3 North Main Street Mansfield, OH 44902 Suite 702 Mansfield, OH 44902 Richland County, Case No. 16CA27 2
Farmer, P.J.
{¶1} On January 15, 2016, appellee, S.B., a juvenile, was alleged to be
delinquent by virtue of committing one count of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02 with a
serious youthful offender specification pursuant to R.C. 2152.11. On March 9, 2016, the
Richland County Grand Jury indicted appellee for the specification.
{¶2} On April 1, 2016, appellee filed a motion to suppress her statements made
to police, claiming she did not understand or voluntarily waive her rights. Hearings were
held on April 6, and May 10, 2016. By judgment entry filed May 16, 2016, the trial court
granted the motion, finding appellant, the state of Ohio, failed to meet its burden that
appellee understood and knowingly waived her rights.
{¶3} Appellant filed an appeal and this matter is now before this court for
consideration. Assignment of error is as follows:
I
{¶4} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED APPELLEE'S
'MOTION TO SUPPRESS JUVENILE'S STATEMENT', AS APPELLEE WAS NOT
SUBJECTED TO CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION AND MADE THE STATEMENTS
VOLUNTARILY."
{¶5} Appellant claims the trial court erred in granting appellee's motion to
suppress under the totality of the circumstances, as appellee was not in custody and
her statements were made voluntarily. We disagree.
{¶6} There are three methods of challenging on appeal a trial court's ruling on a
motion to suppress. First, an appellant may challenge the trial court's findings of fact. Richland County, Case No. 16CA27 3
In reviewing a challenge of this nature, an appellate court must determine whether said
findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence. State v. Fanning, 1
Ohio St.3d 19 (1982); State v. Klein, 73 Ohio App.3d 486 (4th Dist.1991); State v.
Guysinger, 86 Ohio App.3d 592 (4th Dist.1993). Second, an appellant may argue the
trial court failed to apply the appropriate test or correct law to the findings of fact. In that
case, an appellate court can reverse the trial court for committing an error of law. State
v. Williams, 86 Ohio App.3d 37 (4th Dist.1993). Finally, assuming the trial court's
findings of fact are not against the manifest weight of the evidence and it has properly
identified the law to be applied, an appellant may argue the trial court has incorrectly
decided the ultimate or final issue raised in the motion to suppress. When reviewing
this type of claim, an appellate court must independently determine, without deference
to the trial court's conclusion, whether the facts meet the appropriate legal standard in
any given case. State v. Curry, 95 Ohio App.3d 93 (8th Dist.1994); State v. Claytor, 85
Ohio App.3d 623 (4th Dist.1993); Guysinger. As the United States Supreme Court held
in Ornelas v. U.S., 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663 (1996), "…as a general matter
determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de
novo on appeal."
{¶7} In its judgment entry filed May 16, 2016, the trial court granted appellee's
motion to suppress, finding she was not in custody and therefore Miranda warnings
were not necessary, even though Detective David Scheurer read the "Miranda Card"
(State's Exhibit 1) to appellee: Richland County, Case No. 16CA27 4
5. The Court finds based upon the totality of the circumstances that
the Juvenile did not understand her Miranda rights at the time of her
questioning.
6. The Court finds there is no credible evidence on the electronic
recording to indicate the Juvenile understood her right to an attorney
based upon the perfunctory manner in which the Miranda rights were
presented to her.
7. The Court further finds that the detective misled the Juvenile
about what it was and why she was signing a waiver of rights.
8. The Court finds the Juvenile did not knowingly and intelligently
waive her rights based upon a totality of the circumstances.
{¶8} Appellee signed the Miranda Card on the back which states, "I have read
on this card the statement of my rights and understand what my rights are. I do not
wish to remain silent. I do not want an attorney present."
{¶9} Detective Scheurer admitted he told appellee to sign the card to prove
"that I read it to her." T. at 21. He testified appellee was fifteen years old and in his
opinion, she understood the conversation they were having, why she was being
questioned, and the words he was using, and she appeared normal and did not appear
to have diminished capacity. T. at 13-15, 18. He stated the interview lasted between
forty-five minutes to one hour. T. at 15. Appellee never requested her mother or
counsel. T. at 18-19. Richland County, Case No. 16CA27 5
{¶10} Marlo Brown, a school psychologist with Townsend Community School,
administered two General Intelligence Tests and an Academic Test to appellee and
testified appellee had a composite quotient of 65 and based on her age, she would be in
the lowest one per cent of same aged peers. T. at 55-56, 58, 59-60, 65, 75;
Defendant's Exhibit A. Ninety-nine percent "of all other students or kids in that
particular group would be higher than her." T. at 60. However, it was acknowledged
that appellee functioned sufficiently in a "brick and mortar" school when in elementary
school. T. at 79.
{¶11} The trial court had the benefit of viewing Detective Scheurer's entire
interview with appellee (State's Exhibit 2). We have also reviewed the entire interview.
At the outset, Detective Scheurer knew appellee was the only suspect of the criminal
act. Appellee was alone in the room with the door closed, and her mother was outside
the room. Although Detective Scheurer read the Miranda Card, he did not tell appellee
that her signature was a waiver of those rights. Immediately after making statements,
appellee was detained, cuffed, and placed into custody. The length of the interview was
in excess of one hour.
{¶12} Appellee was in tears over one-third of the interview. She chewed her
fingers, covered her head with a hood, and looked away from the detective. When
confronted with the fact that her first stories were not the truth and the detective knew
she did it, appellee told Detective Scheurer at least three times just to take her to jail.
On the other hand, Detective Scheurer had a calm and fatherly approach to appellee.
He kept his voice low and was persuasive that appellee could say it was just an
accident. Richland County, Case No. 16CA27 6
{¶13} In State v. Barker, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2016-Ohio-2708, ¶ 39, 41-42, the
Supreme Court of Ohio stated the following:
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[Cite as In re S.B., 2016-Ohio-7732.]
COURT OF APPEALS RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
IN THE MATTER OF: S.B. : JUDGES: : Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, P.J. ALLEGED DELINQUENT CHILD : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J. : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. : : Case No. 16CA27 : : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, Case No. 2016DEL45
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: November 9, 2016
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendant-Appellee
DANIEL M. ROGERS DAVID M. WATSON 38 South Park Street 3 North Main Street Mansfield, OH 44902 Suite 702 Mansfield, OH 44902 Richland County, Case No. 16CA27 2
Farmer, P.J.
{¶1} On January 15, 2016, appellee, S.B., a juvenile, was alleged to be
delinquent by virtue of committing one count of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02 with a
serious youthful offender specification pursuant to R.C. 2152.11. On March 9, 2016, the
Richland County Grand Jury indicted appellee for the specification.
{¶2} On April 1, 2016, appellee filed a motion to suppress her statements made
to police, claiming she did not understand or voluntarily waive her rights. Hearings were
held on April 6, and May 10, 2016. By judgment entry filed May 16, 2016, the trial court
granted the motion, finding appellant, the state of Ohio, failed to meet its burden that
appellee understood and knowingly waived her rights.
{¶3} Appellant filed an appeal and this matter is now before this court for
consideration. Assignment of error is as follows:
I
{¶4} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED APPELLEE'S
'MOTION TO SUPPRESS JUVENILE'S STATEMENT', AS APPELLEE WAS NOT
SUBJECTED TO CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION AND MADE THE STATEMENTS
VOLUNTARILY."
{¶5} Appellant claims the trial court erred in granting appellee's motion to
suppress under the totality of the circumstances, as appellee was not in custody and
her statements were made voluntarily. We disagree.
{¶6} There are three methods of challenging on appeal a trial court's ruling on a
motion to suppress. First, an appellant may challenge the trial court's findings of fact. Richland County, Case No. 16CA27 3
In reviewing a challenge of this nature, an appellate court must determine whether said
findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence. State v. Fanning, 1
Ohio St.3d 19 (1982); State v. Klein, 73 Ohio App.3d 486 (4th Dist.1991); State v.
Guysinger, 86 Ohio App.3d 592 (4th Dist.1993). Second, an appellant may argue the
trial court failed to apply the appropriate test or correct law to the findings of fact. In that
case, an appellate court can reverse the trial court for committing an error of law. State
v. Williams, 86 Ohio App.3d 37 (4th Dist.1993). Finally, assuming the trial court's
findings of fact are not against the manifest weight of the evidence and it has properly
identified the law to be applied, an appellant may argue the trial court has incorrectly
decided the ultimate or final issue raised in the motion to suppress. When reviewing
this type of claim, an appellate court must independently determine, without deference
to the trial court's conclusion, whether the facts meet the appropriate legal standard in
any given case. State v. Curry, 95 Ohio App.3d 93 (8th Dist.1994); State v. Claytor, 85
Ohio App.3d 623 (4th Dist.1993); Guysinger. As the United States Supreme Court held
in Ornelas v. U.S., 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663 (1996), "…as a general matter
determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de
novo on appeal."
{¶7} In its judgment entry filed May 16, 2016, the trial court granted appellee's
motion to suppress, finding she was not in custody and therefore Miranda warnings
were not necessary, even though Detective David Scheurer read the "Miranda Card"
(State's Exhibit 1) to appellee: Richland County, Case No. 16CA27 4
5. The Court finds based upon the totality of the circumstances that
the Juvenile did not understand her Miranda rights at the time of her
questioning.
6. The Court finds there is no credible evidence on the electronic
recording to indicate the Juvenile understood her right to an attorney
based upon the perfunctory manner in which the Miranda rights were
presented to her.
7. The Court further finds that the detective misled the Juvenile
about what it was and why she was signing a waiver of rights.
8. The Court finds the Juvenile did not knowingly and intelligently
waive her rights based upon a totality of the circumstances.
{¶8} Appellee signed the Miranda Card on the back which states, "I have read
on this card the statement of my rights and understand what my rights are. I do not
wish to remain silent. I do not want an attorney present."
{¶9} Detective Scheurer admitted he told appellee to sign the card to prove
"that I read it to her." T. at 21. He testified appellee was fifteen years old and in his
opinion, she understood the conversation they were having, why she was being
questioned, and the words he was using, and she appeared normal and did not appear
to have diminished capacity. T. at 13-15, 18. He stated the interview lasted between
forty-five minutes to one hour. T. at 15. Appellee never requested her mother or
counsel. T. at 18-19. Richland County, Case No. 16CA27 5
{¶10} Marlo Brown, a school psychologist with Townsend Community School,
administered two General Intelligence Tests and an Academic Test to appellee and
testified appellee had a composite quotient of 65 and based on her age, she would be in
the lowest one per cent of same aged peers. T. at 55-56, 58, 59-60, 65, 75;
Defendant's Exhibit A. Ninety-nine percent "of all other students or kids in that
particular group would be higher than her." T. at 60. However, it was acknowledged
that appellee functioned sufficiently in a "brick and mortar" school when in elementary
school. T. at 79.
{¶11} The trial court had the benefit of viewing Detective Scheurer's entire
interview with appellee (State's Exhibit 2). We have also reviewed the entire interview.
At the outset, Detective Scheurer knew appellee was the only suspect of the criminal
act. Appellee was alone in the room with the door closed, and her mother was outside
the room. Although Detective Scheurer read the Miranda Card, he did not tell appellee
that her signature was a waiver of those rights. Immediately after making statements,
appellee was detained, cuffed, and placed into custody. The length of the interview was
in excess of one hour.
{¶12} Appellee was in tears over one-third of the interview. She chewed her
fingers, covered her head with a hood, and looked away from the detective. When
confronted with the fact that her first stories were not the truth and the detective knew
she did it, appellee told Detective Scheurer at least three times just to take her to jail.
On the other hand, Detective Scheurer had a calm and fatherly approach to appellee.
He kept his voice low and was persuasive that appellee could say it was just an
accident. Richland County, Case No. 16CA27 6
{¶13} In State v. Barker, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2016-Ohio-2708, ¶ 39, 41-42, the
Supreme Court of Ohio stated the following:
The totality-of-the-circumstances test takes on even greater
importance when applied to a juvenile. A 14- or 15-year-old "cannot be
compared with an adult in full possession of his senses and
knowledgeable of the consequences of his admissions." Gallegos v.
Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 53–54, 82 S.Ct. 1209, 8 L.Ed.2d 325 (1962), citing
Haley, 332 U.S. 596, 68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224. The United States
Supreme Court has observed:
[A] 14–year–old boy, no matter how sophisticated, is
unlikely to have any conception of what will confront him
when he is made accessible only to the police. That is to
say, we deal with a person who is not equal to the police in
knowledge and understanding of the consequences of the
questions and answers being recorded and who is unable to
know how to protect his own interests or how to get the
benefits of his constitutional rights.
Id. at 54, 82 S.Ct. 1209. Richland County, Case No. 16CA27 7
" 'It is now commonly recognized that courts should take "special
care" in scrutinizing a purported confession or waiver by a child.' " In re
C.S., 115 Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 874 N.E.2d 1177, at ¶ 106,
quoting In re Manuel R., 207 Conn. 725, 737–738, 543 A.2d 719 (1988),
citing Haley, 332 U.S. at 599, 68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224. When an
admission is obtained from a juvenile without counsel, "the greatest care
must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense
not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the
product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair."
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 55, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527.
The totality of the circumstances from which a court must determine
the voluntariness of a juvenile's statement includes not only the details of
the interrogation but also the juvenile's unique characteristics. That
analysis here would necessarily include consideration of factors such as
Barker's age, the late-night time of the interrogation, the absence of a
parent or guardian, Barker's "borderline intelligence" and third-grade
reading level, Barker's statement that he was not familiar with Miranda
rights other than having heard of them from television, and Barker's
apparent confusion about what an attorney was. Application of the
statutory presumption would remove all consideration of the juvenile's
unique characteristics from the due-process analysis unless the juvenile
introduced evidence to disprove voluntariness when the interrogation was
electronically recorded. But there is no rational relationship between the Richland County, Case No. 16CA27 8
existence of an electronic recording and the voluntariness of a suspect's
statement. This is especially true where, as with R.C. 2933.81(B), the
statute requires only that the statement sought to be admitted, not the
entire interrogation, be recorded.
{¶14} We are disinclined to embrace the trial court's conclusion that appellee
was not in custody. We further find there is no affirmative waiver of appellee's
constitutional rights. Appellee's signature on State's Exhibit 1 was at the detective's
direction and was a mere acknowledgment that he had read her the rights card.
{¶15} Appellee's I.Q., demeanor, and childlike actions during the interview lead
us to conclude that the admissions were at the suggestion of the detective and not
voluntary.
{¶16} Upon review, we find the trial court did not err in granting the motion to
suppress.
{¶17} The sole assignment of error is denied. Richland County, Case No. 16CA27 9
{¶18} The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Richland County, Ohio is
hereby affirmed.
By Farmer, P.J.
Gwin, J. and
Delaney, J. concur.
SGF/sg 1017