[Cite as In re S.B., 2015-Ohio-4284.]
COURT OF APPEALS STARK COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
IN RE: S.B. : JUDGES: : Hon. John W. Wise, P.J. : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. : : : Case No. 2015CA00012 : : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, Family Court Division, Case No. 2014-JCR-01759
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: October 13, 2015
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
JOHN D. FERRERO ANTHONY KOUKOUTAS Prosecuting Attorney 116 Cleveland Ave., North Canton, Ohio 44702 By: RONALD MARK CALDWELL Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 110 Central Plaza South, Suite 510 Canton, Ohio 44702 Stark County, Case No. 2015CA00012 2
Baldwin, J.
{¶1} Appellant S.B. appeals a judgment of the Stark County Common Pleas
Court, Family Court Division, finding him delinquent by reason of domestic violence
(R.C. 2919.25(C)). Appellee is the State of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} Appellant and his girlfriend, A.C., had a child together. As of July 27,
2014, the date of the incident giving rise to the charge of delinquency by reason of
domestic violence, they had been together almost two years. A.C. lived with her
mother, her stepfather, and her baby daughter, while appellant lived with his family.
{¶3} A conflict developed between the two families regarding visitation with the
baby. Appellant wanted to have visitation, while his mother refused to acknowledge that
the child was his. She called Child Services claiming that the child was not her
granddaughter, and threatened to sue because she believed S.B. had been forced to
sign the birth certificate. Child Services told A.C. not to allow S.B.'s family to see the
child until a formal visitation schedule was set.
{¶4} On July 27, 2014, A.C. and appellant were together in A.C.'s bedroom.
Appellant's mother or sister called him, asking him to bring the baby to their home to
visit. A.C. told appellant that he could not take the child. He responded by punching
the bed and screaming at A.C., "Motherfucker, I'll fuck you up, bitch." A.C. was afraid
that appellant would harm her physically, and she believed his threat to cause her
physical harm was credible. Stark County, Case No. 2015CA00012 3
{¶5} A.C.'s mother and stepfather heard S.B. screaming. When A.C.'s mother
ran into the room, appellant confronted her while flexing at her, without his shirt on.
A.C. jumped between them, asking appellant to calm down. Appellant responded by
lifting the bed into the air. A.C.'s mother told appellant to leave the home.
{¶6} Instead of leaving, appellant continued to scream at A.C. He went into the
living room, where he kicked the sofa near where the baby was seated in a jumper.
A.C. and her mother went outside, hoping that appellant would follow and leave the
house, but he screamed, "What the fuck ever," and slammed the door shut. A.C.'s
mother called 911.
{¶7} Officer Dominic Antenora of the Perry Township Police Department
responded to the call. A.C. told him that a verbal dispute ensued over child custody
issues, that appellant had threatened her with physical harm, and she believed the
threat to be credible. Appellant admitted that they had a verbal dispute, but denied any
threats of physical harm.
{¶8} Appellant was charged with delinquency by reason of domestic violence.
The case proceeded to trial before a magistrate. Appellant testified that he became
angry when A.C. refused to let him take the baby to visit his family, and said, "This is
fucking bullshit." He testified that he got his clothes to leave, but could not find his car
keys, so he sat in his car until the police arrived. He denied flipping the bed in the air,
denied flexing, denied kicking anything, and denied threatening anyone.
{¶9} Following the hearing, the magistrate found the complaint to be true and
recommended that appellant be sentenced to community control, with the special
condition that he successfully complete the Alliance Municipal Court's anger Stark County, Case No. 2015CA00012 4
management program. Appellant filed an objection, arguing that the decision was
against the manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence. The judge overruled the
objection and adopted the magistrate's decision as the decision of the court.
{¶10} Appellant assigns a single error:
{¶11} "THE JUVENILE'S ADJUDICATION AS A JUVENILE OFFENDER WAS
AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE."
{¶12} Appellant argues that the magistrate and the court erred in believing the
testimony of A.C., her mother, and her stepfather rather than his own testimony.
{¶13} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile case, we
apply the same standard of review applicable to criminal convictions. In re Watson, 47
Ohio St.3d 86, 91, 548 N.E.2d 210 (1989). The standard of review for a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence is set forth in State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d
492 (1991) at paragraph two of the syllabus, in which the Ohio Supreme Court held, “An
appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether
such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence
in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”
{¶14} In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict by
the trier of fact, it is the mind of the trier of fact, rather than the reviewing court, that
must be convinced. State v. Thomas, 70 Ohio St.2d 79, 434 N.E.2d 1356 (1982). In
applying this standard of review, the question of credibility of conflicting testimony and Stark County, Case No. 2015CA00012 5
the weight to be accorded certain evidence are matters left primarily to the trier of fact.
State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967). A reviewing court should
not disturb the decision below unless it finds that reasonable minds could not reach the
conclusion reached by the trier of fact. Jenks, supra, 61 Ohio St.3d at 273.
{¶15} In determining whether a verdict is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, the appellate court reviews the entire record, weighs the evidence and all
reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses, and determines whether in
resolving conflicts in evidence the trier of fact “clearly lost its way and created such a
manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial
ordered.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St. 3d 380, 387, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541,
quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App. 3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1983).
{¶16} Domestic violence is defined by R.C. 2919.25(C), which states, "No
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[Cite as In re S.B., 2015-Ohio-4284.]
COURT OF APPEALS STARK COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
IN RE: S.B. : JUDGES: : Hon. John W. Wise, P.J. : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. : : : Case No. 2015CA00012 : : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, Family Court Division, Case No. 2014-JCR-01759
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: October 13, 2015
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
JOHN D. FERRERO ANTHONY KOUKOUTAS Prosecuting Attorney 116 Cleveland Ave., North Canton, Ohio 44702 By: RONALD MARK CALDWELL Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 110 Central Plaza South, Suite 510 Canton, Ohio 44702 Stark County, Case No. 2015CA00012 2
Baldwin, J.
{¶1} Appellant S.B. appeals a judgment of the Stark County Common Pleas
Court, Family Court Division, finding him delinquent by reason of domestic violence
(R.C. 2919.25(C)). Appellee is the State of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} Appellant and his girlfriend, A.C., had a child together. As of July 27,
2014, the date of the incident giving rise to the charge of delinquency by reason of
domestic violence, they had been together almost two years. A.C. lived with her
mother, her stepfather, and her baby daughter, while appellant lived with his family.
{¶3} A conflict developed between the two families regarding visitation with the
baby. Appellant wanted to have visitation, while his mother refused to acknowledge that
the child was his. She called Child Services claiming that the child was not her
granddaughter, and threatened to sue because she believed S.B. had been forced to
sign the birth certificate. Child Services told A.C. not to allow S.B.'s family to see the
child until a formal visitation schedule was set.
{¶4} On July 27, 2014, A.C. and appellant were together in A.C.'s bedroom.
Appellant's mother or sister called him, asking him to bring the baby to their home to
visit. A.C. told appellant that he could not take the child. He responded by punching
the bed and screaming at A.C., "Motherfucker, I'll fuck you up, bitch." A.C. was afraid
that appellant would harm her physically, and she believed his threat to cause her
physical harm was credible. Stark County, Case No. 2015CA00012 3
{¶5} A.C.'s mother and stepfather heard S.B. screaming. When A.C.'s mother
ran into the room, appellant confronted her while flexing at her, without his shirt on.
A.C. jumped between them, asking appellant to calm down. Appellant responded by
lifting the bed into the air. A.C.'s mother told appellant to leave the home.
{¶6} Instead of leaving, appellant continued to scream at A.C. He went into the
living room, where he kicked the sofa near where the baby was seated in a jumper.
A.C. and her mother went outside, hoping that appellant would follow and leave the
house, but he screamed, "What the fuck ever," and slammed the door shut. A.C.'s
mother called 911.
{¶7} Officer Dominic Antenora of the Perry Township Police Department
responded to the call. A.C. told him that a verbal dispute ensued over child custody
issues, that appellant had threatened her with physical harm, and she believed the
threat to be credible. Appellant admitted that they had a verbal dispute, but denied any
threats of physical harm.
{¶8} Appellant was charged with delinquency by reason of domestic violence.
The case proceeded to trial before a magistrate. Appellant testified that he became
angry when A.C. refused to let him take the baby to visit his family, and said, "This is
fucking bullshit." He testified that he got his clothes to leave, but could not find his car
keys, so he sat in his car until the police arrived. He denied flipping the bed in the air,
denied flexing, denied kicking anything, and denied threatening anyone.
{¶9} Following the hearing, the magistrate found the complaint to be true and
recommended that appellant be sentenced to community control, with the special
condition that he successfully complete the Alliance Municipal Court's anger Stark County, Case No. 2015CA00012 4
management program. Appellant filed an objection, arguing that the decision was
against the manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence. The judge overruled the
objection and adopted the magistrate's decision as the decision of the court.
{¶10} Appellant assigns a single error:
{¶11} "THE JUVENILE'S ADJUDICATION AS A JUVENILE OFFENDER WAS
AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE."
{¶12} Appellant argues that the magistrate and the court erred in believing the
testimony of A.C., her mother, and her stepfather rather than his own testimony.
{¶13} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile case, we
apply the same standard of review applicable to criminal convictions. In re Watson, 47
Ohio St.3d 86, 91, 548 N.E.2d 210 (1989). The standard of review for a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence is set forth in State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d
492 (1991) at paragraph two of the syllabus, in which the Ohio Supreme Court held, “An
appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether
such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence
in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”
{¶14} In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict by
the trier of fact, it is the mind of the trier of fact, rather than the reviewing court, that
must be convinced. State v. Thomas, 70 Ohio St.2d 79, 434 N.E.2d 1356 (1982). In
applying this standard of review, the question of credibility of conflicting testimony and Stark County, Case No. 2015CA00012 5
the weight to be accorded certain evidence are matters left primarily to the trier of fact.
State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967). A reviewing court should
not disturb the decision below unless it finds that reasonable minds could not reach the
conclusion reached by the trier of fact. Jenks, supra, 61 Ohio St.3d at 273.
{¶15} In determining whether a verdict is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, the appellate court reviews the entire record, weighs the evidence and all
reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses, and determines whether in
resolving conflicts in evidence the trier of fact “clearly lost its way and created such a
manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial
ordered.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St. 3d 380, 387, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541,
quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App. 3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1983).
{¶16} Domestic violence is defined by R.C. 2919.25(C), which states, "No
person, by threat of force, shall knowingly cause a family or household member to
believe that the offender will cause imminent physical harm to the family or household
member."
{¶17} In the instant case, the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to
allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the offense of domestic violence proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. A.C. testified that when she told appellant he could not take the
baby, he began punching the bed and screaming, "Motherfucker, I'll fuck you up, bitch."
She believed he would physically harm her, and she was afraid. She testified that when
her mother came into the room, he flexed at her. She testified that he continued
screaming, and kicked the couch and a kitchen chair. When she and her mother went
outside, he slammed the door, screaming, "What the fuck ever." Stark County, Case No. 2015CA00012 6
{¶18} A.C.'s mother testified that she was cleaning her room when she heard
appellant screaming. She heard him say, "I will fuck you up, bitch" to her daughter.
She went into her daughter's room, where appellant confronted her by flexing at her,
without his shirt on. He lifted up A.C.'s bed and threw it in the air. She also testified that
appellant continued screaming, he kicked the couch near where the baby was seated in
a jumper, and he kicked a chair.
{¶19} This testimony was sufficient, if believed by the trier of fact, to support a
finding of delinquency by reason of domestic violence.
{¶20} As to appellant's manifest weight claim, appellant argues that A.C., her
mother, and her stepfather all have a similar motivation to lie, because they do not want
him to gain visitation with his daughter. However, appellant has a similar motivation to
lie, as an adjudication of domestic violence would impact any custody and visitation
decision. Appellant injected the issue of the impact of the case on custody and
visitation into the trial, and the magistrate was therefore aware of the possible
motivation of all of the witnesses to lie. However, the magistrate, who was in the best
position to assess the credibility of the witnesses, chose to believe A.C. and her family
and to disbelieve appellant. The judgment was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Stark County, Case No. 2015CA00012 7
{¶21} The assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Stark County
Common Pleas Court, Family Court Division, is affirmed. Costs are assessed to
appellant.
By: Baldwin, J.
Wise, P.J. and
Delaney, J. concur.