In Re Samantha B., (Dec. 26, 1997)

1997 Conn. Super. Ct. 13217
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedDecember 26, 1997
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1997 Conn. Super. Ct. 13217 (In Re Samantha B., (Dec. 26, 1997)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Samantha B., (Dec. 26, 1997), 1997 Conn. Super. Ct. 13217 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]MEMORANDUM OF DECISION Nature of Proceeding

On April 30, 1997, twenty-seven month old Samantha B., who had spent none of her life with either of her biological parents, became the subject of this petition by which her legal guardian, the Department of Children and Families (DCF), seeks to terminate the parental rights of Evelyn M. and Jason B, her mother and acknowledged father, so that she could secure a permanent home through adoption. The sole ground alleged for terminating the mother's parental rights1 was her failure to rehabilitate within the meaning of subsection (c) of Sec. 17a-112 of the Conn. Gen. Stats. (Rev. 1997):

the parent of a child who has been found by the Superior Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child;

The initial hearing was not scheduled in the court location at which it was filed until June 17, 1997, notwithstanding the applicable statutory requirement that ". . . the time for hearing shall be not more than thirty days after the filing of the petition." Sec. 45a-716(a), incorporated by reference into Sec. 17a-112, subsection (b) for all cases concerning children previously committed to DCF as neglected or uncared for under Sec. 46b-129, subsection (d). Like the time parameters for filing petitions to extend commitments 90 days prior to the expiration of such commitments, the "shall" in Sec. 45a-716 (a) is deemed directory rather than mandatory, under the reasoning of In Re Adrien C., 9 Conn. App. 506, 510-512 (1987). The mother's failure to object to this late scheduling of the initial hearing thus constitutes a waiver of any right she might have had to do so. Id., at 511-512.

Two months after the initial hearing, the petitioner's oral motion to amend to add consent as grounds for terminating the father's parental rights was granted by agreement, and the court, after canvassing Jason B., found his consent, having been made voluntarily, knowingly and with the advice of counsel, to be a valid ground for terminating his parental rights. The allegation of Evelyn's failure to rehabilitate as grounds for terminating CT Page 13219 her parental rights, so as to free the child for adoption, remained contested and was transferred for trial to the Child Protection Session of the Superior Court sitting at Middleton.

At the outset of the initial trial date of October 14, 1997, the court found the mother competent to participate in the trial, based upon an evaluation performed by psychiatrist Dr. Richard Sadler. (Testimony of October 24, 1997, Court's Exh. 1.) On that date, and on a final date two weeks later, the mother appeared, represented by the same attorney who had represented her since DCF first took custody of Samantha shortly after her birth.

At the conclusion of trial, closing arguments were made on the record in lieu of counsel submitting written trial memoranda. The adjudicatory date is thus April 30, 1997, the date the petition was filed under Practice Book Sec. 1042.1, subsection (4)1; the dispositional date is October 28, 1997, the same date on which decision was reserved.

Facts

Evidence offered at trial interpreted in the light of the prior record in this court concerning Samantha and judicial notice taken of all court actions affecting her which preceded initiation of this action, supports the following findings of fact:

Samantha was conceived one month after her acknowledged father, Jason B., was arrested for risk of injury, based upon allegations of sexual abuse of several children. He subsequently was convicted and sentenced to probation until January 3, 2000, conditioned upon his having no unsupervised contact with any child under the age of sixteen. (State's Exh. 2, pp. 7-8.) Samantha was born on January 20, 1995 at 26 weeks gestation, weighing approximately twenty ounces. She remained in hospitals with a variety of respiratory and eating difficulties until she stabilized sufficiently to be placed into a specialized foster home on September 2, 1995, where she has remained until the present.

A referral was made to DCF when the infant was only three weeks old because of concerns of hospital staff about the mother's ability to care for the child based upon their observations of her intellectual limitations, and her plan to CT Page 13220 take the baby to live in the home where she then lived with her mother and brothers, one of whom, she reported, was retarded and had physically abused her in the past. Evelyn also expressed her disbelief that Jason had committed the acts for which he was convicted, did not believe he would present any risk of danger to Samantha in the future, and planned to marry him and make a home with him for the baby. (Id., p. 7.) In late March, hospital staff complained to DCF that Evelyn repeatedly overstimulated this fragile baby, causing "severe distress". (Id. P. 8.) Overstimulation increased her difficulty breathing, causing her to turn blue. The staff nurse was concerned when Evelyn asked her, "Does she stand on her head, because her father does that?" She did not appear to understand how difficult it was to get nutrition into Samantha or avoid temporary asphyxiation, claiming that she knew how to care for children because of having taken care of nephews and nieces. She became increasingly agitated when told that DCF would be seeking temporary custody, and after telling the DCF social worker that she would "rather see her daughter dead than in foster care" and that she "meant it", hospital staff requested that DCF obtain temporary custody since the hospital could not provide constant supervision during parental visits. On April 19, DCF obtained a 96-hour administrative hold so that the agency could ensure supervision during all such visits, and the next day filed a neglect petition with the Superior Court and obtained an Order of Temporary Custody (OTC). Following a contested hearing on June 5 on the necessity for an OTC under these circumstances (See In ReJuvenile Appeal (83-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 289, (1983) for criteria), the court confirmed the OTC, enabling the child to be placed directly into a specialized foster home when ready to leave the hospital three months later. On January 29, 1996, following receipt of a psychological evaluation conducted by Dr. Robert Meier, the parents entered nolo pleas to the allegation that the child was uncared for within the sense of having specialized needs that could not be met in the parental homes, based upon the inability or unavailability of both parents to meet the extraordinarily specialized physical and developmental needs of this premature baby. The court also found the child to have been neglected by the mother for failing to provide Samantha with proper care and attention.

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Related

In re Juvenile Appeal (83-CD)
455 A.2d 1313 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1983)
In re Luis C.
554 A.2d 722 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1989)
In re Adrien C.
519 A.2d 1241 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1987)
In re Christina V.
660 A.2d 863 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1995)

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Bluebook (online)
1997 Conn. Super. Ct. 13217, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-samantha-b-dec-26-1997-connsuperct-1997.