In Re S3 Ltd.

242 B.R. 872, 1999 WL 1288508
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Virginia
DecidedDecember 6, 1999
Docket19-70178
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 242 B.R. 872 (In Re S3 Ltd.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re S3 Ltd., 242 B.R. 872, 1999 WL 1288508 (Va. 1999).

Opinion

*874 Memorandum Opinion and Order Concerning Motion to Quash Subpoena of S3 By Goodman and Company

STEPHEN C. ST. JOHN, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter came on for hearing upon the Motion to Quash Subpoena of S3 Ltd. [“S3”] filed by Goodman and Company [“Goodman”]. Management Consulting, Inc. [“Mancon”], a creditor of S3, has filed a claim in this matter representing its prepetition claim against S3 [“Pre-petition Claim”] and a second claim representing its losses as a result of S3’s rejection of certain subcontracts entered into between S3 and Mancon [“Rejection Claim”]. S3 has objected to both of Mancon’s claims and has filed a counterclaim against Man-con. In its counterclaim, S3 seeks damages for certain alleged contractual breaches and fraudulent conduct on the part of Mancon relating to entry into these subcontracts and of alleged breaches of an agreement made by S3 and Mancon in anticipation of the entry into these now rejected subcontracts.

The Rejection Claim filed by Mancon exhibits a report prepared by Goodman which calculates the total Rejection Claim to be in excess of $10,00,000.00. The Rejection Claim was prepared by Mr. Kenneth Bricker of Goodman [“Bricker”]. Prior to issuance of the subpoena to Goodman that is the subject of this hearing, the working materials Bricker used in the Rejection Claim’s preparation had been produced to S3.

On October 27, 1999, S3 caused to be issued and served upon Goodman a subpoena that, among other items, required the production of “[a]ll workpapers for the financial statements for Mancon for years 1996-1998.” Goodman, on November 2, 1999, filed its objection to the production of materials responsive to this request. Goodman moved to quash this portion of the subpoena on the basis that (i) it requested production of documents and information proprietary to Goodman; (ii) it imposed upon Goodman an undue burden and expense; and (iii) the subpoena, which had as its return date November 3,1999 at 9:00 a.m., did not provide Goodman with a reasonable period of time within which to comply with the requested production. At the hearing on the Motion to Quash, Goodman asserted, as an additional basis for objection, that the request for workpapers is not calculated to lead to admissible evidence.

At the hearing, Bricker testified that he prepared the Rejection Claim for Mancon and, in doing so, extracted documents from the 1996, 1997 and 1998 Goodman financial statement workpaper files [“Workpapers”]. Bricker also testified that he did not pre *875 pare any portion of the 1996, 1997 or 1998 financial statements for Mancon. Mr. Jeffrey L. Karr [“Karr”], a partner at Goodman, testified that he, along with other principals and employees of Goodman, prepared Mancon’s 1996, 1997 and 1998 financial statements, and that the Workpapers for these statements would amount to roughly three inches of paper per year— nine inches altogether. Karr asserted that the revelation of the Goodman Workpapers for the financial statements in question would permit competitors access to Goodman’s specialized techniques' for providing professional services to government contractors. Karr stated that Goodman had developed these techniques over a long period of time and that divulging them would allow Goodman’s competitors to avail themselves of these specialized techniques by “reverse engineering” the information contained in the Workpapers. Karr further testified that Goodman had developed manuals, procedures and checklists concerning the provisions of accounting services to their clients, all of which reflect proprietary information of Goodman. Karr objected to the discovery of any of the documents contained within the Workpapers.

After the conclusion of the evidence introduced at the hearing, the Court overruled Goodman’s objection that the provision of the Workpapers would constitute an undue burden. Notwithstanding that the responsive documents were described as “nine inches” in girth, the Workpapers apparently were already segregated in separate annual files. The Rejection Claim being litigated is in excess of $10,-000,000.00; it must be expected that the process to prove or disprove the appropriate amount of this case will be document intensive. Thus, while the amount of Workpapers is extensive, it is not so voluminous as to constitute an undue burden considering the nature of the Rejection Claim.

The Court also overruled Goodman’s objection that the information sought was not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. Bricker’s testimony was unequivocal that he utilized information derived from the Workpapers in the preparation of the Rejection Claim. Fairness dictates that, in the absence of valid privilege, S3 be permitted to review the source of information that Bricker reviewed and, as a result of his review, derived therefrom portions of the claim calculation .upon which Mancon relied. It is doubtless that methodology and information utilized to compile the Rejection Claim will be the subject of extensive evidentiary and testimonial production at the hearing to be conducted on S3’s objection to the Rejection Claim. The standard that the materials for which discovery is sought must be reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence easily permits the discovery of the Workpapers upon which Bricker relied, at least in part, in the calculation of the Rejection Claim.

With respect to the objection founded on the proprietary nature of the Workpapers, the Court elected to require the production of the documents for an in camera review thereof to permit the Court to better understand the nature of the claimed proprietary interest of Goodman in the Work-papers. The Court found this review to be necessary particularly given Karr’s assertion that all of the responsive documents should not be required to be produced because of the resulting betrayal of confidential or proprietary information.

In analyzing the obligation of an accountant to surrender his Workpapers, we start with the premise that there is no accountant-client privilege under federal law. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18, 104 S.Ct. 1495, 79 L.Ed.2d 826 (1984); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335, 93 S.Ct. 611, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973). Accordingly, *876 all substantive information contained in accountant’s workpapers pertaining to the financial affairs of the accountant’s client are proper subjects for discovery. See Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Creditor’s Comm. of Northeast Dairy Coop. Fed’n. Inc., 65 B.R. 886, 887 (N.D.N.Y.1986).

This scope of discovery may be limited, however, where an accountant asserts a valid claim for protection of the information for which discovery is sought on the basis of preventing disclosure of a trade secret or confidential commercial information. Id. On the issue of when a party may prevent disclosure of such information, Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9016 incorporates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
242 B.R. 872, 1999 WL 1288508, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-s3-ltd-vaeb-1999.