In re Ryan

12 B.R. 425, 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 3434
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedJuly 2, 1981
DocketBankruptcy No. 80-00123G
StatusPublished

This text of 12 B.R. 425 (In re Ryan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Ryan, 12 B.R. 425, 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 3434 (Pa. 1981).

Opinion

OPINION

EMIL F. GOLDHABER, Bankruptcy Judge:

The issue at bench is whetheh a judicial lien and a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-mon-ey security interest in household goods, both of which arose prior to the enactment date of the Bankruptcy Code (“the Code”), may [426]*426be avoided by the debtors pursuant to § 522(f) of the Code. We conclude that § 522(f) is constitutional as applied to pre-enactment liens and the debtors may therefore avoid those liens pursuant to that section.

The facts of the instant case are as follows: 1 Sometime in 1977, Thomas J. and Ethel Ryan (“the debtors”) entered into a loan transaction with Provident Consumer Discount Company (“Provident”) by which the debtors granted to Provident a nonpos-sessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in certain of their household goods. Thereafter, when the debtors defaulted on that loan, Provident instituted suit and obtained a judgment thereon against the debtors. Provident then levied on the personal property of the debtors effecting a judicial lien thereon.

On January 16, 1980, the debtors filed a petition for relief under chapter 7 of the Code and on January 30, 1981, they filed an application to avoid several liens on the property which they had claimed as exempt. Among the liens which the debtors sought to avoid were the three held by Provident: (1) the nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in household goods, (2) the judgment lien on the debtors’ real property and (3) the execution lien on the debtors’ personal property. Provident objected to the avoidance of those liens.

Provident admits that the above three liens fit within the provisions of § 522(f)2 but asserts that that section is unconstitutional as applied to Provident’s liens which were created prior to the enactment date of the Code3 because to so apply it would be a deprivation of property without due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.4 We do not agree with Provident’s contentions. In In re Paden, 10 B.R. 206 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Pa. 1981), we held that the application of § 522(f)(2) to pre-enactment liens was not an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process because that section was not so grossly arbitrary and unreasonable as to be “incompatible with fundamental law.” Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 192, 22 S.Ct. 857, 862, 46 L.Ed. 1113 (1901).

We conclude that the same analysis applies herein to § 522(f)(1) as well as § 522(f)(2) and that neither subsection is so grossly arbitrary and unreasonable as to be “incompatible with fundamental law.” Consequently, we conclude that Provident’s liens may be avoided by the debtors herein.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Hanover National Bank v. Moyses
186 U.S. 181 (Supreme Court, 1902)
Paden v. G.E.C.C. Consumer Discount Co. (In Re Paden)
10 B.R. 206 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1981)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
12 B.R. 425, 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 3434, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-ryan-paeb-1981.