In re R.V.

2020 IL App (3d) 200173-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: September 4, 2020
• Docket: 3-20-0173
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2020 IL App (3d) 200173-U

Order filed September 4, 2020 ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

In re R.V. and V.V., ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the 10th Judicial Circuit, Minors ) Peoria County, Illinois. ) (The People of the State of Illinois, ) ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) Appeal Nos. 3-20-0173 and 3-20-0174 ) Circuit Nos. 16-JA-170 and 18-JA-88 v. ) ) Michael V., ) Honorable ) Timothy J. Cusack, Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE CARTER delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Lytton and Justice Wright concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court’s determination that it was in the best interest of the minors to terminate the respondent’s parental rights was not against manifest weight of the evidence.

¶2 The respondent, Michael V., appeals from the circuit court’s order terminating his

parental rights as to his minor children, R.V. and V.V. On appeal, respondent argues the trial court’s finding that it was in the best interest of the minors to terminate his parental rights was

against the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 R.V. was born in November 2015, and V.V. was born in February 2018. Respondent is

the minors’ biological father.

¶5 On July 23, 2016, and February 27, 2018, the State filed petitions for the adjudication of

wardship of R.V. and V.V., respectively. The State alleged in the petitions that the minors were

neglected in that their environment was injurious to their welfare and that the minors’ mother

and respondent had previously been found unfit with no subsequent finding of fitness.

¶6 Specific to the petition regarding R.V. (case no. 16-JA-170) filed on July 23, 2016, the

State alleged that respondent had previously been found unfit in case no 13-JA-301 on July 2,

2014, had not completed all services that would result in a finding of fitness, was a registered sex

offender (convicted in 2009 for “indirect solicitation/aggravated criminal sexual abuse”), had

previously been a juvenile sex offender (as to three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault),

and had been assessed as being at high risk for reoffending. On November 3, 2016, the parties

stipulated to the allegations of neglect regarding R.V. and agreed to an immediate dispositional

hearing, during which the trial court found respondent unfit.

¶7 Specific to the petition regarding V.V. (case no. 18-JA-88) filed on February 27, 2018,

the State asserted the same allegations as set forth in the petition related to R.V. and additionally

alleged that: respondent had previously been found unfit in two cases (no 13-JA-301 on July 2,

2014, and no. 16-JA-170 (R.V.’s case) on November 3, 2016); following the birth of V.V.,

respondent and the minors’ mother told hospital staff that the Department of Children and

Family Services (DCFS) had not met with them and that they were allowed to be unsupervised

2 with V.V., which was not true; and respondent had mental health problems, which included

adjustment disorders (including schizoid, avoidant, schizotypal, and paranoid features, persistent

depressive disorder, and psychological trauma).

¶8 On April 18, 2018, the minors’ mother surrendered her parental rights to the minors.

¶9 On May 2, 2018, respondent stipulated to the allegations in the neglect petition, and the

circuit court found V.V. to be neglected. On May 30, 2018, the circuit court entered a

dispositional order indicating it found respondent to be unfit.

¶ 10 On December 2, 2019, the State filed petitions to terminate respondent’s parental rights

as to R.V. and V.V.. In the termination petitions, the State alleged respondent was an unfit

person pursuant to section 50/1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West

2018)) in that respondent failed to make reasonable progress toward the return home of the

minor during any nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect, with the nine-month

period being March 2, 2019, to December 2, 2019. On March 11, 2020, the trial court found

that the State had proven the allegations of unfitness set forth in the termination petition. By

agreement of the parties, the best interest hearing took place immediately following the unfitness

hearing.

¶ 11 At the best interest hearing, the circuit court asked if all parties received the best interest

report for the minors, and they acknowledged having received reports for the minors. The best

interest report indicated that at the time of the report, R.V. (age 4) had been in substitute care for

1027 days (since July 13, 2016) and had been living with his current foster family for 825 days

(since November 28, 2017, after being transferred from another foster family). V.V. (age 2) had

been in substitute care since February 2018 (shortly after her birth), at which time she was placed

in her current foster home with R.V. (her biological brother). The foster parents’ home was

3 observed by the caseworker as having adequate food, being in a good state of repair, and having

adequate space for the family. There were no apparent safety issues with the home. The foster

parents provided appropriate medical care for the minors. The minors’ safety and welfare needs

(including food, shelter, clothing, health, and education) were being met by their foster parents.

Both R.V. and V.V. attended church with their foster parents. The minors’ sense of security and

familiarity was with their foster family. Both minors referred to their foster parents as “mom”

and “dad” and referred to their older foster siblings as their family. When the minors were upset,

they wanted to be with their foster parents. The foster parents were willing and able to adopt

R.V. and V.V.

¶ 12 The best interest report further indicated that R.V. was enrolled in preschool and the

foster parents provided him with all needed school supplies, met with the teacher on a regular

basis, and attended school meetings and conferences. R.V. was doing well in school, and,

according to R.V.’s teacher, the minors’ foster mother was very involved with his schooling.

R.V. attended speech therapy through his school program as well as speech and occupational

therapy at Children’s Hospital in Peoria. R.V.’s speech was improving.

¶ 13 The caseworker also indicated in the best interest report that the minors’ relationship with

respondent was minimal, with them having visits with him only one hour per month. The

supervising worker reported that R.V. and V.V. did not acknowledge respondent much during

visits and, instead, played together on their own. The caseworker noted in the best interest report

that the minors had a strong relationship with their foster mother. The minors’ foster mother

loved the minors, and she viewed them as if they were her own children. The minors were very

comfortable around their foster parents. The minors smiled, laughed, and interacted positively

with both their foster mom and their foster dad. The minors had strong bonds with their older

4 foster siblings. R.V. made friends through preschool and church, and V.V. made friends through

church. In the best interest report, the caseworker indicated that she believed it was in the best

interest of the minors to terminate respondent’s parental rights, noting their need for

permanency.

¶ 14 Respondent testified that he felt that he had a bond with R.V., like any other parent would

have with their child. Respondent further testified that R.V. knew him as “dad.” Respondent

described his relationship with R.V. as loving and close. Respondent testified that R.V. did not

want their visits to end and at the conclusion of their visits, R.V. did not want to leave

respondent’s side. Respondent testified there was physical affection between him and R.V., such

as hugging and playing. R.V. started to bring a mask and cape to visits for respondent to wear.

During the visits, respondent would let R.V. choose the music to play or the movie to watch.

Respondent described R.V. as excited and happy during their visits. Respondent testified that at

the end of visits, R.V. stated, “[d]ad, go home” or “[h]ome dad,” which respondent believed was

an indication that R.V. wanted to go home with respondent. Respondent further testified that

V.V. said “daddy” in reference to him and that his visits with V.V. go just the same as with R.V.

¶ 15 Respondent testified that he had food and clothes for the minors. Respondent doubted

that the minors’ current placement was suitable because he saw a picture of a dog with R.V. and

the dog’s expression appeared unsafe. He also believed the minors’ current placement was

unsuitable because he believed it was important for kids to celebrate holidays, such as Christmas,

Halloween, and Easter. He was told by the minors’ foster family that they did not celebrate

Halloween, and he suspected that they did not celebrate any holidays. Respondent also believed

that the minors’ placement was not in the minors’ best interest because he is their parent.

Respondent testified the minors had never been in his daily care.

5 ¶ 16 The minors’ foster mother testified that she has been R.V.’s foster mother since

November 2017, after he transferred from another foster family. She had been V.V.’s foster

mother since February 2018 (shortly after V.V.’s birth). The minors’ lived with their foster

mother, foster father, and the foster parents’ 20-year-old and two 15-year-old children. The

minors’ foster mother described R.V. as “a ray of sunshine” in their house and as a “wonderful

kid.” She indicated they were growing every day together and that he had come “a long way”

since being placed with them. The minors’ foster mother indicated that V.V. had known no other

family. In the previous September, respondent’s supervised visits with the minors had been

reduced to once per month. The minors’ foster mother indicated that R.V. became stressed and

his behavior was not good prior to his visits with respondent, with R.V. becoming aggressive and

“go[ing] after” V.V. The minors’ foster mother described R.V.’s aggression as him having “far

more squabbles” with V.V. that resulted “in the use of his hands” to hurt or pinch. She now only

gave R.V. 30 minutes of notice prior to his visits with respondent. She could not send R.V. to

school on the days after visits because R.V. had a history of getting into trouble the day

following a visit with respondent. She described an instance where R.V. became physical with

the other children in his class. The minors’ foster mother described V.V. as becoming clingy and

grouchy after visits. On cross-examination, she acknowledged that she had no way of knowing if

the minors’ behavior after visits was the result of them being upset that the visit had ended.

¶ 17 The minors’ foster mother testified that she had facilitated and observed visits between

the minors and respondent. She believed that R.V. thought of respondent as a “really good

friend.” She never heard R.V. refer to respondent as “dad” or “father.” V.V.’s bond with

respondent was also that of a good friend, and V.V. enjoyed going to visits to play with her

“good friend.” The minors’ foster mother testified, “I’m not sure either of them understand that

6 he is their father. I think they’re too young.” The minors called their foster father “dad” and

called her “mom.”

¶ 18 The minors’ foster mother testified that she and her family celebrated standard American

holidays (such as Christmas, New Years, and Easter) with the minors, except for Halloween.

They did not celebrate Halloween due to religious reasons. The minors’ foster mother testified

that she had three dogs in their home and neither of the minors showed any fear of the dogs.

¶ 19 The trial court found that the State proved that it was in the best interest of the minors to

terminate respondent’s parental rights. The trial court specifically found that the minors’ physical

safety and welfare needs, including their need for food, shelter, health, and clothing, and the

development of their identity, their background ties, their sense of attachment, and their need for

permanence favored continuing them in the care of their foster parents. The trial court terminated

respondent’s parental rights.

¶ 20 Respondent appealed.

¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 22 On appeal, respondent argues the trial court’s finding that it was in the best interest of the

minors to terminate his parental rights was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Respondent argues that he presented evidence of a strong bond with the minors and that “an

outcome such as guardianship” should have been explored before taking the “drastic step of

termination.” The State contends the trial court did not err in finding that it was in the best

interest of the minors to terminate respondent’s parental rights.

¶ 23 In Illinois, the authority to involuntarily terminate a person’s parental rights is statutorily

derived from the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/0.01 et seq. (West 2018)) and the Juvenile Court

Act of 1987 (Juvenile Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2018)). In re K.P., 2020 IL App (3d)

7 190709, ¶ 35 (citing In re E.B., 231 Ill. 2d 459, 463 (2008)). The involuntary termination of

parental rights is a two-step process. 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2018); K.P., 2020 IL App (3d)

190709, ¶ 35 (citing In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198, 210 (2002)). Initially, the court must find that a

parent is unfit as defined in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2018))

by clear and convincing evidence. K.P., 2020 IL App (3d) 190709, ¶¶ 35, 37. At the subsequent

best interest stage, the State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that

the termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests. Id. ¶¶ 35, 41. The preponderance

standard is a less stringent standard than the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and

even less stringent than the intermediate standard of clear and convincing evidence. Id. ¶ 41

(citing People v. Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 37). To meet the preponderance of the evidence

standard, the State need only present enough evidence to render the fact at issue more likely than

not. Id.

¶ 24 In determining whether terminating parental rights is in the best interest of a child, the

trial court shall consider, within the context of the child’s age and developmental needs, the

following factors: (1) the physical safety and welfare of the child (which includes food, shelter,

health, and clothing); (2) the development of the child’s identity; (3) the child’s background and

ties (familial, cultural, and religious); (4) the child’s attachments (which includes where the child

feels love, attachment, and a sense of being valued, the child’s sense of security and familiarity,

continuity of affection for the child, and the least disruptive placement alternative for the child);

(5) the child’s wishes and long-term goals; (6) community ties of the child; (7) the child’s need

for permanence (which includes the need for stability and continuity of relationships with parent

figures, siblings, and other figures); (8) the uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the risks

related to substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the person available to care for the child.

8 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2018). A reviewing court will not reverse a trial court’s best

interest determination unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. K.P., 2020 IL App

(3d) 190709, ¶ 43. A best interest determination is against the manifest weight of the evidence

where it is clearly apparent from the record the opposite conclusion should have been reached or

that the conclusion itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented. Id.

¶ 25 In this case, the evidence presented indicated that the minors’ foster parents were meeting

the physical safety and welfare needs of the minors. The minors identified themselves as being a

part of their foster family. The minors felt loved by and were attached to their foster parents. The

minors had been in the continuous care of their foster parents for over two years and their foster

parents were willing to adopt them. The minors, as biological siblings, were able to remain

together in their current placement. The evidence was conflicting as to the strength of the bond

the minors had with respondent (with respondent describing their bond with him much stronger

than his bond with them was described by their foster mother or the caseworker). The respondent

was required to have supervised visits with the minors and only had visits with them for one hour

per month. The minors had never been in respondent’s care. The evidence was clear as to the

minors’ need for permanency, with both minors having been in substitute care for over two

years. In reviewing the statutory factors within the context of R.V. and V.V.’s ages and their

developmental needs, we cannot say that the facts clearly demonstrate that the trial court should

have reached the opposite conclusion or that its determination to terminate respondent’s parental

rights was unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented. See id.

¶ 26 We, therefore, conclude that the trial court’s finding that it was in R.V. and V.V.’s best

interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights was not against the manifest weight of the

evidence.

9 ¶ 27 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 28 The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.

¶ 29 Affirmed.