In re R.R. CA4/2
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Opinion
Filed 6/30/26 In re R.R. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re R.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E087139
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. J288815)
v. OPINION
C.R.,
Defendant and Appellant.
In re R.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. E087502 ________________________________________ (Super.Ct.No. J288815) SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
C.R. et al., Defendants and Appellants.
1 APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Cara D. Hutson,
Judge. Affirmed.
Lauren K. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant for C.R.
Suzanne Davidson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant for A.H.
Laura Feingold, County Counsel, and Joseph R. Barrell, Deputy County Counsel,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I.
INTRODUCTION
C.R. is the biological mother of seven-year-old R.R.H. (R.)1 and 15-year-old
S.R.H (S.).2 A.H. is their adoptive mother.3 Each mother has filed an appeal of the
juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights following a hearing pursuant to
1 R.R.H. is at times referred to as “R.R.” and other times as “R.H.”
2 S.R.H. is not a subject of this appeal. S.R.H. is at times referred to as “S.H.”
3 C.R. and A.H. were in a registered domestic partnership under Family Code section 297.
2 Welfare and Institutions Code4 section 366.26.5 On appeal, both mothers contend that
the juvenile court failed to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to
adoption pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). C.R. additionally contends
the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her section 388 petition seeking
additional reunification services. We find no error and affirm the judgment.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND6
The family came to the attention of the San Bernardino County Children and
Family Services (CFS) in December 2020 due to the mothers ongoing and contentious
custody dispute over the children in family law proceedings. At that time, CFS provided
the mothers with referrals for counseling to address the relationship concerns and their
inability to co-parent.
In February 2021, the family law court temporarily granted primary legal and
physical custody of S. to A.H., and primary legal and physical custody of R. to C.R.
C.R. was granted visitation with S. on alternate weekends while A.H. was granted
4 All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
5 On our own motion, we consolidated case No. E087139 with case No. E087502 for briefing, argument, and decision.
6 The factual and procedural background is taken from C.R.’s prior appeals in case Nos. E078019 and E085273 unless otherwise noted. (See In re R.H. (May 25, 2022, E078019) [nonpub. opn.] (R.H.); C.R. v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County (Apr. 11, 2025, E085273) [nonpub. opn.] (C.R.).) We took judicial notice of the records in case No. E078019. And on our own motion, we incorporated the record in case No. E085273 with the record in case No. E087139.
3 alternate weekend visits with R. C.R. and A.H. were ordered to communicate by means
of Talking Parents.
In March 2021, CFS received six different referrals with allegations of physical
and emotional abuse of S. by A.H. The referral also indicated that S. had been placed on
involuntary section 5150 holds in December 2020 and March 2021 after he had expressed
suicidal ideations. The sixth referral alleged general neglect to S. by A.H. after the child
refused to return to A.H.’s custody during the custody exchange. When S. was
interviewed, he appeared traumatized, exhibited behavioral outbursts, and reported
physical abuse in both homes. S. also disclosed being “coached” in both homes.
On March 31, 2021, a social worker held an informal meeting with both mothers
to address the concerns of emotional abuse to the children, to promote effective
communication between the mothers, and to discuss a third-party arrangement for
custody exchanges. CFS’s attempts to work with the mothers, however, were to no avail,
and by April 2021, the custody exchanges had not improved. C.R. had violated family
law orders multiple times by refusing to exchange the children with A.H. She had also
transferred S.H.’s medical card to a county where he did not reside, thereby preventing
A.H. from getting him mental health services. The social worker believed C.R.’s conduct
negatively impacted S.’s behaviors and emotional state. C.R. and A.H. also had prior
child welfare histories. A.H.’s eldest child was removed from her care and her parental
rights as to that child were terminated in 2008.
4 Despite A.H.’s prior child welfare history, the social worker believed that A.H.
was a safer and more protective parent at the time and obtained a warrant to detain the
children from C.R. while maintaining them with A.H. The social worker noted that A.H.
was cooperative with CFS, enrolled S. in programs to address his behaviors and mental
health and attempted to change the child’s medical coverage to the county of residence.
C.R., on the other hand, repeatedly violated prior family law court orders, made excessive
calls to CFS and law enforcement with allegations of child abuse in A.H.’s home, and
undermined effective co-parenting efforts.
On April 8, 2021, CFS filed petitions on behalf of the children pursuant to
section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect), (c) (emotional abuse), and (j) (abuse of a
sibling). The petitions were later amended on June 14, 2021, to add domestic violence
allegations against both mothers.
The children were formally detained from C.R. at the April 9, 2021, detention
hearing, and maintained with A.H. on the condition that no corporal punishment be used
on the children. C.R. was provided with weekly supervised visits, and both mothers were
advised against making disparaging remarks to the children.
CFS recommended that the petitions be sustained, the children be maintained with
A.H. under a family maintenance plan, and that C.R. be provided with reunification
services. A.H. denied physically or emotionally abusing the children. A.H. believed the
allegations stemmed from C.R.’s false reports to CFS and law enforcement to gain
primary custody of the children. A.H. also believed that C.R. suffered from an
5 undiagnosed mental health disorder which impaired her ability to provide adequate care
and protection for the children. A.H. noted that she had observed C.R.’s extreme mood
swings and anger. A.H. also reported several incidents of domestic violence during her
domestic partnership with C.R., including a 2008 incident in which C.R. hit and choked
A.H., resulting in C.R.’s arrest.7 A.H. recalled another incident in November 2020 in
which C.R. hit her in the face while she (A.H.) was holding R. S.
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Filed 6/30/26 In re R.R. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re R.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E087139
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. J288815)
v. OPINION
C.R.,
Defendant and Appellant.
In re R.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. E087502 ________________________________________ (Super.Ct.No. J288815) SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
C.R. et al., Defendants and Appellants.
1 APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Cara D. Hutson,
Judge. Affirmed.
Lauren K. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant for C.R.
Suzanne Davidson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant for A.H.
Laura Feingold, County Counsel, and Joseph R. Barrell, Deputy County Counsel,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I.
INTRODUCTION
C.R. is the biological mother of seven-year-old R.R.H. (R.)1 and 15-year-old
S.R.H (S.).2 A.H. is their adoptive mother.3 Each mother has filed an appeal of the
juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights following a hearing pursuant to
1 R.R.H. is at times referred to as “R.R.” and other times as “R.H.”
2 S.R.H. is not a subject of this appeal. S.R.H. is at times referred to as “S.H.”
3 C.R. and A.H. were in a registered domestic partnership under Family Code section 297.
2 Welfare and Institutions Code4 section 366.26.5 On appeal, both mothers contend that
the juvenile court failed to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to
adoption pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). C.R. additionally contends
the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her section 388 petition seeking
additional reunification services. We find no error and affirm the judgment.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND6
The family came to the attention of the San Bernardino County Children and
Family Services (CFS) in December 2020 due to the mothers ongoing and contentious
custody dispute over the children in family law proceedings. At that time, CFS provided
the mothers with referrals for counseling to address the relationship concerns and their
inability to co-parent.
In February 2021, the family law court temporarily granted primary legal and
physical custody of S. to A.H., and primary legal and physical custody of R. to C.R.
C.R. was granted visitation with S. on alternate weekends while A.H. was granted
4 All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
5 On our own motion, we consolidated case No. E087139 with case No. E087502 for briefing, argument, and decision.
6 The factual and procedural background is taken from C.R.’s prior appeals in case Nos. E078019 and E085273 unless otherwise noted. (See In re R.H. (May 25, 2022, E078019) [nonpub. opn.] (R.H.); C.R. v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County (Apr. 11, 2025, E085273) [nonpub. opn.] (C.R.).) We took judicial notice of the records in case No. E078019. And on our own motion, we incorporated the record in case No. E085273 with the record in case No. E087139.
3 alternate weekend visits with R. C.R. and A.H. were ordered to communicate by means
of Talking Parents.
In March 2021, CFS received six different referrals with allegations of physical
and emotional abuse of S. by A.H. The referral also indicated that S. had been placed on
involuntary section 5150 holds in December 2020 and March 2021 after he had expressed
suicidal ideations. The sixth referral alleged general neglect to S. by A.H. after the child
refused to return to A.H.’s custody during the custody exchange. When S. was
interviewed, he appeared traumatized, exhibited behavioral outbursts, and reported
physical abuse in both homes. S. also disclosed being “coached” in both homes.
On March 31, 2021, a social worker held an informal meeting with both mothers
to address the concerns of emotional abuse to the children, to promote effective
communication between the mothers, and to discuss a third-party arrangement for
custody exchanges. CFS’s attempts to work with the mothers, however, were to no avail,
and by April 2021, the custody exchanges had not improved. C.R. had violated family
law orders multiple times by refusing to exchange the children with A.H. She had also
transferred S.H.’s medical card to a county where he did not reside, thereby preventing
A.H. from getting him mental health services. The social worker believed C.R.’s conduct
negatively impacted S.’s behaviors and emotional state. C.R. and A.H. also had prior
child welfare histories. A.H.’s eldest child was removed from her care and her parental
rights as to that child were terminated in 2008.
4 Despite A.H.’s prior child welfare history, the social worker believed that A.H.
was a safer and more protective parent at the time and obtained a warrant to detain the
children from C.R. while maintaining them with A.H. The social worker noted that A.H.
was cooperative with CFS, enrolled S. in programs to address his behaviors and mental
health and attempted to change the child’s medical coverage to the county of residence.
C.R., on the other hand, repeatedly violated prior family law court orders, made excessive
calls to CFS and law enforcement with allegations of child abuse in A.H.’s home, and
undermined effective co-parenting efforts.
On April 8, 2021, CFS filed petitions on behalf of the children pursuant to
section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect), (c) (emotional abuse), and (j) (abuse of a
sibling). The petitions were later amended on June 14, 2021, to add domestic violence
allegations against both mothers.
The children were formally detained from C.R. at the April 9, 2021, detention
hearing, and maintained with A.H. on the condition that no corporal punishment be used
on the children. C.R. was provided with weekly supervised visits, and both mothers were
advised against making disparaging remarks to the children.
CFS recommended that the petitions be sustained, the children be maintained with
A.H. under a family maintenance plan, and that C.R. be provided with reunification
services. A.H. denied physically or emotionally abusing the children. A.H. believed the
allegations stemmed from C.R.’s false reports to CFS and law enforcement to gain
primary custody of the children. A.H. also believed that C.R. suffered from an
5 undiagnosed mental health disorder which impaired her ability to provide adequate care
and protection for the children. A.H. noted that she had observed C.R.’s extreme mood
swings and anger. A.H. also reported several incidents of domestic violence during her
domestic partnership with C.R., including a 2008 incident in which C.R. hit and choked
A.H., resulting in C.R.’s arrest.7 A.H. recalled another incident in November 2020 in
which C.R. hit her in the face while she (A.H.) was holding R. S. intervened during this
incident by pulling C.R. away. A.H. believed the children suffered serious emotional
damage due to the custody battle between her and C.R.
C.R. denied any untreated mental health issues or difficulties regulating her
emotions. She also denied she was in a registered domestic partnership with A.H. or that
A.H. was named as a parent on the children’s birth certificates.8 She further denied that
the children suffered emotional abuse because of the custody dispute between her and
A.H. C.R. claimed that A.H. used excessive physical discipline on the children and was
the cause of S.’s emotional issues. C.R. acknowledged she had previously been arrested
for domestic violence.
On April 29, 2021, the children’s attorney requested the children be removed from
A.H.’s care based on S.’s disclosures of physical abuse in the home. The court granted
7 C.R.’s criminal history indicated that she had domestic violence charges in 2006 for infliction of corporal injury to a spouse or cohabitant and a 2008 charge for battery on a spouse.
8 Both A.H. and C.R. were named as the children’s parents on the birth certificates.
6 the request, detained the children from A.H.’s care, placed them in a foster home, and
offered the mothers predisposition services.
By June 2021, S. continued to exhibit emotional issues and was placed on a
psychiatric hold for stabilization following his visit with A.H. on June 5. During the
visit, S. refused to participate in the visit with A.H. and was asked to sit separately so that
A.H. could visit R. When S. overheard A.H. stating that she needed the iPad returned
from S., S. had an emotional breakdown. He began to hit his head on the wall, throw
toys, mix playdoh containers, and swing a small plastic golf club. Despite efforts to de-
escalate the child, S. continued to slam himself against the wall and fall to the ground.
After CFS transported the child to a hospital for an evaluation of the physical injuries he
had sustained from slamming into the wall, S. was placed on a psychiatric hold and
remained hospitalized until June 16, 2021. After A.H. recovered the iPad, it was
discovered that S. was having unauthorized and unsupervised contact with C.R. A.H.
showed CFS text messages between S. and C.R., in which C.R. tells S. to delete the text
messages. The child also used the iPad to watch pornography and communicate with an
unidentified individual about his wish to commit suicide.
CFS was also concerned about C.R.’s mental health as she was unable to regulate
her emotions and behaviors. In addition, she continued to deny responsibility for her
actions and did not believe her behavior affected the children. Regarding the
predisposition services, C.R. had begun individual counseling. However, her therapist
reported that C.R. was not taking any responsibility for the case, required extensive
7 services, and requested additional sessions in advance. CFS was concerned that S.’s
disclosures were influenced by “at least one parent.” CFS noted that while S. maintained
A.H. physically abused him, he also had a pattern of disclosing abuse while changing
some details and recanting the allegations. In any event, CFS believed S.’s emotional and
mental state required protection and recommended reunification services for A.H. and
C.R. CFS noted that C.R. would benefit from a psychological evaluation to identify
untreated mental health issues and to determine the appropriate treatment.
On June 22, 2021, CFS applied for psychotropic medication on S.’s behalf for
“acute stabilization.” C.R. disagreed with the administration of medication explaining
that “[S.]’s behavior has changed because of [A.H.] . . . abusing him over and over in
different ways and he’s having a hard time being around her.”
On August 3, 2021, the mothers participated in mediation. A.H. reached an
agreement, but C.R. continued to disagree with the allegations and disposition.
By August 18, 2021, C.R. continued to engage in predisposition services and had
completed individual counseling, parenting classes, and a domestic violence program.
However, C.R.’s domestic violence service provider indicated that C.R.’s progress was
“[g]uarded” as she required additional sessions to “complete the book, . . . a safety plan
and a[n] exit letter.” CFS was concerned that C.R. had not benefited from her services as
she continued to fail to take responsibility for her role in the acts of domestic violence
and demonstrated stalking conduct by appearing excessively early at visits to observe
8 A.H. CFS thus recommended that C.R. complete an additional domestic violence course
for perpetrators.
The contested jurisdictional hearing was held on August 19, 2021. After C.R.’s
testimony and argument from the parties, the juvenile court found true some of the
allegations in the amended petitions as modified and dismissed some of the allegations.
The court found both C.R. and A.H. to be the children’s presumed mothers and continued
the matter for a contested disposition hearing.
By October 13, 2021, C.R. continued to participate in services, including
parenting, individual counseling, and domestic violence. C.R. also completed a
psychological evaluation with Dr. Brodie. Dr. Brodie diagnosed C.R. with “Partner
Relational problem,” and concluded that C.R. would need to focus on “effective coping
with the relational stress, and managing her emotions and behaviors that may [be]
triggered if she continues to co-parent with [A.H.].” Dr. Brodie noted that C.R. would
benefit from “Dialectical Behavior Therapy (emotion regulation and distress tolerance).”
Dr. Brodie recommended “individual therapy to build assertive communication” in
conjunction with “treatment focused on assertive communication and interpersonal
effectiveness skills” to address C.R.’s difficulties with self-reflection and
acknowledgement of responsibility. Dr. Brodie noted no specific mental health issues
that would prevent C.R. from benefitting with services. However, Dr. Brodie stated that
continued domestic violence between C.R. and A.H. would present a risk to the children’s
safety. Dr. Brodie thus recommended specific risks and consequences of domestic
9 violence and ongoing domestic disputes be identified for C.R. in writing. Dr. Brodie
further noted that C.R. would also benefit from additional coaching and parental support
groups.
The contested dispositional hearing was held on October 29, 2021. At that time,
C.R.’s counsel argued there was insufficient evidence to remove the children from her
care and requested the court place the children back in her care under a family
maintenance plan. The juvenile court denied the request, noting that although C.R. had
received a positive psychological evaluation and there was no impediment for her ability
to benefit from services, “[the court] [had] no information regarding [C.R.] that she’s
accepting any responsibility for the true findings.” The court noted that therapy for C.R.
was still left on her case plan and “possible PCIT [Parent Child Interaction Therapy].”
The court declared the children dependents of the court, removed them from parental
custody, and provided the mothers with reunification services and supervised visits.
C.R. subsequently appealed, challenging the removal order. We rejected C.R.’s
contentions and affirmed the order. (R.H., supra, E078019.)
By the six-month review hearing in April 2022, A.H. had made progress in her
case plan. CFS thus recommended the children return to A.H. with family maintenance
services and that reunification services be continued for C.R. C.R. continued to not take
responsibility for her actions and continued to deny that she did anything wrong. She
was inappropriate during visits and failed to redirect S.’s incorrigible behavior. CFS and
therapists had concerns for C.R.’s behaviors and her mental health. C.R. also sent
10 alarming texts and emails to CFS, as well as to her therapist. C.R. continued to have
animosity towards A.H.
The six-month review hearing was set contested, but due to timing and the need
for additional information from A.H., the matter was continued and set for a contested
12-month review hearing.
At the June 28, 2022, contested 12-month review hearing, the juvenile court
maintained the children in their out-of-home placements and continued reunification
services for both mothers.
By the 18-month review hearing, CFS recommended return of the children to A.H.
with family maintenance services, and that reunification services for C.R. be terminated.
C.R. still had not completed individual counseling sessions and had not started family
sessions.
The children were placed on a 29-day extended visit with A.H. at the 18-month
review hearing on September 27, 2022, and the matter was set contested on behalf of
C.R.
The contested 18-month-review hearing was held on December 5, 2022. The
juvenile court ordered the children returned to A.H. and terminated C.R.’s services. C.R.
was provided with supervised visits once a week for four hours.
On April 20, 2023, a section 342 subsequent petition was filed on behalf of both
children due to domestic abuse between A.H. and her partner, and S.’s increasingly
aggressive behaviors.
11 The children were detained at the April 21, 2023, detention hearing on the
subsequent petition.
CFS recommended the children be placed in out of home care, that no
reunification services be provided to either parent and that the permanent plan of
placement in foster care with a plan of adoption be ordered. CFS later recommended that
the children remain in out-of-home care and a section 366.26 hearing be set. R.’s
caretakers desired to provide legal permanency for both the children, even though S. was
not placed in the same home due to a capacity issue. S. continued to struggle with
emotional behaviors.
The jurisdictional/dispositional hearing was set contested on behalf of both
mothers on August 10, 2023.
CFS continued to recommend that a section 366.26 hearing be set as to R., and
that S. remain in out-of-home care with the goal of adoption with R. when appropriate.
CFS was concerned about C.R.’s ability to care for both children and her mental health to
safely parent the children.
On November 2, 2023, C.R. filed a section 388 petition, seeking return of both
children and family maintenance services. CFS recommended that C.R.’s section 388
petition be denied as the proposed order was not in the children’s best interests. CFS
explained that C.R. had not benefited from the services she had received as evidenced in
her irrational interactions with others, her lack of parenting when given an opportunity,
12 her inability to discuss the cycle of domestic violence and declining to participate in
services when asked.
The contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing on the subsequent petition was
eventually held on February 27, 2024. The juvenile court found true the allegations in the
petition, declared the children dependents of the court, ordered reunification services as
to A.H. terminated, and then ordered services to both parents under the permanency
planning program. The court ordered unsupervised visitation for C.R. once a week for
two hours with CFS having the authority to increase frequency and duration.
On May 13, 2024, CFS filed a section 388 petition, asking the court to revert visits
with C.R. to supervised one time a week for two hours, due to R. regressing in potty
training and engaging in aggressive behavior.
By August 2024, CFS recommended that R. remain in out-of-home care with the
permanent plan of placement in foster care with the plan of adoption and that services be
terminated for the mothers. R., who was five years old at the time, was not meeting his
developmental milestones, and had behavioral issues following visits with C.R. There
were multiple concerns and issues with C.R.’s visits and the lack of progress in C.R.’s
therapy. CFS noted the negative issues R. began experiencing after his visits went to
unsupervised with C.R.
At a hearing on August 16, 2024, C.R.’s counsel asked to set the hearing “as it
pertains to the visitation request by the Department” and objected to R.’s visits being
monitored. Counsel objected to a modification in visitation without the filing of a
13 section 388 petition and notice, contending it was a due process violation. Counsel noted
she wanted the social worker, the social worker’s supervisor, and both children available
for testimony. Counsels for the children and CFS argued that a section 388 petition is not
required to modify a visitation order and asked that the court make a detriment finding.
The juvenile court indicated it was not inclined to make a detriment finding at the
hearing, but indicated supervised visits were necessary at that time and they would hear
testimony on the impact of visits with the children. The court set a pretrial settlement
conference to work out witness lists, discovery and other issues that may concern
counsel, and noted its understanding of counsel’s goal in setting the hearing is return of
the children to the mothers and the court was setting the hearing for that purpose.
C.R. submitted exhibit and witness lists on October 8 and 17, 2024, noting the
intention to call both mothers, R., a therapist, and three CFS employees. The exhibit list
included 13 items, mainly delivered service logs.
CFS continued to recommend that services to both mothers be terminated, and that
R. remain in out-of-home care with the permanent plan of adoption. R.’s encopresis and
enuresis had increased. R. appeared to have panic attack type behaviors when being
transported to visits with C.R. CFS provided detailed notes of some visits between C.R.
and R. CFS concluded that returning the children to either mother would create a
substantial risk of detriment to the well-being of the children, because the mothers had
failed to benefit from the court-ordered case plan and reunification services.
14 The contested planned permanency review hearing was held on October 17, 2024.
Before hearing evidence, the court emphasized that it had nothing before it justifying
return or justifying the fact that the children were stabilized and ready for return, and that
was what the juvenile court desperately needed. The court noted its desire to authorize
conversion of visits to unsupervised visits but could only do that once there is assurance
of stabilization of the children. The court encouraged the parties to work together before
the next court date and the parties indicated they would work together.
The in progress contested planned permanency review hearing continued
October 21, 2024. No agreement was noted between the parties and the hearing
progressed as contested. CFS’s reports and the evidence previously submitted by C.R.
were accepted into evidence. Counsel for Mother called the social worker to the stand to
testify. In general, the social worker testified as to C.R.’s parenting skills during visits
and the boys’ developmental and behavioral issues. The court continued the hearing to
December 20, 2024, for further testimony.
On December 20, 2024, CFS filed an additional report to the court (6.7 Report),
noting that R. continued to defecate and urinate prior to, during, and after C.R.’s visits.
The report further noted C.R.’s lack of understanding of R.’s developmental age of three
versus his actual age of five. CFS recommended that R. remain in his concurrent
planning home with a plan of adoption and a section 366.26 hearing be set.
The further contested planned permanency hearing was held on December 20,
2024. The juvenile court noted there were protracted discussions off the record. The
15 court also stated that it read the transcripts and all the relevant discovery and decided that
it already understood that the children loved their mothers and wanted to visit with their
mothers. The court determined that it wanted to tailor the issue to psychological
evaluations and expert testimony focusing on visitation, not return. The court’s concern
was for the stability of the children. Noting it might be an appellate issue subject to
reversal, then stated its inclination to suspend the hearing and not make a detriment
finding on visitation at that point. The children’s counsel agreed with the court, stating
the same issues would be before the court at the section 366.26 hearing, arguing the court
was the finder of fact and could determine when it heard the evidence. Counsel for A.H.
objected to the setting of a section 366.26 hearing but indicated the current hearing was
regarding visitation and asked that the hearing be continued.
C.R.’s counsel asserted the 6.7 Report was untimely as it was filed that morning
and objected to the court relying on the report. Counsel asked for an opportunity to
cross-examine the individual who wrote the report and objected to a suspension of the
hearing and raised the court’s previous request for additional witnesses, which counsel
had subpoenaed. Counsel further asserted concerns with C.R.’s therapy and the
observation of her visits and stressed the importance of hearing testimony from C.R.’s
therapist. Counsel noted that in August 2024, CFS recommended termination of services
and that R. remain in out-of-home care with the permanent plan of placement in foster
care with a plan of adoption, recognizing it was the same recommendation as CFS made
in the 6.7 Report. Counsel stressed her client was entitled to a hearing under
16 section 366.3, noting the court granted the hearing and that the court had not heard all the
evidence to that end. Counsel argued the court was essentially asking for a directed
verdict, but since the court had not heard all the evidence it was not appropriate at that
time. Counsel stressed that it was a violation of C.R.’s due process rights.
CFS’s counsel argued the court had two choices in the case, either return to the
parents or set a section 366.26 hearing. Counsel argued the court had the authority to
determine it had sufficient evidence before it to decide, noting the services were
discretionary at that point and the court’s decision would not violate any due process
rights. Counsel then asked that the prior planned permanency hearing reports and
6.7 Report be accepted into evidence. Counsel asserted the recommendation in the
6.7 Report was different from the previous recommendation in asking to set a
section 366.26 hearing. The 6.7 Report was accepted into evidence over the objection of
C.R.’s counsel.
Following argument from all counsel, the court stated its understanding that C.R.’s
counsel wanted the court to hear further testimony regarding length of visitation but
noted it would not have resulted in the court affirmatively saying return of the children.
The court stated its only focus was on the children’s best interest and noted it was not
trying to violate due process or “hamstring people from testifying.” The court understood
the mothers loved their children and wanted to visit them more, but emphasized this was
not the issue. The issue was whether the children could safely be returned to their parents
and the answer was no. The court then found that R.’s placement was necessary and
17 appropriate and set a section 366.26 hearing to determine the most appropriate plan for
the children and consider termination of parental rights. The court clarified this was as to
R. only. The court also found CFS complied with the case plan by making reasonable
efforts and found CFS had exercised due diligence to locate appropriate relatives for
placement. C.R. timely filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition.
In her writ petition, C.R. argued she was denied her constitutional due process
right when the juvenile court refused to allow C.R. to continue to challenge CFS’s
recommendation and thereby denying her a contested hearing. We rejected this argument
and denied C.R.’s petition. (C.R., supra, E085273.)
CFS’s observations of visits between R. and C.R. showed that they loved each
other and that R. was affectionate with C.R., he hugged her and run up to C.R. at visits.
After one visit, R. said he did not want “mommy to go” and was reassured when told he
would see C.R. next week. However, later in October 2024, R. had mixed reactions to
C.R., and the visit was described as “ok” and R.’s negative behaviors increased at home
and in school. In addition, after visits, R. was able to easily separate from C.R. and walk
to his caregivers, Mr. and Mrs. S. R. had resided with Mr. and Mrs. S. since April 18,
2023. The social worker opined that the visits were appropriate, but C.R. did not parent
R. and they were more like brief playdates. Overall C.R.’s visits were described as
appropriate, but C.R. struggled with being present and felt wronged.
After unsupervised visits with C.R., R.’s caregiver reported that R. reverted to
whispering instead of talking out loud. C.R. told R. several times she would treat him as
18 if he were five and began visits by telling R. that she was “the best mommy ever” and he
was lucky to have her. C.R. also ignored the admonishment that electronics were not
allowed during visits. CFS noted that R. began having accidents since the inception of
unsupervised visits even though he had previously been potty trained. CFS also noted
other behavioral changes that occurred after unsupervised visits were initiated including
uncharacteristic anger towards people with whom he was previously affectionate. He hit
A.H. and told her he was not allowed to talk to her anymore. He also stopped displaying
joy in activities he previously enjoyed like going to school, learning, and playing with
other children. And he began hitting other children in the home and at school and he had
also hit and spat on his teachers. He also hit Mrs. S. for the first time and pinned down a
younger child in his foster home. R.’s encopresis and enuresis had also increased.
C.R. had completed individual therapy with Dr. Werderman and recently started
family therapy. C.R. was not applying what she learned and not personalizing the
information covered in therapy. Dr. Werderman observed “noticeable executive
dysfunctions.” C.R. did not make progress and her prognosis was poor. Dr. Werderman
reported that C.R. took responsibility for her actions that led to the removal of the
children but did not address the components of the cycle of violence, or her psychological
evaluation in full. S.’s therapist noted C.R. was saying the rights things but not
implementing them when given the opportunity.
A.H. completed both individual counseling and family therapy with positive
reports. A.H. was described as making progress on and off in individual therapy. She
19 completed a domestic violence program and was participating in family counseling to the
extent possible as she was still homeless. A.H.’s visits appeared to go well with R.
However, at a visit with A.H. in April 2024, R. became upset at one point and pulled her
hair. He was able to regain his composure but struggled throughout the visit. A.H.
expressed concern about R.’s deteriorating behavior. She disclosed that R. continued to
tell her that he could not talk to her or did not want to. This was a new behavior and
different than his behaviors at visits with A.H. in the past. At a visit in June 2024, R.
attempted to kick A.H.’s feet. Mrs. S. disclosed that C.R. told R. that he was not allowed
to talk to A.H. or Mrs. S. CFS was concerned that C.R. presented no observable change
in her behaviors with her becoming argumentative when angry or frustrated. C.R.
contacted A.H.’s aunt who lived in Texas to complain that A.H.’s mother was
manipulating the case and insisted that A.H. was “beating” the children and “stealing”
them from her. According to CFS, C.R. had not demonstrated any change in her
behaviors.
R. was not meeting his developmental milestones in language development, social
functioning, sensory processing, or overall development. He began to whisper when
stressed and was referred to the Inland Regional Center (IRC) and the Inland Empire
Autism Assessment Center of Excellence (AAC). On June 26, 2024, the AAC reported
that R. was diagnosed with mild intellectual disability, articulation problems, anxious
presentation, and enuresis/encopresis.
20 By April 7, 2025, CFS recommended parental rights be terminated. R. was up to
date on his well-child exams, immunizations and dental exams. Mrs. S. intended to seek
additional services through Applied Behavioral Analysis (ABA) therapy for R. and have
him assessed for Supplemental Security Income (SSI). R. had global developmental
delay, and the school district psychologist noticed R. had difficulty with communication
and adaptive skills. He was talking more and enjoyed riding bikes, blowing bubbles,
playing with hot wheels, coloring, and playing with other children. Mrs. S. reported R.
was making progress academically.
R. was placed with Mr. and Mrs. S. for about four weeks in September 2022 prior
to being returned to A.H. and then replaced with them on April 18, 2023, where he
remained for over two years. R.’s attachment to Mr. and Mrs. S. had grown as they had
cared for R. for much of his young life. R. was considered part of Mr. and Mrs. S.’s
family and they desired to adopt him. R. called them “ ‘mom’ ” and “ ‘papa.’ ” R.
identified the other children in the home as his siblings. R. was comfortable in the home,
expressed that he felt safe in the home and liked living there. R. had a limited
understanding of adoption due his young age and level of development but was able to
express that he wanted to live with Mr. and Mrs. S. “ ‘forever.’ ” The social worker
observed R. to be very bonded, loved, and secure with Mr. and Mrs. S.
On April 16, 2025, C.R. filed a section 388 petition requesting the court take the
section 366.26 hearing off calendar and order six additional months of reunification
services. C.R. continued to visit with R. and a bonding study had been completed. C.R.
21 argued that R. was substantially bonded to her, she alleviated the issues that brought the
matter before the court, her visits were appropriate, and she could work with R.’s service
providers to ensure R. received the support he needed. The April 14, 2025 bonding study,
conducted by Dr. Rogers, was attached to C.R.’s section 388 petition. Counsel for C.R.
informed Dr. Rogers that the court sustained allegations of emotional abuse against C.R.
for withholding R. from A.H. Counsel indicated that she believed C.R. was ready to have
R. returned to her care and that CFS was not doing so because R. was diagnosed with a
learning disability and was urinating and defecating on himself.
For the bonding study Dr. Rogers was provided visitation observation records, the
neurodevelopmental evaluation report from when R. was five years old, an updated
“question and answer” letter, and the initial petition. C.R. also completed a report
regarding her observation of R. at Dr. Rogers’s request. Dr. Rogers did not review every
page of the visitation logs. Instead she conducted word searches for cry, crying, cried,
pee, peed, poop, pooped, diaper, C.R., R., supervised, and unsupervised. She then
focused on important time markers and reviewed selected documents. She acknowledged
it was possible she missed some relevant data. Dr. Rogers observed a two-hour visit on
March 21, 2025. During the visit Dr. Rogers did not observe any maladaptive behaviors.
She concluded that R.’s intellectual disability was not causing his enuresis/encopresis and
that this behavioral regression was related to some kind of stress in the school setting.
She also concluded that C.R.’s limited parenting time was completely unrelated to R.’s
intellectual disability. Dr. Rogers believed the causal link between R.’s
22 enuresis/encopresis and C.R.’s visits was “exceedingly thin.” Dr. Rogers opined R. was
clearly attached to C.R. and that his relationship with her was important based on R.’s
statements to different people that he thought he might never see C.R.
Citing In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.), Dr. Rogers analyzed
whether the parental-benefit exception applied. Dr. Rogers stated R.’s benefit from the
relationship was more than incidental and termination would pose a detriment. R. was
diagnosed with intellectual disability and language difficulties and was therefore more
vulnerable than the average six-year-old. R. had also expressed fear that he would never
see C.R. again. Dr. Rogers opined that R. had a bond with C.R. prior to removal and his
significant positive emotional attachment continued while he was apart from her.
Relying on C.R.’s reporting, Dr. Rogers concluded that C.R. and A.H. were now
cooperative and could successfully co-parent. Based on the visitation logs, Dr. Rogers
believed there was less contention between C.R. and A.H. and the earlier derogatory
statements were not coming from C.R. Dr. Rogers concluded that R.’s behaviors were
due in part to the length of the case and predominantly related to his developmental level
and that fear of not seeing C.R. showed that he would be destabilized and traumatized by
her loss. The relationship with C.R. was not so intense that it would prevent him from
forming or maintaining relationships with others including Mr. and Mrs. S. Dr. Rogers’s
study was limited because she was unable to speak with R., his teachers, Mr. and Mrs. S.,
his speech therapist, or A.H. and was provided with limited documentation.
23 CFS recommended that the juvenile court deny C.R.’s section 388 petition because
it was not in R.’s best interest. The social worker noted that C.R. was more animated and
spoke louder at the March 2025 visit that Dr. Rogers observed. She also noted that C.R.
allowed R. to take two “uncrustables” home with him but normally she did not allow R.
to take the things she gave him home. CFS included documentation of several other
visits through June 21, 2025. A third-party monitor was present at some of those visits
and provided independent documentation of those visits. At an April 5 visit, C.R. was
described as being animated at these visits and R. was described as having a blank stare
and being quiet. The April 26 visit was supervised by another social worker who refused
to allow the third-party monitor to participate because the paperwork did not reflect that
she could be present. The third-party monitor was described as upset and speaking with a
loud voice. The monitor stormed out of the office indicating that the social worker would
hear from her lawyer. When told to put her phone away during the visit, C.R. got upset
and began to slam things. R. reacted with a concerned look and would flinch when C.R.
slammed things. C.R. presented as angry and upset. She then threw a toy into her bag.
The visit ended an hour early. The May 10 visit was supervised by two social workers.
C.R. again tried to use her cell phone and was admonished that electronics were not
allowed during visits, otherwise there were no concerns. The May 24 visit also ended
early after C.R. informed the supervising social worker that she had a family emergency.
R.’s schedule was adjusted based on this new information. During the visit C.R.’s speech
was calm, but her behavior was erratic. When asked about ending the visit at the time
24 C.R. requested, C.R. became increasingly agitated. When the visit finally ended, the
social worker escorted C.R. to the parking lot and had to tell her to leave the property.
The third-party monitor attended the June 21 visit. The third-party monitor insisted on
watching R. use the bathroom despite being told it was not necessary and being asked to
leave the restroom. After the confrontation, the social worker told the third-party monitor
that she was no longer allowed to be part of the visit and asked her to leave the building.
Security was called to assist. When the social worker asked C.R. to proceed to the
visitation room and take R. to a safe location, C.R. declined stating that the incident
needed to be documented. The visit was terminated as a result.
As to the bonding study, CFS noted that it only included the last year of the case
records. CFS also noted that Dr. Rogers did not consider C.R.’s mental health issues.
Instead, the bonding study attributed the decision not to return R. to C.R.’s care to his
learning disability and enuresis/encopresis when the actual reason was C.R.’s mental
health concerns, her behavior at visits, and R.’ reaction to those behaviors. CFS
disagreed with Dr. Rogers’s conclusions about R.’s reaction during visits and that the
cause of some of his behaviors was related to school.
On July 2, 2025, supervised visits with C.R. were ordered once per month for two
hours. The section 366.26 and the section 388 petition hearings were continued to
September 8, 2025, and a contested hearing on visitation was set for August 26, 2025.
CFS recommended C.R.’s visits remain once per month. At a July 26, 2025, visit
it was noted that R. did not have any bathroom incidents since C.R.’s last visit on
25 June 21, 2025, but did urinate on himself at the July 26 visit. CFS disputed the accuracy
of the third-party monitor’s visitation notes and believed they lacked behaviorally
specific details. CFS believed the third-party monitor was not a neutral observer.
At some point prior to the contested hearings, the court denied C.R.’s section 388
petition for failure to state new evidence or changed circumstances and because a
contested section 366.26 hearing was already set. On October 20, 2025, C.R. filed a
notice of appeal challenging the denial of her section 388 petition.
CFS noted that R. enjoyed his visits with A.H. and easily separated from her. He
did not ask to visit her during the week. CFS opined that R. did not have a substantial
positive emotional attachment to A.H. that he would benefit from maintaining. A.H. had
not had an in-person visit with R. in the last three months. CFS also believed that the
sibling bond was not sufficient to derail the termination of parental rights.
The August 30, 2025, visit with C.R. occurred without incident. It was noted,
however, that R. urinated on himself twice after the visit. He also urinated on himself at
school when he thought C.R. would be contacted because he associated the word
“mommy” with C.R. The September 6, 2025, visit occurred without incident. However,
there continued to be issues with the use of electronics during the visit.
The contested hearings began on September 8, 2025, and were heard on several
days over several months. The court declined to connect R.’s enuresis/encopresis to
C.R.’s visitation absent additional evidence establishing a nexus.
26 Mother’s retained third-party visitation monitor testified first. She described C.R.
as prepared for the visits. She brought breakfast and two large bags with her with things
to do like crafts, books, and other things to play with. She testified that R.
“communicates with his mom” during visits and used an example where he told C.R.,
“look at my outfit” and asked if she liked his shoes. She did not have a baseline
regarding how much he talked. R. urinated on himself once during a visit she monitored.
She did not observe any distress when R. greeted C.R. and testified that he usually gave
her a hug. She described C.R. as positive and encouraging of R. She did not know if R.
became sad at the end of visits but noted that he did not cry when visits ended. She
described herself as a neutral observer. She did not observe R. acting out at visits.
A.H. testified that she did activities with R. during visits, such as painting, going
outside, and doing things R. liked. A.H. noted that R.’s speech improved and he spoke in
full sentences during visits. She believed she had a strong bond with R. and noted that
when in the presence of Mrs. S. R. called her mommy.
After A.H. testified, the contested hearing was continued and the court authorized
Dr. Rogers to observe a second visit.
Dr. Rogers provided a supplemental report to the court on October 20, 2025. She
observed a second visit and considered additional documents filed after her initial
bonding study report. She took issue with the social worker’s criticism of her initial
report. She discussed the different observational tones of the different people observing
the visits. She observed that R. was much more verbal compared to her first
27 observational visit and his language showed remarkable improvement. Dr. Rogers
concluded that the visits were more than play dates and established a substantial positive
emotional attachment emphasizing that C.R. brought clothing, hygiene items, gifts, and
prepared food. She could not say whether termination of the relationship with C.R.
would be more or less detrimental to R. because of the anger C.R. displayed. She
maintained that it was not appropriate to blame R.’s enuresis/encopresis on C.R.
Dr. Rogers testified that she had scanned the records and conducted word searches
such as “peeing, pooping, diapers, crying, visitation, monitored, unmonitored” to identify
important events where problems were mentioned. She did not interview R. and did not
review every CFS record. She also did not interview Mrs. S., but she focused on the
issues and dates highlighted by C.R.’s attorney. Nevertheless she believed she had
enough information to make conclusions about the parent-child bond between C.R. and
R. She took into consideration R.’s development, and that he had “an intellectual deficit”
with significant receptive and expressive language difficulties. She maintained that R.’s
enuresis/encopresis was not attributable to C.R.’s visits because there were competing
and contributing concerns such as school and “transitions.” She could not say R. never
wet the bed in reaction to a visit with C.R. or whether it was anticipatory of C.R.’s visits.
Dr. Rogers concluded that R. would benefit from continuing the relationship with C.R.
and identified her as “mommy.” She also noted that the records she reviewed reflected
that he had three moms including A.H. and Mrs. S. However, she was unable to
determine with which mother, if any, he had a stronger bond. She believed R. had no
28 memory of living with C.R. or A.H. and all he recalled was the life with Mrs. S. She was
surprised in R.’s development over the last six months and could not say whether it would
be better for R. to be adopted or not. She could not speak to the relationship or bond R.
had with Mrs. S. and had limited things to say about A.H. Dr. Rogers believed R.’s
emotional attachment was growing and important to him and he saw C.R. as a parent.
She referenced Caden C. and the “intensity” of the child’s bond such that a child is
unable to form a bond with anyone else. She concluded that level of intensity did not
exist in this case noting that he formed a relationship with Mrs. S. She concluded that
C.R. had a reasonably good bond with R., which was respectful of his other bonds. She
believed based on his developmental level that he had enough of a bond with C.R. that it
would be detrimental to him if C.R. were to “disappear” and he would be at risk for
certain emotional problems. As for Mrs. S. Dr. Rogers stated, “I would infer reading
between the lines that there is a connection there . . . I would say much of his
remembered life has been with Mommy Trish and Papa [Mrs. S. and Mr. S.].” Dr. Rogers
explained stability and predictability were the most important thing for a young child and
the stability of his living situation helped mitigate the conflict from the initial removal.
After Dr. Roger’s testimony the matter was continued to December 11, 2025.
CFS spoke with R. about adoption in November 2025. R. said adoption was good
because he would be able to stay with Mrs. S. He wanted to be adopted and appeared
happy discussing being adopted with another child that was adopted by Mr. and Mrs. S.
29 On December 11, 2025, the court accepted stipulated testimony from R. taken on
August 21, 2025, that he had “a Mommy [Mrs. S.], a Mommy [C.R.], and a Mommy
[A.H.].” He liked living with Mrs. S. because he loved her and because she hugged him
at bedtime. He liked Papa [Mr. S.] “a lot of bit.” He liked visiting C.R. because she gave
him snacks. He was happy during visits with [C.R.] and liked visiting [A.H.] because
“she always ma[de] [him] fried rice.” He wanted to live with both [Mrs. S.] and his
moms.
C.R. and the social worker also testified. In relevant part, C.R. testified she was
R.’s biological mother and her visits had been reduced to once a month about three to
four months ago. Prior to that, she visited R. once a week throughout the case and that
she had unsupervised visits with R. for about six months throughout the case. R. hugged
her tight at the beginning of visits and they did activities together and ate during visits.
R. enjoyed their time together and did not want visits to end. They had a wonderful and
delightful relationship. R. called C.R. “mom” or “mommy.”
A.H. called the social worker as a witness. In pertinent part, the social worker
testified she had been assigned to the case since April 2021 and had observed A.H.’s
visits with R. Overall, their visits were very pleasant. A.H. would engage with both R.
and S.H. The social worker opined R. and A.H.’s visits were like play dates. A.H. read
and sang to R. and they did activities together. R. called A.H. “mom” and greeted her
with a hug. A.H. stopped in-person visits after she was hospitalized several times and
had no transportation.
30 After hearing argument by the parties, the juvenile court found R. to be generally
and specifically adoptable. As for the parental-benefit exception, the court found that
both mothers met the first prong of regularly visiting R. The court did not attribute R.’s
enuresis or encopresis to C.R.’s visits. The court considered factors related to the second
and third prongs. The court also considered R.’s wishes and found R. had a bond with
C.R. and A.H. However, the court found adoption outweighed the benefits of
maintaining the parent-child bonds. After analyzing the Caden C. factors, the court found
the parental exception did not apply and terminated parental rights. C.R. and A.H. filed
timely notices of appeal.
III.
DISCUSSION
A. Summary Denial of Section 388 Petition
C.R. contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in summarily denying her
section 388 petition because she made a prima facie showing of changed circumstances
and best interest of the child. We disagree.
A parent may petition the juvenile court for modification of a prior dependency
order. (§ 388, subds. (a), (c).) To obtain the modification, the petitioner must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that there has been a change of circumstances sufficient to
warrant the changed order, and also that the new order would be in the child’s best
interests. (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 532-535 (Kimberly F.).)
31 The juvenile court must order an evidentiary hearing on the petition only where “it
appears that the best interests of the child . . . may be promoted by the proposed change
of order.” (§ 388, subd. (d).) “To obtain a hearing on a section 388 petition, the parent
must make a prima facie showing as to both elements.” (In re Samuel A. (2020) 55
Cal.App.5th 1, 7.) “The conditional language of section 388 makes clear that the hearing
is only to be held if it appears that the best interests of the child may be promoted by the
proposed change of order, which necessarily contemplates that a court need not order a
hearing if this element is absent from the showing made by the petition.” (In re Zachary
G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 806-807, fn. omitted.)
“Under section 388, a party ‘need only make a prima facie showing to trigger the
right to proceed by way of a full hearing.’ [Citation.] The prima facie showing is not met
unless the facts alleged, if supported by evidence given credit at the hearing, would
sustain a favorable decision on the petition. [Citation.] In determining whether the
petition makes the necessary showing, the court may consider the entire factual and
procedural history of the case. [Citation.] The petition must be liberally construed in
favor of its sufficiency.” (In re J.P. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 108, 127; accord, In re K.L.
(2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 52, 62 (K.L.).)
“ ‘A prima facie case is made if the allegations demonstrate that these two
elements are supported by probable cause. [Citations.] It is not made, however, if the
allegations would fail to sustain a favorable decision even if they were found to be true at
a hearing. [Citations.] While the petition must be liberally construed in favor of its
32 sufficiency [citations], the allegations must nonetheless describe specifically how the
petition will advance the child’s best interests.’ [Citation.]” (K.L., supra, 248
Cal.App.4th at pp. 61-62; id. at p. 62 [“Significantly, Mother did not allege that any of the
children’s current or prospective placements [were] inadequate.”].) “To support a
section 388 petition, the change in circumstances must be substantial. [Citation.]” (In re
Ernesto R. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 219, 223.)
“After termination of services, the focus shifts from the parent’s custodial interest
to the child’s need for permanency and stability. [Citation.].” (In re Amber M. (2002)
103 Cal.App.4th 681, 685-686.) “[A]nd in fact, there is a rebuttable presumption that
continued foster care is in the best interests of the child. [Citation.] A court hearing a
motion for change of placement at this stage of the proceedings must recognize this shift
of focus in determining the ultimate question before it, that is, the best interests of the
child.” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317 (Stephanie M.).)
We review a juvenile court’s decision to summarily deny a section 388 petition for
abuse of discretion. (K.L., supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 62.) “We must uphold the
juvenile court’s denial of [a] section 388 petition unless we can determine from the record
that its decisions ‘ “exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can
reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute
its decision for that of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re Brittany K. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th
1497, 1505.) “It is rare that the denial of a section 388 motion merits reversal as an abuse
of discretion.” (Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 522.)
33 C.R.’s section 388 petition requested additional reunification services and that the
section 366.26 hearing be taken off calendar. She alleged that R. was substantially
bonded to her, she alleviated the issues that brought the matter before the court, her visits
were appropriate, and she could work with R.’s service providers to ensure his needs
were being met. On appeal, C.R. argues that she “demonstrated a meaningful period of
engagement with therapy and impactful and loving visitation, reunification services were
rightfully requested at this moment.” However, C.R. fails to explain how she had
addressed her inability to take responsibility for her actions leading to CFS intervention
and to recognize the impact her behavior had on her children. She believed she did
nothing wrong and continued to display erratic behaviors. Despite participating in her
case plan components and continuing in therapy, her mental health remained a concern
and there was little evidence showing she had benefitted from the services she had
received. The juvenile court noted at an earlier hearing that C.R. did not make
substantive progress or take responsibility for her part in the case coming before the
court. Although C.R. made moderate progress and eventually took responsibility for her
actions, had over 20 months of court-ordered services, and continued to participate in
services after services were terminated, there is no evidence to suggest she benefitted
from the services she received or resolved the issues that led to the removal of the
children. C.R. continued to engage in concerning behaviors and failed to address her
mental health and domestic violence issues.
34 Four months had passed between the termination of services under the
permanency planning and the filing of her current section 388 petition in April 2025. The
April 2025 section 388 petition did not include any updated letters or reports from any
service providers after the termination of services provided under the permanent plan.
C.R. cites no support for her assertion that she was actively addressing her mental health
at the time the section 388 petition was filed or how her actions impacted R.
C.R. argues that the bonding study addressed the central concerns raised in the
dependency case which she claims were R.’s intellectual disability and his ongoing
enuresis and encopresis. While these were certainly issues to be addressed during the
dependency case and related directly to the parental-benefit exception to the termination
of parental rights, they bore little relevance to the issue of providing additional
reunification services to C.R. CFS made clear that the basis for not returning R. to C.R.’s
custody and thus terminating services to C.R. was her mental health, her behavior at
visits, and R.’s reaction to her behaviors at visits. Even if the enuresis, encopresis, and
other behaviors were not related to C.R.’s visits, CFS noted that there was “no observable
change in [C.R.’s] behaviors” over the four and a half years that R. was in CFS custody.
She spoke negatively about the case while at visits in front of the children, was unable to
regulate her anger, threw things that caused R. to flinch and appear afraid at the most
recent visit, and ultimately some visits were cancelled or terminated early. The bonding
study did not provide evidence that the jurisdictional issues were resolved or that C.R.
had made a change in circumstances. It made no representations that C.R. had
35 rehabilitated herself such that additional reunification services were warranted or in R.’s
best interest. It did not address C.R.’s progress or participation in any of the court
ordered case plan components or how it would be in R.’s best interest. The bonding
study solely addressed the parental-benefit exception to the termination of parental rights
as evidence by Dr. Rogers’s attempt to synthesize her findings with Caden C. C.R. failed
to assert any facts that would support a prima facie showing of changed circumstances.
Moreover, C.R. has not shown the proposed order would be in R.’s best interest.
C.R.’s best interest allegations did not “describe specifically how” the petition will
advance R.’s best interest or how granting C.R. additional services to which she had
received for over 20 months was in R.’s best interest. (K.L., supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 61-62.) At the time C.R. filed her April 2025 section 388 petition, R. was five years
old and had been with the same caregivers for about two years. R. was formally detained
from C.R. in April 2021 when he was two years old and had lived with his current
caregivers almost half of his entire young life. In addition, R. had extensive
developmental needs which required numerous services that were already established and
being met by his caregivers. Although the bonding study showed R. was attached to
C.R., the record indicates R. was also attached to his caregivers and thriving in their
home.
C.R.’s conclusory statement that she had a strong bond with R. did not support her
claim that granting her additional services was in his best interest. By the time of C.R.’s
April 2025 petition, the caregivers were not strangers but caregivers who had been caring
36 for R. for a long period of time and addressing his extensive developmental needs. As the
juvenile court noted, the dependency had reached the stage of a 366.26 hearing, which
meant services had been terminated for both parents. The focus at that point was the
permanence and stability of the child, which was found with the caregivers with whom R.
had lived almost half of his young life. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) “In
any custody determination, a primary consideration in determining the child’s best
interests is the goal of assuring stability and continuity.” (Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th
at p. 317.) “ ‘When custody continues over a significant period, the child’s need for
continuity and stability assumes an increasingly important role. That need will often
dictate the conclusion that maintenance of the current arrangement would be in the best
interests of that child.’ ” (Ibid.) There was nothing in the April 2025 section 388 petition
filed by C.R. to support a prima facie case that the proposed order was in R.’s best
interest.
On this record, C.R. did not establish that R.’s need for permanency and stability
would be advanced by granting C.R. additional services. C.R. has already received over
20 months of court-ordered services and this dependency matter has been ongoing since
2021. It is important to keep in mind that, where, as here, the juvenile court’s ruling is
against the party who has the burden of proof, it is extremely difficult for C.R. to prevail
on appeal by arguing the evidence compels a ruling in her favor. Unless the juvenile
court makes specific findings of fact in favor of the moving party, we presume the
juvenile court found C.R.’s evidence lacked sufficient weight and credibility to carry the
37 burden of proof. (See Rodney F. v. Karen M. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 233, 241.) The
juvenile court properly summarily denied C.R.’s April 2025 section 388 petition.
B. Parental-Benefit Exception
C.R. and A.H. contend the juvenile court erred in failing to apply the beneficial
parent-child relationship exception to adoption pursuant to section 366.26,
subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) as to R.
The purpose of the section 366.26 hearing is to select and implement a permanent
plan for the child. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 630.) “[I]f the court finds that the
child is likely to be adopted and that ‘there has been a previous determination that
reunification services be terminated, then the court shall terminate parental rights to allow
for adoption. [Citation.] But if the parent shows that termination would be detrimental to
the child for at least one specifically enumerated reason, the court should decline to
terminate parental rights and select another permanent plan.’ (Caden C., supra, 11 cal.5th
at pp. 630-631; see § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)-(vi), (4)(A).)” (In re M.V. (2025) 109
Cal.App.5th 486, 507 (M.V.).) One of those exceptions is the parental-benefit exception.
(Ibid.) The California Supreme Court has explained that the exception “ ‘merely
permit[s] the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to choose an option other than
the norm, which remains adoption.’ [Citation.]” (Caden C., at p. 631.)
The proponent of the parental-benefit exception must establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence, three elements: “(1) regular visitation and contact, and
(2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child such that (3) the
38 termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.” (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 631, italics omitted.)
“ ‘The first element . . . is straightforward. The question is . . . whether “parents
visit consistently,” taking into account “the extent permitted by court orders.” ’ ” (In re
Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303, 316 (Katherine J.), quoting Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 632.)
“To establish the second element, . . . the parent must show the child has a
‘substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment
implying that the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.’ ” (M.V., supra,
109 Cal.App.5th at p. 507, quoting Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) “The ‘focus is
the child,’ ” (id. at p. 508), and the court considers “a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of
the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or
“negative” effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular
needs.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632, quoting In re Autumn H. (1994) 27
Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) In assessing this element, “courts often consider how children
feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about their parents.” (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 632.) “The significant attachment from child to parent results from the
adult’s attention to the child’s needs for physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection
and stimulation.” (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) The relationship should
be that of parent and child and not one of friends. (Id. at p. 576.)
39 Finally, “[c]oncerning the third element—whether ‘termination would be
detrimental to the child due to’ the relationship—the court must decide whether it would
be harmful to the child to sever the relationship and choose adoption.” (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 633; see Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 317.) In other words,
courts must determine “in effect, what life would be like for the child in an adoptive
home without the parent in the child’s life.” (Caden C., at p. 633.) “That subtle, case-
specific inquiry” asks whether “the benefit of placement in a new, adoptive home
outweigh[s] ‘the harm [the child] would experience from the loss of [a] significant,
positive, emotional relationship’ ” with the parent. (Ibid.) “ ‘When the relationship with
a parent is so important to the child that the security and stability of a new home wouldn’t
outweigh its loss,’ ” the parental-benefit exception applies. (M.V., supra, 109
Cal.App.5th at p. 508.) “When it weighs whether termination would be detrimental, the
court is not comparing the parent’s attributes as custodial caregiver relative to those of
any potential adoptive parent(s). . . . Accordingly, courts should not look to whether the
parent can provide a home for the child.” (Caden C., at p. 634; see Katherine J., at
p. 317.)
A “substantial evidence standard of review applies to the first two elements. The
determination that the parent has visited and maintained contact with the child
‘consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent permitted by the court’s orders’ [citation] is
essentially a factual determination. It’s likewise essentially a factual determination
whether the relationship is such that the child would benefit from continuing it.” (Caden
40 C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-640; see Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 317-
318.)
“The third element—whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental
to the child—is somewhat different. As in assessing visitation and the relationship
between parent and child, the court must make a series of factual determinations. . . . [¶]
Yet the court must also engage in a delicate balancing of these determinations as part of
assessing the likely course of a future situation that’s inherently uncertain. . . . The court
makes the assessment by weighing the harm of losing the relationship against the benefits
of placement in a new, adoptive home. And so, the ultimate decision—whether
termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child due to the child’s
relationship with his parent—is discretionary and properly reviewed for abuse of
discretion.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640; see Katherine J., supra, 75
Cal.App.5th at p. 318.)
In this case, at the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court expressly conducted
the analysis under Caden C. on the record before finding the exception inapplicable. The
juvenile court found that the mothers met the first and second prongs of the parental
benefit exception. The mothers, however, disagree with the court’s finding as to the third
prong of the exception.
We conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in determining that
adoption by committed caregivers outweighed any detriment R. might experience by
losing his relationship with his mothers. At the time of the contested section 366.26
41 hearing, R. desired to be adopted by Mr. and Mrs. S. And although the court
acknowledged a bond between R. and his mothers, he also called Mrs. S. “mommy” and
wanted to remain with his caregivers and their family. R. had been in foster care since he
was two years old, had been with Mr. and Mrs. S. for almost three years, and was almost
seven years old by the time of the section 366.26 hearing. Except for a brief four-month
period when he was returned to A.H. in early 2023, he spent almost five years in foster
care. After his removal from A.H., R. was placed with Mr. and Mrs. S. for almost three
years by the time parental rights were terminated. Most of his youth was spent in foster
care and more time in the care of Mr. and Mrs. S. than in the care of the mothers.
Moreover, R. was thriving in his caregivers’ home. Dr. Rogers and C.R.’s third-party
monitor acknowledged R. had improved verbal skills and spoke in complete sentences.
Although Dr. Rogers testified R. was particularly vulnerable to emotional
destabilization caused by severance, the mothers did not demonstrate great harm that R.
would experience. Neither Dr. Rogers nor the mothers described specific harm that R.
would likely or potentially suffer from the termination of parental rights. The record
shows R. would also suffer emotional destabilization if his relationship with Mrs. S was
severed. We acknowledge that R. repeatedly identified the mothers as “Mommy,”
expressed fear that he would never see C.R. again, cried at end of visits, ran to the
mothers screaming and hugging them, and consistently showed affection and connection
during visitation. However, there was no evidence of detrimental loss if parental rights
were terminated, particularly since R. wished to be freed for adoption and the record
42 shows R. had behavioral issues after visits with C.R. He had mood changes and
uncharacteristic anger towards people he had previously shown affection towards. He
returned from unsupervised visits whispering instead of speaking out loud and stopped
using his words. R. told Mrs. S. that C.R. told him that he was not allowed to talk to A.H.
or Mrs. S. Although Dr. Rogers may have concluded that R.’s negative behaviors were
not attributable to C.R.’s visits, the juvenile court was not obligated to adopt those
findings.
And CFS observed that Mrs. S. and R. developed mutual positive bonds.
Section 366.26, subdivision (h)(1) provides that, “At all proceedings under
[section 366.26], the court shall consider the wishes of the child and shall act in the best
interests of the child.” (§ 366.26, subd. (h)(1).) The juvenile court has a mandatory duty
to determine the child’s wishes, based upon the evidence. (In re Christopher L. (2006)
143 Cal.App.4th 1326, 1334; In re Amanda D. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 813, 820; In re Leo
M. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1591.) R. expressly indicated that he wished to be
adopted, even though he had an attachment to his mothers. R. deserved permanency and
stability after many years of being with his caregivers.
Notably, no credible evidence demonstrated any distress upon the conclusion of
visits, “which tends to support the juvenile court’s conclusion that the relationship was
not so substantial that its severance would be detrimental to the child.” (In re I.E. (2023)
91 Cal.App.5th 683, 692.) Nothing in the record showed the children asked to see
Mother longer or more frequently. In sum, there was no evidence of “emotional
43 instability and preoccupation leading to acting out, difficulties in school, insomnia,
anxiety, or depression” due to R.’s separation from the mothers. (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 633.)
Here, the juvenile court could reasonably find that any potential detriment caused
to R. by the separation from the mothers may well be alleviated by the source of stability
offered by his prospective adoptive parents. Mr. and Mrs. S. were committed to meeting
R.’s needs and desired to adopt him. And R. was bonded to them. The court did not
abuse its discretion in determining that adoption by committed caregivers outweighed
any detriment R. might experience by losing his relationship with his mothers.
The evidence did not show that there would be substantial harm to R. that would
outweigh the benefits of adoption. The court did not abuse its discretion in making this
finding. Nothing in the record suggests R. would be detrimentally affected by having the
parents’ rights terminated and being adopted by his caregivers. R. was bonded to his
caregivers, who had been providing him with ongoing care and love from a very young
age, and had a strong, positive attachment to them. Indeed, due to his caregivers’
commitment, R. was thriving in their home. The stability, security, and sense of
belonging R. felt in his caregivers’ home was evidenced by his emotional attachment to
his caregivers, his wish to be adopted by them, and him calling them “mom” and “papa.”
While Dr. Rogers’ bonding study shows R. was attached to C.R., the evidence in the
record is clear that R. will not suffer any detriment from the termination of parental
rights. Although it appeared that the mothers were appropriate during their visits and R.
44 was excited to see them, there is no evidence to suggest R. was in extreme distress at the
conclusion of the visits. The record amply supports the court’s finding adoption by his
committed caregivers outweighed any detriment R. might experience by losing his
relationship with the mothers.
The mothers’ arguments to the contrary ask this court to reweigh the evidence and
redetermine credibility issues. However, “ ‘[i]ssues of fact and credibility are questions
for the trial court.’ [Citations.]” (In re Sheila B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 187, 200.) “In
reviewing factual determinations for substantial evidence, a reviewing court should ‘not
reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary
conflicts.’ [Citation.]” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.)
Given R.’s young age, his developmental issues and his preference of adoption, his
need for permanency and stability was paramount. And his caregivers were willing and
able to provide permanency. Although the mothers were able to maintain some parental
relationship through their visitation with R. and R. had a bond with them as well, we
cannot say this presents an extraordinary case where preservation of parental rights
outweighs the preference for adoption. (See In re G.B. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147,
1166 [“ ‘ “it is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent’s rights will
prevail over the Legislature’s preference for adoptive placement” ’ ”].)
We express no doubt that the mothers love R., or that the mothers’ visits with R.
were generally positive and enjoyable for everyone. However, “[a] ‘ “showing [that] the
child would derive some benefit from continuing a relationship maintained during
45 periods of visitation” ’ is not a sufficient ground to depart from the statutory preference
for adoption.” (In re Andrew M. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 803, 818, quoting In re G.H.
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 15, 25, italics omitted.)
In sum, the juvenile court reasonably concluded that maintaining R.’s relationship
with the mothers did not outweigh “ ‘the security and the sense of belonging a new
family would confer.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) We therefore cannot
find that the court abused its discretion in declining to apply the beneficial parent-child
relationship exception in connection with R.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court terminating parental rights as to C.R. and A.H. are
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS CODRINGTON J. We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
FIELDS J.
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
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