In re R.R. CA2/1

Opinion

Filed 8/31/26 In re R.R. CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re R.R., a Person Coming Under B351691 the Juvenile Court Law.

(Los Angeles County

LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No. 23CCJP03688) DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CHRISTINA V.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Tara L. Newman, Judge. Affirmed.

Carolyn S. Hurley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Assistant County Counsel and Tracey Dodds, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services.

Christina V. (Mother) appeals from a juvenile court judgment terminating her parental rights. She contends notice of the selection and implementation hearing was faulty and the court should have continued the hearing. We disagree with both contentions and affirm.

BACKGROUND

The family is comprised of Mother, Rudy R. (Father), who is not a party to this appeal, and R.R., age five. Mother resides in an assisted living facility.

The juvenile court found R.R. was a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g).1 After a year and a half of hearings and family reunification services, the court terminated services and set the matter for a hearing on October 23, 2025, to select and implement a permanent plan (the October hearing). Mother personally received notice of the hearing.

In its report for the October hearing, DCFS recommended that parental rights be terminated.

Mother failed to appear at the October hearing. The court continued the hearing to December 18, 2025, so that Father could be served notice (the December hearing).

On November 21, 2025, DCFS mailed notice of the December hearing to Mother. The notice advised that permanency planning would occur at the hearing and DCFS recommended that parental rights continue.

Mother failed to appear at the December hearing as well.

Staff at Mother’s assisted living facility appeared telephonically

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

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and stated that Mother knew about the hearing but was not responding to text messages or telephone calls.

Mother’s counsel stated, “Your Honor, I don’t have more information as to Mother’s whereabouts. So in an abundance of caution, I would request a brief continuance to ensure her appearance.” The court denied counsel’s request.

Finding that R.R. was adoptable, the court terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.

Mother appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Notice Mother contends she received inadequate notice of the December hearing because the notice falsely stated that DCFS recommended continuation of parental rights. We disagree.

The state must afford adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard before depriving a parent of the companionship, care, custody, and management of her child. (In re B.G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679, 688–689.) Such notice must advise the parent of the nature of the hearing, including what will be decided therein. (In re Mia M. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 792, 807.) “ ‘ “Only with adequate advisement can one choose to appear or not, to prepare or not, and to defend or not.” [Citation.]’ ” (Ibid.)

DCFS’s notice correctly advised Mother that the December hearing was for permanency planning. This adequately apprised Mother of the nature of the hearing and what would be decided, and thus satisfied due process.

Mother argues the notice was inadequate because it incorrectly stated that DCFS recommended continuation of Mother’s parental rights, when in fact DCFS recommended

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termination of those rights. This inaccuracy did not vitiate the notice. Although we do not condone misrepresenting DCFS’s position, the essence of the notice was that an important decision regarding parental rights would be made at the hearing. That sufficed. Indeed, a reasonable person in Mother’s position would understand that the court was not bound by DCFS’s recommendation and that her input would be important.

B. Continuance Mother contends the court abused its discretion when it denied her request for a continuance. We disagree.

Continuances are discouraged in dependency cases, must be supported by a showing of good cause, and may not be contrary to the interest of the minor. (In re Giovanni F. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 594, 604.) “ ‘In considering the minor’s interests, the court shall give substantial weight to a minor’s need for prompt resolution of his or her custody status, the need to provide children with stable environments, and the damage to a minor of prolonged temporary placements.” (Ibid.) We review denial of a continuance for abuse of discretion. (In re Elijah V. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 576, 585.)

Mother’s counsel requested a continuance orally during the disposition hearing, waited more than a month after the hearing had been set, and gave no explanation for the need of a continuance other than to give Mother a third opportunity to appear at the hearing. Any of these three factors standing alone justified denial of the continuance. R.R. was entitled to a prompt resolution of his custody status. (In re Ninfa S. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 808, 811.) The court did not abuse its discretion by denying the continuance request.

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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

We concur:

BENDIX, J.

WEINGART, J.