In re Royal Fleet Service, Inc.

15 Fla. Supp. 82
CourtFlorida Public Service Commission
DecidedSeptember 30, 1959
DocketNo. 5162-CCT
StatusPublished

This text of 15 Fla. Supp. 82 (In re Royal Fleet Service, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Florida Public Service Commission primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Royal Fleet Service, Inc., 15 Fla. Supp. 82 (Fla. Super. Ct. 1959).

Opinion

BY THE COMMISSION.

Approval is here sought for the transfer of certificate of public convenience and necessity # 418 from Van C. Kussrow, as trustee in bankruptcy of Royal Fleet Service, Inc., to the Industrial National Bank of Miami, and from said bank to Rapid Delivery Service, Inc. The certificate authorizes the transportation in common carriage of packaged and unpackaged general merchandise in a parcel delivery service over irregular routes on irregular schedules to, from and between points and places in Dade, Broward and Palm Beach counties, limited to parcels weighing not more than 75 pounds and to shipments weighing not more than 75 pounds, mov[84]*84ing from one shipper to one consignee on the same vehicle on the same day.

Certificate # 418 was heretofore issued to Royal Fleet Service, Inc. on January 8, 1953 and was subsequently extended on June 11, 1954 and on March 12, 1956 by orders ## 2986 and 3425, respectively. As extended it encompasses all of the authority above set forth.

On April 26, 1955, Royal Fleet Service, Inc., being indebted to the Industrial National Bank of Miami in the sum of $34,950, assigned the certificate to the bank to secure the indebtedness. On April 16, 1957, Royal Fleet Service, Inc. was adjudged a bankrupt by the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, Miami Division, and subsequently Van C. Kussrow was duly appointed trustee in bankruptcy and duly qualified in such capacity. The referee in bankruptcy of said court ordered that the certificate be sold by the trustee in bankruptcy free and clear of liens, other than the aforesaid lien of the Industrial National Bank of Miami, which, to protect itself, purchased the certificate.

After the foregoing events had transpired, the trustee in bankruptcy, together with the aforesaid bank and Florida United Parcel Service, Inc., applied to this commission for approval of transfer of the certificate to Florida United Parcel Service, Inc. Notice of filing of the joint application was given by the commission on August 15, 1957 pursuant to provisions of chapter 57-260, Acts of 1957 (section 323.041, Florida Statutes). Protests were filed and hearing on the joint application was held at Tallahassee on October 14, 1957. At this hearing the commission heard only arguments on pending motions. On October 17, 1957, order # 4057 was entered by the commission approving suspension of operations pending the commission’s decision on the joint application. Subsequently, on April 7, 1958, the commission entered its order (order # 4243) on the pending motions in the transfer proceeding and directed that the cause be set for hearing on the merits at Miami. Said order again approved temporary suspension of operations pending final disposition of the joint application for transfer. This matter was held in abeyance pending disposition of an application of United Parcel Service, Inc. (with which company Florida United Parcel Service, Inc. was associated) for extension of its contract carrier certificate with Jordan Marsh Company.

On June 8, 1959 an amendment was filed to the joint application substituting Rapid Delivery Service, Inc. as the transferee of the certificate and setting forth that Florida United Parcel Service, Inc. [85]*85had sold to Rapid Delivery Service, Inc. its right to acquire the certificate. The joint application as now amended requests approval of the transfer as heretofore set forth in the first paragraph of this order. Notice of the filing of the amended joint application was issued by the commission on June 17, 1959. Protests were received and hearing on the amended application was held as aforesaid on August 17, 1959.

Apparently, the last operations were conducted under this certificate on April 17, 1957. Subsequent to that date lack of operation has been excused by the aforesaid orders ## 4057 and 4243 entered on October 17, 1957 and April 7, 1958, respectively. During the interim period, however, several other applications for certificates to authorize parcel delivery carriage have been granted for operations in Dade County — Russell’s Parcel Service, Inc. (certificate # 613); United Parcel Service (certificate # 561); and Red Top Cab and Baggage Company (certificate # 551). Also, extensions have been sought and denied for Dade County operators to expand into Broward and Palm Beach counties. In connection with these applications for extensions and in considering the parcel delivery problems and competitive situation between these carriers in this three-county lower east coast area, the commission in its order # 4428 entered on November 5, 1958, pointed out that certificate # L-106 held by Delivery Service, Inc. and certificate # 418 held by Van C. Kussrow, as trustee in bankruptcy of Royal Fleet Service, Inc., both authorize operations in Broward and Palm Beach counties, whereas the other parcel delivery certificates issued in this area are limited territorially to certain portions of Dade County. In said order we stated as follows—

“Proposed Safeguards
“In his proposed order, the examiner pointed out that at the present time, there are two certificates outstanding which authorize common carrier parcel delivery service between all points in Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach counties. It was his conclusion, in which we concur after considering the entire record herein, that the evidence in these various proceedings fails to show that there is sufficient parcel delivery business originating in Dade County and destined to points in Broward and Palm Beach counties to justify the issuance of similar authority to additional carriers. It is quite apparent, however, from the record herein that the very nature of the operations in question makes it necessary for all such carriers either to have similar authority or, in lieu thereof, adequate protection [86]*86against possible competitive practices by those carriers having certificates with broader territorial scope. Where several parcel delivery carriers are authorized to call on the same prospective customers, and one carrier is limited territorially to one county while the other carrier is authorized to serve two additional adjoining counties, it is only natural that customers having shipments destined to the three counties will give it all to the carrier with the broader authority. Such carrier is armed with an unfair advantage and can seriously handicap the strictly intracounty operator. Certainly, it is an inconvenience for merchants to have several carriers picking up parcels at different times for delivery some with one authority and some with another. The merchant necessarily becomes confused and wonders why he cannot give all his intracounty and his inter-county business to one and the same carrier. Soon he will discover that he can, because the carrier armed with the broader authority will not long forego the competitive advantages of his position. Ultimately, only those carriers will survive which are permitted to serve the three counties unless, of course, some adequate safeguard is devised which will give all the parcel delivery carriers a fair opportunity to develop a sound operation. We agree with the examiner that the answer does not lie in granting all parcel delivery carriers in Miami authority to serve the three counties of Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach. If such authority is granted, and the carriers are required, as they are, to furnish such service, there will not be sufficient business to support so many carriers and only those who are financially strong will have a chance to survive.

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15 Fla. Supp. 82, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-royal-fleet-service-inc-flapubserv-1959.