In Re Rott

94 B.R. 163, 1988 Bankr. LEXIS 2077, 1988 WL 132111
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. North Dakota
DecidedOctober 27, 1988
Docket19-07028
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 94 B.R. 163 (In Re Rott) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. North Dakota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Rott, 94 B.R. 163, 1988 Bankr. LEXIS 2077, 1988 WL 132111 (N.D. 1988).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WILLIAM A. HILL, Bankruptcy Judge.

The matter before the court is confirmation of the Debtors’ First Amended Plan under Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Debtors, Arlon and Rhodell Rott, filed the plan on August 10, 1988, and a confirmation hearing was held on September 7, 1988. The Small Business Administration (SBA) and Aetna Life Insurance Corporation (Aetna) have both filed objections to confirmation of the plan.

1.

The Debtors’ Chapter 12 plan currently before the court arises from their third bankruptcy filing. The Debtors filed their first petition for relief under Chapter 12 on January 29, 1987, commencing bankruptcy case number 87-05098. On April 20, 1987, the court entered an order denying confirmation of the Rott’s First Amended Plan in case 87-05098. Confirmation was denied because the plan did not propose an adequate interest rate to give Aetna the present value of its interest in its collateral as required by section 1225(a)(5)(B). See In re Rott, 73 B.R. 366, 374 (Bankr. D.N.D.1987).

As part of this order the court valued the Debtors’ real estate at $463,233.00. In the plans advanced by the Debtors in their first Chapter 12 filing they proposed to transfer all but $315,133.00 worth of the land to Aetna.

On September 23, 1987, the court entered an order denying confirmation of the Debtors’ Second Amended Plan in case number 87-05098. In that Order the court concluded that the Second Amended plan was not confirmable because it was not feasible. Case number 87-05098 was dismissed on December 29, 1987.

On February 8, 1988, the Debtors again filed for relief under the Bankruptcy Code, this time under Chapter 11 in case number 88-05100. United States Magistrate Klein dismissed the Chapter 11 filing on June 3, 1988. The Magistrate concluded that there was no reasonable likelihood that the Debtors could rehabilitate their farming operation while complying with the absolute priority rule under Chapter 11. See In re Rott, Bankr. No. 88-05100, slip op. at 9 (Bankr. D.N.D. June 3,1988). The Debtors filed their current Chapter 12 petition on July 11, 1988. In the instant case the Debtors propose to turn over all of their land to Aetna except the parcels designated 3, 4 and 5 with an aggregate value of $267,133.00. Thus, they have reduced their secured debt load from their first Chapter 12 by $48,000.00.

2.

In this case there are several objections to aspects of plan treatment and an objection to the plan’s feasibility. The plan treatment objections will be discussed first. The SBA objects to confirmation because the plan provides that unsecured debts will be discharged after only one year. Section 8(b) of the plan provides:

*166 1. All unsecured creditors shall receive a yearly pro-rata payment being a percent of the total claim. The yearly amount, $13,582.17 to be pro-rata to all unsecured creditors. * * * First year only, then discharged.
2. The first payment to all unsecured creditors should commence on 12-31-88 and on the same date each year thereafter for the term of the plan at which time they are discharged.

Section 1228(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the court shall grant a discharge to the debtor “[a]s soon as practicable after completion by the debtor of all payments under the plan, other than payments provided for under section 1222(b)(5) or 1222(b)(10).” The two plan provisions quoted above are contradictory. Paragraph 1 indicates that the unsecured debts will be discharged after the first year. Paragraph 2 appears to provide that the unsecured debts will not be discharged until after all of the payments are made over the term of the plan. The Debtors bear the burden of proving that their plan is con-firmable. The plan is a contract between the Debtors and their creditors. It is not a document which may be ambiguous. Section 1225(a)(1) provides that the court shall confirm a plan if it complies with the provisions of Chapter 12. In this case the Debtors have not convinced the court that their plan, as proposed, complies with the discharge provision of section 1228(a).

3.

The SBA and the Chapter 12 standing trustee have objected that the plan does not commit all of the Debtors’ disposable income to the plan. Once again certain of the plan provisions are contradictory. Section 8(b)(1) of the plan provides that the unsecured creditors shall receive a one-time payment of $13,582.17 after the first year of the plan. Alternatively paragraph 15 provides that “all of the Debtors’ projected disposable income will be applied to make payments under the plan.” While this apparent ambiguity alone could be a basis upon which to deny confirmation, a more serious problem exists with regard to the plan’s treatment of the Debtors’ disposable income. The expenses projected in a schedule attached to the plan include a line item for “capital improvements.” The plan projects a capital improvement expense of $11,917.00 for 1988; $5,763.09 for 1989; and, $6,974.25 for each of the years 1990-91. At the confirmation hearing Debtors’ counsel redesignated the item as a “cushion”. The purpose advanced for the cushion is to allow for unexpected expenses over the life of the plan. The plan does not specify exactly what potential expenses are to be absorbed by the cushion. Section 1225(b)(1) provides that if an unsecured creditor objects to confirmation a plan may not be confirmed unless the unsecured creditor receives the full amount of its claim or the plan “provides that all of the Debtors’ projected disposable income to be received in the three year périod ... will be applied to make payments under the plan.” While the language of the statute does not specify what type of plan payments are to be made with the disposable income, it is generally accepted that the disposable income is to be used for payments to unsecured creditors. See In re Citrowske, 72 B.R. 613, 616 (Bankr.D.Minn.1987); In re Wobig, 73 B.R. 292, 295-96 (Bankr.D.Neb.1987); In re Janssen Charoláis, 73 B.R. 125, 128 (Bankr.D.Mont.1987). Section 1225(b)(2) defines “disposable income” as income not “reasonably necessary” for the Debtors’ maintenance and support or for the “continuation, preservation, and operation of the Debtor’s business.” The basic test of disposable income is one of reasonableness. In re Coffman, 90 B.R. 878 (Bankr.W.D.Tenn.1988). The expenses deducted from income to arrive at disposable income must be reasonable. See Id.

Disposable income is a residual amount calculated as follows:

Total income
—Personal living expenses
—Business expenses including cash
—Plan payments (other than to unsecured creditors)
Disposable income available for unsecured creditors

The structure of the Debtors’ plan reflects a different calculation than the one set out *167 above. Section 1225(a)(4) requires that an unsecured creditor in a Chapter 12 reorganization must receive at least as much as it would in a Chapter 7 liquidation.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
94 B.R. 163, 1988 Bankr. LEXIS 2077, 1988 WL 132111, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-rott-ndb-1988.