In re Rosenhaus

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

In re Rosenhaus

105 A.D.2d 750, 481 N.Y.S.2d 403, 1984 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 20864

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedNovember 13, 1984

StatusPublished

This text of 105 A.D.2d 750 (In re Rosenhaus) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

In re Rosenhaus, 105 A.D.2d 750, 481 N.Y.S.2d 403, 1984 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 20864 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1984).

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Opinion

In a habeas corpus proceeding, the mother appeals from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Burstein, J.), entered August 2,1983, as denied her application for a counsel fee for her defense in the proceeding.

Judgment affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Considering the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties, we find no abuse of discretion in the denial of the mother’s application for a counsel fee (see Domestic Relations Law, § 237, subd [b]). The record shows that the habeas corpus proceeding was brought on as a result of the mother’s violation of the visitation provisions of the parties’ separation agreement. Such misconduct is properly the basis for denial of a party’s application for attorney’s fees (see Dobransky v Dobransky, 89 AD2d 614). Weinstein, J. P., Brown, Boyers and Eiber, JJ., concur.

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In a habeas corpus proceeding, the mother appeals from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Burstein, J.), entered August 2,1983, as denied her application for a counsel fee for her defense in the proceeding.

Judgment affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Considering the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties, we find no abuse of discretion in the denial of the mother’s application for a counsel fee (see Domestic Relations Law, § 237, subd [b]). The record shows that the habeas corpus proceeding was brought on as a result of the mother’s violation of the visitation provisions of the parties’ separation agreement. Such misconduct is properly the basis for denial of a party’s application for attorney’s fees (see Dobransky v Dobransky, 89 AD2d 614). Weinstein, J. P., Brown, Boyers and Eiber, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

105 A.D.2d 750, 481 N.Y.S.2d 403, 1984 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 20864, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-rosenhaus-nyappdiv-1984.

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