In re Rogers

7 P.3d 1260, 269 Kan. 829, 2000 Kan. LEXIS 616
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedJuly 14, 2000
DocketNo. 84,676
StatusPublished

This text of 7 P.3d 1260 (In re Rogers) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Rogers, 7 P.3d 1260, 269 Kan. 829, 2000 Kan. LEXIS 616 (kan 2000).

Opinion

Per Curiam:

This is an original proceeding in discipline filed by the office of the Disciplinary Administrator against John Edward Rogers, of Kansas City, Missouri, an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Kansas.

The matter was called for hearing before the disciplinary panel on December 13, 1999. Respondent failed to appear.

The panel made the following findings of fact.

“FINDINGS OF FACT
“2. On September 30,1998, pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 5.25, die Respondent voluntarily surrendered his license to practice law in the state of Missouri. The Respondent was represented by counsel in the Missouri disciplinary proceeding.
“3. The basis for die Respondent tendering his license in Missouri, as reflected in Respondent’s Basis for Voluntary Surrender of Law License’ was twofold:
a. The Respondent was not truthful in his communications widi certain witnesses having knowledge relevant to a bar complaint filed against him in 1997 and he failed to disclose all material facts and circumstances to witnesses involved in the investigation of the complaint against him. The Respondent acknowledged that diis conduct violated Missouri Rules 4-4.1 and 4-8.4(a) and (c).
b. The Respondent admitted that he participated in die solicitation of clients for his law practice in a joint marketing program widi a chiropractor during die years 1996 and 1997. He admitted that the marketing program was not qualified pursuant to Missouri Rule 4-10.1 and that his actions violated Missouri Rules 4-7.3 and 4-10.1.
“4. On December 2, 1998, in an Order signed by the Chief Justice of the Missouri Supreme Court, the Respondent was disbarred.
[830]*830“5. During the course of the Kansas disciplinary investigation, Disciplinary Administrator Investigator Donald E. Burns obtained the honre telephone number of the Respondent. In an attempt to contact the Respondent, on March 17, 1999, Mr. Burns left a telephone message on tire Respondent’s answering machine. Mr. Burns’ call went unanswered. Then, on March 22, 1999, Mr. Burns sent the Respondent a letter. That letter was mailed to the Respondent’s home address. The Respondent did not respond to this letter. Finally, on April 5,1999, Mr. Burns sent the Respondent a second letter. That letter went unanswered.
“6. On November 2, 1999, the Disciplinary Administrator filed a Formal Complaint against the Respondent. Also on November 2, 1999, the Disciplinary Administrator sent to the Respondent, via regular United States mail, postage prepaid, a copy of the Formal Complaint and the Notice of Hearing. The package was sent to the Respondent’s last registration address of Post Office Box 32207, Kansas City, Missouri 64111. The package was returned to the Disciplinary Administrator by the United States .Postal Service marked unable to forward.’
“7. On that same date, the Disciplinary Administrator sent to the Respondent a copy of the Formal Complaint and the Notice of Hearing via certified United States mail, postage prepaid. The notice was also sent to the Respondent’s last registration address of Post Office Box 32207, Kansas City, Missouri 64111. Again, this package was returned to the Disciplinary Administrator by the United States Postal Service. The package was returned because the forwarding order had expired.
“8. In his contact with the Missouri disciplinary authorities, the Disciplinary Administrator obtained the Respondent’s home address. . . . On November 2, 1999, the Disciplinary Administrator sent the Respondent a copy of die Formal Complaint and the Notice of Hearing to the Respondent’s home address, via certified United States mail, postage prepaid. The package was, returned to the Disciplinary Administrator after delivery had been attempted three (3) times.”

Based upon these findings, the panel concluded:

“CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
“Based upon die above findings of fact, the Hearing Panel makes the following conclusions of law:
“1. Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 215 governs service of process in disciplinary proceedings. That rule provides, in pertinent part as follows:
(a) Service upon the respondent of die formal complaint in any disciplinary proceeding shall be made by the Disciplinary Administrator, either by personal service or by certified mail to the address shown on the attorney’s most recent registration, or at his or her last known office address.
(c) Service by mailing under subsection (a) or (b) shall be deemed complete upon mailing whether or not the same is actually received.
[831]*831”2. Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 202 provides that [a] final adjudication in another jurisdiction that a lawyer has been guilty of misconduct shall establish conclusively the misconduct lor purposes of a disciplinary proceeding in this state. Id. Based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, including Disciplinary Administrator’s Exhibits A and B, and pursuant to Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 202, the Plearing Panel concludes that die Respondent engaged in misconduct and violated KRPC 4.1, 7.3, 8.4(a), and 8.4(c).2
a.KRPC 4.1 provides:
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a diird person; or
(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a diird person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client) unless disclosure is prohibited by or made discretionary under Rule 1.6.
Id. Although die record is devoid of any evidence that would show that ‘in die course of representing a client’ the Respondent made a ‘false statement of material fact or law’ or ‘fail[ed] to disclose a material fact to a third person,’ die state of Missouri, however, concluded diat he had. For that reason, the Hearing Panel concludes that, based on Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 202, the Respondent violated KRPC 4.1.
b. Solicitation of clients by lawyers is restricted by KRPC 7.3. In this case, the record clearly establishes that die Respondent directly solicited clients for his law practice in a joint marketing program widi a chiropractor. Accordingly, die Hearing Panel concludes that the Respondent violated KRPC 7.3.
c. According to KRPC 8.4(a) ‘[I]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . [vjiolate or attempt to violate the rules of professional conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so dirough the acts of another.’ Id. The Respondent violated KRPC 4.1 and 7.3, therefore, die Hearing Panel concludes that the Respondent violated KRPC 8.4(a).
d. KRPC 8.4(c) defines professional misconduct as ‘engag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.’ By misrepresenting material facts to witnesses in die Missouri disciplinary proceeding, the Re[832]*832spondent engaged in conduct that involves dishonesty or misrepresentation. Id.

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Bluebook (online)
7 P.3d 1260, 269 Kan. 829, 2000 Kan. LEXIS 616, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-rogers-kan-2000.