In re R.M.

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: June 12, 2026
• Docket: 4-26-0222
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2026 IL App (4th) 260222-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is June 12, 2026 NO. 4-26-0222 Carla Bender not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re R.M., a Minor ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Sangamon County Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 24JA108 v. ) Kaylenna M., ) Honorable Respondent-Appellant). ) Karen S. Tharp, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Knecht and Vancil concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Respondent mother failed to establish that the trial court erred in finding her unfit and terminating her parental rights.

¶2 Respondent, Kaylenna M., appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental

rights to her minor child. She argues the court erred in finding her unfit. We affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 Respondent is the mother of R.M., born in July 2024. Shortly following R.M.’s

birth, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship, asserting R.M. was a neglected and

dependent minor pursuant to sections 2-3(1)(b) and 2-4(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987

(Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b), 2-4(1)(b) (West 2024)). Specifically, it alleged

R.M. was neglected in that his environment was injurious to his welfare because his siblings had

been adjudicated neglected, respondent failed to make reasonable progress toward the siblings’ return to her care, and the siblings were in the custody and guardianship of the Illinois Department

of Children and Family Services (DCFS). The State alleged that R.M. was a dependent minor

because he was without proper care due to respondent’s mental disability.

¶5 In September 2024, the trial court entered an adjudicatory order, finding R.M. was

neglected as alleged by the State. The following month, the court entered its dispositional order,

adjudicating R.M. a ward of the court and placing him in DCFS’s custody and guardianship.

¶6 In July 2025, the State filed a motion to terminate respondent’s parental rights to

R.M. It alleged she was an unfit parent in that she (1) failed to maintain a reasonable degree of

interest, concern, or responsibility as to R.M.’s welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2024));

(2) abandoned R.M. (id. § 1(D)(a)); (3) deserted R.M. for more than three months before the

commencement of termination proceedings (id. § 1(D)(c)); (4) failed to make reasonable efforts

to correct the conditions which were the basis for R.M.’s removal from her care from September

18, 2024, to June 18, 2025 (id. § 1(D)(m)(i)); (5) failed to make reasonable progress toward R.M.’s

return to her care from September 18, 2024, to June 18, 2025 (id. § 1(D)(m)(ii)); (6) evidenced her

intent to forgo her parental rights by failing, for 12 months, to visit R.M., communicate with R.M.

or DCFS, or maintain contact with R.M. or plan for his future (id. § 1(D)(n)(1)(i)-(iii)); and

(7) lacked the ability to discharge her parental responsibilities due to a mental illness, mental

impairment, or intellectual disability that would extend beyond a reasonable time period (id.

§ 1(D)(p)). The State further alleged termination of respondent’s parental rights was in R.M.’s best

interest. (The record shows that during the underlying proceedings, the State also sought to

terminate the parental rights of any putative and unknown fathers of R.M., and the trial court

granted the State’s request. However, this appeal concerns only the termination of respondent’s

parental rights, and we discuss the issues solely as they relate to her.)

-2- ¶7 In January 2026, the trial court conducted a fitness hearing. The State presented

testimony from Danielle Croll, a case manager with the Family Service Center and R.M.’s

caseworker. Croll testified R.M. was removed from respondent’s care because respondent had “a

current open DCFS case that she had not completed her services on.” Croll indicated that

respondent had developmental delays and that respondent’s mother, Jacqueline M., acted as

respondent’s adult guardian. Jacqueline reported to Croll that respondent “had several delays,”

including autism and microcephaly.

¶8 The first of respondent’s service plans that involved R.M. covered August 2024 to

February 2025. Respondent was required to cooperate “with the agency,” receive parenting

coaching, attend visitations with R.M., and undergo a psychological assessment. Croll stated she

discussed with respondent what she needed to do to complete each of the tasks in her service plan.

Croll also made the necessary referrals so that respondent could engage in services. Nevertheless,

respondent “didn’t cooperate.” Additional service plans were established in February 2025 and

August 2025, but respondent failed to cooperate and did not complete the required services.

¶9 Croll testified that from the time of R.M.’s birth in July 2024 until December 2024,

she had regular contact with respondent. However, after January 2025, respondent was

uncooperative. After February 2025, Croll had no contact with respondent until December 2025,

when respondent gave birth to another baby.

¶ 10 Croll testified that, in 2022, respondent was originally referred for parenting

services in connection with the case involving her older children. Respondent completed parenting

coaching, and a determination was made that she “could probably parent with the help of someone

else.” In November 2024 and February 2025, respondent received referrals for additional parenting

services but was “dropped” both times “for failure to engage.” Also, in March 2023, respondent

-3- underwent a psychological evaluation. However, the evaluation was incomplete because

respondent could not answer all the questions without assistance. Later, a court order was obtained

for an additional psychological evaluation. That evaluation was scheduled for March 2025 but was

never completed by respondent.

¶ 11 With respect to visitation, respondent was offered two two-hour visits with R.M.

per week. The visits were always held at the Family Service Center and supervised by its staff.

Croll stated that until December 2024, respondent attended her visits with R.M. “pretty regularly.”

During visits, respondent required assistance from Jacqueline, who would help with feeding and

changing R.M.

¶ 12 In December 2024, Jacqueline began “having some issues” and was admitted to a

mental health facility. Beginning in January 2025, case aides were sent to respondent’s residence

to pick her up and take her to visitations. Croll stated there were several times that respondent

refused to answer the door and that, sometimes, respondent provided the excuse that she was sick.

According to Croll, respondent knew when her visits with R.M. were every week and what time a

case aide would arrive to pick her up. At some point, respondent’s residence “had an eviction

notice on it” and, around February or March 2025, respondent left the residence. It was Croll’s

understanding that after being evicted, respondent was either homeless or living with different

people. In February 2025, respondent’s visits with R.M. were suspended due to her “not showing”

and Croll’s inability to contact her. Croll stated that respondent “missed all visits [with R.M.] from

February 2025 to present.”

¶ 13 Croll testified that after losing contact with respondent, she texted respondent’s

phone numbers that were “on file.” She also texted respondent’s paramour. However, respondent

never responded to the text messages and, eventually, the phone numbers stopped working. Croll

-4- further “submitted diligent searches” for respondent, which “kept coming up to the address that

[respondent] was evicted from.” In December 2025, respondent gave birth to another child, and

Croll visited her in the hospital. She stated she spoke with respondent about the new baby, but

respondent “didn’t really ask any questions about [R.M.]”

¶ 14 Croll agreed that respondent became uncooperative around the time Jacqueline was

institutionalized and that, prior to that time, Jacqueline helped to facilitate interactions between

Croll and respondent. After December 2024, Croll had no contact with Jacqueline. She

unsuccessfully tried to reach out to Jacqueline by contacting the facility she was in and contacting

Jacqueline’s mother. However, Jacqueline was not willing to speak with Croll, and Croll believed

Jacqueline was not “in her right mind to be able to do that.” Around the same time Croll lost

contact with Jacqueline, she discussed with respondent the possibility of obtaining an alternate

guardian. Respondent suggested her paramour, who Croll stated “also ha[d] some developmental

delays.” In February or March 2025, Croll contacted Adult Protective Services regarding

respondent. She later learned that respondent “wouldn’t talk to them.” Croll testified that

respondent had “no other family supports” to act as her guardian.

¶ 15 Croll asserted that she was never close to returning R.M. to respondent’s care and

pointed out that respondent “had not completed any of her services.” She also stated that she did

not believe that R.M. could have been returned to respondent even if Jacqueline had been available

to help, stating that respondent was also unsuccessful at having her older children returned to her

care.

¶ 16 Respondent testified on her own behalf at the fitness hearing. She stated that she

agreed with Croll’s testimony regarding what had occurred “[f]or the most part.” Respondent

asserted she successfully completed parenting coaching but could not remember if she was asked

-5- to take parenting classes. She also stated that she underwent one psychological evaluation and

“was not aware of the second one.”

¶ 17 Respondent acknowledged that she had not visited with R.M. since February 2025.

She explained that she lost Croll’s contact information after “going to the hospital for appointments

and treatments.” She could not remember if Croll ever reached out to her during that time and

stated that she also believed that she was denied visitation at some point. Respondent stated she

was not aware of Croll sending people to facilitate visitation for her and denied that she deliberately

refused to answer the door or communicate with anyone. Respondent maintained that she still

wanted to have visits with R.M. She asserted that she asked to reengage in visits and was told “they

would discuss it.” However, no one got back to her, and she had not “recently” reached out to Croll

regarding visits with R.M.

¶ 18 Respondent testified that her adult guardian Jacqueline previously assisted her with

her services and facilitated her visits with R.M. Jacqueline being unavailable to assist her interfered

with her ability to engage in services. Respondent admitted that she did not take any steps on her

own to reach out to Croll, participate in services, or reinstitute visits with R.M. However, she

asserted she was willing to engage in services. Respondent also acknowledged that she did not

currently have a “fixed residence” but stated that she and her paramour were “working to get a

place.”

¶ 19 The trial court determined respondent was unfit based upon five of the seven

unfitness grounds alleged by the State. Specifically, it determined that respondent (1) failed to

maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to R.M.’s welfare;

(2) abandoned R.M.; (3) deserted R.M.; (4) failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the

conditions that were the basis for R.M.’s removal from her care from September 2024 to June

-6- 2025; and (5) failed to make reasonable progress toward R.M.’s return to her care during that same

period.

¶ 20 Immediately following the fitness hearing, the trial court conducted the best interest

hearing. Again, both Croll and respondent testified at the hearing. The evidence showed R.M. was

one and a half years old. He had been in the same traditional foster home since birth, and the home

was an adoptive placement. During her testimony, respondent continued to express a desire to have

visits with R.M. She also expressed a willingness to engage in services. Ultimately, the court found

that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in R.M.’s best interest.

¶ 21 This appeal followed.

¶ 22 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 23 On appeal, respondent argues the trial court erred in finding that she was an unfit

parent. She contends the court’s findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence when

considering her efforts and unique circumstances.

¶ 24 The Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2024)) provides for the

involuntarily termination of parental rights where the trial court finds, by clear and convincing

evidence, that a parent is unfit based on grounds set forth in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750

ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2024)) and that termination is in the minor’s best interest. In re M.I., 2016 IL

120232, ¶ 20. “Although section 1(D) of the Adoption Act sets forth numerous grounds under

which a parent may be deemed ‘unfit,’ any one ground, properly proven, is sufficient to enter a

finding of unfitness.” In re Donald A.G., 221 Ill. 2d 234, 244 (2006). On review, a trial court’s

finding that a parent is unfit will not be disturbed unless the finding is against the manifest weight

of the evidence. M.I., 2016 IL 120232 ¶ 21. A court’s decision “is against the manifest weight of

the evidence only where the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent.” (Internal quotation marks

-7- omitted.) Id.

¶ 25 Here, the State alleged respondent was unfit based upon seven separate grounds set

forth in the Adoption Act. Following the fitness hearing, the trial court found that respondent was

unfit based upon five of those seven grounds. Specifically, the court determined that respondent

(1) failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to R.M.’s

welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2024)); (2) abandoned R.M. (id. § 1(D)(a)); (3) deserted

R.M. for more than three months preceding the commencement of termination proceedings (id.

§ 1(D)(c)); (4)failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for

R.M.’s removal from her care during the nine-month period extending from September 2024 to

June 2025 (id. § 1(D)(m)(i)); and (5) failed to make reasonable progress toward R.M.’s return to

her care during that same nine-month period (id. § 1(D)(m)(ii)).

¶ 26 Significantly, on appeal, respondent addresses only three of the five grounds upon

which the trial court found her unfit, presenting no argument or analysis with respect to the grounds

of abandonment or desertion (id. § 1(D)(a), (c)). We note that the argument section of an

appellant’s brief must “contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor” and that

“[p]oints not argued are forfeited.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Further, as stated, a

trial court’s unfitness finding may be supported by only a single ground which is properly proven.

Donald A.G., 221 Ill. 2d at 244. A parent’s failure to challenge every ground upon which the court

determined him or her unfit effectively concedes that the parent was unfit based upon the

unchallenged grounds. See In re D.L., 326 Ill. App. 3d 262, 268 (2001) (finding that the respondent

parents’ failure to challenge one ground upon which the trial court determined that they were unfit

amounted to a concession that they were unfit on that unchallenged ground).

¶ 27 Here, respondent has forfeited any argument that the trial court erred in finding that

-8- she was unfit for abandoning or deserting R.M. by failing to present any reasoned analysis as to

either of those grounds in her appellant’s brief. Her failure to challenge the court’s findings that

she was unfit on those grounds amounts to a concession that she was unfit on those bases.

¶ 28 However, even setting aside respondent’s forfeiture and her concession to the

unchallenged grounds, we would find the evidence supports the trial court’s findings that she was

unfit based on the grounds respondent does challenge on appeal. In particular, the evidence

sufficiently demonstrated that respondent was unfit for “[f]ail[ing] to maintain a reasonable degree

of interest, concern, or responsibility as to [R.M.’s] welfare” under section 1(D)(b) of the Adoption

Act.

¶ 29 “Because the language of section 1(D)(b) is in the disjunctive, any of the three

elements may be considered on its own as a ground for unfitness.” In re T.A., 359 Ill. App. 3d 953,

961 (2005). When considering whether a parent is unfit under that section, “a trial court must

(1) focus on a parent’s reasonable efforts, not his success, and (2) consider any circumstances that

may have hindered his ability to visit, communicate with, or otherwise show interest in his child.”

Id. “[A] parent is not fit merely because she has demonstrated some interest or affection towards

her child.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Instead, “a parent’s interest, concern, or

responsibility must be reasonable.” Id. “Noncompliance with an imposed service plan, a continued

addiction to drugs, a repeated failure to obtain treatment for an addiction, and infrequent or

irregular visitation with the child have all been held to be sufficient evidence warranting a finding

of unfitness under [section 1(D)(b)].” In re Jaron Z., 348 Ill. App. 3d 239, 259 (2004).

¶ 30 In this case, the evidence showed respondent was noncompliant with the service

plans that were established following R.M.’s removal from her care. She was referred for parenting

services in November 2024 and February 2025 but was “dropped” on both occasions “for failure

-9- to engage.” She also failed to complete a psychological evaluation that was scheduled to occur in

March 2025. In February 2025, respondent stopped communicating with Croll entirely, and she

attended no visits with R.M. from that time through the date of the January 2026 fitness hearing.

Evidence indicated that Croll was able to reestablish contact with respondent in December 2025,

after respondent gave birth to another child. When Croll visited respondent in the hospital,

¶ 31 On appeal, respondent contends her lack of engagement and participation in the

case was due to the unavailability of her adult guardian, beginning in December 2024. The record

shows that the trial court considered such circumstances but noted that efforts were made by Croll

and others after that time to maintain contact with respondent and to facilitate her visits with R.M.

In particular, case aides went to respondent’s residence to take her to visits. Respondent did not

answer the door or provided excuses for not attending visits. After respondent was evicted from

her residence, Croll texted respondent and her paramour without receiving a response and

unsuccessfully conducted “diligent searches” for respondent. The court also pointed out that

respondent’s visits with R.M. had always occurred at the same location, the Family Service Center.

The court concluded that respondent had “some responsibility” to go to that location if she could

not reach Croll and stated as follows: “[Respondent] said that she was going to therapies or

treatments, so she got other places. She[,] at the most basic level[,] needed to get to the Family

Service Center to re-establish contact.”

¶ 32 Here, the trial court’s findings were supported by the record, and the evidence was

sufficient to establish that respondent was unfit. An opposite conclusion from the one reached by

the court is not clearly apparent, and the court’s decision was not against the manifest weight of

the evidence.

- 10 - ¶ 33 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 34 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 35 Affirmed.

- 11 -