In re R.M., B.M., and H.M. (Justice Ewing, concurring, joined by Senior Status Justice Hutchison)

• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Decided: November 12, 2025
• Docket: 24-357
• Status: Separate

Opinion

No. 24-357 – In re R.M., B.M., and H.M. FILED November 12, 2025 released at 3:00 p.m. C. CASEY FORBES, CLERK Ewing, Justice, concurring, joined by Senior Status Justice Hutchison: SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

I concur with the majority’s decision to affirm the termination of the parental

rights of petitioner C.N. despite the lack of detailed factual findings in the adjudicatory

order to support the circuit court’s conclusion that she abused and neglected her children.

I write separately, however, to caution against viewing our decision in this case as

alleviating circuit courts of their duty to make the necessary findings of fact and

conclusions of law when determining whether a child is abused and/or neglected and

whether a respondent is an abusing, neglecting, or if applicable, a battered parent. See W.

Va. Code § 49-4-601(i); W. Va. R. of P. for Child Abuse & Neglect Proc. 27. Not only are

such findings and conclusions mandated by statute and rule, but they are also critical to

fulfilling the joint legislative and judicial goal of resolving abuse and neglect proceedings

as expeditiously as possible. So, while we have clarified that such findings are not required

for establishing or maintaining subject matter jurisdiction, they remain an indispensable

part of the abuse and neglect process, informing the very issues that must be addressed as

part of any improvement period and at disposition.

At the circuit court level, adequate findings of abuse and neglect serve as the

necessary framework for the case to move forward. Indeed, “the [S]tate’s right to intervene

is predicated upon its initial showing that there has been child abuse or neglect, which

1 constitutes unfitness on the part of the parents to continue, either temporarily or

permanently, in their custodial role.” State v. T.C., 172 W. Va. 47, 51, 303 S.E.2d 685,

690 (1983). In addition, “[t]h[e] process of adjudication enables the presiding tribunal to

identify what abuse and/or neglect the subject children have sustained and to implement

procedures to help the parents remedy these conditions to prevent future incidences

thereof[.]” In re I.M.K., 240 W. Va. 679, 685, 815 S.E.2d 490, 496 (2018). Finally, “only

after a court determines that there is clear and convincing evidence that abuse and/or

neglect has occurred, may the case proceed to the dispositional phase[.]” In re Z.S.-1, 249

W. Va. 14, 21, 893 S.E.2d 621, 628 (2023).

At the appellate level, adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law in the

adjudicatory order are necessary for meaningful review. “[O]ur task as an appellate court

is to determine whether the circuit court’s reasons for its order are supported by the record.”

Nestor v. Bruce Hardwood Flooring, L.P., 206 W. Va. 453, 456, 525 S.E.2d 334, 337

(1999). Therefore “[c]lear and complete findings by the trial judge are essential to enable

[this Court] properly to exercise and not exceed our powers of review.” In re Edward B.,

210 W. Va. 621, 631, 558 S.E.2d 620, 632 (2001) (additional quotations and citation

omitted). While a circuit court’s findings, including credibility determinations, are entitled

to deference on appeal, see In Int. of Tiffany Marie S., 196 W. Va. 223, 226, 470 S.E.2d

177, 180 (1996), such deference is not absolute. If “lower tribunals fail to meet this

standard—i.e. making only general, conclusory or inexact findings—we must vacate the

judgment and remand the case for further findings and development.” Hawk v. Hawk, 203

2 W. Va. 48, 51, 506 S.E.2d 85, 88 (1998) (additional quotations and citation omitted).

Inadequate findings in an adjudicatory order make it necessary for us to vacate both the

adjudication and disposition orders. That means the case essentially begins anew, resulting

in a significant delay in achieving permanency and representing continued disruption in

the lives of the children involved.

Without detailed findings of facts specifying what conduct or conditions

warrant the conclusion that a child has been abused and/or neglected, the entire abuse and

neglect process may be thwarted. To avoid that outcome, I harken back to high school

math to implore circuit courts to “show their work” by making findings that thoroughly

explain the basis for their conclusion that a child has been abused and/or neglected as well

as the basis for any credibility determinations. This also extends to abuse and neglect

adjudications involving factual admissions in stipulated adjudications. In many instances,

the petition will set forth multiple allegations of abuse and/or neglect, yet the respondent

parent will only stipulate to a single act of abuse and/or neglect or to a limited set of facts

and circumstances. Rule 26(b) of the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect

Proceedings requires the circuit court to determine that the stipulation “meets the purpose

of these rules and [the] controlling statute.” In other words, the circuit court must make

findings of fact following a stipulated adjudication, explaining how the factual admissions

in the stipulation support the conclusion that the child has been abused and/or neglected

and that the respondent stipulating is abusing or neglectful.

3 Having recently been a circuit judge, I fully understand that our circuit courts

have overloaded dockets and at times, the number of abuse and neglect cases that need

attention seems insurmountable. Undoubtedly, circuit court judges feel immense pressure

to be efficient and comply with short timelines for issuing orders in abuse and neglect cases

under the statutes and rules. In many instances, courts understandably rely upon

overwhelmed prosecutors, respondent attorneys, and/or guardians ad litem in their circuits

to assist with drafting and proposing draft orders following contested adjudicatory,

disposition, and placement hearings.1 However, courts must remember that it is their

responsibility—not the attorneys—to ensure that the order contains sufficient findings of

fact and conclusions of law to facilitate meaningful review on appeal. See Taylor v. W. Va.

Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res., 237 W. Va. 549, 558, 788 S.E.2d 295, 304 (2016); Province

v. Province, 196 W. Va. 473, 483, 473 S.E.2d 894, 904 (1996) (stating that the circuit

court’s order “must be sufficient to indicate the factual and legal basis for the [court]’s

ultimate conclusion so as to facilitate a meaningful review of the issues presented.”).

1 This Court has warned circuit courts about “the risks attendant to adopting and entering—wholesale—orders prepared by counsel” stating

[w]e caution circuit courts, however, that the burden of issuing an order which meets this Court’s requirements, which requirements are designed to permit meaningful appellate review, ultimately remains on the circuit court. It is incumbent on the trial court to determine if the submitted order accurately reflects the court ruling given that it is well-established that “[a] court of record speaks only through its orders [.]” State ex rel. Erlewine v. Thompson, 156 W.Va. 714, 718, 207 S.E.2d 105, 107 (1973).

Taylor v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res., 237 W. Va. 549, 558, 788 S.E.2d 295, 304 (2016). 4 As this case illustrates, we have on occasion upheld an adjudication of abuse

and neglect even when the adjudicatory order lacked the necessary findings and

conclusions, but from our review, it was evident that the circuit court made the requisite

finding that the children were abused and/or neglected on the record. Nevertheless, as an

appellate court, we should not have to scour the record to make that determination, and we

are reluctant to continue doing so while being mindful that delay in these cases is delay in

a child achieving permanency. Accordingly, it is imperative that circuit courts make clear,

detailed, and complete findings of fact in their adjudicatory orders that explain their reasons

for concluding that a child has been abused and/or neglected. Doing so not only facilitates

proper appellate review, it also protects the procedural rights of the respondent parents,

promotes achievement of timely permanency, and most importantly, serves the best

interests of the children involved.

For these reasons, I concur with the decision in this case. I am authorized to

state that Senior Status Justice Hutchison joins in this concurrence.