IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-466
Filed 3 June 2026
Craven County, No. 22JA000015-240
IN THE MATTER OF: R.L.
Appeal by respondent-mother from order entered 4 December 2024 by Judge
Debra L. Massie in District Court, Craven County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11
March 2026.
Craven County Department of Social Services, by James D. Dill, for petitioner- appellee Craven County Department of Social Services.
Troutman Pepper Locke LLP, by Joshua D. Davey, for guardian ad litem.
Jeffrey L. Miller for respondent-appellant-mother.
STROUD, Judge.
Respondent Mother challenges an initial disposition and permanency planning
order, arguing that the trial court erred by taking judicial notice of a Responsible
Individuals List (RIL) order and by ceasing efforts to reunify the child with Mother.
Because she did not object to the trial court taking judicial notice of the RIL order,
Mother waived review of this issue. Further, we conclude the trial court did not err
in ceasing reasonable efforts toward reunification. We therefore affirm.
I. Procedural Background
On 15 February 2022, Craven County Department of Social Services (DSS) IN RE: R.L.
Opinion of the Court
filed a juvenile petition on behalf of Robbie,1 contending he was an abused, neglected,
and dependent juvenile. Robbie was three months old and had bruises, a skeletal
survey that revealed previous breaks and injuries, and a broken arm that did not
match the parents’ explanation. On 18 April 2022, DSS filed an amended juvenile
petition still alleging abuse, neglect, and dependency. The hearing on adjudication
was held on 18 and 19 September and 10 October 2023, and the trial court entered
an order adjudicating Robbie as an abused juvenile on 18 January 2024.2
In 2022, both parents filed petitions for judicial review after finding out they
were to be placed on the RIL. On 10 October 2023, at the end of the adjudication
hearing, the court considered the judicial review petitions; it took both the
adjudication and the RIL petition under advisement. On 18 January 2024, the trial
court entered an adjudication order and the RIL orders.
The trial court held a disposition and permanency planning hearing on 30
January and 12 and 26 July 2024, and on 4 December 2024, entered a combined
disposition and permanency planning order (Order), determining that reunification
efforts were not required. On 27 December 2024, Mother timely appealed the
adjudication order3 and the Order.
1 A stipulated pseudonym is used to protect the identity of the child. See N.C. R. App. P. 42.
2 Robbie was also adjudicated neglected, but this is not at issue on appeal.
3 Mother makes no arguments regarding the adjudication order.
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II. RIL Orders
Because Mother is challenging the trial court’s judicial notice of the RIL orders
as part of the factual basis for its determination that “aggravating circumstances”
exist under North Carolina General Statute Section 7B-901, we begin with Mother’s
second issue on appeal: “The trial court erred in taking judicial notice of RIL [o]rders
for purposes of making its factual findings and conclusions in its . . . Order.” Mother
contends that the trial court should not have relied on the RIL orders in any manner
for purposes of the disposition or permanency planning hearing.
At the beginning of the hearing, DSS asked for the trial court to take judicial
notice of the adjudication order entered on 18 January 2024 and the “two orders filed
in 22 JRI 10,” which were also filed on 18 January 2024. The “two orders” were the
RIL orders. Neither Mother nor Father made any objection to judicial notice of the
orders. The trial court stated that it would take judicial notice. Mother’s counsel
asked whether the court was also taking “judicial notice of the court report or
anything we haven’t got to that point.” The trial court clarified that it was taking
notice of only “the orders,” and Mother’s counsel—confirming, “The RIL orders”—
stated he had “[n]o objection.”
In In re L.N.H, our Supreme Court held that the respondent-mother who failed
to object to the trial court’s taking judicial notice of medical records previously
admitted at another hearing in the case “waive[d] appellate review of the issue.” 382
N.C. 536, 541, 879 S.E.2d 138, 142–43 (2022) (citation omitted). Because Mother
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raised no objection to the trial court’s judicial notice of the RIL orders here, she has
likewise waived appellate review.
III. Cessation of Reunification
We begin our analysis of Mother’s next issue by clarifying what she is not
arguing. She claims that “[t]he trial court erred in ceasing/eliminating reunification
as a permanent plan at the consolidated initial disposition/permanency planning,”
because “the relevant evidence was insufficient to support the necessary findings, and
the relevant findings were insufficient to support a conclusion, that aggravating
circumstances existed.” Mother thus does not challenge the trial court’s abuse
adjudication. To the contrary, she acknowledges that “[d]espite her actual innocence,
[she] must concede the supported findings in adjudication as adequate to conclude
Robbie’s status as an abused . . . juvenile based on the inference of circumstances
occurring between 17 January 2022 and 5 February 2022.”
Nor does Mother challenge the permanency planning portion of the Order.
Finding of fact 82 states that the trial court “has found aggravating circumstances
for the Initial Dispositional portion of these hearings and reasonable efforts at
reunification are no longer required for purposes of the Permanency Planning and
Review portion of th[is] hearing.” In other words, we need not reach ceasing
reunification as to the permanency planning portion of the Order
Because Mother’s challenge to ceasing reunification rests on the dispositional
finding of aggravated circumstances, we need not address ceasing reunification as to
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the Order’s permanency planning portion. We thus review the trial court’s decision
to cease reunification efforts only under the Order’s initial disposition portion.
North Carolina General Statute Section 7B-901 sets out the aggravating
circumstances under which a trial court may make a determination that reasonable
efforts will not be made for reunification in an initial disposition order. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-901 (2023).
Section 7B-901 provides in pertinent part,
(c) If the disposition order places a juvenile in the custody of a county department of social services, the court shall direct that reasonable efforts for reunification as defined in G.S. 7B-101 shall not be required if the court makes written findings of fact pertaining to any of the following, unless the court concludes that there is compelling evidence warranting continued reunification efforts:
(1) A court of competent jurisdiction determines or has determined that aggravated circumstances exist because the parent has committed or encouraged the commission of, or allowed the continuation of, any of the following upon the juvenile:
....
b. Chronic physical or emotional abuse.
f. Any other act, practice, or conduct that increased the enormity or added to the injurious consequences of the abuse or neglect.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-901(c) (emphasis added).
A. Standard of Review
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Our review of a permanency planning order is limited to whether there is competent evidence in the record to support the findings of fact and whether the findings support the conclusions of law. The trial court’s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if supported by any competent evidence. The trial court’s dispositional choices—including the decision to eliminate reunification from the permanent plan—are reviewed only for abuse of discretion, as those decisions are based upon the trial court’s assessment of the child’s best interests.
In re L.R.L.B., 377 N.C. 311, 315, 857 S.E.2d 105, 111 (2021) (citations, quotation
marks, and brackets omitted).
B. Findings of Fact
1. Challenges to trial court’s wording and characterization of facts
Mother, using brief bullet points, challenges many of the Order’s ninety-two
detailed findings of fact.4 We have considered each challenge, and for many of them,
Mother argues mostly about the trial court’s characterization of established facts. In
finding of fact 58, for example, the trial court found that Mother “denied the serious
physical abuse that” Robbie suffered. Mother contends that “[w]hile it is true [she]
consistently denied her knowledge of or responsibility for Robbie’s abuse, she did not
deny the facts of the injuries he suffered and . . . ultimately came to accept and believe
Father was responsible.” So Mother wants to clarify that she denied responsibility
for the abuse, not the existence of abuse itself. Such clarifications, however, do not
4 The Order also incorporates the 74 “findings of fact from the [a]djudication [o]rder . . . . as if fully
set forth.”
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change the fact that finding 58, and the trial court’s interpretation, is supported by
the evidence. See In re K.W., 282 N.C. App. 283, 290, 871 S.E.2d 146, 152 (2022) (“A
trial judge passes upon the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given
their testimony and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.” (citation and
quotation marks omitted)).
In other challenges, Mother contests the weight and credibility of the evidence.
But this is within the trial court’s purview. See id. (“[I]t is within the trial court’s
discretion to determine the weight and credibility that should be given to all evidence
that is presented during the trial.”). For instance, in finding of fact 74, the trial court
found neither Mother nor Father “exhibited any sympathy or remorse for” Robbie’s
injuries. In Mother’s view, this “is outrageous.” Yet the trial court saw Mother and
Father over multiple days and was allowed to make “reasonable inferences” based on
what it saw; here, it did not see sympathy or remorse, even if Mother believes that
she exhibited these emotions. Id.
Mother also challenges certain findings of fact but leaves unchallenged other
findings establishing the same facts. She contests finding 50, which states that
“[b]oth Respondent Parents suffered from substantial mental health issues at the
time of [Robbie’s] birth and in February 2022.” But she does not challenge finding 33
from the incorporated adjudication order, which addresses her mental health in much
greater detail:
33. Respondent Mother was suffering from mental health
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issues in January, 2022. She was feeling sad, anxious, out of control and irritable and having thoughts of harming herself. On January 28, 2022 Respondent Mother reported self-cutting on her ankles. Respondent Mother was not compliant with taking prescribed medication for her mental health issues.
Accordingly, we need not examine each challenged finding in this opinion. We have
considered each and address below only those challenges that go beyond attacking
the trial court’s wording or its assessment of credibility and the weight of the
evidence.
2. Finding of fact 46
We analyze Mother’s challenge to finding of fact 46. That finding states that
“[b]oth parents pled guilty to the criminal charges of Contributing to the Delinquency
of a Minor on December 19, 2023. Both admitted culpability in knowingly causing,
encouraging, and aiding [Robbie] to have multiple broken bones whereby he could be
adjudicated abused and neglected.” Mother argues that “[t]here was no evidence that
[she] ‘admitted to culpability in knowingly causing, encouraging and aiding [Robbie]
to have multiple broken bones whereby he could be adjudicated abused and
neglected.’” She further asserts that “a signed plea transcript was not admitted” as
evidence, and “no witness testified to the” facts as stated in the finding.
The evidence shows that Mother pled guilty to a charge of contributing to the
delinquency of a minor. The transcript confirms that a DSS court report was
admitted as an exhibit, which states that
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[Mother] pleaded guilty to misdemeanor contributing to the delinquency of a minor and was placed on 120 days unsupervised probation and the stipulation of this probation is that she adheres to the recommendations of the Department related to the juvenile case. The charging language listed in the body of the misdemeanor statement of charges states that . . . [Mother] did knowingly cause, encourage. and aid [Robbie], age 3 months old, a juvenile within the jurisdiction of the court, to be in a condition, multiple broken bones, whereby the juvenile could be adjudicated abused and neglected.
(Emphasis added.) (Quotation marks omitted.) Finding 46 is supported by the
3. Finding of fact 47
We also address Mother’s challenge to finding 47 because it concerns the word
“chronic”—a term relevant to the trial court’s “aggravating circumstances” finding,
and one for which the trial court took judicial notice of a definition at Mother’s
request. Finding 47 states: “Three-month-old [Robbie] suffered chronic physical
abuse that persisted over his entire life.” Mother contends that any abuse was not
“chronic” and did not “persist[ ] over [Robbie’s] entire life” because the evidence
shows, at most, abuse “within a one to two week period near the time of the February
6 hospital visit.” (Quotation marks omitted.)
At the hearing, Mother’s attorney admitted an exhibit with the definition of
“chronic.” And at Mother’s request, the trial court took judicial notice of the
definition:
chronic adjective
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... 1 a : continuing or occurring again and again for a long time ... b : being, providing, or requiring long-term medical care (as for a chronic disease) ... 2 a : always present or encountered ... b : being such habitually
This Court has interpreted “chronic” abuse in this same context—dealing with
a very young infant over a brief time period—and rejected the argument that only
two occasions of abuse could not be “chronic”:
We likewise find no merit in respondent-father’s contention that the factual findings here do not support the conclusion that Ben suffered “chronic” physical abuse because the child’s injuries were inflicted over the course of only two months and consisted of only two injuries—noting the broken ribs. Although respondent-father cites In re V.S.O. for the proposition that the term chronic, although not defined in section 7B, is commonly defined as lasting a long time or recurring often, we find that case unhelpful here because that Court upheld the district court’s determination that a four-month-old juvenile had suffered chronic physical abuse where evidence indicated that the abuse persisted over the juvenile’s entire life.
In re B.L.M.-S., 294 N.C. App. 44, 50, 901 S.E.2d 687, 692 (2024) (citation, quotation
marks, ellipses, brackets, and emphasis omitted).
Moreover, in In re NN, this Court determined that only one instance of injury
did not qualify as “chronic” abuse. See 296 N.C. App. 159, 173, 907 S.E.2d 430, 441
(2024) (holding that the trial court’s “findings show a single, albeit severe, incident of
physical abuse while [the child] was in the sole care of [the] [p]arents” did not support
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the court’s “conclusion that ‘aggravated circumstances exist based upon the abuse
and neglect of this infant child by her parents’ under . . . Section 7B-901(c)(1)(b)”).
And we contrasted the injuries inflicted on more than one occasion in In re B.L.M.-S:
In In re B.L.M.-S., 294 N.C. App. 44, 50, 901 S.E.2d 687, 692 (2024), this Court noted that the term chronic, although not defined in [S]ection 7B, is commonly defined as lasting a long time or recurring often. This Court affirmed a dispositional order in which the district court concluded that reunification efforts were not required due to a finding of chronic abuse where the findings of fact included that the two-month-old juvenile had unexplained, non-accidental injuries including two rib fractures at different stages of healing, indicating that the injuries were inflicted at different times, and the father admitted that, out of frustration, he had squeezed the juvenile and shaken him on more than one occasion and also had tossed the child into the air and fumbled or dropped him. These findings supported the court’s conclusion that the respondent-father committed or encouraged and/or allowed the chronic physical abuse of the juvenile.
Id. at 172, 907 S.E.2d 430, 440–41 (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted)
(determining injury was not chronic because it occurred only once).
Here, the most relevant finding regarding more than one occurrence is finding
43: “Ann Parsons and Dr. John Wright, both with Tedi Bear, concluded that [Robbie]
had sustained non-accidental injuries likely inflicted during at least two separate and
possibly several different episodes of physical abuse.” (Emphasis added.) A finding
that merely recites what a witness said while testifying is not itself a proper finding
of fact on the substance of the testimony. But the trial court may identify the source
of the evidence, so long as its findings also make clear that the court resolved the
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factual issue rather than just summarizing the testimony:
[R]ecitations of testimony do not constitute findings of fact absent an indication concerning whether the trial court deemed the relevant portion of the testimony credible. There is nothing impermissible about describing testimony, so long as the court ultimately makes its own findings, resolving any material disputes.
Shomette v. Needham, 298 N.C. App. 400, 406, 915 S.E.2d 39, 44 (2025) (citations,
quotation marks, ellipses, and emphasis omitted). Here, the trial court’s other
findings show that it found Parsons and Wright’s testimony credible: it found that
Robbie was chronically abused.
Thus, even though Mother may consider her definition of “chronic” to be more
“accurate,” the trial court properly followed our caselaw in determining chronic
abuse. Although the court took judicial notice of Mother’s proffered “chronic”
definition, it was not bound to apply that definition, as Mother contends it should
have been. See generally K.W., 282 N.C. App. at 290, 871 S.E.2d at 152 (noting that
the trial court determines the weight and credibility evidence is to be given). And
even if Mother had prevailed on her challenge to finding 47, other unchallenged
findings preceding support the trial court’s chronic abuse finding. See generally In re
K.H., 281 N.C. App. 259, 266, 867 S.E.2d 757, 762 (2022) (“Unchallenged findings of
fact are deemed supported by the evidence and are binding on appeal.”). These
unchallenged findings include:
8. That among the issues that led to the removal of the juvenile were: the juvenile being 3 months old and in the
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sole care of both of the Respondents when the juvenile suffered nonaccidental injuries for which no explanation has been provided that has been accepted by a medical provider; said injuries including, but not being limited to, a bruise under his chin, a bruise on the side of his face, swelling and redness of his right shoulder, swelling and tenderness in the juvenile’s right upper arm and decreased movement of his right shoulder, the juvenile not being able to move his arm and crying when his arm was touched by a medical provider, fractures in both of the juvenile’s shoulders, a fracture in his lower left tibia, a fracture in his thigh, and two rib fractures; Respondent Father suffering from anger issues at the time of the juvenile’s injuries; neither Respondent providing a reasonable explanation of causation for the numerous injuries and Respondent Mother’s explanation being inconsistent with the injuries the juvenile sustained; genetic testing being done that ruled out a genetic cause for the multiple bone fractures suffered by the juvenile; the juvenile being a pre-mobile infant who could not have caused these injuries to himself; the juvenile’s injuries being consistent with child abuse in a pre-mobile infant; Respondents suffering mental health issues at the time of the injuries; and Respondent Mother being informed about safe sleeping with the juvenile and Respondent Mother, at the very least, admitting that she was not safe sleeping with the juvenile on the day during which some of the injuries occurred.
35. On February 6, 2022, Respondent Parents took [Robbie], now three months old, to the emergency room at Carteret Health Care. They reported that his right shoulder was swollen.
36. Examination by medical professionals revealed that [Robbie] had a bruise under his chin, a bruise on the side of his face and swelling, bruising and redness of his right shoulder. [Robbie] exhibited pain when his right arm was moved. [Robbie] had a fractured humerus.
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37. Carteret County DSS was notified and met with Respondent Parents at the hospital.
38. Respondent Mother told the social worker that on February 5, 2022 she was taking a nap with [Robbie] on the couch and his face became lodged under a pillow and she had to move the pillow from his face and pulled him up by his right arm and his arm chicken winged. [Robbie] cried for a brief moment but did not show any signs of pain in the arm after that.
40. The physician that treated [Robbie] at the emergency room on February 6, 2022 did not believe that Respondent Mother’s chicken wing explanation for this injury was consistent with the nature of the fracture of the humerus.
41. [Robbie] was transferred to Vidant Medical Center in Greenville, NC. A CME was conducted at Tedi Bear Advocacy Center and Vidant Medical Center to determine a medical explanation for [Robbie’s] injuries.
42. A skeletal survey revealed that [Robbie] had a humeral fracture in both shoulders, a fracture in his left tibia, and fractures of two ribs on his left side. Additionally, [Robbie] had a bruise under his chin, a bruise on the side of his face, a bruise on his right shoulder, and a bruise on his left side.
43. Ann Parsons and Dr. John Wright, both with Tedi Bear, concluded that [Robbie] had sustained non- accidental injuries likely inflicted during at least two separate and possibly several different episodes of physical abuse.
44. Neither Respondent Mother nor Respondent Father have provided any plausible explanations for any of the numerous injuries that [Robbie] sustained.
45. Respondent Parents were the only caregivers for
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[Robbie]. Neither Respondent Parent has admitted to inflicting any of the injuries on [Robbie]. Since February 6, 2022, when [Robbie] was removed from Respondent Parents’ home[,] [Robbie] has not had any unexplained bruises or suffered additional bone fractures.
Finding 47 is supported by the evidence.
Further, as another way of challenging finding 47, Mother contends that before
the trial court, DSS and the guardian ad litem (GAL) did not argue “the existence of
the ‘chronic’ aggravated circumstance.” Mother is correct that at the hearing, DSS
focused its arguments on aggravated circumstances under North Carolina General
Statute Section 7B-901(c)(l)f—“[a]ny other act, practice or conduct that increased the
enormity or added to the injurious consequences of the abuse or neglect”—and it did
not claim to be relying on “chronic physical abuse.” N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-901(c)(1)f,
b. For example, Ms. Turnage, the “permanency planning supervisor with” DSS who
helped prepare the court report for the hearing, acknowledged on cross-examination
that DSS was not alleging “chronic physical or emotional abuse:”
Q. So does, is the Department alleging that there’s been chronic physical or emotional abuse?
A. No.
Q. And is the Department - - so it would need to be any other act, practice, or conduct that increase the enormity or the, or added to the injurious consequences of the abuse or neglect; correct? That catchall?
A. Correct.
In L.N.H., the trial court found that “there [we]re aggravating circumstances
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that exist[ed]” but did not explain what those circumstances were, so our Supreme
Court held that the finding was insufficient under North Carolina General Statute
Section 7B-901(c). 382 N.C. at 547, 879 S.E.2d at 146 (quotation marks omitted). The
Court also stated that “the evidence presented in th[e] case c[ould] [not] support a
finding of any of the aggravated circumstances listed in [Section] 7B-901(c)(1)a–e.”
Id. at 547, 879 S.E.2d at 147. DSS argued that the evidence would support a finding
under subsection Section 7B-901(c)(1)f—“[a]ny other act, practice, or conduct on the
part of the respondent-parent that increased the enormity or added to the injurious
consequences of the abuse or neglect”—based on evidence that the child’s feet were
severely burned while in the mother’s care, that the mother drank alcohol and then
lacked any memory of hurting the child, the child was left alone on the front porch of
the mother’s house, and the injuries were so severe as to require hospitalization and
continued medical care after leaving the hospital. Id. at 547, 879 S.E.2d at 147
(quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court determined that these facts were all
part of the abuse adjudication, so they could not “serve as conduct that increased the
enormity or added to the injurious consequences of that conduct” and thus did not
support “a determination that any of the aggravating factors specified in [Section]
7B-901(c)(1) exist[ed]” in that case. Id. at 548, 879 S.E.2d at 147 (quotation marks
and brackets omitted).
But the Court did not end its analysis there. See id. Instead, it remanded for
additional findings of fact to address another possible basis for ceasing reunification
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efforts under Section 7B-901(c):
On the other hand, we do believe that there is sufficient evidence in the record to support a determination by the trial court that reunification efforts were not required pursuant to [Section] 7B-901(c)(3)(iii), which allows the cessation of reunification efforts in an initial dispositional order in the event that the parent has committed a felony assault resulting in serious bodily injury to the child. . . . Although the trial court did not make the findings necessary to permit the cessation of reunification efforts with respondent-mother based upon [Section] 7B-901(c)(3)(iii), it certainly could have done so had it chosen to make such a determination.
Id. (quotation marks and brackets omitted).
Thus, under L.N.H., DSS did not have to argue in support of a particular
ground in Section 7B-901(c) for the trial court to find “aggravat[ing] circumstances”
under that ground. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-901; see L.N.H., 382 N.C. at 548, 879 S.E.2d
at 147. If the evidence supports findings under any subsection of Section 7B-901, the
court may make those findings and reach the conclusion of law to cease reunification
efforts based on that factor. See 382 N.C. 536, 879 S.E.2d 138. So although DSS
relied on subsection 7B-901(c)(1)f at the hearing, the trial court did not err by making
findings based on evidence of “chronic physical abuse” under subsection 7B-901(c)(1)b
and ceasing reunification efforts on that ground. The trial court’s conclusions are
supported by its findings of fact and are legally correct under Section 7B-901(c).
4. Findings of ultimate fact
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Mother also argues that some of the Order’s findings of fact are actually
conclusions of law. Specifically, Mother posits that findings 48, 49, 81, and 82 are
conclusions of law and that they are not supported by “the evidence or the findings of
fact”:
48. Aggravating circumstances as set forth in [Section] 7B- 901(c) exist in this matter.
49. Respondent Parents have committed or encouraged the commission of and/or allowed the continuation of, chronic physical abuse of [Robbie] as set forth in [Section] 7B- 901(c)(l)b.
81. Respondent Mother’s and Respondent Father’s acts, practices, and conduct increased the enormity or added to the injurious consequences of the abuse and neglect [Section] 7B-90l(c)(l)f.
82. The Court has found aggravating circumstances for the Initial Dispositional portion of these hearings and reasonable efforts at reunification are no longer required for purposes of the Permanency Planning and Review portion of the[] hearing.
DSS and the GAL argue that these challenged findings are findings of ultimate fact
and not conclusions of law. This Court has noted that
There are two kinds of facts: Ultimate facts, and evidentiary facts. Ultimate facts are the final facts required to establish the plaintiff’s cause of action or the defendant’s defense; and evidentiary facts are those subsidiary facts required to prove the ultimate facts.
Kelly v. Kelly, 228 N.C. App. 600, 607, 747 S.E.2d 268, 276 (2013) (citation omitted).
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In L.N.H., our Supreme Court considered the existence of “aggravating
circumstances” as a question of fact, not a conclusion of law:
Given that respondent-mother has challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s finding of aggravated circumstances under [Section] 7B- 901(c), we review those findings to determine if they were supported by competent evidence.
382 N.C. at 546–47, 879 S.E.2d at 146; see In re A.W., 377 N.C. 238, 251–53, 856
S.E.2d 841, 852–53 (2021) (addressing the same issue presented in L.N.H. as an issue
of fact).
Findings 48, 49, and 81 are findings of ultimate fact, and for the reasons
discussed above in regard to the other findings of fact, they are supported by the
evidence. The previous findings of evidentiary facts explain the reasons for the trial
court’s ultimate finding of “chronic physical abuse” as an “aggravating circumstance.”
And although finding 81 rests on a different statutory basis—Section 7B-901(c)(1)f—
we have already upheld the trial court’s aggravating circumstances determination
under Section 7B-901(c)(1)f, so we need not address finding 81.5
Finally, finding 82 explains that the trial court “found aggravating
circumstances” in the “Initial Dispositional portion of these hearings,” so “reasonable
5 Mother also notes that in the adjudication order, the trial court found in finding 69 that “[t]he [c]ourt
does not find at adjudication aggravating circumstances pursuant to [Section] 7B-90l(c)(l)(f).” Mother contends the trial court acted under a “misapprehension of the law” that it “was not permitted to make the findings at adjudication.” Because the trial court properly found “chronic physical abuse” as an aggravating factor, we need not address Mother’s argument as to Section 7B-90l(c)(l)f.
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efforts at reunification are no longer required for purposes of the Permanency
Planning and Review portion of the[] hearing[.]” Finding 82 does not address any
new fact or law but simply repeats the previous finding of aggravating circumstances
and highlights why the trial court did not address this issue in the permanency
planning portion.
C. Conclusions of Law
Mother also challenges conclusions of law 10 and 11 as unsupported by the
findings of fact. These conclusions state:
10. Reasonable efforts at reunification are not required with either Respondent Mother or Respondent Father. Aggravated circumstances exist pursuant to [Section] 7B- 901(c)(l)b in that Respondent Mother and Respondent Father have committed, or encouraged the commission of, or allowed the continuation of, chronic physical abuse upon the juvenile. Additionally, aggravated circumstances exist pursuant to [Section] 7B-90I(c)(l)f in that Respondent Mother’s and Respondent Father’s acts, practices and conduct increased the enormity or added to the injurious consequences of the abuse and neglect.
11. That the permanent plan for the juvenile should be guardianship with a concurrent plan of custody. This plan is in the best interest of the minor juvenile. This plan is consistent with the juvenile’s health and safety. The Department should make reasonable efforts to achieve this plan.
As noted above, the trial court determined that aggravating circumstances
existed under both Sections 7B-901(c)(1)b and (c)(1)f—because we have determined
that findings on Section 7B-901(c)(1)f were proper, we address conclusion 10 based
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only on the findings about Section (c)(1)b, “chronic physical abuse.”
Mother repeats many of her arguments as to the finding of facts in her
challenge to the conclusions of law. As mentioned, the findings of “chronic physical
abuse” and “[a]ggravating circumstances” are findings of fact, not conclusions of law.
Conclusion of law 10 repeats the findings upon which the trial court based its decision
under Section 7B-901(c)(1)b.
A conclusion of law is reached “by an application of fixed rules of law.” See
Woodard v. Mordecai, 234 N.C. 463, 472, 67 S.E.2d 639, 645 (1951) (“Whether a
statement is an ultimate fact or a conclusion of law depends upon whether it is
reached by natural reasoning or by an application of fixed rules of law.”). The actual
conclusion of law is that “Reasonable efforts at reunification are not required with
either Respondent Mother or Respondent Father”; this portion of conclusion 10
applies the law stated in Section 7B-901(c) to the facts of this case. So we review only
to determine if the findings of fact support the trial court’s conclusion that reasonable
efforts at reunification are not required under Section 7B-901.
Mother stresses that the trial court’s own findings indicate that it “was unable
to determine if Mother inflicted or allowed the injuries on Robbie.” She relies on
finding of fact 75, quoted in italics below, but she does not address the findings right
before and after that finding:
73. For all of the time from February 6, 2022 until Respondent Father separated from Respondent Mother in February 2024, Respondent Mother continued to live with
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Respondent Father and engage in marital relations with him despite her claim that she had suspected him from February 2022 for inflicting the injuries on [Robbie].
74. Neither Respondent Mother nor Respondent Father have exhibited any sympathy or remorse for the serious injuries [Robbie] endured.
75. The Court is unable to determine which Respondent Parent or if both Respondent Parents inflicted the numerous injuries on [Robbie].
76. The Court has concerns for [Robbie]’s safety and for further harm and abuse in either parent’s home as neither parent has taken responsibility for [Robbie]’s injuries.
77. Respondent Mother wants [Robbie] to be placed back in her custody with Respondent Father having visitation despite her claims that she has suspicions that Respondent Father inflicted the injuries on [Robbie].
Taking finding 75 in context, the trial court was expressing the dilemma any
judge faces when confronting claims of serious non-accidental injuries to a very young
child who has been in the sole care of the parents, with no plausible explanation other
than abuse by one or both of them. See e.g. In re M.T., 285 N.C. App. 305, 306-07,
877 S.E.2d 732, 736 (2022) (“Here, as in most cases involving life-threatening
nonaccidental injuries to a baby, there is no direct evidence of exactly what happened.
A baby cannot tell anyone what happened, and no one, other than someone who hurt
the baby, saw what happened. Trial courts must often make these difficult and
momentous decisions based upon circumstantial evidence and evaluation of
credibility and weight of the evidence.”).
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As to conclusion 11, it is the logical application of the law of Section 7B-
901(c)(1)b and the preceding conclusion of law.
IV. Conclusion
Mother waived her challenge to the trial court’s judicial notice of the RIL
orders by failing to object—either to their admission or the court’s taking judicial
notice—at the hearing. Further, competent evidence supports the trial court’s
findings of fact, and those findings support its conclusion of law that reasonable
reunification efforts should be ceased. We affirm the adjudication order and the
disposition and permanency planning order.
AFFIRMED.
Judges ARROWOOD and WOOD concur.
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