2025 IL App (2d) 250051-U No. 2-25-0051 Order filed June 12, 2025
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
In re R.L.-C., a Minor ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Kane County. ) ) No. 23-JA-27 ) ) Honorable (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner- ) Kathryn D. Karayannis, Appellee, v. Aimee C., Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE JORGENSEN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Schostok and Birkett concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the circuit court’s judgment terminating respondent’s parental rights, concluding there exist no issues of arguable merit to be raised on appeal.
¶2 Respondent, Aimee C., appeals from the circuit court’s order finding her unfit to parent her
daughter, R.L.-C. (born December 6, 2019), and terminating her parental rights. 1 Per Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and In re S.M., 314 Ill. App. 3d 682, 685 (2000) (holding Anders
applies to cases involving termination of parental rights), appointed appellate counsel moves to
1 The parental rights of Sarah L., R.L.-C.’s other parent, were also terminated. She is not a party to
this appeal. 2025 IL App (2d) 250051-U
withdraw. Counsel has supported her motion with a memorandum of law providing a statement of
facts, potential issues, and argument as to why those issues lack arguable merit. See In re Alexa J.,
345 Ill. App. 3d 985, 988 (2003) (further holding that “counsel must identify at least one potentially
justiciable issue in a motion to withdraw under Anders.”). In her motion, counsel states that she
read the record and found no issues of arguable merit. Counsel, further, served respondent with a
copy of the motion and memorandum. We advised respondent that she had 30 days to respond to
counsel’s motion. That time has passed, and no response was filed. We conclude that this appeal
lacks arguable merit based on the reasons set forth in counsel’s memorandum. Thus, we grant
counsel’s motion and affirm the circuit court’s judgment.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Respondent had a lengthy history of involvement with the Illinois Department of Children
and Family Services (DCFS). Specifically, on February 1, 2023, DCFS received a call reporting
that respondent was intoxicated and grabbed R.L.-C. by the arm and swung her around
aggressively. Respondent then left the shelter with R.L.-C. and placed her in the care of Kari
Young at the Candlewood Suites in Aurora. While at this location, respondent began punching and
kicking walls. She was asked to leave the premises and refused. Respondent was thereafter arrested
and charged with aggravated battery to a peace officer, aggravated assault to a peace officer, and
criminal trespass to land.
¶5 At a shelter-care hearing on February 28, 2023, the court found that probable cause existed
to proceed with the petition for adjudication, thereby requiring the urgent and immediate removal
of R.L.-C. from respondent’s care. The court placed R.L.-C. in the temporary custody of DCFS
and scheduled an adjudicatory hearing. The court appointed CASA of Kane County as the guardian
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ad litem (GAL) for R.L.-C. She was initially placed with Kari Young, fictive kin, and respondent
and Sarah L. were allowed supervised visitation at the discretion of DCFS.
¶6 After hearings on April 25, 2023, and May 23, 2023, the circuit court, relying on the factual
basis submitted by the State and stipulated by respondent and Sarah L., found R.L.-C. to be
neglected. The court continued on to a dispositional hearing on May 23, 2023. There, the court
found that it was in the best interests of the minor to be made a ward of the court. Regarding both
parents, the court determined that, for reasons other than financial circumstances alone, respondent
and Sarah L. were unfit and unable to care for, protect, educate, train, supervise, or discipline R.L.-
C. As to respondent specifically, the court advised that she would need to complete the services
identified in her integrated assessment, including random drug testing, substance abuse treatment,
parenting education and coaching, a mental health assessment, individual therapy, and Partner
Abuse Intervention Program (PAIP) classes. Additionally, she would need to have stable housing
and income, disclose her prescription medications, abstain from alcohol and cannabis, and visit
R.L.-C. The court set the permanency goal as return home in 12 months.
¶7 A series of permanency-review hearings were held between September 2023 and July
2024. During that time, the court found that respondent was not making reasonable efforts or
progress. In September 2023, the court noted that respondent was not following through on any of
her services and either missed or tested positive for illegal substances at several drug screenings.
Moreover, respondent missed two visits with R.L.-C. for failing to confirm the visit. In January
2024, the court found that respondent was not making reasonable efforts or progress toward the
goal of reunification, as she was not participating in any of her required services, she missed
several drug screenings, and tested positive for amphetamines. By April 2024, the court found that
still not much progress was being made. Respondent missed six of nine drug screenings. She also
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missed three scheduled visits with R.L.-C due to weather conditions. However, she completed a
parenting education program and substance abuse assessment.
¶8 At the July 2024 permanency hearing, the parties noted that respondent was given a referral
for parent coaching in June of 2024, had not completed PAIP classes, missed individual therapy
appointments, and missed drug screenings. Counsel noted that respondent was wheelchair-bound,
as she had broken her leg a month prior and this impacted her ability to complete some services.
Nonetheless, the court found that it was “very clear” that neither respondent nor Sarah L. “has
been doing what they needed to do.” Specifically, the court highlighted that respondent missed
two more drug screenings, was not likely enrolled in individual therapy, failed to start her 26-week
PAIP classes, and failed to complete her substance abuse services allegedly because of her leg
injury, yet was still able to attend court dates and visitation with R.L.-C. Moreover, respondent
was unable to provide stable housing, income, or transportation. Accordingly, the court found that
“there is not a potential to find that this child could in the near future be returned to [respondent].”
Overall, the court concluded that few efforts were made by respondent and there was no substantial
progress toward reunification with R.L.-C. The court therefore changed the permanency goal to
substitute care pending a petition to terminate parental rights.
¶9 On October 25, 2024, the State filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights.
The State cited the following unfitness grounds: (1) failure to maintain a reasonable degree of
interest, concern, or responsibility as to the minor’s welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2022));
(2) failure to protect the minor from conditions within her environment that were injurious to her
welfare (id. § 50/1(D)(g)); (3) failure to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions which
were the basis for the removal of R.L.-C. from respondent during the nine-month period between
May 24, 2023, and February 24, 2024, after R.L.-C. was adjudicated neglected or abused (id. §
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50/1(D)(m)(i)); and (4) failure to make reasonable progress toward the return of R.L.-C. to
respondent during the nine-month period between May 24, 2023, and February 24, 2024, after
R.L.-C. was adjudicated a neglected/abused minor (id. § 50/1(D)(m)(ii)). The State also alleged
that it was in the best interests and welfare of the minor that respondent’s parental rights be
terminated. A hearing on the State’s petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights was held
over several dates, beginning on December 12, 2024.
¶ 10 During the unfitness phase of the termination proceeding, the State called four witnesses:
(1) respondent; (2) Sarah L.; (3) Kristen Rangel, a supervisor Lutheran Social Services of Illinois
(LSSI); and (4) Gabrielle Moreno, a caseworker at LSSI. The State also submitted several exhibits,
including certified records and reports from various agencies and the integrated assessment. In
addition, the State asked the court to take judicial notice of various documents, including the
minor’s birth certificate; respondent and Sarah L.’s marriage license; the visitation plan; the family
severance plan; the adjudicatory order; multiple family service plans; the dispositional order; a
certificate of completion for a parenting workshop filed July 2, 2024; a letter filed July 2, 2024; a
March 2024 parenting-class certificate from Mutual Ground; and several permanency review
orders.
¶ 11 On December 13, 2024, the circuit court found respondent unfit based on each allegation
in the petition. Specifically, the court questioned respondent’s credibility—it recognized
respondent’s criminal history and her demeanor while testifying, which vacillated between
disinterested or asleep on the witness stand to being upset. The court also incorporated the State’s
closing argument into its findings, which highlighted that respondent has a long history with
DCFS; she failed to complete her substance abuse aftercare, including intensive outpatient
treatment and alcoholics anonymous meetings; she failed to appear at several drug screenings; she
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did not maintain proper identification; she could not recall the content of her parenting classes
finished in March 2024; and she failed to complete PAIP classes. Regarding respondent’s leg
injury, the court found that respondent’s excuse for failing to complete some services due to the
injury was not credible because she was able to attend court hearings and visits with R.L.-C.
regularly, despite the same injury. In sum, the court concluded that respondent did not make
progress towards, take reasonable efforts to, or show a reasonable degree of interest in completing
services and reuniting with R.L.-C. between May 24, 2023, and February 24, 2024, and that she
failed to protect R.L.-C. from the conditions of her environment—namely, anger management
issues, substance misuse, and domestic violence.
¶ 12 On January 13, 2025, the court proceeded with the best-interests hearing. First, the court
incorporated the prior testimony and exhibits for consideration. Then, Moreno testified for the
State and recommended that it was in R.L.-C.’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental
rights. Notably, Moreno stated that R.L.-C. was in a loving pre-adoptive home with foster mother,
Anna F., who provided her structure and stability, despite facing challenging behaviors initially in
the placement. However, since the initial placement, R.L.-C. and Anna F. had begun therapeutic
services.
¶ 13 Following arguments by the parties, the circuit court found that it was in the best interests
of R.L.-C. that respondent’s parental rights be terminated. The court noted that it reviewed the
CASA report prior to the hearing and had concerns about Anna F. being an appropriate placement.
However, the court found Moreno’s testimony “very credible and very helpful” at assuaging the
court’s concerns that Anna F. was an appropriate placement, as both R.L.-C. and Anna F. started
receiving therapeutic services that were not available at the time of the CASA report. The court
remarked that Anna F.’s pursuit of services, in particular, was commendable because it “shows
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quite a commitment to wanting to be a safe and appropriate foster placement.” The court also noted
that R.L.-C. began referring to Anna F. as “mommy” or “mama,” and, at some points, expressed a
preference for staying with Anna F. permanently. The court also noted the positive shift Anna F.
was making in shaping R.L.-C.’s sense of responsibility, boundaries, and identity away from
influences that valued stealing or violence. Overall, the court found that R.L.-C. was safe and
stable and had a sense of identity, participated in tutoring, had new friends, and participated in
extracurricular activities while in Anna F.’s care. Nonetheless, the court concluded that, even if
Anna F. was not a permanent placement for R.L.-C., it would still be in the minor’s best interests
to terminate respondent’s parental rights. The court therefore granted the State’s petition to
terminate respondent’s parental rights and changed the permanency goal to adoption. This appeal
followed.
¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 15 The Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2022)) mandates a
two-stage process for the involuntary termination of parental rights. In re Keyon R., 2017 IL App
(2d) 160657, ¶ 16. In the first stage, the State has the burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent is unfit under any ground set forth in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act
(750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2022)). See 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2), (4) (West 2022); In re C.W., 199 Ill.
2d 198, 210 (2002). If the circuit court finds the parent unfit, the State must then show by a
preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in the minor’s best interests.
See 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2022); In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 352, 366-67 (2004). On appeal,
we will not disturb a circuit court’s finding as to parental unfitness or a minor’s best interests
unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re N.B., 2019 IL App (2d) 180797, ¶¶
30, 43. A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if an opposite conclusion is
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clearly apparent or the decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence. Keyon R.,
2017 IL App (2d) 160657, ¶ 16.
¶ 16 Appellate counsel’s motion states that she thoroughly reviewed the record and concluded
that there are no meritorious issues to be raised on appeal. In accordance with Alexa J., 345 Ill.
App. 3d at 987, counsel identified three potential issues she considered raising: (1) the court should
have considered respondent’s temporary disability and allotted her additional times to complete
services; (2) respondent’s temporary disability prevented her from completing her required
services, which led to the finding of unfitness; and (3) it was not in R.L.-C.’s best interests to
terminate respondent’s parental rights. However, counsel concludes that none have arguable merit.
We agree.
¶ 17 A. Fitness Finding
¶ 18 The State has the burden of proving parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence.
In re Jordan V., 347 Ill.App.3d 1057, 1067, 808 N.E.2d 596, 604 (2004). The court’s decision is
given great deference due to “its superior opportunity to observe the witnesses and evaluate their
credibility.” Id. Furthermore, it is well settled that, “when parental rights are terminated based
upon clear and convincing evidence of a single ground of unfitness, the reviewing court need not
consider additional grounds for unfitness cited by the trial court.” In re Tiffany M., 353 Ill. App.
3d 883, 891 (2004). Hence, if we affirm the circuit court’s decision on one ground, we need not
consider the court’s decision on the other grounds.
¶ 19 Here, the circuit court found respondent unfit, inter alia, under section (1)(D)(m)(ii) of the
Act, which defines an “unfit person” as, one who fails “to make reasonable progress toward the
return of the child *** during any nine-month period following the adjudication of neglected or
abused minor under Section 2-3 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 or dependent minor under
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Section 2-4 of that Act.” 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2022). In particular, the State had the
burden to show that respondent did not make reasonable progress toward reunification with R.L.-
C. between May 24, 2023, and February 24, 2024.
¶ 20 The question of reasonable progress is an objective one, which requires the circuit court to
consider whether a parent’s actions during a given nine-month period would support a decision to
return the child home soon. In re Phoenix F., 2016 IL App (2d) 150431, ¶ 7. The court will consider
the parent’s compliance with the service plans and the court’s directives. In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d
181, 216-17 (2001). For there to be reasonable progress, there must be, at a minimum, some
measurable or demonstrable movement toward the goal of reunification. In re J.O., 2021 IL App
(3d) 210248, ¶ 57.
¶ 21 We agree with appellate counsel that no meritorious issue can be raised regarding whether
respondent’s temporary disability warranted additional time to complete services or prevented her
from completing her required services. During the relevant nine-month period, between May 24,
2023, and February 24, 2024, respondent failed to complete substance abuse aftercare, including
intensive outpatient treatment and alcoholics anonymous meetings; failed to initiate PAIP classes;
missed individual therapy appointments (though the court doubted she was enrolled at all); missed
several drug screenings and tested positive for amphetamines; did not maintain proper
identification; could not recall the content of her parenting classes she completed after March 2024;
and failed to provide proof of stable housing, income, or transportation. The court also remarked
on respondent’s demeanor during the termination proceedings—respondent did not display
remorse; rather, she “looked like she was at times half asleep, most of the time upset to be on the
witness stand,” disinterested, and angry. Overall, the court noted it was “very clear” that neither
respondent nor Sarah L. “has been doing what they needed to do” to be reunited with R.L.-C.
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¶ 22 After the relevant nine-month period, in May 2024, respondent broke her leg and became
wheelchair-bound. During the termination proceedings, in December 2024 and January 2025, the
court considered respondent’s ailment and found her claim of hinderance caused by the injury to
be not credible, as respondent only failed to complete her required services, but she continued to
attend visitation and court dates regularly without issue. Moreover, respondent never mentioned
to the court any efforts made to arrange for transportation after her injury.
¶ 23 The record reflects that, for months, respondent ignored her required services and made
minimal effort to complete her required testing and documentation, all before her injury occurred.
That respondent’s ailment occurred after the relevant nine-month window does not excuse her
failure to make reasonable progress between May 2023 and February 2024. See In re F.P., 2014
IL App (4th) 140360, ¶ 89 (noting that a parent’s personal circumstances “prevent[ing] her from
making reasonable progress is irrelevant to the ‘objective standard’ ” by which reasonable progress
is measured). Moreover, she is not entitled to additional time to complete the services listed in her
service plan, especially where the record is devoid of any evidence that reasonable progress was
being made during the relevant nine-month period. The circuit court was entitled to weigh the
evidence of respondent’s injuries and her inability to complete her required services accordingly,
as it was in the best position to observe the conduct and demeanor of respondent. We will not
substitute our judgment for that of the circuit court. See In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 498-99 (2002).
In this case, nearly two years had passed since the minor was removed from respondent’s custody
in February 2023. Nevertheless, respondent was further, rather than closer, to the minor being able
to return home. The evidence supported the court’s find that “there is not a potential to find that
this child could in the near future be returned to [respondent].” In re Ta. T., 2021 IL App (4th)
200658, ¶ 55. Overall, respondent’s injury did not contribute to her failure to make reasonable
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progress toward reunification with R.L.-C., and she was not entitled to additional time to complete
services, where she demonstrated no reasonable progress toward completing them even before her
injury occurred. Accordingly, the court’s unfitness finding was not against the manifest weight of
the evidence, and, we agree with counsel that no meritorious issues could be raised attacking that
finding.
¶ 24 B. Best-Interests Finding
¶ 25 During the best-interests phase of parental-rights termination proceedings, “the parent’s
interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the child’s interest in a stable,
loving home life.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 364 (2004). The State bears the burden of proving
by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of the parent’s rights is in the minor’s best
interests. In re Z.J., 2020 IL App (2d) 190824, ¶ 74. Section 1-3(4.05) of the Act sets forth various
factors for the circuit court to consider in assessing a minor’s best interests. These considerations
include: (1) the minor’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the minor’s identity;
(3) the minor’s familial, cultural, and religious background; (4) the minor’s sense of attachment,
including love, security, familiarity, and continuity of relationships with parental figures; (5) the
minor’s wishes and goals; (6) community ties; (7) the minor’s need for permanence; (8) the
uniqueness of every family and every child; (9) the risks related to substitute care; and (10) the
preferences of the person available to care for the minor. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2022).
¶ 26 Here, the evidence supported the court’s finding that R.L.-C. was in a stable, safe, and
appropriate placement, despite its earlier concerns that Anna F. was struggling with R.L.-C. The
court considered Anna F.’s and R.L.-C.’s participation in therapeutic services and found that it
was positively assisting their relationship. In particular, the court noted that Anna F.’s pursuit of
services was commendable because it “shows quite a commitment to wanting to be a safe and
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appropriate foster placement.” The court also remarked on the positive shift Anna F. was making
in shaping R.L.-C.’s sense of responsibility, boundaries, and identity away from influences that
valued stealing or violence. In fact, R.L.-C. started calling Anna F. “mommy” and expressed her
desire to stay with Anna F. permanently. Overall, the court found that R.L.-C. was safe and stable
and had a sense of identity, tutoring, new friends, and extracurricular activities in Anna F.’s care.
These findings were reasonable and supported its determination.
¶ 27 Appellate counsel contends that she can find no justiciable basis to challenge the court’s
best-interests finding. We agree and conclude that there is no arguable merit to a claim that it was
against the manifest weight of the evidence for the circuit court to conclude that the termination of
respondent’s parental rights was in the minor’s best interests. Simply, we have no basis for finding
that a conclusion opposite that of the circuit court is clearly evident or that the trial court’s decision
is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence. Keyon R., 2017 IL App (2d) 160657, ¶ 16.
¶ 28 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 29 After examining the record, the motion to withdraw, and the memorandum of law, we agree
with counsel that this appeal presents no issues of arguable merit. Thus, we grant the motion to
withdraw, and we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County.
¶ 30 Affirmed.
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