NOTICE 2026 IL App (4th) 251232-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is April 2, 2026 not precedent except in the NOS. 4-25-1232, 4-25-1233 cons. Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re R.J., a Minor ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Peoria County Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 23JA282 v. (No. 4-25-1232) ) Amelia G., ) Respondent-Appellant). ) ____________________________________________ ) ) No. 23JA283 In re N.J., a Minor ) ) (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) v. (No. 4-25-1233) ) Honorable Amelia G., ) David A. Brown, Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE LANNERD delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Steigmann and Justice Vancil concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court granted appellate counsel’s motions to withdraw as counsel and affirmed the trial court’s judgments, concluding no issues of arguable merit could be raised on appeal in the consolidated cases.
¶2 Respondent, Amelia G., filed notices of appeal from two judgments of the Peoria
County circuit court, which respectively terminated her parental rights to her minor children, R.J.
(born October 2023) (Peoria County case No. 23-JA-282), and N.J. (born December 2022) (Peoria
County case No. 23-JA-283). The trial court ordered attorney Linda Groezinger to represent her
in both appeals. This court docketed the appeals as appellate case Nos. 4-25-1232 (R.J.) and 4-25- 1233 (N.J.) and consolidated them for review on its own motion. Appellate counsel now moves to
withdraw as counsel in both cases, asserting there exist no viable or meritorious grounds for appeal
in either case. Amelia G. did not respond to the motion to withdraw. After reviewing the record,
we grant appellate counsel’s motion and affirm the court’s judgment in both cases.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 A. Adjudication of Neglect and Permanency Reviews
¶5 In December 2023, the State filed one-count petitions for adjudication of neglect in
the Peoria County circuit court on behalf of Amelia G.’s minor children, R.J. (No. 23-JA-282) and
N.J. (No. 23-JA-283), whom Amelia G. shares with their father, Dorrell J. Dorrell J. is not a party
to this appeal. Amelia G. also has two other minor children who are not the subject of these
consolidated appeals, E.G. and A.G. The respective petitions alleged R.J. and N.J. were neglected
minors in that their environment was injurious to their welfare. See 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West
2022). The petition involving R.J. alleged as follows:
“A. Minor [R.J.] was born prematurely with a significant birth defect that
affects the heart. Neither the mother Amelia [G.] nor the legal father Dorrell [J.]
could be reached by Carle/Methodist Unity Point hospital to consent to surgery;
B. As of December l8, 2023, the mother has not visited the minor [R.J.] in
the neonatal intensive care unit since December 5, 2023;
C. Since November 20, 2023, [the Department of Children and Family
Services (DCFS)] has been attempting to contact the mother and Dorrell [J.], but to
no avail;
D. As of December l8, 2023, the minor’s siblings, [N.J., E.G., and A.G.]
cannot be located by DCFS;
-2- E. The mother Amelia [G.] and the legal father to the minors [N.J. and R.J.],
Dorrell [J.], have a history of alcohol and domestic violence as evident in that:
1. On December 11, 2023, the minors [E.G. and A.G.] called police.
They had not been residing with their mother due to the constant alcohol
and domestic violence issues. During a periodic welfare check on their
mother, an intoxicated Dorrell [J.] punched a hole in the wall while arguing
with the intoxicated mother. Both minors refused to return home.
2. On December 7, 2023, the mother and Dorrell [J.] argued about
the minors [E.G. and A.G.] Dorrell [J.] attempted to strike the mother in the
face. The mother was holding the minor [N.J.] at the time. The mother
refused to go to a safe shelter or to press charges.
3. On September 24, 2023, the mother and Dorrell [J.] argued about
the mother’s drinking issues while both were intoxicated. The mother
refused to obtain an order of protection. In the presence of the minors [E.G.
and A.G.], the mother threatened to stab Dorrell [J.] if he returned to the
residence.
4. During some arguments, Dorrell [J.] brandishes a gun at the
mother and others in the residence.
F. The minor [E.G.] was expelled from [high school] for intending to sell
2.5 ounces of marijuana;
G. The minor [A.G.] has extremely poor attendance at [her high school];
H. The mother has been previously indicated by DCFS for: Substantial Risk
of Physical Injury/Environment Injurious to Health and Welfare by Neglect on
-3- April 1, 2022[,] and April 27, 2022;
I. The legal father to the minors [N.J. and R.J.], Dorrell [J.], has been
previously indicated by DCFS for: Substantial Risk of Physical Injury/Environment
Injurious to Health and Welfare by Neglect on April 27, 2022;
J. The mother has a criminal history that includes a conviction for Driving
Under the Influence ***;
K. The legal father to the minors [N.J. and R.J.], Dorrell [J.], has a criminal
history that includes a conviction for Armed Robbery *** and a pending charge for
Battery.”
The petition relating to N.J. alleged substantially the same.
¶6 In March 2024, FamilyCore filed a dispositional report with the court. The
caseworker indicated Amelia G. had been cooperative with her and the agency since the case
opened. Her goals included managing substance abuse and mental health, maintaining
communications with the caseworker, providing a safe and stable environment for her children,
and attending medical appointments. Later that month, the trial court entered an order indicating
Amelia G. had stipulated to the allegations in the petitions, with the exception and agreement that
the State dismissed the claim in count I(E)(4). The court found a factual basis existed for the
stipulation and adjudicated the minors neglected on the grounds alleged in the petitions.
¶7 The same day, the court entered a dispositional order finding Amelia G. unfit based
on the allegations in the petitions, “particularly domestic violence, substance abuse.” The court
ordered Amelia G. to complete a number of tasks to address the conditions leading to the
adjudication of neglect, including the following: (1) obtain a drug and alcohol assessment arranged
by DCFS or its designees and follow, cooperate with, and successfully complete any course of
-4- treatment recommended; (2) provide proof to DCFS or its designee of the successful completion
of the treatment; (3) perform random drug drops twice per month at the agency’s discretion;
(4) submit to a mental health assessment arranged by DCFS or its designees and follow the
recommendations made; (5) participate and successfully complete a parenting course or parenting
classes specified by DCFS or its designee and provide DCFS or its designee proof of the successful
completion of such parenting course or classes; (6) obtain and maintain stable housing conducive
to the safe and healthy rearing of her minor children; (7) visit her minor children as scheduled; and
(8) use her best efforts to maintain a legal source of income.
¶8 In February 2025, the court entered a written order changing the permanency goal
from “return home pending status for all minors” to “substitute care pending court decision for all
minors.”
¶9 B. Termination Petition
¶ 10 In July 2025, the State filed petitions to terminate Amelia G.’s and Dorrell J.’s
parental rights with respect to R.J. and N.J. The petitions alleged Amelia G. was an unfit person
under 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2024)). Specifically, the
petitions alleged she failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of R.J. and N.J. to her
care within nine months after the adjudication of neglect (October 18, 2024, to July 18, 2025). See
id.
¶ 11 In October 2025, the trial court conducted a hearing on the petition to terminate
Amelia G.’s parental rights. At the hearing, Amelia G. stipulated to the foundation and
admissibility of the People’s exhibit No. 1 (a certified copy of Amelia G.’s drug drop records),
People’s exhibit No. 2 (a certified copy of Amelia G.’s mental health and chemical dependency
records from Trillium Place (Trillium)), People’s exhibit No. 3 (a certified copy of Amelia G.’s
-5- service plans from FamilyCore), and People’s exhibit No. 4 (a certified copy of Amelia G.’s
visitation records from FamilyCore). The court took judicial notice of the court files, including the
prior pleadings and written orders, with no objections.
¶ 12 Child Welfare Specialist Stephanie Church, the caseworker, testified that from
October 18, 2024, to July 18, 2025, Amelia G. was required to submit to a drug and alcohol
assessment, a mental health assessment, drug drops twice a month, domestic violence classes, and
individual counseling. During this time period, Amelia G. did not have stable housing, was
unhoused on multiple occasions, failed to update Church when she changed addresses, did not
have stable employment, failed to complete the recommended outpatient treatment, only
completed 4 of her 19 drug drops, and had appeared under the influence of alcohol when
interacting with the children on two occasions. Although Amelia G. completed her domestic
violence class, she was still in a relationship with Dorrell J., who was arrested in May 2025 on
domestic violence charges against her. Amelia G. failed to complete outpatient mental health
treatment, and after completing a new assessment, she was unsuccessfully discharged. According
to Church, Amelia G. was not equipped to provide the level of care N.J. required due to her serious
medical conditions, had not been attending N.J.’s doctor’s appointments on a consistent basis, and
failed to adequately educate herself on N.J.’s conditions. Church testified R.J. has even more
significant special needs, requiring a very high level of care. Specifically, R.J. is nonverbal and
uses American Sign Language (ASL) to communicate; has tetralogy of Fallot; has several cardiac
catheters; has a history of open heart surgery; requires oxygen; has physical, occupational,
developmental, and feeding therapies; has optometric needs for a lazy eye and perception issues;
has a cranial helmet and a left ankle brace; has a global developmental delay; requires a walker;
and has 84 hours of in-home nursing care approval. In Church’s opinion, Amelia G. had not
-6- reached out to educate herself regarding these conditions and had not attended R.J.’s doctor’s
appointments.
¶ 13 In closing arguments, the State asserted Amelia G. failed to address the conditions
leading to the adjudication of neglect and had not made reasonable progress toward the return of
the children during the nine-month period alleged in the petition to terminate her parental rights.
Specifically, Amelia G. lacked housing and employment stability, failed to address her substance
use, remained in an unhealthy and violent relationship with Dorrell J., did not adequately cooperate
with the agency, and was unable to meet the extensive medical needs of either child.
¶ 14 Amelia G.’s counsel argued that during the relevant nine-month period, Amelia G.
was cooperative, executed releases of information, and had completed her drug and alcohol
evaluation. Although her drug drops were initially inconsistent, they were consistently negative
later in the nine-month period. Additionally, she completed her parenting and domestic violence
classes. Although she had issues with housing stability, she had completed many hours of
outpatient treatment. Counsel then listed in detail Amelia G.’s attendance and participation in
outpatient treatment at Trillium and asked the court to pay special attention to the visitation
records, which showed she attended at least 20 visits with the children without incident. Counsel
claimed Amelia G. had not been invited to attend any of the children’s doctor’s visits. Finally,
counsel asserted Amelia G. made reasonable progress and asked the court to find that the State had
not proven its case by clear and convincing evidence.
¶ 15 The trial court found the State had proven the allegations in the petition by clear
and convincing evidence. The court first acknowledged the records showed Amelia G. was an
active participant in outpatient treatment at Trillium. However, Amelia G. was consistently rated
as unsatisfactory in most categories of her service plans throughout the relevant nine-month period
-7- set forth in the petition. As recently as the June 2025 substance abuse evaluation, Amelia G.
admitted she continued to drink alcohol on a regular or periodic basis. Her substance abuse
continued to negatively affect her life, specifically in the areas of domestic abuse, housing, and
supervised visits with her children. Based on her lack of progress in these areas, the State had
shown it was no closer to returning R.J. and N.J. to Amelia G.’s care at the end of the nine-month
period alleged in the petition than at the beginning. Accordingly, the court found she was an unfit
parent under section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act (id.).
¶ 16 C. Best-Interest Hearing
¶ 17 The trial court then conducted the best-interest portion of the hearing. First, the
court admitted the best-interest report without objection. The report detailed Amelia G.’s service
plan history and progress and recommended the permanency goal for both R.J. and N.J. be changed
to adoption.
¶ 18 The State again called Church to testify. Church testified Amelia G.’s visits had not
been reinstated since being suspended for a second time in August 2025. Although she had
completed a drug drop, Church did not yet have the results. To Church’s knowledge, she remained
unhoused and unemployed. The trial court inquired of Church whether, if asked, she would testify
consistently with the contents of her best-interest report, and Church responded she would.
¶ 19 The State then called the foster mother, Taylor C., to testify. According to Taylor
C., R.J. and N.J. called her “mama,” and called her husband “[d]addy.” Taylor C. works as a nurse
specializing in critical congenital heart conditions and became the foster mother to R.J. after taking
care of her in the pediatric intensive care unit. Taylor C. described how she took care of R.J.’s
medical needs on a daily basis in her home and opined that R.J. had improved since being in their
home. She also described N.J’s medical needs and her improvement since coming into their care.
-8- Taylor C. testified R.J. and N.J. attended ASL classes every week with her and her husband, and
her extended family was also making efforts to learn ASL. She had a lot of support for the children
from family and friends, as well as from colleagues in the nursing profession. Taylor C.
acknowledged her racial and cultural backgrounds differed from the children, which she addressed
by embracing their differences, such as learning how to style the children’s hair and seeking out
African American health care providers. According to Taylor C., the children did not talk about
their biological parents at home. Finally, Taylor C. expressed her commitment to providing
permanency for both girls and her desire to adopt them.
¶ 20 Amelia G. did not testify at the termination hearing and presented no evidence.
¶ 21 In closing, State argued it was in the children’s best interest to terminate
Amelia G.’s parental rights based on all of the statutory best-interest factors, and the guardian
ad litem (GAL) agreed. Specifically, the GAL indicated Amelia G. was not able to adequately and
safely address the children’s health and safety needs, while the current foster placement was
eminently capable and willing to do so.
¶ 22 The trial court discussed each of the statutory best-interest factors and concluded it
was in the minor children’s best interest that Amelia G.’s parental rights be terminated.
Specifically, the court found the physical health and safety factor weighed in favor of termination
due to the children’s very high level of special needs, which Amelia G. was not equipped to address
due to her lack of housing stability. The foster parents were doing a “remarkable” job of addressing
those needs, and the children were progressing well in their care. The children had a strong bond
with their foster parents, and the children’s need for permanency and stability at their young age
additionally weighed in favor of termination.
¶ 23 These consolidated appeals followed.
-9- ¶ 24 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 25 On appeal, appellate counsel has filed a motion in these consolidated cases to
withdraw as counsel, accompanied by a supporting memorandum in compliance with Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Appellate counsel provided Amelia G. a copy of the motion and
supporting memorandum. This court notified Amelia G. of her opportunity to file additional points
and authorities on or before January 20, 2026, but she has not responded. We grant appellate
counsel’s motion to withdraw in both cases and affirm the trial court’s judgments.
¶ 26 A. Motion to Withdraw as Counsel
¶ 27 The procedure set forth in Anders applies to an appellate counsel’s motion to
withdraw as counsel following findings of parental unfitness and termination of parental rights.
In re S.M., 314 Ill. App. 3d 682, 685 (2000). Pursuant to Anders, appellate counsel must attach to
the motion to withdraw a memorandum of law (1) outlining any issues in the record which might
arguably support the appeal, (2) explaining why counsel finds those issues frivolous, and
(3) concluding the case presents no viable grounds for appeal. Id. The reviewing court must then
decide, after a full examination of all the proceedings, “whether the case is wholly frivolous.”
Anders, 386. U.S. at 744.
¶ 28 B. Parental Unfitness and Termination of Rights
¶ 29 Section 2-29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West
2024)) establishes a two-step process for the involuntary termination of an individual’s parental
rights. First, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that a parent is “unfit.” See
750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2024); In re Donald A.G., 221 Ill. 2d 234, 244 (2006). In this case, the
State alleged Amelia G. was unfit in that she failed to make reasonable progress toward the return
of the children to her care during the period of October 18, 2024, to July 18, 2025. See 750 ILCS
- 10 - 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2024). “Reasonable progress” is determined by an objective standard based
upon the amount of progress measured from the conditions existing at the time custody was taken
from the parent. In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1067 (2006). A parent’s failure to make
reasonable progress toward the return of the children to her care “includes the parent’s failure to
substantially fulfill his or her obligations under the service plan and correct the conditions that
brought the child into care” during any nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect.
750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2024). A parent makes reasonable progress when the trial court
can find that the progress “is sufficiently demonstrable and of such a quality” that the court may
soon be able to order the return of the child to the parent’s custody. In re D.T., 2017 IL App (3d)
170120, ¶ 17. This court will not reverse a trial court’s finding of unfitness unless it was against
the manifest weight of the evidence. In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 29.
¶ 30 Once the trial court has found a parent unfit, the State must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest.
In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 363-66 (2004). In considering the child’s best interest, the court must
consider the following factors in the context of the child’s age and developmental needs:
“(a) the physical safety and welfare of the child, including food, shelter,
health, and clothing;
(b) the development of the child’s identity;
(c) the child’s background and ties, including familial, cultural, and
religious;
(d) the child’s sense of attachments, including:
(i) where the child actually feels love, attachment, and a sense of
being valued (as opposed to where adults believe the child should feel such
- 11 - love, attachment, and a sense of being valued);
(ii) the child’s sense of security;
(iii) the child’s sense of familiarity;
(iv) continuity of affection for the child;
(v) the least disruptive placement alternative for the child;
(e) the child’s wishes and long-term goals, including the child’s wishes
regarding available permanency options and the child’s wishes regarding
maintaining connections with parents, siblings, and other relatives;
(f) the child’s community ties, including church, school, and friends;
(g) the child’s need for permanence which includes the child’s need for
stability and continuity of relationships with parent figures, siblings, and other
relatives;
(h) the uniqueness of every family and child;
(i) the risks attendant to entering and being in substitute care; and
(j) the preferences of the persons available to care for the child, including
willingness to provide permanency to the child, either through subsidized
guardianship or through adoption.” 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2024).
This court will not disturb the trial court’s finding that termination is in the minor children’s best
interest unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re T.A., 359 Ill. App. 3d 953,
961 (2005).
¶ 31 Appellate counsel claims any appeal in these consolidated cases would be frivolous
because there are no viable issues to raise in this case. Although counsel was able to identify
several issues, upon a review of the full record, she found none of them sufficient to overturn or
- 12 - challenge the trial court’s finding of unfitness based on Amelia G.’s lack of progress toward the
return of the children in the nine-month period alleged in the petition. Specifically, counsel
concluded that there were no irregularities or errors with respect to the fitness hearing, including
any issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, and no meritorious argument can be made that
Amelia G.’s conduct during the relevant nine-month period constituted reasonable progress.
Although Amelia G. had completed a parenting class and an anger management course, her
housing, transportation, and employment were not stable through the nine-month period.
¶ 32 Appellate counsel additionally found nothing in the record from which it could
reasonably be argued the trial court’s best-interest decision was against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Counsel suggested one could argue it was not in R.J.’s or N.J.’s best interest to terminate
Amelia G.’s parental rights based on her attendance and participation in outpatient rehab, regular
visits, and bond with N.J. However, counsel ultimately concluded all the other evidence presented
at the best-interest hearing appeared to support the court’s findings, including Amelia G.’s failure
to adequately address her substance abuse issues and appearing intoxicated at visits. Our review
of the record and the applicable law leads us to conclude counsel is correct. Accordingly, we grant
appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 33 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 34 For the reasons stated, we grant appellate counsel’s motions to withdraw as counsel
in these consolidated cases and affirm the trial court’s judgment in both cases.
¶ 35 Affirmed.
- 13 -