In re Risch

36 F. 546
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Texas
DecidedJuly 1, 1888
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 36 F. 546 (In re Risch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Risch, 36 F. 546 (E.D. Tex. 1888).

Opinion

Sabin, J.

The defendant and one Louis Risch, alias Rischkee, or Rischky, are charged with the murder of Franz Schmalinsky, alleged to have been committed by them on the 23d day of April, A. D. 1883, at Griesel, in the district of Crossen, in the kingdom of Prussia, in the empire of Germany, to which he has pleaded not guilty; and his extradition is sought for the trial thereof under the treaties 0^852 between the United States and Prussia and other states of the Germanic confederation, and in pursuance of the laws of the United States for extradition.

The first question presented for my decision is as to whether a person may be extradited upon a prima facie showing; and it is claimed that the presumption of law as to a man’s innocence is a stand-off as against a prima facie showing of guilt. This might be so, and would probably be so acted on, where the prima facie showing was light;' but when the evidence not only creates the presumption of guilt, but creates such a volume of strength, from the evidence, of the guilt of the party charged that it would seem unreasonable to suppose such party innocent, then, in such case, it would seem the plain, duty of the magistrate to make the order for holding for extradition. The treaty provides for extradition “ upon such evidence of criminality, as, according to .the laws of the place where the fugitive is found, would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial, if the crime had there been committed.” And, further, that “ if on such hearing the evidence be deemed sufficient to sustain the charge, it shall be the duty of the examining judge or magistrate to certify the same to the proper executive authority.” I take it that this latter clause requires the judge to be satisfied that the evidence before him is sufficient to sustain the charge were the same on trial before him. If a verdict of guilty were rendered upon the evidence, would he feel it his duty to set it aside? That seems to me to be the reasonable rule. In other words, the evidence should be such as to fairly prove the charge, and call upon the defendant to explain the facts adduced, and without which explanation the charge would stand proven. I think that is the rule by which I should be governed in the decision of this case.

In 1883 there were three mills on the Griesel river, in the kingdom of Prussia, known as the “upper mill,” the “middle mill,” and the “lower” or “back mill.” The defendant was the proprietor of the middle mill, and afterwards his son, Louis Risch; while the deceased was the proprietor of the lower or back ñiill. These mills were in a thickly-settled country, and near which were several villages and good-sized towns, and near there ivas a forest on the Bentnitz road, known as a “fir preserve.” It [548]*548was for thégrowth'and preservation of these trees. Franz Schmalinsky, the deceased, on and prior to April 22,1883, was an industrious anden-terprising miller, and at times thrifty-, and enjoyed the confidence of those with whom he dealt to a considerable extent; 'but in the spring of that year he became embarrassed to a great extent, and availed himself of the confidence he enjoyed to obtain money, as alleged, by forgeries, and also by converting many of his available assets into money, and unquestionably had in hand from $1,600 to $3,000, probably in the neighborhood of $2,500; but as his creditors would soon likely be upon him with writs, and'as the supposed forgeries might soon come to light, he took one further step of transferring all his available means, household furniture, cattle, horses, buggies, arid hay to the defendant, and, with the exception of a load or so of hay, the whole of those things were removed to the house and mill of the defendant, as early as April 22, 1883, in which both parties took part, and engaged in the transfer and removal with an energy that showed that time was an important element of the transaction in hand. The 22d was on Sunday. Among the things so removed was a large-sized fir wardrobe, capable of holding a man inclosed therein; and when it was moved over to defendant’s, a distance of about three-quarters of a mile or less, one witness says it was full of clothes, and another that it contained all of the best clothes of the deceased. That the deceased contemplated a movement of some kind is evident, not only from thesis facts, but from the fact that he had frequently announced his intention of going to Poland to buy cattle. He had made such trips several times before in previous years.

In the afternoon of the 22d he sent _his servant, with his money satchel, to defendant, informing his servant that it contained money, and to deliver it to defendant, which she did, but whether it contained any money or not was unknown to witness. Some time early in April the defendant recalled from service in a neighboring place one of his daughters, with the view of keeping house for his son Louis, at the mill, and in whose name the mill property stood. She reached home April 3, 1883, and some seven days prior to April 23, 1883, that being the day of the tragedy, defendant engaged tickets for himself, wife, and four children, one of them, his ward, being also a child by adoption, he paying say $20 thereon by way of earnest money to secure the tickets, the vessel being to sail about the 29th or 30th of April, whereupon the ticket agent, as was his duty, gave notice of such transaction to the local police. The defendant left his home for the steamer on the 29th of April, 1883, and for America, with all of his family above stated, leaving only his son Louis and a daughter remaining at the mill, which stood in the name of Louis, who had recently returned from a three-years service in the army. The defendant and the five members of his family arrived in America in due course, reaching San Antonio, Tex., from New York, by rail,.where he bought a lot shortly after his arrival, paying $200 down and the balance of $300 on time, and erected by himself.a small shed-house, and afterwards, by arrangement with a building association, a larger and more comfortable dwelling, in all, however, not exceeding in [549]*549present value the sum of from $1,500 to $2,500 for lot and improvements. His life has been frugal, and he has maintained good habits, and is well esteemed by all who know him in San Antonio, Tex. His name in Germany was Ludwig Risch, and he was so known. On coming to America he claims an additional given name, “Martin.” He also changed his name from “Risch” to “Rischki,” and signs his name “M. Ludwig Rischki.” Since here he has been overwhelmed by misfortune in the loss by death in 1883 of his son Otto, and afterwards by the death of his wife, and also of his daughter Anna. In October, 1883, his daughter left by him at the mill left for America, and joined him at San Antonio, and afterwards his son Louis did likewise, his daughter, however, coming first, and alone. His daughters went at once to service, and have contributed to his aid in living and acquiring the homestead; and such was the case up to the time of the arrest herein, on which day the one last arriving here was to have been married. The property of Schmalinsky, moved over to defendant’s mill, was left there by defendant, in the hands of his son Louis, and was mostly taken back by Mrs. .Schmalinsky or redelivered to her, There was one notable exception, however, and that was the clothes of Schmalinsky. When the wardrobe came back through the aid of her former guardian, it was empty of clothing.

It is time now to go back to the mill, and review the tragic occurrences of the 23d of April, and those connected therewith.

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Bluebook (online)
36 F. 546, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-risch-txed-1888.