In re Ripple Labs Inc. Litigation

District Court, N.D. California·Decided August 15, 2023·No. 4:18-cv-06753·Unknown

Opinion

VLADI ZAKINOV, et al., Case No. 18-cv-06753-PJH Plaintiffs,

v. ORDER RE MOTIONS TO SEAL

RIPPLE LABS, INC., et al., Re: Dkt. No. 181, 200, 218 Defendants.

This is a securities case. In connection with plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, the parties filed three motions to seal. See Dkt. 181, 200, 218. The court has already issued an order on the class certification motion, and now rules as follows on the motions to seal. A. Legal standard “There is a general principle in favor of public access to federal court records.” Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). “The proponent of sealing bears the burden with respect to sealing. A failure to meet that burden means that the default posture of public access prevails.” Kamakana v. City & City of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1182 (9th Cir. 2006). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that two different standards may apply when a request to seal a document is made in connection with a motion—namely the “compelling reasons” standard or the “good cause” standard. Ctr. For Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., to any sealing request made in connection with a motion that is “more than tangentially related to the merits of a case.” Id. at 1101. Courts in this district have ruled that the compelling reasons standard controls sealing requests made in connection with a motion for class certification. Yan Mei Zheng v. Toyota Motor Corp., 2019 WL 6841324, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2019); Hadley v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2018 WL 7814785, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2018). Under the compelling reasons standard, a court may seal a record only if it finds a “compelling reason” to support such treatment and articulates “the factual basis for its ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1096-97. If it has made such finding, the court “must then conscientiously balance the competing interests of the public and the party who seeks to keep certain judicial records secret.” Id. at 1097. Factors relevant to that balancing test include the public interest “in understanding the judicial process,” Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass'n, 605 F.3d 665, 679 n.6 (9th Cir. 2010), as well as the volume of material sought to be sealed, Algarin v. Maybelline, LLC, 2014 WL 690410, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2014). The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that “[w]hat constitutes a ‘compelling reason’ is best left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1097. B. Analysis The parties have filed three motions to seal, seeking the sealing of excerpts of their briefs along with certain attached declarations and exhibits. See Dkt. 180, 200, 218. As the court indicated at the hearing, nothing in the parties’ briefs meets the high standard for sealing set forth in this court’s Civil Local Rule 79-5, so the motions to seal are DENIED to the extent that they seek the sealing of any portion of any brief. The court now addresses each of the three motions to seal in turn. First motion to seal (Dkt. 180) Along with the opening motion for class certification, plaintiff filed a motion seeking entirety of certain exhibits, based on the confidentiality designations made by defendants and/or third parties. See Dkt. 180. Defendants then filed a supporting declaration setting forth the basis for the requested sealing. See Dkt. 182. In the declaration, defendants state that they have identified two exhibits for which they do not seek sealing (namely, exhibits 24 and 42) and one exhibit for which they seek sealing of only redacted portions (exhibit 3). Id. at 5. Defendants maintain that the following exhibits should be sealed in their entirety: exhibits 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43, and 64. For the majority of those exhibits (namely, exhibits 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, and 64), defendants cite only the following boilerplate language, without more: “[d]ocuments or portions thereof describing or providing detailed information on trade secret business information and highly sensitive internal strategy information, disclosure of which would be very likely to result in unjustified competitive harm.” See Dkt. 182 at 4. The court finds that defendants’ broad, generalized language does not meet the standard for sealing as set forth in Civil Local Rule 79-5(c)(1), especially given the volume of the sealing request, and thus, the motion to seal is DENIED on that basis. For exhibits 1, 4, 8, 13, 27, 38, and 40, defendants cite the following language, without more: “[d]ocuments or portions thereof describing or providing financial information or highly confidential internal valuation information or derived from or quoting from such information, such that trade secret information would be revealed if filed publicly and significant competitive harm would likely result.” See Dkt. 182 at 4. As before, the court concludes that defendants’ broad, generalized language does not meet the standard for sealing as set forth in Civil Local Rule 79-5(c)(1), and thus, the motion to seal is DENIED on that basis. For exhibit 26, defendants cite the following language, without more: “[d]ocuments or portions thereof describing or providing highly confidential and trade secret information clauses. Disclosure of this trade secret information would be very likely to cause significant competitive harm.” See Dkt. 182 at 4. Defendants do not identify anything specific about this contract that justifies secrecy, and instead appear to rely on a broad rationale that would justify the sealing of every contract in its entirety. The court cannot approve such a broad standard, and in the absence of any more narrowly-tailored request to seal a portion of this exhibit, the court finds that the motion to seal exhibit 26 must be DENIED on this basis. For exhibits 27 and 41, defendants argue that “[d]ocuments or portions thereof describing or providing highly confidential and private information on individual Defendant Bradley Garlinghouse. Disclosure of this private information would be very likely to cause significant invasion of privacy.” See Dkt. 182 at 4. Defendants do not provide any additional information regarding the nature of the claimed private information, nor do they attempt to narrow the sealing request to seek the sealing of only the information that they claim to be private. Exhibit 27 is a transcript excerpt of the Garlinghouse deposition, and appears to contain discussion of the makeup of Ripple’s board of directors, as well as Garlinghouse’s meetings with the SEC, and the sources of Garlinghouse’s income. See Dkt. 180, Ex. 27. Defendants provide no support for their argument that generalized discussion of a defendant’s sources of income are properly sealable, and the court denies the request to seal Exhibit 27. Exhibit 41 is a set of Garlinghouse’s interrogatory objections and responses. As before, defendants do not identify the nature of any claimed private information in this exhibit. The court’s review of the document shows that it contains a list of Garlinghouse’s international travel for 2017 through 2020. See Dkt. 180, Ex. 41. Defendants provide no support for their argument that a list of past travel destinations, without more, is properly sealable, and thus, the court denies the request to seal exhibit 41. For exhibits 35 and 43, defendants argue that the documents contain information 4. Plaintiff further filed a response indicating that third party Poloniex, LLC requests the sealing of only a portion of exhibit 43 (specifically, exhibit 43 is a spreadsheet showing XRP transactions, and Poloniex reque

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Related

Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.
435 U.S. 589 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Pintos v. PACIFIC CREDITORS ASS'N
605 F.3d 665 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Ramírez v. Arlequín
447 F.3d 19 (First Circuit, 2006)