in Re Richard Dale Reed
This text of in Re Richard Dale Reed (in Re Richard Dale Reed) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-16-00007-CV
In re Richard Dale Reed
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FROM TRAVIS COUNTY
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this original proceeding, relator Richard Dale Reed asks this Court to compel
respondent Vincent Harding, Chair of the Travis County Democratic Party, to de-certify the
application of Gary Allan Cobb, real party in interest, to appear on the general primary election ballot
in the upcoming election for District Attorney of the 53rd Judicial District. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8.
Reed, who is also a Democratic primary candidate for the same District Attorney position, contends
that public documents conclusively establish that Harding should reject Cobb’s application because
it does not comply with the requirements as to form, content, and procedure that the application must
satisfy for the candidate’s name to be placed on the ballot. See Tex. Elec. Code § 141.032. To apply
to be on the ballot for this particular office, an applicant must either pay a $1,250 filing fee or submit
a petition containing signatures from 500 registered voters in support of the applicant’s appearing
on the ballot. Id. §§ 172.021(b). .024, .025. Reed asserts that 194 of the 679 signatures obtained by
Cobb are invalid and that therefore Cobb’s petition contains only 485 valid signatures.
After reviewing the petition, the responses, and the record provided, we conclude that
the challenges advanced by Reed present either (1) fact issues beyond our proper purview to resolve or (2) facial challenges that, if meritorious, would ultimately fail to conclusively demonstrate the
legal invalidity of a sufficient number of Cobb’s signatures to entitle Reed to relief. Consequently,
Reed has not shown himself entitled to the mandamus relief he seeks, and we deny the petition for
writ of mandamus. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a). In light of this ruling, we also dismiss as moot
Reed’s accompanying motion for temporary relief. See id. R. 52.10.
__________________________________________ Cindy Olson Bourland, Justice
Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Pemberton and Bourland
Filed: January 11, 2016
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