In re Rice

56 A.D. 253
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedJuly 1, 1900
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 56 A.D. 253 (In re Rice) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Rice, 56 A.D. 253 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1900).

Opinion

Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, on opinion of the court below.

Present—Van Brunt, P. J., Rumsey, Patterson, O’Brien and MoLau&hlin, JJ.

The following is the opinion of the court below:

Yarnum, Surrogate:

This matter was argued before and submitted to Judge Arnold, but was not décided by him. It was reargued orally before me and briefs were submitted. The appeals herein are from an order entered April 28, 1894, assessing and fixing the transfer tax upon an appraisal had under an ex parte order granted on the application of the State Comptroller. Proceedings had been had theretofore in. which there was an appraisal of the estate for the purpose of taxation on the facts presented by the personal representative of the decedent.. Since-such appraisal, and by reason of facts that thereafter occurred, it. was found that the amount appraised did not represent the entire sum of the property of the deceased, and it is claimed that there is now due on said estate a further tax upon property not covered by the ■ former appraisement. Upon the first appraisement all the property then- known to the executor was appraised, its value and the taxable • [255]*255interests therein ascertained and reported by the appraiser, an order duly entered upon the basis of such report, and the tax was paid over two years prior to the tiling of the petition in the present proceeding. No allegations of fraud, mistake or concealment in connection with the first appraisal are made, nor has any application been made to set aside such appraisement or to open the proceedings and remit the case to the appraiser. The law (Laws of 1887, chap. 713, § 13) provides that the surrogate shall appoint some competent person as appraiser as often as and whenever occasion may require,” in order to fix the value of property of persons whose estates shall be subject to the payment of the tax. The object of successive appraisals as thus provided for is evidently to collect the tax on the whole taxable estate, and, where all the assets have been appraised and the tax thereon fixed, to cover any omission by additional or supplemental appraisals when such omissions are discovered. The petition herein upon its face is an application for a new and not a reappraisement, for its purpose is therein stated to be to obtain the appointment of an appraiser of “ all said estate or property on which the said tax has not already been paid.” Upon the new appraisement it was found that there was some property of the decedent subject to tax which had not been appraised in the previous proceeding, and an appraisal thereof was had, which was entirely proper and as to which no question has been raised. Instead of confining himself to this property, however, the appraiser filed a report setting out an appraisal of the whole estate, including not only the newly-discovered property, but property which had been the subject of the former appraisal, as to some portion of which he adopted the valuation previously arrived at, and as to two specific items, to wit, certain pictures and a foreign newspaper enterprise which had on the first appraisal been valued, the former at $1,000 and the other as without value, he increased the valuations. The ground upon which the increase was made was that the executor had, since the former appraisal, actually received for such properties the respective sums at which they were valued in the new appraisal. The contention that the transfer tax can be based on any such later increase in value cannot be sustained. The transfer tax is to be measured by the value of the estate transferred at the time of the transfer of the title, and not its value at the time of transfer [256]*256of possession. Section 2 of chapter 713 of the Laws of 1887, which was the statute in force at the time of Mr. Rice’s death, provides that an appraisal of property for the purposes of the act shall be made immediately after the death of the decedent, at what was the fair and clear market value thereof at the time of the death of the decedent. Moreover, in Matter of Seaman (147 N. Y. 69) the Court of Appeals said : The transfers take place necessarily at the moment of death, for the will on the one hand and the intestate laws on. the other operate„and speak from that dateand in Matter of Davis (149 N. Y. 539) that the transfer or inheritance tax is not a tax upon-property, but upon the right of succession, and, hence, the true test of value by which the tax is to be measured is the value of the estate at the time of the transfer of title, and not its value at the time of the transfer of possession.” In ascertaining, therefore, the value of the estate for the purpose of taxation under the Transfer or Inheritance Tax Act, it must be appraised as of the time of the death of the testator, when the title passed, and not as of the time when the possession passed. As is likewise said in Matter of Davis (ubi supra), “ Where the estate transferred has a fixed or ascertainable value at the time of the death of the * * * testator or intestate, the value at that time must be the basis of the appraisal whenever made.” (See, also, Matter of Vassar, 127 N. Y. 1, and Dos Passos Col, Inh. Tax,. 148.) The appraisement proceeding furnishes an opportunity to the parties interested in the estate, on the one hand, and the State. on the other, to inquire fully as to the value of the property at the time of the decedent’s death, and to obtain and present such testimony as may aid in the ascertainment of such value. Upon the proofs thus taken the appraiser makes his report and the surrogate enters an order assessing and fixing the tax. This order is an adjudication in respect to the liabilities thereby fixed, and unless an appeal is taken therefrom is conclusive on all parties thereto. (Matter of Wolfe, 137 N. Y. 205; Matter of Smith’s Estate, 23 N. Y. Supp. 762 ; Matter of Astor, 6 Dem. 402.) The original appraisement of the decedent’s interest in the journal known as Le Matin as of no value, cannot now be disturbed, notwithstanding • a considerable sum was afterwards realized therefrom, and the same rule would apply as to the surplus proceeds of the sale of certain pictures above their [257]*257appraised value, unless, as is suggested in the papers, the executor has made some special concession or agreement that the latter valuation thereof may stand, less certain additional expenses incurred in making the sale aforesaid. The action of the appraiser is also •objected to on the ground that on the second appraisal he reduced the allowance made by him on the first, for debts due by the decedent and for expenses of administration, for the reason, apparently, that certain of the claims previously allowed had been sued for by the alleged creditors and defeated by the executor. In other cases the claims were disputed by the executor and had never been prosecuted by the creditors. As to the expenses, they had turned out to be less than previously estimated. With respect to this question as to the deductions allowed for debts and expenses, a novel and more serious question arises. Matter of Westurn (152 N. Y. 93) says: The principle that in administering the statute, debts, commissions and expenses of administration should be deducted in ascertaining taxable values, accords with the general practice and is permitted by a just construction of the law.” (See, also, Matter of Gould, 19 App. Div. 352 at 359; affd. on this point by the opinion of the Court -of Appeals, 156 N. Y.

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Bluebook (online)
56 A.D. 253, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-rice-nyappdiv-1900.