[Cite as In re R.G., 2011-Ohio-275.]
COURT OF APPEALS STARK COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JUDGES: Hon. Julie A. Edwards, P. J. IN RE: Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J. Hon. John W. Wise, J.
R.G. Case No. 2010 CA 00190
MINOR CHILD OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, Case No. 2009 JCR 01442
JUDGMENT: Vacated and Remanded
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: January 24, 2011
APPEARANCES:
For Appellee For Appellant
JOHN D. FERRERO BROOKE M. BURNS PROSECUTING ATTORNEY ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER RENEE M. WATSON 250 East Broad Street ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR Suite 1400 110 Central Plaza South, Suite 510 Columbus, Ohio 43215 Canton, Ohio 44702-0049 Stark County, Case No. 2010 CA 00190 2
Wise, J.
{¶1} Appellant R.G. appeals the June 29, 2009, Judgment Entry of the Stark
County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, which adjudicated him a Tier III
sexual offender subject to statutory registration requirements.
{¶2} Appellee is the State of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
{¶3} On May 20, 2009, the Stark County Prosecutor's Office filed a complaint
alleging that R.G., then fifteen years old, was a delinquent child for one count of rape, in
violation of R.C. §2907.02(A)(2), a felony of the first degree if committed by an adult.
{¶4} On August 12, 2009, the juvenile court found R.G. delinquent as charged,
and he was adjudicated delinquent.
{¶5} On August 13, 2009, R.G. was committed to the Ohio Department of
Youth Services (DYS) for a minimum period of one (1) year, or until age 21.
{¶6} A release date of June 30, 2010, was approved for Appellant.
{¶7} On June 21, 2010, and June 29, 2010, the trial court held a hearing to
address Appellant’s registration requirements. At the conclusion of said hearing, the trial
court ordered that R.G. be classified as a "Tier III" juvenile sex offender.
{¶8} It is from this classification Appellant appeals, raising the following
assignments of error:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶9} “I. THE JUVENILE COURT ERRED WHEN IT CLASSIFIED [R.G.] AS A
TIER III JUVENILE OFFENDER REGISTRANT BECAUSE THE APPLICATION OF
R.C. 2152.83 TO HIM VIOLATES HIS RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE Stark County, Case No. 2010 CA 00190 3
LAW IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION; ARTICLE I, SECTION 2 OF THE OHIO.
{¶10} “II. THE JUVENILE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
CLASSIFIED [R.G.] AS A TIER III JUVENILE SEXUAL OFFENDER REGISTRANT
WHEN THAT FINDING WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED
AT [R.G.]’S CLASSIFICATION HEARING, AND WHEN THE COURT DID NOT
UNDERSTAND THAT IT HAD DISCRETION TO DETERMINE [R.G.]'S TIER LEVEL.
{¶11} “III. [R.G.] WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
AS GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 10, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION,
WHEN COUNSEL FAILED TO ARGUE AGAINST A MANDATORY TIER III
CLASSIFICATION AND WHEN COUNSEL FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SENATE BILL 10 AS APPLIED TO [R.G.].”
I.
{¶12} In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues R.C. §2152.83 violates
his right to equal protection under the law.
{¶13} Initially, we note that Appellant failed to raise a challenge to the
constitutionality of R.C. §2152.83 before the trial court.
{¶14} It is well established that a party cannot raise any new issues or legal
theories for the first time on appeal." Dolan v. Dolan, 11th Dist. Nos. 2000-T-0154 and
2001-T-0003, 2002-Ohio-2440, at ¶ 7, citing Stores Realty Co. v. Cleveland (1975), 41
Ohio St.2d 41, 43, 322 N.E.2d 629. "Litigants must not be permitted to hold their Stark County, Case No. 2010 CA 00190 4
arguments in reserve for appeal, thus evading the trial court process." Nozik v. Kanaga
(Dec. 1, 2000), 11th Dist. No. 99-L-193, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5615.
{¶15} This Court has previously addressed and rejected similar claims in In re:
Adrian R. (December 11, 2008), Licking App. No. 08CA17, 2008 Ohio 6581. In that
opinion, this Court rejected the Constitutional challenges raised based upon the holding
and rationale set forth in State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 700 N.E.2d 570,
wherein the Supreme Court of Ohio characterized the prior sex offender registration
statutes as civil and remedial rather than criminal. See also State v. Williams (2000), 88
Ohio St.3d 513, 528, 728 N.E.2d 342.
{¶16} Unless and until the Supreme Court of Ohio reverses or modifies this
decisional construct, we are constrained by the weight of precedent.
{¶17} Based on our previous holdings, Appellant’s first assignment of error is
overruled.
II.
{¶18} In his second assignment of error, Appellant argues that the trial court
erred in classifying him as a Tier III juvenile sexual offender. Specifically, Appellant
argues that the trial court failed to consider the appropriate factors in making its
determination and further failed to recognize that it had discretion in determining which
tier level to assign to Appellant. We agree.
{¶19} This Court has previously reviewed and interpreted R.C. §2142.83 as
vesting the juvenile court with discretion in classifying the juvenile offenders. In the
matter of R.D., Licking App.No. 09 CA 97, 2010-Ohio-2986. This interpretation is
likewise shared by several other appellate districts. Id. Stark County, Case No. 2010 CA 00190 5
{¶20} In the instant case, R.G. was fifteen (15) years old at the time the offense
was committed. The trial court determined that Appellant was a juvenile offender
registrant and then went on to find that, because he had been adjudicated delinquent for
rape, it was required to classify him as a Tier III offender.
{¶21} Upon review of the record, it appears that while the trial court understood
that it had discretion as to juvenile offender registrant classification, the trial court
believed that it had no discretion as to the tier classification, that such classification was
offense-based. We therefore find a remand is necessary for the trial court to exercise
its discretion in this matter.
{¶22} However, if after a proper classification hearing and consideration of the
factors contained in R.C. §2152.83(D)(1)-(6), the trial court believes that such
classification is warranted based on the evidence in this case, it may re-impose such
classification on remand. The important point, however, is that the trial court does
possess the discretion to make this determination.1
{¶23} Accordingly, we sustain Appellant’s second assignment of error.
III.
{¶24} In Appellant’s Third Assignment of Error, he contends that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he argues that trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to challenge the constitutionality of Senate Bill 10 and for failing to object to
the trial court’s Tier III classification. We disagree.
1 We emphasize that this opinion should not be construed to take any position on the issue of whether R.G. should have been classified as a Tier III sex offender. Rather, we simply conclude that the trial court erred only to the extent that it believed it did not have discretion to decide the matter. Stark County, Case No.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
[Cite as In re R.G., 2011-Ohio-275.]
COURT OF APPEALS STARK COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JUDGES: Hon. Julie A. Edwards, P. J. IN RE: Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J. Hon. John W. Wise, J.
R.G. Case No. 2010 CA 00190
MINOR CHILD OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, Case No. 2009 JCR 01442
JUDGMENT: Vacated and Remanded
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: January 24, 2011
APPEARANCES:
For Appellee For Appellant
JOHN D. FERRERO BROOKE M. BURNS PROSECUTING ATTORNEY ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER RENEE M. WATSON 250 East Broad Street ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR Suite 1400 110 Central Plaza South, Suite 510 Columbus, Ohio 43215 Canton, Ohio 44702-0049 Stark County, Case No. 2010 CA 00190 2
Wise, J.
{¶1} Appellant R.G. appeals the June 29, 2009, Judgment Entry of the Stark
County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, which adjudicated him a Tier III
sexual offender subject to statutory registration requirements.
{¶2} Appellee is the State of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
{¶3} On May 20, 2009, the Stark County Prosecutor's Office filed a complaint
alleging that R.G., then fifteen years old, was a delinquent child for one count of rape, in
violation of R.C. §2907.02(A)(2), a felony of the first degree if committed by an adult.
{¶4} On August 12, 2009, the juvenile court found R.G. delinquent as charged,
and he was adjudicated delinquent.
{¶5} On August 13, 2009, R.G. was committed to the Ohio Department of
Youth Services (DYS) for a minimum period of one (1) year, or until age 21.
{¶6} A release date of June 30, 2010, was approved for Appellant.
{¶7} On June 21, 2010, and June 29, 2010, the trial court held a hearing to
address Appellant’s registration requirements. At the conclusion of said hearing, the trial
court ordered that R.G. be classified as a "Tier III" juvenile sex offender.
{¶8} It is from this classification Appellant appeals, raising the following
assignments of error:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶9} “I. THE JUVENILE COURT ERRED WHEN IT CLASSIFIED [R.G.] AS A
TIER III JUVENILE OFFENDER REGISTRANT BECAUSE THE APPLICATION OF
R.C. 2152.83 TO HIM VIOLATES HIS RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE Stark County, Case No. 2010 CA 00190 3
LAW IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION; ARTICLE I, SECTION 2 OF THE OHIO.
{¶10} “II. THE JUVENILE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
CLASSIFIED [R.G.] AS A TIER III JUVENILE SEXUAL OFFENDER REGISTRANT
WHEN THAT FINDING WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED
AT [R.G.]’S CLASSIFICATION HEARING, AND WHEN THE COURT DID NOT
UNDERSTAND THAT IT HAD DISCRETION TO DETERMINE [R.G.]'S TIER LEVEL.
{¶11} “III. [R.G.] WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
AS GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 10, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION,
WHEN COUNSEL FAILED TO ARGUE AGAINST A MANDATORY TIER III
CLASSIFICATION AND WHEN COUNSEL FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SENATE BILL 10 AS APPLIED TO [R.G.].”
I.
{¶12} In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues R.C. §2152.83 violates
his right to equal protection under the law.
{¶13} Initially, we note that Appellant failed to raise a challenge to the
constitutionality of R.C. §2152.83 before the trial court.
{¶14} It is well established that a party cannot raise any new issues or legal
theories for the first time on appeal." Dolan v. Dolan, 11th Dist. Nos. 2000-T-0154 and
2001-T-0003, 2002-Ohio-2440, at ¶ 7, citing Stores Realty Co. v. Cleveland (1975), 41
Ohio St.2d 41, 43, 322 N.E.2d 629. "Litigants must not be permitted to hold their Stark County, Case No. 2010 CA 00190 4
arguments in reserve for appeal, thus evading the trial court process." Nozik v. Kanaga
(Dec. 1, 2000), 11th Dist. No. 99-L-193, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5615.
{¶15} This Court has previously addressed and rejected similar claims in In re:
Adrian R. (December 11, 2008), Licking App. No. 08CA17, 2008 Ohio 6581. In that
opinion, this Court rejected the Constitutional challenges raised based upon the holding
and rationale set forth in State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 700 N.E.2d 570,
wherein the Supreme Court of Ohio characterized the prior sex offender registration
statutes as civil and remedial rather than criminal. See also State v. Williams (2000), 88
Ohio St.3d 513, 528, 728 N.E.2d 342.
{¶16} Unless and until the Supreme Court of Ohio reverses or modifies this
decisional construct, we are constrained by the weight of precedent.
{¶17} Based on our previous holdings, Appellant’s first assignment of error is
overruled.
II.
{¶18} In his second assignment of error, Appellant argues that the trial court
erred in classifying him as a Tier III juvenile sexual offender. Specifically, Appellant
argues that the trial court failed to consider the appropriate factors in making its
determination and further failed to recognize that it had discretion in determining which
tier level to assign to Appellant. We agree.
{¶19} This Court has previously reviewed and interpreted R.C. §2142.83 as
vesting the juvenile court with discretion in classifying the juvenile offenders. In the
matter of R.D., Licking App.No. 09 CA 97, 2010-Ohio-2986. This interpretation is
likewise shared by several other appellate districts. Id. Stark County, Case No. 2010 CA 00190 5
{¶20} In the instant case, R.G. was fifteen (15) years old at the time the offense
was committed. The trial court determined that Appellant was a juvenile offender
registrant and then went on to find that, because he had been adjudicated delinquent for
rape, it was required to classify him as a Tier III offender.
{¶21} Upon review of the record, it appears that while the trial court understood
that it had discretion as to juvenile offender registrant classification, the trial court
believed that it had no discretion as to the tier classification, that such classification was
offense-based. We therefore find a remand is necessary for the trial court to exercise
its discretion in this matter.
{¶22} However, if after a proper classification hearing and consideration of the
factors contained in R.C. §2152.83(D)(1)-(6), the trial court believes that such
classification is warranted based on the evidence in this case, it may re-impose such
classification on remand. The important point, however, is that the trial court does
possess the discretion to make this determination.1
{¶23} Accordingly, we sustain Appellant’s second assignment of error.
III.
{¶24} In Appellant’s Third Assignment of Error, he contends that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he argues that trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to challenge the constitutionality of Senate Bill 10 and for failing to object to
the trial court’s Tier III classification. We disagree.
1 We emphasize that this opinion should not be construed to take any position on the issue of whether R.G. should have been classified as a Tier III sex offender. Rather, we simply conclude that the trial court erred only to the extent that it believed it did not have discretion to decide the matter. Stark County, Case No. 2010 CA 00190 6
{¶25} A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a two-prong analysis.
The first inquiry is whether counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonable representation involving a substantial violation of any of defense counsel's
essential duties to Appellant. The second prong is whether Appellant was prejudiced by
counsel's ineffectiveness. Lockhart v. Fretwell (1993), 506 U.S. 364, 113 S.Ct. 838;
Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052; State v. Bradley (1989),
42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373.
{¶26} In determining whether counsel's representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly
deferential. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d at 142, 538 N.E.2d 373. Because of the difficulties
inherent in determining whether effective assistance of counsel was rendered in any
given case, a strong presumption exists that counsel's conduct fell within the wide range
of reasonable, professional assistance. Id.
{¶27} The United States Supreme Court and the Ohio Supreme Court have held
a reviewing court "need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient
before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged
deficiencies." Bradley at 143, 538 N.E.2d 373, quoting Strickland at 697.
{¶28} "When counsel's alleged ineffectiveness involves the failure to pursue a
motion or legal defense, this actual prejudice prong of Strickland breaks down into two
components. First, the defendant must show that the motion or defense 'is meritorious,'
and, second, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that the
outcome would have been different if the motion had been granted or the defense
pursued." In re Adrian R., 5th Dist. No. 08-CA-17, 2008-Ohio-6581, at ¶ 23, citing Stark County, Case No. 2010 CA 00190 7
Kimmelman v. Morrison (1986), 477 U.S. 365, 375, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305
(other citations omitted).
{¶29} Upon review, under the first prong of the Strickland test, we do not find
counsel's performance at the classification hearing deficient.
{¶30} We do not find that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a
constitutional challenge to this statute as this Court has previously rejected such
challenges. See In re Adrian R., Licking App. No. 08 CA 17, 2008-Ohio-6581; In the
Matter of R.D., Licking App. No. 09CA97, 2010-Ohio-2986.
{¶31} Nor do we find that counsel was ineffective for failing to familiarize himself
with the Tier classification law. Although other districts in Ohio had interpreted the
statute to allow the trial court to have discretion in determining the Tier level to assign to
a juvenile, this Court did not join such decisions until In the Matter of R.D., Licking App.
No. 09CA97, 2010-Ohio-2986, which was decided on June 28, 2010. As R.G.’s hearing
was held on June 29, 2010, the benefit of such decision was most likely not available to
him.
{¶32} Furthermore, counsel for R.G. did argue against registration in this case.
{¶33} Accordingly, we overrule R.G.'s third assignment of error. Stark County, Case No. 2010 CA 00190 8
{¶34} Based on the foregoing, we hereby vacate R.G.'s classification and this
case is remanded to the Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, Stark County, Ohio,
for a reclassification hearing.
By: Wise, J.
Edwards, P. J., and
Farmer, J., concur.
___________________________________
JUDGES JWW/d 1229 Stark County, Case No. 2010 CA 00190 9
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR STARK COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
IN RE: : : R.G. : JUDGMENT ENTRY : MINOR CHILD : Case No. 2010 CA 00190
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the
judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, Stark County, Ohio, is
vacated and remanded.
Costs assessed to Appellant.
JUDGES