NOTICE 2026 IL App (4th) 260167-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is June 2, 2026 not precedent except in the NO. 4-26-0167 Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re R.G., a Minor ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Tazewell County Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 23JA219 v. ) Taylor G., ) Honorable Respondent-Appellant). ) Katherine G. P. Legge, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court. Justices DeArmond and Grischow concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court granted appointed appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirmed the trial court’s judgment terminating respondent’s parental rights to her minor child.
¶2 Respondent, Taylor G., appeals the trial court’s judgment terminating her parental
rights to her minor child, R.G. (born in September 2021). On appeal, her appointed appellate
counsel moves to withdraw on the basis he can raise no colorable argument the court erred in
terminating her parental rights. We grant counsel’s motion and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 A. Neglect Proceedings
¶5 In December 2023, the State filed a shelter care petition alleging R.G. was
neglected pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act)
(705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2022)) because his environment was injurious to his welfare. Specifically, the State alleged that on October 6, 2023, respondent admitted to police officers
that she had “made threats of suicide in that she intended to wreck her vehicle with her child in
the car.” After disclosing this information, respondent was taken to the hospital for a psychiatric
evaluation and subsequently admitted to the hospital’s psychiatric unit involuntarily for a period
of four days. Following her release from the hospital on October 10, 2023, respondent “refused
to take her psychotropic medication” and failed to comply with a “safety plan” implemented by
the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) in that she did not “obtain a
mental health assessment to assess if she could safely parent the minor.” The trial court
conducted an adjudicatory hearing and found probable cause to believe R.G. was neglected. The
court entered an order granting temporary custody of the minor to DCFS.
¶6 On April 18, 2024, the trial court entered (1) an adjudicatory order adjudicating
the minor neglected under section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act (id.) and (2) a dispositional
order making him a ward of the court. The court also entered a “SUPPLEMENTAL TASK
ORDER” setting forth the tasks respondent had to complete to have the minor returned to her
care. Specifically, she was required to complete the following: (1) cooperate with DCFS,
(2) communicate with the caseworker and provide all requested information, (3) maintain stable
housing, (4) attend visits with the minor, (5) undergo a psychological examination and comply
with any recommended treatment, (6) undergo a substance abuse assessment and comply with
any recommended treatment, (7) complete a parenting class, (8) complete a domestic violence
class, and (9) attend individual counseling sessions.
¶7 B. Termination Proceedings
¶8 On December 2, 2025, the State filed a supplemental petition to terminate
respondent’s parental rights to R.G., alleging she was an “unfit person” within the meaning of
-2- section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2024)) because she
failed to make reasonable progress toward the minor’s return during the nine-month period from
February 20, 2025, to November 20, 2025.
¶9 1. Fitness Hearing
¶ 10 On February 5, 2026, the trial court conducted a hearing on the fitness portion of
the State’s termination petition. The State called the caseworker assigned to R.G.’s case, Hannah
Simonovic, to testify. Respondent testified on her own behalf.
¶ 11 a. Hannah Simonovic
¶ 12 Hannah Simonovic testified that she was the caseworker assigned to R.G.’s case
during the nine-month period identified in the State’s petition. Simonovic testified that in
addition to the services listed in the supplemental task order, respondent was also required to
complete a drug screening “three times a month.” During the relevant time period, respondent
failed to appear for 12 screenings and tested positive for marijuana at each screening she
completed. In May 2025, Simonovic discussed respondent’s marijuana usage with her and
directed her to complete another substance abuse assessment. The next month, respondent told
Simonovic that she had completed the assessment, but she did not disclose to Simonovic whether
treatment had been recommended. In early November 2025, Simonovic obtained a copy of the
assessment, and it indicated respondent had been diagnosed with “severe alcohol and severe
marijuana usage.” The assessment “also stated *** that she refused to complete treatment and
left without making a follow-up appointment.” Simonovic filed an “Addendum Report” in the
trial court discussing the assessment, and she provided respondent with a copy on November 11,
2025. Three days later, Simonovic “received a message from [respondent] stating that she was
checking herself into [the psychiatric unit] at Carle Health.” Respondent’s mother told
-3- Simonovic that respondent had voluntarily admitted herself because she was upset about the
addendum report. Respondent was released from the hospital on November 18, 2025.
¶ 13 Simonovic testified that she also continued to have concerns with respondent’s
anger management throughout the nine-month period. Simonovic described an incident that
occurred in June 2025 where respondent “was angry about how court went and was speaking to
her mom about [Simonovic] and how she didn’t agree and was quite angry and refused *** to
speak [to her].” And, after a hearing on November 20, 2025, the final day of the nine-month
period, Simonovic “was informed that [respondent] said ‘Fuck the judge’ and also *** stated to
[counsel for the State] *** ‘Fuck you, you dumb blonde bitch.’ ” According to Simonovic,
respondent “appeared very enraged” and “was also suicidal, making suicidal threats and
ideations.”
¶ 14 Simonovic testified that respondent had been attending counseling sessions at the
beginning of the nine-month period. However, in June 2025, respondent’s therapist informed
Simonovic that at some time prior to May 31, 2025, respondent’s “insurance had lapsed and she
was not attending counseling and [the therapist] tried to reach out multiple times to get her new
insurance and [respondent] did not respond.” After reviewing her notes, Simonovic clarified that
“from March 13th until June 26th,” respondent “only had one to two counseling sessions.” She
reengaged with her counseling services in July 2025 and attended consistently for the remainder
of the nine-month period. But, according to Simonovic, “despite her going to counseling, [she]
had difficulty maintaining her mental health.” Simonovic testified that at the conclusion of the
nine-month period, respondent was no closer to having R.G. returned to her care.
¶ 15 b. Respondent
¶ 16 Respondent testified that in June 2024, a doctor had prescribed her a “medical
-4- marijuana card” for “severe back pain from the two failed epidurals when [she] had [her] son.”
Respondent testified that the prescribing doctor “agreed [with her] that the safe option was
marijuana instead of narcotics.” She further testified that she had “cut back tremendously” on her
marijuana usage “and now it’s only right before [she goes] to bed.” With respect to her alcohol
consumption, she indicated that she only had “the occasional one or two drinks every once in a
while if we go out but not every day.”
¶ 17 c. The Trial Court’s Unfitness Finding
¶ 18 After hearing the arguments of the parties, the trial court found the State had
proven respondent unfit by clear and convincing evidence. In articulating its reasoning, the court
began by noting, “[T]his case came into care [because of respondent’s] mental health that was a
significant concern for the child’s well-being,” “but the issues that were pervasive throughout
this period were [respondent’s] mental health and *** substance abuse.” The court then
highlighted that even though respondent had been diagnosed with “a severe cannabis use
disorder,” she tested positive for marijuana at each completed drug screening. The court further
found that respondent’s testimony was not credible and her engagement in mental health and
substance abuse services was not in earnest, stating:
“In looking at all of [respondent’s] statements *** throughout the interviews and
assessments that she had with the clinicians, both substance abuse and mental
health, *** there’s varying stories and some of which she said today on the stand
never reported to another clinician throughout *** and so I think that there is a
level of dishonesty or picking and choosing rather than just being completely
forthright with the clinicians in order to engage earnestly in these services.”
Lastly, the court found respondent’s psychiatric records and November 2025 admission to the
-5- hospital “show[ed] an escalation in her mental health instability” and that “her mental health
continue[d] to remain unstable.”
¶ 19 2. Best Interest Hearing
¶ 20 Immediately after announcing its unfitness finding, the trial court proceeded to the
best interest portion of the State’s termination petition. The State called Simonovic and R.G.’s
foster father, Steve T., to testify. Respondent did not present any evidence.
¶ 21 a. Simonovic
¶ 22 Simonovic testified that R.G. had been living with his maternal grandparents
since he came into care in December 2023. Simonovic went to the foster home two times per
month to inspect the home and observe the interactions between R.G. and his foster parents. She
described them as having “a very loving, close relationship.” She explained, “He will hug them
in my presence. He will speak to them, he said I love you to them once before in my presence.
He’s very close with them.” According to Simonovic, the foster parents showed R.G. love and
affection, and they were meeting all of his needs—such as providing him with adequate food,
shelter, and clothing and taking him to all of his medical appointments. Simonovic testified that
the foster home was “clean and appropriate” and R.G. had his own bedroom. She further testified
that she had no concerns about the foster parents, who had expressed their willingness to adopt
the minor if necessary.
¶ 23 On cross-examination by counsel for respondent, Simonovic testified that
respondent demonstrated appropriate parenting skills during her visits with R.G. Respondent
showed interest in engaging with his interests, and she would bring him lunch when the visits
occurred during his lunchtime. Simonovic also testified that R.G. loved respondent. He called
her “mommy” and would get excited when he saw her.
-6- ¶ 24 On cross-examination by the guardian ad litem, Simonovic testified that at the
time of the hearing, respondent was no closer to having the minor returned to her care than she
was at the end of the nine-month period in November 2025. She explained that respondent had
yet to complete the treatment recommended in the substance abuse assessment, continued to test
positive for marijuana, and tested positive for alcohol the month prior.
¶ 25 b. Steve T.
¶ 26 Steve T. testified that he and his wife were R.G.’s maternal grandparents and
foster parents. No other people lived in the foster home. Steve described R.G. as a happy and
social child. At the time of the hearing, R.G. was four years old and attending preschool, where
he had made several friends. Steve testified that R.G. did “have some [attitude] problems at
school.” However, he and his wife “just had a meeting with occupational therapy, speech
therapy, the teachers, *** and they said overall [R.G.’s] progress has been good.” Steve testified,
“I was worried that some of the outbursts were because of this, but a lot of it is just being four
and a half, a boy.” Steve further testified that R.G. had plenty of toys at the house and enjoyed
running through sprinklers in the summer. R.G. had his own bedroom, but he preferred to sleep
with the foster parents. Steve testified that he “[a]bsolutely” loved R.G. and he and his wife had
already agreed that they would adopt him if necessary.
¶ 27 c. The Trial Court’s Best Interest Determination
¶ 28 After hearing the arguments of the parties, the trial court announced its ruling that
the State had proven termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the minor’s best interest.
The court identified the best interest factors it found favored termination, stating: “[I]n reviewing
the best interest factors, as it relates to the child’s physical safety and welfare and development
of the child’s identity, his sense of attachment, continuity of affection, least disruptive placement
-7- option, the community ties, and most significantly the child’s need for permanence all those
factors favor termination.” The court acknowledged that there was a bond between R.G. and
respondent, her visits with him went well, and she “loves him very much.” Nonetheless, the
court stated, “[T]hat love in and of itself is not sufficient to provide a stable, suitable future for
the child. The child’s needs prevail when I have to consider each of these permanency ***
decisions in looking at his future.”
¶ 29 This appeal followed.
¶ 30 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 31 On appeal, appointed counsel asserts he can raise no colorable argument the trial
court erred in (1) finding respondent unfit or (2) determining it was in the minor’s best interest to
terminate her parental rights.
¶ 32 A. Unfitness Finding
¶ 33 First, counsel asserts he can raise no colorable argument the trial court erred in
finding respondent unfit for failing to make reasonable progress toward the minor’s return to her
care where the evidence showed that during the nine-month period from February 20, 2025, to
November 20, 2025, respondent “refused to participate in drug treatment, tested positive for
cannabis in all her drug drops, missed numerous other drug drops, failed to adequately address
and overcome her mental health issues, and did not make progress toward a return to home of the
minor.”
¶ 34 Section 2-29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2024))
“delineates a two-step process in seeking termination of parental rights involuntarily.” In re J.L.,
236 Ill. 2d 329, 337 (2010). First, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
parent is unfit. In re Donald A.G., 221 Ill. 2d 234, 244 (2006). In making such a determination,
-8- the court considers whether the parent’s conduct falls within one or more of the unfitness
grounds described in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2024)). In re
D.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 417 (2001). Under section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS
50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2024)), an unfit parent includes any parent who fails to make reasonable
progress toward his or her child’s return during any nine-month period following the neglect
adjudication.
¶ 35 Our supreme court has provided the following guidance for measuring a parent’s
progress toward the return of her child pursuant section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act:
“[T]he benchmark for measuring a parent’s ‘progress toward the return of the
child’ under section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act encompasses the parent’s
compliance with the service plans and the court’s directives, in light of the
condition which gave rise to the removal of the child, and in light of other
conditions which later become known and which would prevent the court from
returning custody of the child to the parent.” In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 216-17
(2001).
We have described “ ‘reasonable progress’ ” as “an ‘objective standard,’ ” which exists “when
‘the progress being made by a parent to comply with directives given for the return of the child is
sufficiently demonstrable and of such a quality that the court, in the near future, will be able to
order the child returned to parental custody.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) In re F.P., 2014 IL App
(4th) 140360, ¶ 88 (quoting In re L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d 444, 461 (1991)). “A reviewing court
will not reverse a trial court’s fitness finding unless it was contrary to the manifest weight of the
evidence, meaning that the opposite conclusion is clearly evident from a review of the record.”
In re A.L., 409 Ill. App. 3d 492, 500 (2011).
-9- ¶ 36 Here, we agree with counsel that it would be frivolous to argue the State failed to
prove respondent unfit for failing to make reasonable progress toward R.G.’s return during the
nine-month period from February 20, 2025, to November 20, 2025. The minor initially came into
care due to concerns about respondent’s mental health, stemming from her suicidal ideations that
led to her being involuntarily admitted to the hospital’s psychiatric unit in December 2023. In
relevant part, to have R.G. returned to her care, respondent was required to cooperate with the
caseworker and provide her with all requested information, complete three drug screenings per
month, comply with the treatment recommendations of her substance abuse assessment, and
consistently attend counseling sessions.
¶ 37 The evidence presented at the fitness hearing showed that during the relevant
nine-month period, respondent failed to complete 12 drug screenings and tested positive for
marijuana at each screening she completed. In May 2025, Simonovic directed respondent to
complete another substance abuse assessment due to her positive drug tests. The next month,
respondent told Simonovic she had completed the assessment. However, she did not provide
Simonovic with any treatment recommendations. In November 2025, Simonovic obtained a copy
of the assessment, and it showed respondent had been diagnosed with “severe alcohol and severe
marijuana usage” but “refused to complete treatment and left without making a follow-up
appointment.” When respondent learned Simonovic had filed an addendum report with the trial
court about the assessment, she was very upset and voluntarily admitted herself to the hospital in
November 2025. After a hearing on the final day of the nine-month period and two days after she
had been released from the hospital, respondent “appeared very enraged” and “was also suicidal,
making suicidal threats and ideations.” With respect to counseling, respondent failed to inform
Simonovic that her “insurance had lapsed,” and she had only attended “one to two counseling
- 10 - sessions” between March 2025 and June 2025. Although respondent did reengage with
counseling in July 2025, Simonovic testified that she continued to have “difficulty maintaining
her mental health.” Simonovic further testified that respondent was no closer to R.G.’s return at
the end of the nine-month period than she was at the beginning.
¶ 38 Accordingly, based on respondent’s failure to comply with the required services
discussed above, we agree with appointed appellate counsel that no colorable argument can be
made the trial court’s unfitness finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 39 B. Best Interest Determination
¶ 40 Next, counsel asserts he can raise no colorable argument the trial court erred in
finding termination of respondent’s parental rights was in R.G.’s best interest.
¶ 41 If the State satisfies its burden of proving the respondent unfit, the termination
proceedings advance to the second stage, where the State must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that termination of parental rights is in the minor’s best interest. 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2)
(West 2024). At the best interest stage, the focus shifts from the parent to the child, and the issue
is “whether, in light of the child’s needs, parental rights should be terminated.” (Emphasis
omitted.) In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 364 (2004). Thus, “the parent’s interest in maintaining the
parent-child relationship must yield to the child’s interest in a stable, loving home life.” Id.
Section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2024)) lists the best
interest factors for the court to consider, in the context of the minor’s age and developmental
needs, when making its best interest determination: (1) the child’s physical safety and welfare;
(2) the development of the child’s identity; (3) the child’s background and ties; (4) the child’s
sense of attachments; (5) the child’s wishes and long-term goals; (6) the child’s community ties;
(7) the child’s need for permanence; (8) the uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the risks
- 11 - associated with substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the persons available to care for the
child. We will not reverse a best interest determination absent a finding it was against the
manifest weight of the evidence, which occurs “only if the facts clearly demonstrate that the
court should have reached the opposite result.” In re Jay. H., 395 Ill. App. 3d 1063, 1071 (2009).
¶ 42 Here, we agree with counsel that it would be frivolous to argue the State failed to
prove termination of respondent’s parental rights was in R.G.’s best interest. The evidence
presented at the best interest hearing showed the minor had been living with his maternal
grandparents on an uninterrupted basis since being removed from respondent’s care. Simonovic
testified that the foster home was “clean and appropriate” and R.G. had his own bedroom.
Simonovic described the relationship between R.G. and his foster parents as “very loving” and
“close.” The foster parents were meeting all of R.G.’s needs—such as providing him with
adequate food, shelter, and clothing and taking him to all of his medical appointments.
Simonovic stated she had no concerns with the foster parents caring for R.G. Moreover, Steve
testified that R.G. was in preschool and had made several friends. Steve described R.G. as a
happy and social child and noted he had plenty of toys to play with at the foster home. Steve
further testified that he and his wife “[a]bsolutely” loved R.G. and they had already agreed that
they would adopt him if necessary. On the other hand, Simonovic testified that respondent
demonstrated appropriate parenting skills during her visits with R.G. and it was apparent that he
loved her and knew that she was his mother. However, Simonovic also testified that since being
found unfit, respondent was no closer to having R.G. returned to her care because she had yet to
engage in the treatment recommended following the substance abuse assessment and she
continued to fail her drug screenings. Accordingly, we agree with appointed appellate counsel
that no colorable argument can be made the trial court’s best interest determination was against
- 12 - the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 43 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 44 For the reasons stated, we grant appointed appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw
and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 45 Affirmed.
- 13 -