In re Request by Hempfield Township

518 A.2d 1314, 102 Pa. Commw. 514, 1986 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 2704
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedDecember 19, 1986
DocketAppeal, No. 602 C.D. 1985
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 518 A.2d 1314 (In re Request by Hempfield Township) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Request by Hempfield Township, 518 A.2d 1314, 102 Pa. Commw. 514, 1986 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 2704 (Pa. Ct. App. 1986).

Opinion

Opinion by

Judge Blatt,

Hempfield Township (Township), a second class township, appeals the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County (trial court), which sustained the preliminary objections of Samuel Scott, an owner of a certain property situate in the Township, and which dismissed the Townships petition for the appointment of a board of viewers to determine the benefit1 to Scotts property from a municipal water line which had been installed across the front of the property

[516]*516By resolution of October 30, 1979, the Township Board of Supervisors (Board) created a water district, Route 30 West, No. 1 Water District, to provide municipal water service to an area encompassing Scott’s property. This resolution provided that the water line would be installed by the Municipal Authority of Westmoreland County, but that the assessments to collect the installation costs would be made by the Township, purportedly under either the “front footage” method or the “benefit” method.

The Township subsequently resolved to utilize the “front footage” method and then filed an action in the common pleas court to enforce a municipal lien against Scott’s property for the water line installation, calculated under the “front footage” method. A jury trial was held and the jury returned a verdict finding that, while Scott’s property enjoyed a benefit because of the increase in its value caused by the installation of the water line, the property, nevertheless, is rural in character and, hence, not subject to a “front footage” assessment.2 The Township did not appeal this verdict. Instead, the Board then resolved to assess Scott’s property under the “benefits” method, and the Township then filed the petition for the appointment of a board of viewers from which the present appeal arises.

[517]*517Scott preliminarily objected to the petition for the appointment of a board of viewers on the grounds that the Code expressly prohibits the Township from utilizing both assessment methods within the same water district, and also arguing that the doctrine of res adjudicata precluded relitigation of the assessment.3

In reviewing the trial court’s order, we must determine if any doubt exists as to whether or not the preliminary objections were properly sustained, resolving such doubt, if any, by overruling the said objections. Monti v. City of Pittsburgh, 26 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 490, 364 A.2d 764 (1976).

Before this Court, the Township contends that combining assessment methods within a single municipal service district is an accepted technique in this Commonwealth, relying on Whitemarsh Township Authority v. Elwert, 413 Pa. 329, 196 A.2d 843 (1964) and Bern Township Authority v. Hartman, 69 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 420, 451 A.2d 567 (1982). The Township acknowledges that these cases involved municipal authorities, but it nonetheless argues that the statutory language empowering those authorities to use both assessment methods simultaneously is similar in nature to Section 1610 of the Code. We disagree.

In Whitemarsh, our Supreme Court interpreted Section 4B of the Municipality Authorities Act of 1945,4 [518]*518as permitting municipal authorities to employ both assessment methods within a single district. The White-marsh court, however, recognized that, as an agent of the state government, not of the incorporating municipalities, a municipal authority’s assessment powers are those conferred by the legislature. 413 Pa. at 333, 196 A.2d at 846. In reviewing subsections (r) and (s) of Section 4B, the Whitemarsh court held that “[n]o restricting words appear, such as are present in the Township Code [the Second Class Township Code]; the disjunctive ‘or,’ which would restrict the simultaneous use of both methods is not present.” Id. at 334, 196 A.2d at 846 (emphasis added).5 We are, therefore, in agreement [519]*519with Scott that the trial court correctly ruled that, under the terms of the Code, the Township is limited to one or the other of the available assessment methods, and cannot use both within the same district.

Inasmuch as we conclude that the trial court correctly sustained the preliminary objections on the above-stated basis, we need not review the other ground upon which the trial court relied. Accordingly, we will affirm the trial courts order.

Order

And Now, this 19th day of December, 1986, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County is affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)
518 A.2d 1314, 102 Pa. Commw. 514, 1986 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 2704, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-request-by-hempfield-township-pacommwct-1986.