In re: R.E.

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA25-1056

Filed 15 July 2026

Iredell County, No. 23JA000289-480

IN THE MATTER OF: R.E., a minor child.

Appeal by Respondent-Mother from order entered 8 August 2025 by Judge

Thomas R. Young in Iredell County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20

May 2026.

Lauren Vaughan for Petitioner-Appellee Iredell County Department of Social Services.

Rebekah W. Davis for Respondent-Appellant Mother.

Administrative Office of the Courts, by GAL Staff Attorney Brittany T. McKinney, for guardian ad litem.

GRIFFIN, Judge.

Respondent-Mother appeals an order changing the custody of her daughter,

Ruth.1 Respondent-Mother argues “[t]he permanency planning order did not address

all of the requirements of N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-906.1 and 7B-906.2” and “findings and the

evidence did not support the placement of Ruth in the legal and physical custody of

1 We use a pseudonym to protect the anonymity of the juvenile and for ease of reading. See N.C. R. App. P. 42(b). IN RE: R.E.

Opinion of the Court

Ms. Heggins[;]” thus, “[t]he trial court’s custody determination was an abuse of

discretion.” She also argues “[t]he provisions for visitation between [Respondent-

]Mother and Ruth were not supported by findings or evidence” and “[t]he visitation

plan was contrary to the best interests of Ruth, and it was an abuse of discretion.”

We affirm the trial court’s order in part, vacate the portion of the order

requiring supervised visits by Pharos at Respondent-Mother’s cost, and remand for

additional findings of fact addressing whether Respondent-Mother has the ability to

pay those costs and for correction of the clerical error in Finding of Fact 23.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Ruth was born to Respondent-Mother on 15 April 2018. In 2018, Respondent-

Mother completed a Parental Capacity Assessment, which determined she did “not

present with sufficiently strong personal or mental health functioning to be capable

of meeting all the demands involved in parenting a child,” and she was diagnosed

with “historic personality disorder, borderline personality disorder[,] and alcohol use

disorder, severe.”

On 30 May 2023, Iredell County Department of Social Services2 (“DSS”)

received a report “alleging neglect due to improper discipline without injuries,

improper care, and lack of supervision” for Ruth and her brother who both resided

with Respondent-Mother at the time. These reports stemmed from altercations

2 Respondent-Mother previously had three older children removed from her by Rowan County

DSS due to “domestic violence, substance abuse[,] and untreated emotional/mental health issues.”

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between Respondent-Mother and her son and Ruth’s brother, Chip.3 In one

altercation, Respondent-Mother and Chip got into an argument around 8:00 P.M.

when Respondent-Mother said if he left to go to the store he would not be let back

into the house, and Respondent-Mother alleged Chip had physically attacked her and

threatened her; after which, Chip went to the store, and Respondent-Mother locked

him out of the house.

At another time, Respondent-Mother stated Chip had jumped out of the car

while Respondent-Mother was driving, and when she attempted to get him back into

the car, “he started hitting her, busted her lip, and left a bump on her head.” Chip

admitted to threatening and assaulting Respondent-Mother several times as well as

being aggressive to his sister, Ruth.

DSS and Respondent-Mother entered into a safety plan, and on 14 July 2023

DSS began providing family In-Home Case Management Services, with Respondent-

Mother and Chip receiving Child Focused Assertive Community Treatment Team

services through Children’s Hope Alliance. However, the verbal and physical

altercations between Respondent-Mother and Chip continued. On 3 September 2023,

Chip assaulted Respondent-Mother and was involuntarily committed until 15

September 2023, when he was discharged. After another physical altercation

between Respondent-Mother and Chip, DSS expressed its concern to Respondent-

3 A pseudonym. See N.C. R. App. P. 42(b).

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Mother about Ruth’s safety because of her exposure to the altercations and requested

Respondent-Mother make a plan for Ruth in the meantime, to which Respondent-

Mother expressed Ruth was safe and refused to make a plan. On 9 November 2023,

Ruth was present for another altercation during which Chip attacked Respondent-

Mother.

Based on this background, DSS filed petitions alleging neglect and dependency

for both Chip and Ruth on 22 December 2022. DSS was granted nonsecure custody

on 28 December 2023, and the children were placed with Ruth’s paternal aunt, Ms.

Heggins. On 14 March 2024, the children were adjudicated neglected.

In its 8 May 2024 disposition order, the trial court found Respondent-Mother

did not take any personal responsibility for why the juveniles had been removed from

her home but “engaged with a case plan[;]” “engaged with mental health therapy[;]”

and “is visiting the juveniles.” Respondent-Mother was ordered to remedy the

conditions of the home by, inter alia, complying with the terms of the case plan,

submitting to mental health and substance abuse assessments, maintaining

consistent employment and a verifiable income source, and completing a psychiatric

assessment if recommended by her treatment provider.

The trial court granted Respondent-Mother a minimum of two hours each week

of supervised visitation with Ruth. Respondent-Mother filed a notice of appeal of

both the adjudication and disposition orders on 7 and 27 June 2024.

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The trial court held the first permanency planning hearing for the children on

20 October 2024. Respondent-Mother had engaged with a case plan and was

“working on it[,]” engaged with mental health therapy, and visited the children. The

children still resided with Ms. Heggins. Ms. Heggins was “ready for the children to

go back to their mom[,]” but requested that Chip be relocated sooner if reunification

was not imminent. The trial court authorized a trial home placement for the children

over the next three to four weeks.

The trial home placement commenced in early November 2024 but quickly

“began to fall apart.” Respondent-Mother stopped attending her mental health

treatment from October to late January. She allowed Ruth to have unsupervised

overnight visits with Ruth’s father, which had been precluded by the trial court.

Respondent-Mother allowed a convicted felon to reside in her home during the trial

home placement. After an argument with Chip while she was impaired, Respondent-

Mother left Chip home alone for several days. Finally, Respondent-Mother, while

impaired, drove Ruth to Ms. Heggins’s home and “started an argument . . . and

damaged property at [Ms. Heggins’s] home.” Law enforcement responded and

forbade Respondent-Mother from driving due to her intoxication. The next day, DSS

visited Respondent-Mother’s home and found Ruth ill and Respondent-Mother in “a

loud argument with her mother over the phone.” Ruth told the social worker that she

wanted to leave and stay with Ms. Heggins. Ruth returned to live with Ms. Heggins,

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and Chip was placed with Ruth’s paternal grandmother, whom Chip considers to be

a relative.

At the subsequent permanency planning hearing on 25 February 2025 and in

the related 5 March 2025 order, the trial court found reunification with the

Respondent-Parents would be “unsuccessful or inconsistent” with the health and

safety of the children and the necessity of a safe, permanent home. The trial court

found DSS had made reasonable efforts towards reunification, “but should be relieved

of further efforts.” The primary permanent plan for the children shifted to “[c]ustody

to a relative or other suitable person” with a secondary plan of adoption. Respondent-

Mother was again entitled to at least two hours of weekly supervised visits with the

children.

On 2 April 2025, this Court affirmed the adjudication of the children as

neglected juveniles and the subsequent disposition granting legal and physical

custody of the children to DSS.

Ruth continued to reside with Ms. Heggins and was “doing well in her home.”

Ms. Heggins desired to be Ruth’s primary custodian. Chip resided in a level III

placement but ran away for about two weeks before Respondent-Mother picked him

up from the police. Chip refused to attend the permanency planning hearing on 23

July 2025, and law enforcement was called to make him attend. Respondent-Mother

was employed at Family Dollar and renewed her CNA license. She attended therapy

and visited Ruth weekly. The trial court held a permanency planning hearing on 23

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July 2025 and made the following findings of fact in its 8 August 2025 order, in

relevant part:

5. The Iredell County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) has made reasonable efforts to reunify and to eliminate the need for placement of the juvenile outside of the juvenile’s own home and should continue to do so. Said efforts are as described in the social worker’s report and the prior court orders.

....

8. The juvenile, [Ruth], is placed with her paternal aunt, Angela Heggins, in Spencer. Ms. Heggins has been taking good care of the juvenile. The juvenile is doing well in her home. Angela Heggins is specifically approved to continue to provide care for [Ruth]. She has demonstrated for more than six months that she has the ability to provide for the juvenile’s needs. She desires to be the permanent custodian of [Ruth].

10. . . . [Chip] stayed in [Respondent-Mother’s] home overnight and then refused to come to court with her today. [Respondent-Mother] resorted to calling law enforcement to get the juvenile to comply.

15. At this time, efforts to reunite the juvenile with the Respondent Parents would be clearly unsuccessful or inconsistent with the juvenile’s health and safety and need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of time.

16. DSS has made reasonable efforts to implement the primary and secondary permanent plans for the juvenile. Said efforts are as described in the social worker’s report and the prior court orders.

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17. All of the same issues that were present when the juveniles were adjudicated neglected continue to exist. . . . . [Respondent-Mother] has sporadic mental health treatment; she is unable to control [Chip]; she makes meritless reports and complaints about caretakers and burns bridges for placements and help; and she exhibits behaviors and conduct demonstrating her mental health issues persist.

22. At this time, it no longer remains possible for the juveniles to be placed with a parent within the next six months.

23. Based on the Respondent Parents’ failure to make sufficient, timely progress in addressing the issues that caused the juvenile to enter the purview of the court and foster care, the termination of parental rights should be considered. Presently, the filing of a petition or motion to terminate parental rights would be inconsistent with the juvenile’s best interest, as there persists the possibility that the parent-child relationship can be maintained through guardianship with a relative.

24. Information regarding the visitation that has occurred is contained in the social worker’s and the GAL’s reports. There is a need to create, modify, or enforce an appropriate visitation plan in accordance with N.C.G.S. § 7B-905.1.

25. Information regarding the placement(s) the juvenile has had is contained in the social worker’s report, the GAL’s report, and the prior court orders. The juvenile’s current placement with Angela Heggins is appropriate and should continue.

26. The goals of the juvenile’s foster care plan include, but are not limited to, providing the juvenile with a safe, nurturing environment in which to reside while the Respondent Parents are working to rectify the issues that

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caused the juvenile to enter the purview of the court and foster care and until such time as permanency can be achieved. The juvenile’s current placement provider will be consulted about the juvenile’s ongoing needs and the placement provider’s desire and ability to provide permanency for the juvenile. Further, the placement provider will be involved in transitioning the juvenile towards permanency.

31. Presently, the juvenile requires more adequate care or supervision than the Respondent Parents can provide, and return to the juvenile’s own home would be contrary to the juvenile’s health and safety.

The trial court concluded the best permanent plan for Ruth was “a plan of [c]ustody

to a relative or other suitable person.” Legal and physical custody of Ruth was given

to Ms. Heggins. Respondent-Mother was entitled to a minimum of one two-hour visit

with Ruth per week. The trial court ordered the visits to be supervised by Pharos

Parenting at Respondent-Mother’s cost or by someone approved by Ms. Heggins. The

supervisor was authorized to end the visit if Respondent-Mother presented as visibly

impaired, behaved in a manner that presented a danger to Ruth, or was visibly

upsetting to Ruth. Only people approved by Ms. Heggins in advance were permitted

to participate in the visitation. Finally, the trial court ordered Respondent-Mother

shall contact Ms. Heggins twenty-four hours before each visit to confirm attendance

or the visit would not occur. Respondent-Mother provided timely notice of appeal on

28 August 2025.

II. Analysis

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Respondent-Mother solely appeals the order as it pertains to Ruth and

presents two issues on appeal: (1) “The permanency planning order did not address

all of the requirements of N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-906.1 and 7B-906.2. Additionally, the

findings and the evidence did not support the placement of Ruth in the legal and

physical custody of Ms. Heggins. The trial court’s custody determination was an

abuse of discretion.” (2) “The provisions for visitation between [Respondent-]Mother

and Ruth were not supported by the findings or evidence. The visitation plan was

contrary to the best interests of Ruth, and it was an abuse of discretion.” We affirm

the trial court in part, vacate in part, and remand in part solely for additional findings

of fact addressing whether Respondent-Mother has the ability to pay visitation costs

and for correction of the clerical error.

A. Statutory Requirements and Findings of Fact

Respondent-Mother first argues “[t]he permanency planning order did not

address all of the requirements of N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-906.1 and 7B-906.2. Additionally,

the findings and the evidence did not support the placement of Ruth in the legal and

physical custody of Ms. Heggins.” Therefore, according to Respondent-Mother, “the

trial court’s custody determination was an abuse of discretion.”

“Our review of a permanency planning order is limited to whether there is

competent evidence in the record to support the findings of fact and whether the

findings support the conclusions of law. The trial court’s findings of fact are

conclusive on appeal if supported by any competent evidence.” In re L.R.L.B., 377

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N.C. 311, 315, 857 S.E.2d 105, 111 (2021) (citation modified). Competent evidence

may consist of “any evidence, including hearsay evidence . . . or testimony or evidence

from any person that is not a party, that the court finds to be relevant, reliable, and

necessary to determine the needs of the juvenile and the most appropriate

disposition.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(c) (2025). Moreover, “the trial judge’s

decisions as to the weight and credibility of the evidence, and the inferences drawn

from the evidence are not subject to appellate review.” In re D.W.P, 373 N.C. 327,

330, 838 S.E.2d 396, 400 (2020) (citation omitted).

1. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1

a. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(d)(3)

Respondent-Mother argues that Findings 15, 17, and 31 are “findings

described in” and using the same language as subsection 7B-906.1(d)(3). Respondent-

Mother also argues these findings do not address Respondent-Mother and Ruth, but

rather Respondent-Mother and Chip. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(d) details criteria

the trial court should consider at a permanency planning hearing and mandates

written findings regarding relevant criteria. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(d) (2025).

One of those criteria, subsection 7B-906.1(d)(3), is “whether efforts to reunite the

juvenile with either parent clearly would be unsuccessful or inconsistent with the

juvenile’s health or safety and need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable

period of time.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(d)(3) (2025).

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DSS argues similar findings in the 5 March order ceased the reunification plan,

and therefore this issue was settled by the Court. Accordingly, the GAL argues the

findings reiterated in the order on appeal are no longer statutorily relevant.

Regardless, presuming arguendo the arguments are preserved and relevant, the

findings of fact are supported by competent evidence.

Findings 15, 17, and 31, state,

15. At this time, efforts to reunite the juvenile with the Respondent Parents would be clearly unsuccessful or inconsistent with the juvenile’s health and safety and need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of time.

17. All of the same issues that were present when the juveniles were adjudicated neglected continue to exist. . . . . [Respondent-Mother] has sporadic mental health treatment; she is unable to control [Chip]; she makes meritless reports and complaints about caretakers and burns bridges for placements and help; and she exhibits behaviors and conduct demonstrating her mental health issues persist.

31. Presently, the juvenile requires more adequate care or supervision than the Respondent Parents can provide, and return to the juvenile’s own home would be contrary to the juvenile’s health and safety.

Here, the trial court admitted the reports of both the social worker and the

GAL into evidence, incorporated them by reference into the findings of fact, and took

judicial notice of prior orders entered in this matter. The 22 January 2025 DSS court

report indicated Respondent-Mother “ha[d] not consistently attended therapy” and

Respondent-Mother’s therapist indicated her participation in treatment “has had

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some breaks but has been consistent overall.” She stopped attending mental health

treatment from October 2024 to late January 2025. Therefore, there is competent

evidence to support Respondent-Mother has sporadic mental health treatment.

Further, Ms. Heggins and Respondent-Mother “ha[ve] a lot of conflict

sometimes.” Respondent-Mother has engaged in “constant criticism of [Ms.

Heggins’s] caretaking skills” that has prevented a cordial relationship. Moreover,

Respondent-Mother filed a report with Rowan County DSS alleging that Chip was

being abused by his caretaker. The caretaker was wheelchair bound and had just left

a Nursing Rehabilitation Facility. While the record does not indicate the outcome of

the allegation, Rowan County DSS spoke with the caretaker and engaged the social

worker. Therefore, there is competent evidence to support that Respondent-Mother

has made meritless reports and complaints about caretakers and burns bridges for

placements and help.

Finally, Respondent-Mother “has displayed continued mental health and

substance abuse issues during th[e] review period,” placing the juveniles in potential

harm. She allowed a convicted felon to stay in her home during the trial home

placement; she left Ruth and Chip in the care of others; she allowed Ruth to have

unsupervised overnight visits with Respondent-Father in violation of the trial court’s

direction; she “ha[d] been engaging in erratic behaviors such as arguing with

neighbors and others in the presence of the juveniles;” and she drove while impaired

with Ruth in the car. Respondent-Mother started an argument with Ms. Heggins and

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damaged property at Ms. Heggins’s home. This is competent evidence to support

finding Respondent-Mother’s mental health issues continue and Findings 15 and 31

in general.

Respondent-Mother also argues that Finding of Fact 10, specifically that

Respondent-Mother “resorted” to calling law enforcement to bring Chip to court for

the permanency planning hearing on 23 July 2025, is “inaccurate and unnecessary.”

Respondent-Mother contends she was calm in an otherwise problematic situation,

and no caretaker could have controlled Chip. While the responding officer did

describe Respondent-Mother as “calm and collected,” she was also “pleading” to get

Chip to come to court and sat outside the door, “kind of waiting for things to play out.”

Thus, there is competent evidence to support that Respondent-Mother is unable to

control Chip, which supports that “[a]ll of the same issues that were present when

the juveniles were adjudicated neglected continue to exist” and “efforts to reunite

[Ruth] with either parent clearly would be unsuccessful or inconsistent with the

juvenile’s health or safety and need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable

period of time.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(d)(3).

b. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(e)

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Respondent-Mother argues that Findings 16, 22, 23, and 254 correspond to

subsection 7B-906.1(e) and lacked specificity or basis for the finding. Subsection 7B-

906.1(e) details additional criteria that the court should consider when the juvenile

is not placed with the parent. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(e) (2025). These criteria

are, in relevant part:

(1) Whether it is possible for the juvenile to be placed with a parent within the next six months and, if not, why such placement is not in the juvenile’s best interests.

(2) Where the juvenile’s placement with a parent is unlikely within six months, whether legal guardianship or custody with a relative or some other suitable person should be established and, if so, the rights and responsibilities that should remain with the parents.

(4) Where the juvenile’s placement with a parent is unlikely within six months, whether the juvenile should remain in the current placement, or be placed in another permanent living arrangement and why.

(5) Whether the county department of social services has since the initial permanency plan hearing made reasonable efforts to implement the permanent plan for the juvenile.

(6) Any other criteria the court deems necessary.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(e). Only relevant criteria require findings under this

subsection. In re L.L., 386 N.C. 706, 713, 909 S.E.2d 151, 157−58 (2024). “The trial

4 Apart from a sole initial citation to Finding 25 within a list of other findings, Respondent-

Mother never mentions Finding 25 in the rest of her argument; thus, we do not address it in relation to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(e).

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court has discretion to determine which factors were relevant.” Id. at 713, 909 S.E.2d

at 158.

Finding 16 states DSS had made reasonable efforts to implement the primary

and secondary plans for the juvenile as described in the social worker’s report and

prior court orders. “When trial courts incorporate documents by reference, the factual

findings contained in those documents—but not their opinions or recommendations—

become the findings of the trial court’s order.” Id. at 718, 909 S.E.2d at 160−61.

Therefore, it is appropriate for the trial court to incorporate the social worker’s report

and prior court orders into the findings of fact, and there is competent evidence within

those documents to support Finding 16.

Respondent-Mother further contends that Finding 22 only recites the

possibility of placement with the parent. This finding of fact, however, is supported

by Finding 17, which, as discussed above, is supported by competent evidence.

Respondent-Mother argues Finding 23 was inaccurate because the finding

references guardianship instead of custody. In Finding 23, the trial court found

“there persists the possibility that the parent-child relationship can be maintained

through guardianship with a relative,” which is in the juvenile’s best interest.

However, the trial court awarded Ms. Heggins legal and physical custody of Ruth, not

guardianship. This appears to be a clerical error. In re R.S.M., 257 N.C. App. 21, 23,

809 S.E.2d 134, 136 (2017) (“A clerical error is an error resulting from a minor

mistake or inadvertence, especially in writing or copying something on the record,

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and not from judicial reasoning or determination.” (citation modified)). The term

“guardianship” does not appear in any part of the order outside of Finding 23; rather,

the term “custody” is used in Finding of Fact 32, Conclusion of Law 4, and the trial

court’s decree. This error does not negate the validity of the finding, and “may be

addressed and corrected upon remand.” In re P.L.E., 290 N.C. App. 176, 181, 891

S.E.2d 613, 617 (2023).

c. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(j)

Respondent-Mother argues “[t]he N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.1(j) findings . . . were

general and did not involve actual consequences or adequate resources” and

challenges Findings 8 and 25. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(j) mandates, if the court

determines that the juvenile should be placed with a custodian or guardian other

than the parent, “the court shall verify that the person receiving custody or being

appointed as guardian . . . understands the legal significance of the placement or

appointment and will have adequate resources to care appropriately for the juvenile.”

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(j) (2025). The trial court is not required to “‘make any

specific findings in order to make the verification.’” In re J.D.M.-J., 260 N.C. App.

56, 65, 817 S.E.2d 755, 761 (2018) (citation omitted). However, “the record must show

the trial court received and considered reliable evidence that the guardian or

custodian had adequate resources and understood the legal significance of custody or

guardianship.” Id. (citation omitted).

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Stable placement of the juvenile with the prospective custodian or guardian for

at least six consecutive months is evidence that the person has adequate resources.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(j). Such evidence, however, “does not per se compel a

conclusion that the ‘person receiving custody . . . understands the legal significance

of the placement.’” In re A.J.J., 299 N.C. App. 616, 624, 919 S.E.2d 711, 717 (2025)

(internal citation omitted). Evidence that a custodian understands the legal

significance of the placement can include “testimony from the potential [custodian] of

a desire to take [custody] of the child . . . and testimony from a social worker that the

potential [custodian] was willing to assume legal [custody].” In re E.M., 249 N.C.

App. 44, 54, 790 S.E.2d 863, 872 (2016) (citation omitted).

Ruth has resided in Ms. Heggins’s home from 3 February 2025 through the

date of the permanency planning hearing, 23 July 2025. This is ten days under the

six-month minimum. Before the trial home placement with Respondent-Mother,

Ruth had resided with Ms. Heggins from 12 March 2024, at the latest, to the trial

home placement, which began in early November 2024. The prior placement

exceeded the consecutive six-month minimum. This indicates that Ms. Heggins has

adequate resources to support Ruth.

Further, Ms. Heggins indicated she has adequate resources to support Ruth.

Ms. Heggins testified that she has been able to pay rent and household bills during

Ruth’s placements, and can provide food, clothing, medical needs, appointments, and

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schooling for Ruth. The social worker testified that, despite a lack of child support,

Ms. Heggins has been able to “maintain the necessities” for herself and Ruth.

The social worker went on to testify that she spoke with Ms. Heggins about the

legal and financial consequences of permanent custody, and Ms. Heggins seemed to

understand the consequences. While Ruth does not have her own room nor her own

bed, “our role on appeal is not to weigh and compare the evidence; our standard of

review merely asks if there was competent evidence, even hearsay evidence, at trial

to support the trial court’s findings.” In re N.H., 255 N.C. App. 501, 507, 804 S.E.2d

841, 845 (2017). The statements from Ms. Heggins and the social worker are enough,

when combined with the stable placement of Ruth with Ms. Heggins, to meet the

statutory requirements of subsection 7B-906.1(j). See In re K.P., 383 N.C. 292, 308,

881 S.E.2d 250, 260 (2022) (holding the combined testimony between the prospective

custodian and the social worker showed the custodian “understood the legal

significance of the placement and had adequate resources to care appropriately for

the child” despite the lack of any specific findings).

Specifically, Respondent-Mother argues Findings 8 and 25 were general and

did not involve actual consequences or resources. These two findings say,

8. The juvenile, [Ruth], is placed with her paternal aunt, Angela Heggins, in Spencer. Ms. Heggins has been taking good care of the juvenile. The juvenile is doing well in her home. Angela Heggins is specifically approved to continue to provide care for [Ruth]. She has demonstrated for more than six months that she has the ability to provide for the juvenile’s needs. She desires to be the permanent

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custodian of [Ruth].

25. Information regarding the placement(s) the juvenile has had is contained in the social worker’s report, the GAL’s report, and the prior court orders. The juvenile’s current placement with Angela Heggins is appropriate and should continue.

The trial court is not required to make any specific findings about the

verification. See J.D.M.-J., 260 N.C. App. at 65, S.E.2d at 761. Still, the findings are

supported by competent evidence. In addition to the financial and material

necessities to which Ms. Heggins and the social worker testified, Ruth is on a waitlist

for the Center for Emotional Health, has been receiving routine medical and dental

treatment, and has been working with Ms. Heggins to “improve her behaviors in and

out of the home.” Ms. Heggins also testified that she would be willing to be Ruth’s

custodian until she reaches age eighteen. Thus, Findings 8 and 25 are supported by

competent evidence.

2. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.2

Respondent-Mother argues Findings 18, 19, 20, and 21 addressed subsection

7B-906.2(d) and were not supported by the evidence. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.2

details necessary findings for concurrent planning at permanency placement

hearings. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.2 (2025). Subsection 7B-906.2(d) states that “[a]t

any permanency planning hearing under subsections (b) and (c) of this section, the

court shall make written findings . . . which shall demonstrate the degree of success

or failure toward reunification” and lists four factors. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.2(d)

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(2025). This subsection, however, is inapplicable here. Subsection 7B-906.2(b)

pertains to “any permanency planning hearing where the court is ordering

reunification as a permanent plan.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.2(b) (2025). Subsection

7B-906.2(c), similarly, applies “[u]nless reunification efforts were previously ceased.”

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.2(c) (2025). “The finding that reunification efforts clearly

would be unsuccessful or inconsistent with the juvenile’s health or safety may be

made at any permanency planning hearing, and if made, shall eliminate reunification

as a plan.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.2(b). The trial court found such in the 5 March

2025 permanency planning order:

15. At this time, efforts to reunite the juvenile with the Respondent Parents would be clearly unsuccessful or inconsistent with the juvenile’s health and safety and need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of time.

Therefore, at the hearing for the order on appeal on 23 July 2025, reunification was

not a permanent plan option for Ruth. Subsections 7B-906.2(b), (c), and (d) are not

applicable.

Respondent-Mother further argues that Findings 5 and 26 are inconsistent

with the conclusions and decree of the order on appeal because reunification efforts

were ended in the 5 March 2025 order and “[t]he movement was towards Ms. Heggins

receiving custody of Ruth or the ability to adopt Ruth, or, perhaps, become her

guardian.” These findings say,

5. The Iredell County Department of Social Services

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(“DSS”) has made reasonable efforts to reunify and to eliminate the need for placement of the juvenile outside of the juvenile’s own home and should continue to do so. Said efforts are as described in the social worker’s report and the prior court orders.

26. The goals of the juvenile’s foster care plan include, but are not limited to, providing the juvenile with a safe, nurturing environment in which to reside while the Respondent Parents are working to rectify the issues that caused the juvenile to enter the purview of the court and foster care and until such time as permanency can be achieved. The juvenile’s current placement provider will be consulted about the juvenile’s ongoing needs and the placement provider’s desire and ability to provide permanency for the juvenile. Further, the placement provider will be involved in transitioning the juvenile towards permanency.

Finding of Fact 26 appears to be referring to Chip as the trial court’s order was

in relation to both Chip and Ruth, but only Chip is referred to in the order in relation

to foster care in Finding of Fact 28 and decree 2.c. Even though the trial court should

have been clearer in who it was referring to regarding foster care, the order never

refers to Ruth in relation to foster care where the juveniles’ names are mentioned.

Thus, since our review in this appeal is solely regarding Ruth, we end our review of

Finding 26 there.

Respondent-Mother is correct Finding 5 conflicts with Finding of Fact 15,

Conclusion of Law 2, decree 2.c pertaining to Ruth, and decree g pertaining to Chip;

therefore, this cannot be related to Chip as Finding 26 is. Despite this inconsistency,

Finding 5 is not necessary to support the trial court’s determination because, as

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Respondent-Mother notes, Conclusion of Law 3 of the 5 March 2025 order relieved

the need for DSS to make reasonable effort to reunify and eliminate the need for

placement of Ruth outside her own home prior to the order on appeal. As noted,

reunification was no longer an option and thus could not be continued. See N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 7B-906.2(b) (“Reunification shall be a primary or secondary plan unless the

court . . . previously made written findings under G.S. 7B-906.1(d)(3), the permanent

plan is or has been achieved, or the court makes written findings that reunification

efforts clearly would be unsuccessful or would be inconsistent with the juvenile’s

health or safety. The finding that reunification efforts clearly would be unsuccessful

or inconsistent with the juvenile's health or safety may be made at any permanency

planning hearing, and if made, shall eliminate reunification as a plan.”).

Moreover, notwithstanding the inconsistency and issues with Finding 5, the

trial court still made findings sufficient to support Conclusion of Law 2’s ending–

again–the efforts for reunification in its findings of fact, such as in Findings 15, 16,

and 17. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.2(b). Accordingly, because Finding 5 or Finding

26 are not necessary or relevant, respectively, and other findings of fact are sufficient

to support the trial court’s order, we need not further review either finding. In re

J.N.J., 286 N.C. App. 599, 605, 881 S.E.2d 890, 895−96 (2022) (stating “we do not

review challenged findings that are unnecessary to support a trial court's

determination” in an appeal from adjudication and disposition (citation omitted)).

3. Ruth’s Best Interests

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Respondent-Mother argues that it is not in Ruth’s best interest to be in the

custody of Ms. Heggins because Ruth enjoys interacting with Respondent-Mother and

“her emotional and mental health benefits from her connection to [Respondent-

Mother].” “We review a trial court’s determination as to the best interest of the child

for an abuse of discretion.” In re J.K., 253 N.C. App. 57, 60, 799 S.E.2d 439, 441

(2017). “An abuse of discretion results where the court’s ruling is manifestly

unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a

reasoned decision.” In re K.P., 383 N.C. at 302, 881 S.E.2d at 256 (citation omitted).

As articulated above, Findings 8 and 17 are both supported by competent

evidence. Finding 8 states that Ruth “is doing well in [Ms. Heggins’s] home.” Ms.

Heggins has regular contact with Ruth’s teachers, Ruth attends routine medical and

dental appointments, and Ruth is attending therapy. Moreover, Ruth “likes to be

under [Ms. Heggins]” and “looks for [Ms. Heggins] for certain things and assistance.”

Respondent-Mother has continued therapy, maintained employment, and attended

supervised visits with Ruth. Despite these improvements, Finding 17, which is

supported by competent evidence as addressed above, dictates “[a]ll of the same

issues that were present when the juveniles were adjudicated neglected continue to

exist.” Moreover, during Ruth’s trial home placement with Respondent-Mother,

Respondent-Mother allowed Ruth to have unsupervised visits with family members

that were precluded by the trial court; she allowed a convicted felon to reside in her

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home; and she drove Ruth, while impaired, to Ms. Heggins’s home, started an

argument, and damaged property.

The trial court’s ruling that it is in Ruth’s best interest to be in the custody of

Ms. Heggins is neither manifestly unsupported by reason nor so arbitrary that it

could not have resulted from a reasonable decision. Therefore, it is not an abuse of

discretion.

B. Visitation Plan

Respondent-Mother next argues, “[t]he provisions for visitation between

[Respondent-]Mother and Ruth were not supported by the findings of evidence” and

“[t]he visitation plan was contrary to the best interests of Ruth, and it was an abuse

of discretion.” We review the visitation plan for abuse of discretion. In re A.J.L.H.,

384 N.C. 45, 57, 884 S.E.2d 687, 695 (2023); In re S.H., --- N.C. App. ----, ----, 929

S.E.2d 75, ----, 2026 WL 763825, at *4 (N.C. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2026) (“A trial court’s

order regarding visitation rights is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” (quoting In

re R.J.P., 284 N.C. App. 53, 60, 875 S.E.2d 1, 6 (2022))). Thus, “we defer to the trial

court’s decision unless it is manifestly unsupported by reason or one so arbitrary that

it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” A.J.L.H., 384 N.C. at 57,

884 S.E.2d at 695 (quoting In re K.N.L.P., 380 N.C. 756, 759, 869 S.E.2d 643, 646

(2022)). “Although the court has broad discretion in selecting an appropriate

visitation arrangement, the exercise of the discretion must be supported by findings

of fact and evidence along with conclusions of law.” S.H., --- N.C. App. at ----, 929

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S.E.2d at ----, 2026 WL 763825, at *4 (citing Lamond v. Mahoney, 159 N.C. App. 400,

407−08, 583 S.E.2d 656, 661 (2003)); see Peters v. Pennington, 210 N.C. App. 1, 12,

707 S.E.2d 724, 733 (2011) (“[W]e ascertain (1) whether the challenged findings of

fact are supported by substantial evidence; (2) whether the trial court’s findings of

fact support its conclusions of law; and (3) whether the trial court abused its

discretion in fashioning the custody and visitation order.”).

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-905.1 prescribes a visitation order “shall provide for

visitation that is in the best interests of the juvenile consistent with the juvenile’s

health and safety, including no visitation[;]” “[t]he court may specify in the order

conditions under which visitation may be suspended[;]” and, relevant here, “[i]f the

juvenile is placed or continued in the custody or guardianship of a relative or other

suitable person, any order providing for visitation shall specify the minimum

frequency and length of the visits and whether the visits shall be supervised.” N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 7B-905.1(a), (c) (2025).

Respondent-Mother specifically argues the trial court’s findings “did not

explain how the visitation schedule was in Ruth’s best interest[;]” “[n]o specific

conclusion was in Ruth’s best interest[;]” “the evidence did not support the visitation

schedule based on the past as opposed to [Respondent-]Mother’s and Ruth’s therapy

and their adjustment to current circumstances[;]” “the finding and the evidence did

not address [Respondent-Mother’s payment for supervision[;]” and the trial court

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improperly delegated its judicial function because the order “places the discretion of

visits outside of Pharos Parenting with Ms. Heggins.”

1. Ruth’s Best Interest

First, Respondent-Mother argues the visitation schedule is not in Ruth’s best

interest. “[T]he court must be controlled by the principle that the best interest and

welfare of the child is the paramount consideration in determining the visitation

rights.” In re Custody of Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 552, 179 S.E.2d 844, 849 (1971);

see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-905.1. We review the trial court’s determination as to the

best interest of the child for an abuse of discretion, J.K., 253 N.C. App. at 60, 799

S.E.2d at 441, and will not reverse its ruling unless it “is manifestly unsupported by

reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision,”

In re K.P., 383 N.C. at 302, 881 S.E.2d at 256.

Respondent-Mother argues that the visits are “appropriate,” and Ruth enjoys

her time with Respondent-Mother. She contends that the new visitation plan

indicates that Respondent-Mother will be able to “visit less often” because there is

additional coordination involved. The GAL report on 24 June 2025 states that

Respondent-Mother “loves her children more than anything in the world.”

Respondent-Mother and Ruth “work on math and spelling” and Respondent-Mother

brings blankets, toys, and dinner. Moreover, Ruth “struggle[s] with leaving the room”

after visits with Respondent-Mother and continues to cry until Respondent-Mother

is out of eyesight.

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However, Ruth is characterized as a “sweet little girl [who is] almost always

happy.” Ruth is “doing well in [Ms. Heggins’s] home.” Both the frequency and length

of the current visitation plan are the same as the visitation plan from the 5 March

2025 order. Ms. Heggins testified that she would be willing to take Ruth to Pharos

or to another person for a supervised visit on a monthly or weekly basis. Moreover,

Respondent-Mother and Ruth have continued to visit weekly while Ruth has been

under Ms. Heggins’s care.

Therefore, the visitation order is neither manifestly unsupported by reason nor

so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision as to Ruth’s

best interest. See K.P., 383 N.C. at 302, 881 S.E.2d at 256. We cannot say the trial

court abused its discretion.

2. Statutory Requirements and Judicial Function

Second, Respondent-Mother argues the findings did not support the provisions

for visitation between Respondent-Mother and Ruth. In support of her argument,

Respondent-Mother relies on In re Custody of Stancil, which held that where the trial

court does not find that “the parent has by conduct forfeited the right of visitation

and does not find that the exercise of the right would be detrimental to the best

interest and welfare of the child,” as in this case, “the court should safeguard the

parent’s visitation rights by a provision in the order defining and establishing the

time, place and conditions under which such visitation rights may be exercised.”

Custody of Stancil, 10 N.C. App. at 552, 179 S.E.2d at 849.

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In reliance on In re Custody of Stancil, this Court concluded in In re E.C. that

“[a]n appropriate visitation plan must provide for a minimum outline of visitation,

such as the time, place, and conditions under which visitation may be exercised.” In

re E.C., 174 N.C. App. 517, 523, 621 S.E.2d 647, 652 (2005) (emphasis added) (citation

omitted). This requirement, however, was abrogated “to the extent that it holds that

a trial court must provide for the time, place, and conditions of visitation in an order

allowing visitation” after a new statute governing visitation was enacted, N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 7B-905.1(b), (c). In re N.B., 240 N.C. App. 353, 364, 771 S.E.2d 562, 569−70

(2015).

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-905.1(c) dictates that, “if the juvenile is placed or

continued in the custody or guardianship of a relative or other suitable person, any

order providing for visitation shall specify the minimum frequency and length of the

visits and whether the visits shall be supervised.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-905.1(c)

(2025). Respondent-Mother admits that the “[t]rial court included the frequency and

the length of the visits and the requirement of supervision” in the order. Moreover,

the order in this case is similar to others where we have determined that the

minimum statutory requirements were met. See N.B., 240 N.C. App. at 365, 771

S.E.2d at 570 (holding that an order that established at least one supervised

visitation session per month for a minimum of one hour met the minimum

requirements for visitation, despite appointments being scheduled monthly).

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Therefore, the visitation order in this case complies with the minimum statutory

requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(c).

Respondent-Mother also argues that additional conditions on the ability to

visit, specifically regarding supervision, improperly delegated the court’s judicial

function. “[W]hen visitation rights are awarded, it is the exercise of a judicial

function.” Custody of Stancil, 10 N.C. App. at 552, 179 S.E.2d at 849. The trial court

may not delegate the judicial function of awarding visitation to a child’s custodian.

In re C.S.L.B., 254 N.C. App. 395, 399, 829 S.E.2d 492, 495 (2017); see In re J.D.R.,

239 N.C. App. 63, 75, 768 S.E.2d 172, 180 (2015). “To give the custodian of the child

authority to decide when, where and under what circumstances a parent may visit

his or her child could result in a complete denial of the right.” Custody of Stancil, 10

N.C. App. at 552, 179 S.E.2d at 849.

Respondent-Mother relies on several of this Court’s cases in support of her

argument. In In re A.P., the trial court mandated that visits would take place at a

location of the father’s choosing, supervised by the father or someone he approves. In

re A.P., 281 N.C. App. 347, 359, 868 S.E.2d 692, 701 (2022). This Court vacated the

visitation order because it allowed the father “the sole discretion to decide where and

by whom [the mother] would be supervised” during visitation. Id. at 361, 868 S.E.2d

at 702. Unlike In re A.P., the trial court in this case defined alternative options for

visitation: “supervised by Pharos at [Respondent-Mother’s] cost or by someone

approved by [Ms. Heggins].” The trial court mandated the frequency and length of

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the visits to be two hours, once per week. Ms. Heggins has no authority to change

either of those conditions. Instead, Ms. Heggins only has discretion if Respondent-

Mother chooses to forego the Pharos option.

In In re J.D.R., this Court found that the trial court “impermissibly delegated

its judicial function” when the father was able to determine whether the mother had

complied with the trial court’s directives, such as the provision of negative drug tests,

and gave the father substantial discretion over the “kinds of visitation” (such as lunch

at school) and future, conditional expansion. J.D.R., 239 N.C. App. at 75−76, 768

S.E.2d at 179–80. Here, Ms. Heggins has no discretion to either alter or expand the

“kind” of visitation. The trial court mandates that the visits will be supervised.

Finally, in In re C.S.L.B., this Court vacated a visitation order because it

allowed the guardians to “unilaterally modify” visitation based on their “concerns”

about the mother’s substance abuse or possible discord during the visit. C.S.L.B., 254

N.C. App. at 400, 829 S.E.2d at 495. In this case, Ms. Heggins does not have the

authority to suspend visits based on general “concern.” Instead, Ms. Heggins can end

an individual visit if Respondent-Mother presents as “visibly impaired or otherwise

behaves in a manner that presents a danger to the juvenile or is visibly upsetting to

the juvenile.” Therefore, unlike In re C.S.L.B., her authority is confined to limited

circumstances.

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In sum, the discretion afforded to Ms. Heggins is both limited in scope and an

alternative to an option entirely within Respondent-Mother’s control. Therefore, it

does not improperly delegate the court’s judicial function to the custodian.

3. Cost of Visitation

Third, Respondent-Mother contends that the findings and evidence do not

address her required payment of supervision. While the trial court has adhered to

the statutory requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-905.1(c), our Supreme Court has

stated that without findings of “whether [the] respondent mother [is] able to pay for

supervised visitation once ordered[,]” we are “unable to determine if the trial court

abused its discretion by requiring as a condition of visitation that visits with the

children be at [the] respondent[-]mother’s expense.” In re J.C., 368 N.C. 89, 89, 772

S.E.2d 465, 465 (2015); see also In re Y.I., 262 N.C. App. 575, 582, 822 S.E.2d 501,

505−06 (2018) (vacating the portion of the permanency planning order and remanding

for additional findings of fact where the trial court intended for the respondent-

mother to bear the cost of visitation but failed to determine whether she could pay).

In this case, while the evidence may support such a conclusion, the trial court

does not make a finding of fact regarding whether Respondent-Mother had the ability

to pay. Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the order requiring supervised visits by

Pharos “at [Respondent-Mother’s] cost” and remand for additional findings of fact

addressing whether Respondent-Mother has the ability to pay those costs.

4. Finding of Fact 24

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Fourth, Respondent-Mother argues Finding 24 “d[oes] not reflect any change

the evidence showed.” “[T]he trial court’s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if

supported by any competent evidence.” In re L.R.L.B., 377 N.C. at 315, 857 S.E.2d

at 111. “The court may consider any evidence . . . that the court finds to be relevant,

reliable, and necessary to determine the needs of the juvenile and the most

appropriate disposition.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(c). Moreover, “[t]he trial judge’s

decisions as to the weight and credibility of the evidence, and the inferences drawn

from the evidence are not subject to appellate review.” In re D.W.P, 373 N.C. 327,

330, 838 S.E.2d 396, 400 (2020) (citation omitted). “Unchallenged findings of fact are

also binding on appeal.” In re H.R.P., 297 N.C. App. 339, 344, 910 S.E.2d 738, 743

(2024) (internal citation omitted).

The GAL report on 24 June 2025 stated visits with Ruth are “appropriate,” and

Respondent-Mother brings toys, blankets, and food for Ruth. Ruth “struggle[s] with

leaving the room” after visits with Respondent-Mother and continues to cry until

Respondent-Mother is out of eyesight. Finding 19, however, which is uncontested

and therefore binding on appeal, states that Respondent-Mother “is not actively

participating in or cooperating with the plan, DSS, and the GAL for the juveniles.”

See id. While the evidence may conflict, the trial judge’s decisions as to the weight

and credibility of the evidence are not subject to appellate review. See D.W.P, 373

N.C. at 330, 838 S.E.2d at 400. Therefore, there is competent evidence to support

Finding 24.

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III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order in part, vacate the

portion of the order requiring supervised visits by Pharos at Respondent-Mother’s

cost, and remand for additional findings of fact addressing whether Respondent-

Mother has the ability to pay those costs and for correction of the clerical error in

Finding 23.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

Judges TYSON and ARROWOOD concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

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