[Cite as In re R.D.A., 2013-Ohio-935.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION No. 98306
IN RE: R.D.A. A Minor Child [APPEAL BY DAVID A. ALDRIDGE]
JUDGMENT: REVERSED
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Division Case No. SU 11704912
BEFORE: Keough, J., Celebrezze, P.J., and Jones, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 14, 2013 FOR APPELLANT
David A. Aldridge 4753 Autumn Lane Brooklyn, Ohio 44144
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty Cuyahoga County Prosecutor By: Christopher McMonagle Assistant County Prosecutor C.J.F.S. P.O. Box 93923 Cleveland, Ohio 44101
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.: {¶1} Appellant, David A. Aldridge, appeals from the judgment of the Cuyahoga
County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Court Division, that overruled Aldridge’s
objections and adopted the magistrate’s decision ordering a California child support order
registered in the state of Ohio for enforcement. We reverse.
I. Background
{¶2} On March 14, 2011, Aldridge’s ex-wife, Hilda L. Aldridge, filed a notice of
registration pursuant to R.C. 3115.42 in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas,
Juvenile Court Division, seeking to register for enforcement a child support order issued
by the Los Angeles County Superior Court on January 5, 1993 as part of an order of
dissolution of marriage. The order indicated that Aldridge had been served with process
in the proceedings on February 8, 1992 at 4080 Pedley Road, #24, Riverside, California.
{¶3} Aldridge filed a response contesting the validity and enforcement of the
support order pursuant to R.C. 3115.44.1 Aldridge argued that the order could not be
enforced because he had never been served in the California proceedings and, therefore,
the issuing court did not have personal jurisdiction over him when it issued the support
order. He also argued that the order was obtained by fraud because his ex-wife made
various misrepresentations to the court to obtain the order.
R.C. 3115.44 states that “A party contesting the validity or enforcement of a registered order 1
or seeking to vacate the registration has the burden of proving one or more of the following defenses: (1) The issuing tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction over the contesting party; (2) The order was obtained by fraud; * * *.” {¶4} At the hearing on Aldridge’s objections, Aldridge testified that he and Hilda
were married in California in 1978 or 1979. They lived together in California with their
three children until November 1989, when they separated. Aldridge moved out of the
family home and lived with his brother for approximately two weeks, then visited at his
parents’ house at 4080 Pedley Road, #24, Riverside, California, for a night or two, and
then moved to Ohio. Aldridge testified that he never resided at his parents’ house.
{¶5} Aldridge presented three exhibits at the hearing. Exhibit A, consisting of
several pages from an Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation document, demonstrated
that Aldridge was working in Ohio on October 10, 1990 when he was injured on the job.
Exhibit B, a “Certification of Incarceration” from the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation
and Correction, demonstrated that Aldridge, Inmate No. A240-249, was incarcerated in
the state of Ohio from August 1, 1991 through November 15, 2002. Exhibit C consisted
of affidavits from Matthew A. Aldridge, Michael V. Aldridge, and Annmarie Paolino,
Aldridge’s siblings, all of whom averred that (1) Aldridge moved from California to Ohio
on November 9, 1989, (2) Aldridge never lived at their parents’ residence at 4080 Pedley
Road, #24, Riverside, California, and (3) Aldridge’s ex-wife knew that Aldridge never
lived at the Pedley Road address, was living in Ohio shortly before he was incarcerated,
and was incarcerated in Ohio from August 1991 until November 2002.
{¶6} Aldridge testified that he never received notice of the divorce proceedings
and was not aware that his wife had filed for divorce; he said he learned about the divorce only after it was over. Aldridge testified further that he did not learn of the support
order until after he was released from prison and started receiving letters “from
California” attempting to collect the obligation. Aldridge said that he contacted “them”
and was told that they would “adjust” the amount that was owed. Aldridge said he heard
nothing more, the letters “just stopped,” and the matter “went away” until he received
notice from the juvenile court regarding the enforcement petition that had been filed.
{¶7} At the close of the hearing, the magistrate told the parties that “service
probably was not good on the father when the divorce happened,” but instructed the
parties to brief the issue of what Aldridge’s obligations relating to the child support order
were once he learned of the order.
{¶8} In his brief, Aldridge argued that the California judgment could not be
enforced because he was never properly served. In its brief, the State conceded that
Aldridge had not been properly served:
The evidence from the previously held hearing establishes that at the time of the divorce, service was attempted on the respondent at an address that later turned out to be his parents’ address. The respondent was incarcerated in Ohio at the time, and service was not attempted at the prison. It seems clear that service on the respondent was not actually obtained at the time of the divorce decree and child support order. (Emphasis added.)
Nevertheless, the State argued that Aldridge had waived the defense of lack of personal
jurisdiction because after he was released from prison and learned of the support order, he
did nothing to challenge it. {¶9} The magistrate subsequently entered an order confirming registration of the
support order. With respect to jurisdiction, the order stated that “[a]fter reviewing all of
the evidence, the court does not find that the issuing tribual lacked personal jurisdiction
over the contesting party.”
{¶10} Aldridge filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. The trial court
overruled the objections and adopted the magistrate’s decision that confirmed registration
of the support order for enforcement.
II. Analysis
{¶11} In his first and second assignments of error, Aldridge contends that the trial
court erred in overruling his objections to the magistrate’s decision and in confirming the
support order for enforcement in Ohio because the California court lacked personal
jurisdiction over him when it entered the order. We agree.
{¶12} The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”), codified in Ohio
at R.C. 3115.01 et seq., permits states that issue child support orders to request other
states to enforce the order against a resident of the responding state when both states have
adopted the UIFSA. Beam v. Beam, 2d Dist. No. 02-CA-1573, 2002-Ohio-2910, ¶ 10.
California and Ohio have both adopted the Act.
{¶13} To be entitled to registration and enforcement, the foreign judgment must
have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the parties. In re Donovan
Kilburn, 2d Dist. No. 20993, 2006-Ohio-991, ¶ 14, citing Emig v. Massau, 140 Ohio App.3d 119, 123, 746 N.E.2d 707 (10th Dist.2000). R.C. 3115.44(A)(1) allows a party
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[Cite as In re R.D.A., 2013-Ohio-935.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION No. 98306
IN RE: R.D.A. A Minor Child [APPEAL BY DAVID A. ALDRIDGE]
JUDGMENT: REVERSED
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Division Case No. SU 11704912
BEFORE: Keough, J., Celebrezze, P.J., and Jones, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 14, 2013 FOR APPELLANT
David A. Aldridge 4753 Autumn Lane Brooklyn, Ohio 44144
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty Cuyahoga County Prosecutor By: Christopher McMonagle Assistant County Prosecutor C.J.F.S. P.O. Box 93923 Cleveland, Ohio 44101
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.: {¶1} Appellant, David A. Aldridge, appeals from the judgment of the Cuyahoga
County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Court Division, that overruled Aldridge’s
objections and adopted the magistrate’s decision ordering a California child support order
registered in the state of Ohio for enforcement. We reverse.
I. Background
{¶2} On March 14, 2011, Aldridge’s ex-wife, Hilda L. Aldridge, filed a notice of
registration pursuant to R.C. 3115.42 in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas,
Juvenile Court Division, seeking to register for enforcement a child support order issued
by the Los Angeles County Superior Court on January 5, 1993 as part of an order of
dissolution of marriage. The order indicated that Aldridge had been served with process
in the proceedings on February 8, 1992 at 4080 Pedley Road, #24, Riverside, California.
{¶3} Aldridge filed a response contesting the validity and enforcement of the
support order pursuant to R.C. 3115.44.1 Aldridge argued that the order could not be
enforced because he had never been served in the California proceedings and, therefore,
the issuing court did not have personal jurisdiction over him when it issued the support
order. He also argued that the order was obtained by fraud because his ex-wife made
various misrepresentations to the court to obtain the order.
R.C. 3115.44 states that “A party contesting the validity or enforcement of a registered order 1
or seeking to vacate the registration has the burden of proving one or more of the following defenses: (1) The issuing tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction over the contesting party; (2) The order was obtained by fraud; * * *.” {¶4} At the hearing on Aldridge’s objections, Aldridge testified that he and Hilda
were married in California in 1978 or 1979. They lived together in California with their
three children until November 1989, when they separated. Aldridge moved out of the
family home and lived with his brother for approximately two weeks, then visited at his
parents’ house at 4080 Pedley Road, #24, Riverside, California, for a night or two, and
then moved to Ohio. Aldridge testified that he never resided at his parents’ house.
{¶5} Aldridge presented three exhibits at the hearing. Exhibit A, consisting of
several pages from an Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation document, demonstrated
that Aldridge was working in Ohio on October 10, 1990 when he was injured on the job.
Exhibit B, a “Certification of Incarceration” from the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation
and Correction, demonstrated that Aldridge, Inmate No. A240-249, was incarcerated in
the state of Ohio from August 1, 1991 through November 15, 2002. Exhibit C consisted
of affidavits from Matthew A. Aldridge, Michael V. Aldridge, and Annmarie Paolino,
Aldridge’s siblings, all of whom averred that (1) Aldridge moved from California to Ohio
on November 9, 1989, (2) Aldridge never lived at their parents’ residence at 4080 Pedley
Road, #24, Riverside, California, and (3) Aldridge’s ex-wife knew that Aldridge never
lived at the Pedley Road address, was living in Ohio shortly before he was incarcerated,
and was incarcerated in Ohio from August 1991 until November 2002.
{¶6} Aldridge testified that he never received notice of the divorce proceedings
and was not aware that his wife had filed for divorce; he said he learned about the divorce only after it was over. Aldridge testified further that he did not learn of the support
order until after he was released from prison and started receiving letters “from
California” attempting to collect the obligation. Aldridge said that he contacted “them”
and was told that they would “adjust” the amount that was owed. Aldridge said he heard
nothing more, the letters “just stopped,” and the matter “went away” until he received
notice from the juvenile court regarding the enforcement petition that had been filed.
{¶7} At the close of the hearing, the magistrate told the parties that “service
probably was not good on the father when the divorce happened,” but instructed the
parties to brief the issue of what Aldridge’s obligations relating to the child support order
were once he learned of the order.
{¶8} In his brief, Aldridge argued that the California judgment could not be
enforced because he was never properly served. In its brief, the State conceded that
Aldridge had not been properly served:
The evidence from the previously held hearing establishes that at the time of the divorce, service was attempted on the respondent at an address that later turned out to be his parents’ address. The respondent was incarcerated in Ohio at the time, and service was not attempted at the prison. It seems clear that service on the respondent was not actually obtained at the time of the divorce decree and child support order. (Emphasis added.)
Nevertheless, the State argued that Aldridge had waived the defense of lack of personal
jurisdiction because after he was released from prison and learned of the support order, he
did nothing to challenge it. {¶9} The magistrate subsequently entered an order confirming registration of the
support order. With respect to jurisdiction, the order stated that “[a]fter reviewing all of
the evidence, the court does not find that the issuing tribual lacked personal jurisdiction
over the contesting party.”
{¶10} Aldridge filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. The trial court
overruled the objections and adopted the magistrate’s decision that confirmed registration
of the support order for enforcement.
II. Analysis
{¶11} In his first and second assignments of error, Aldridge contends that the trial
court erred in overruling his objections to the magistrate’s decision and in confirming the
support order for enforcement in Ohio because the California court lacked personal
jurisdiction over him when it entered the order. We agree.
{¶12} The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”), codified in Ohio
at R.C. 3115.01 et seq., permits states that issue child support orders to request other
states to enforce the order against a resident of the responding state when both states have
adopted the UIFSA. Beam v. Beam, 2d Dist. No. 02-CA-1573, 2002-Ohio-2910, ¶ 10.
California and Ohio have both adopted the Act.
{¶13} To be entitled to registration and enforcement, the foreign judgment must
have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the parties. In re Donovan
Kilburn, 2d Dist. No. 20993, 2006-Ohio-991, ¶ 14, citing Emig v. Massau, 140 Ohio App.3d 119, 123, 746 N.E.2d 707 (10th Dist.2000). R.C. 3115.44(A)(1) allows a party
to contest enforcement of a support order upon a claim of lack of personal jurisdiction.
The burden of proving such a claim is on the contesting party. R.C. 3115.44(B).
{¶14} “It is axiomatic that for a court to acquire jurisdiction there must be proper
service of summons or an entry of appearance, and a judgment rendered without proper
service or entry of appearance is a nullity and void.” Lincoln Tavern, Inc. v. Snader, 165
Ohio St. 61, 133 N.E.2d 606 (1956); see also Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v.
Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision, 87 Ohio St.3d 363, 366-367, 2000-Ohio-452, 721 N.E.2d
40 (a judgment rendered without personal jurisdiction over a defendant is void ab initio);
Am. Family Ins. Co. v. Williams, 8th Dist. No. 93658, 2010-Ohio-1672, ¶ 13.
{¶15} Here, it is abundantly clear that Aldridge met his burden of demonstrating
that the Los Angeles County Superior Court lacked personal jurisdiction over him when it
entered the support order. The evidence at the hearing clearly demonstrated that
Aldridge was incarcerated in Ohio when the complaint for dissolution was served in
California at an address where he never resided. As both the magistrate and the State
conceded, Aldridge was never properly served in the California matter.
{¶16} Moreover, the evidence is clear that Aldridge never voluntarily submitted to
the California court’s jurisdiction. He never filed a responsive pleading in the matter,
nor engaged in any other action that indicated his actual or constructive knowledge of the
proceedings and his waiver of personal jurisdiction. In fact, Aldridge testified that he was not aware that his then-wife had filed for dissolution of the marriage, and the
judgment from the California court indicates that the dissolution and support order were
granted by default.
{¶17} We are astounded by the State’s assertion that Aldridge somehow waived
the lack of personal jurisdiction because he contacted authorities in California to discuss
the support order after he learned of its issuance but otherwise made no effort to
challenge it prior to disputing the registration and enforcement action. It is axiomatic
that a party’s actions subsequent to the entry of a void judgment against that party cannot
waive the trial court’s lack of personal jurisdiction over that party. Furthermore, the
State’s contention that a trial court may enter a void judgment against a party who was
never properly served, and that the party is then bound by the void judgment unless he
actively contests the judgment, is contrary to the most basic principles of due process in
our judicial system.
{¶18} Because Aldridge was never properly served in the California matter and did
not waive insufficiency of process, the Los Angeles County Superior Court lacked
jurisdiction to enter judgment against him. The support order is therefore void and
cannot be registered nor enforced in Ohio. The first and second assignments of error are
sustained.
{¶19} In his third assignment of error, Aldridge asserts that the support order
cannot be registered nor enforced in Ohio because it was obtained by fraud. Specifically, Aldridge contends that his ex-wife misrepresented to the California court
that he lived at the Pedley Road address and could be served there, even though she knew
he never lived there and was, in fact, incarcerated in Ohio. This assignment of error is
moot in light of our resolution of the first two assignments of error.
{¶20} The trial court’s judgment overruling Aldridge’s objections to the
magistrate’s decision and ordering the support order registered for enforcement in Ohio is
reversed.
It is, therefore, considered that said appellant recover of said appellee his costs
herein.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into
execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., P.J., and LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., CONCUR