In re Rainey

100 F. Supp. 757, 1951 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3978
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Texas
DecidedOctober 4, 1951
DocketNos. 2249, 2252
StatusPublished

This text of 100 F. Supp. 757 (In re Rainey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Rainey, 100 F. Supp. 757, 1951 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3978 (S.D. Tex. 1951).

Opinion

KENNERLY, Chief Judge.

This is a hearing on the Petition of the Heights State Bank of Houston to Review an Order made in this case by the Referee in Bankruptcy.

During 1949 and 1950, the Bank, made three loans to the Bankrupt (Walter M. [758]*758Rainey, doing business as Walter M. Rainey Construction Company) which were unpaid, wholly or in part, at the date of the filing of the Petitions in Bankruptcy and the Adjudications herein. These were the Loan of January 29, 1949 (referred to by the Referee as Claim A), of February 19, 1949 (referred to by the Referee as Claim B), and of March 13, 1950 (referred to by the Referee as Claim C). The first two loans (Claims A and B) were secured by Chattel Mortgage on certain personal property. The third loan of March 13, 1950, for $10,-000 (Claim C), was secured by a Deed of Trust or Mortgage on certain Houston real estate.

The Bank claimed and claims that such Deed of Trust (dated March 13, 1950, and in the Record) was also intended to secure and does secure the then unpaid indebtedness of the first two loans (Claims A and B). This, the Trustee, in appropriate proceedings, disputed. The Referee, by his Order of August 7, 1951, decided for the Trustee and against the Bank. . The Bank filed its Petition to Review his action, and the question is here for decision.

Further, the Referee refused to allow the attorneys’ fees stipulated in the Notes, constituting Claims A, B and C, allowing only what he finds to be a reasonable 'attorneys’ fee. Of this, the Bank complains in its Petition for Review, and that question is also here for decision.

(a) The Order of the Referee. (August 7, 1951) on the first point sought to be reviewed is as follows (italics mine) : “The Referee is of- the opinion by reason of the findings herein above made that the contest of the Trustee to the allowance of the bank’s claim as a secured claim for the balance due on the two notes secured by chattel mortgage should be sustained and that the secured claim should be limited to the amount due on the note set out" in sub-paragraph C of the claim and being the balance due on the note secured by the deed of trust, with the exception that the attorneys’ fees should be reduced.” etc.

(b) The findings referred to in such Order are apparently as follows (italics mine) : — ■

“The bank is claiming that its total indebtedness is secured by the motor vehicles, the tractor, the Gunite machine, and the real estate, basing this claim upon a paragraph in the deed of trust, being subdivision 2 of paragraph 2 of the deed o-f trust, to which paragraph reference is made. The portion of said paragraph claimed to be applicable seems to be the following words included in said paragraph, ‘Any and all other direct and indirect obligations and indebtedness now or at any time in the future owing and to be owing by grantor (any or all of them) to bank, its successors, and assigns, regardless of how evidenced or how incurred;’ I find that the indebtedness claimed under subparagraphs A and B of the claim occurred prior to the indebtedness under the deed of trust as set out in subparagraph C of said claim, and that said indebtedness under A and B were renewed and extended subsequent to the date o-f the note and deed of trust on the real estate as set out in subsection C of the claim. No-mention was made in the renewals of these-two indebtednesses that they were in anyway secured except by the chattel mortgages, and no reference was made therein-that they were additionally secured under the deed of trust.
“The deed of trust loan was made on-March 13, 1950, and the deed of trust was-of even date therewith, and the two indebtednesses under A and B were not specifically mentioned in the deed of Trust as-indebtedness being secured thereby, but is-claimed to be secured by reason of the-printed provision in the deed of trust above-quoted.”

1: — These do not appear to be fact-findings of the Referee which may not be disturbed, Phillips v. Baker, 5 Cir., 165 F.2d 578, but they are conclusions of law reached by the Referee upon proven or undisputed facts.

2: — This brings us at once to a discus- - sion of the first question of whether such-Deed of Trust of March 13 1950, secures-the first two loans (Claims A and B). I think the question may be and must be-decided by determining the legal effect of; the Deed of Trust itself.

[759]*759Such Deed of Trust is partly printed and partly typewritten. It contains five Sections which are lettered I, II, III, IV, and V. Each of the lettered Sections contains Paragraphs which are numbered and designated by figures.

Section I contains two numbered Paragraphs. The first paragraph is a clause conveying the Houston real estate (which is described) to a Trustee in Trust, and the second paragraph is the habendum clause.

Passing now to Section II. The first line of Section II reads: "This conveyance is made in trust, however, to secure and enforce the full and prompt payment when due of:”

Then follow two paragraphs numbered (1) and (2). Paragraph (1), shown in the margin, is a typewritten description of the $10,000 note of March 13, 1950.1 Paragraph (2), shown in the margin,2 contains the language substantially as stated by the Referee and other pertinent language.

I find myself unable to agree with the Referee. If we stop here, I think there is no escape that under the quoted provisions of the Deed of Trust, all indebtedness of Bankrupt to the Bank, including the first two loans (Claims A and B), as well as the third loan '(Claim C), are secured thereby.

But the provisions discussed are not all. Other provisions of the Deed of Trust, when looked to, support the Bank’s contention, particularly the provisions of Paragraph (1) of Section III, quoted in [760]*760thé margin.3 This provides that the conveyance shall become null and void upon payment, not only of the $10,000 Note (Claim C), but also all other amounts and indebtedness secured and to ‘be secured, etc. Note also those provisions in Para[761]*761graph (2) of Section III, quoted in the margin 4 which direct the payment of the proceeds from any Trustee’s sale thereunder to be applied, after the payment of the $10,000 Note (Claim C), to any and all other indebtedness secured thereunder, Also the provisions quoted in the margin5 that all rights, titles, liens, or equities held under the Deed of Trust, or Iby any other instruments, shall be considered cumulative, one of the other and not exclusive. Also the provision quoted in the margin6 that [762]*762the security which has been given for the payment of indebtedness shall be taken, considered, and held as cumulative, etc.

The Deed of Trust, when read from its four corners, is perfectly plain and unambiguous, clearly shows the intention of the parties, and may not be varied by extraneous evidence. It secures not only the third loan $10,000 Note (Claim C), 'but all other indebtedness of the Bankrupt to the Bank, including the notes executed for the first and second loans (Claims A and B).

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Related

Phillips. v. Baker
165 F.2d 578 (Fifth Circuit, 1948)

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Bluebook (online)
100 F. Supp. 757, 1951 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3978, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-rainey-txsd-1951.