In re Rahmel H.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

In re Rahmel H.

250 A.D.2d 470, 671 N.Y.S.2d 663, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6172

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 19, 1998

StatusPublished

This text of 250 A.D.2d 470 (In re Rahmel H.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

In re Rahmel H., 250 A.D.2d 470, 671 N.Y.S.2d 663, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6172 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1998).

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Opinion

—Order of disposition, Family Court, Bronx County (Susan Larabee, J.), entered on or about January 29, 1997, which adjudicated appellant a juvenile delinquent, upon a fact-finding determination that he committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crime of criminal trespass in the third degree, and conditionally discharged him for a period of 12 months, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The fact-finding determination was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence (People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490; Matter of Joseph J., 205 AD2d 776, 777). That the laundry room door was locked from the inside when the police arrived, thus precluding entry by other residents, demonstrates that appellant exceeded the scope of his license, and supports the Family Court’s determination that he remained unlawfully (see, Penal Law § 140.00 [5]; [471]*471§ 140.10 [a]; People v Izzo, 96 Misc 2d 634, 636). Concur— Sullivan, J. P., Rosenberger, Rubin, Tom and Andrias, JJ.

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—Order of disposition, Family Court, Bronx County (Susan Larabee, J.), entered on or about January 29, 1997, which adjudicated appellant a juvenile delinquent, upon a fact-finding determination that he committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crime of criminal trespass in the third degree, and conditionally discharged him for a period of 12 months, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The fact-finding determination was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence (People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490; Matter of Joseph J., 205 AD2d 776, 777). That the laundry room door was locked from the inside when the police arrived, thus precluding entry by other residents, demonstrates that appellant exceeded the scope of his license, and supports the Family Court’s determination that he remained unlawfully (see, Penal Law § 140.00 [5]; [471]*471§ 140.10 [a]; People v Izzo, 96 Misc 2d 634, 636). Concur— Sullivan, J. P., Rosenberger, Rubin, Tom and Andrias, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

250 A.D.2d 470, 671 N.Y.S.2d 663, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6172, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-rahmel-h-nyappdiv-1998.

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