DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO IN RE: | | RAFAEL MALDONADO ROSADO and | CASE NUMBER 01-06989- ESL CARMEN Y. ORTIZ REYES | CHAPTER 13 DEBTORS | | ____________________________________| | RAFAEL MALDONADO ROSADO and | CARMEN Y. ORTIZ REYES | | Plaintiffs | ADVERSARY PROCEEDING NUMBER: Vs. | 08-01153 VICTOR CRUZ COLON, LYDIA CASTRO| AND THEIR CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP;| LUIS MORELL MORELL, et. al. | Defendants | ____________________________________| This adversary proceeding is before the court upon defendants’ motion for summary judgment and the opposition thereto by the debtors/plaintiffs. Defendants allege and contend that the determination regarding the nondischargeability of their claim under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) was adjudicated by the Superior Court of Puerto Rico in case number DDP-1999-0877. Plaintiffs allege that defendants violated the discharge injunction and should be sanctioned because the state court made no specific finding or determination regarding the dischargeability of defendants’ claim. Procedural History The procedural history of this case is detailed in the opinion and order entered on October 13, 2009, dkt. # 38. The same will not be repeated and is incorporated herein. Summary Judgment Standard Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is applicable to this proceeding by Rule 7056 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, provides that summary judgment should be entered “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 1 -2- moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7056; see also, In re Colarusso, 382 F.3d 51 (1* Cir. 2004), citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “The summary-judgment procedure authorized by Rule 56 is a method for promptly disposing of actions in which there is no genuine issue as to any material fact or in which only a question of law is involved.” 10A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 3d§ 2712 ) at 198. “Rule 56 provides the means by which a party may pierce the allegations in the pleadings ) and obtain relief by introducing outside evidence showing that there are no fact issues that need to be tried.” Id at 202-203. Summary judgment is not a substitute for a trial of disputed facts; the court may only determine whether there are issues to be tried, and it is improper if the existence of a material fact is uncertain. Id at 205-206. Summary judgment is warranted where, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, a party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case and upon which it carries the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party must "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). For there to be a "genuine" issue, facts which are supported by substantial evidence must be in dispute thereby requiring deference to the finder of fact. Furthermore, the disputed facts must be "material" or determinative of the outcome of the litigation. Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 464 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976). When considering a petition for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962); Daury v. Smith, 842 F.2d 9, 11 (1st Cir. 1988). The moving party invariably bears both the initial as well as the ultimate burden in demonstrating its legal entitlement to summary judgment. Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157(1970). See also Lopez v. Corporacion Azucarera de Puerto Rico, 938 F.2d 1510, 1516 (Ist Cir. 1991). It is essential that the moving party explain its reasons for concluding that the record does not contain any genuine issue of material fact in addition to making a showing of support for those
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DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO IN RE: | | RAFAEL MALDONADO ROSADO and | CASE NUMBER 01-06989- ESL CARMEN Y. ORTIZ REYES | CHAPTER 13 DEBTORS | | ____________________________________| | RAFAEL MALDONADO ROSADO and | CARMEN Y. ORTIZ REYES | | Plaintiffs | ADVERSARY PROCEEDING NUMBER: Vs. | 08-01153 VICTOR CRUZ COLON, LYDIA CASTRO| AND THEIR CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP;| LUIS MORELL MORELL, et. al. | Defendants | ____________________________________| This adversary proceeding is before the court upon defendants’ motion for summary judgment and the opposition thereto by the debtors/plaintiffs. Defendants allege and contend that the determination regarding the nondischargeability of their claim under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) was adjudicated by the Superior Court of Puerto Rico in case number DDP-1999-0877. Plaintiffs allege that defendants violated the discharge injunction and should be sanctioned because the state court made no specific finding or determination regarding the dischargeability of defendants’ claim. Procedural History The procedural history of this case is detailed in the opinion and order entered on October 13, 2009, dkt. # 38. The same will not be repeated and is incorporated herein. Summary Judgment Standard Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is applicable to this proceeding by Rule 7056 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, provides that summary judgment should be entered “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 1 -2- moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7056; see also, In re Colarusso, 382 F.3d 51 (1* Cir. 2004), citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “The summary-judgment procedure authorized by Rule 56 is a method for promptly disposing of actions in which there is no genuine issue as to any material fact or in which only a question of law is involved.” 10A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 3d§ 2712 ) at 198. “Rule 56 provides the means by which a party may pierce the allegations in the pleadings ) and obtain relief by introducing outside evidence showing that there are no fact issues that need to be tried.” Id at 202-203. Summary judgment is not a substitute for a trial of disputed facts; the court may only determine whether there are issues to be tried, and it is improper if the existence of a material fact is uncertain. Id at 205-206. Summary judgment is warranted where, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, a party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case and upon which it carries the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party must "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). For there to be a "genuine" issue, facts which are supported by substantial evidence must be in dispute thereby requiring deference to the finder of fact. Furthermore, the disputed facts must be "material" or determinative of the outcome of the litigation. Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 464 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976). When considering a petition for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962); Daury v. Smith, 842 F.2d 9, 11 (1st Cir. 1988). The moving party invariably bears both the initial as well as the ultimate burden in demonstrating its legal entitlement to summary judgment. Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157(1970). See also Lopez v. Corporacion Azucarera de Puerto Rico, 938 F.2d 1510, 1516 (Ist Cir. 1991). It is essential that the moving party explain its reasons for concluding that the record does not contain any genuine issue of material fact in addition to making a showing of support for those
1 -3- claims for which it bears the burden of trial. Bias v. Advantage International, Inc., 905 F.2d 1558, 1560-61 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 958 (1990). The moving party cannot prevail ifany essential element of its claim or defense requires trial. Lopez, 938 F.2d at 1516. In addition, the moving party is required to demonstrate that there is an absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. See also, Prokey v. Watkins, 942 F.2d 67, 72 (1st Cir. 1991); Daury, 842 F.2d at 11. In its opposition, the nonmoving party must show genuine issues of material facts precluding summary judgment; the l| existence of some factual dispute does not defeat summary judgment. Kennedy v. Josepthal & Co., Inc., 814 F.2d 798, 804 (1st Cir. 1987). See also Kauffman v. Puerto Rico Telephone Co., 841 F.2d } 1169, 1172 (1st Cir. 1988); Hahn, 523 F.2d at 464, A party may not rely upon bare allegations to create a factual dispute but is required to point to specific facts contained in affidavits, depositions and other supporting documents which, if established at trial, could lead to a finding for the nonmoving party. Over the Road Drivers, Inc. v. Transport Insurance Co., 637 F.2d 816, 818 (1st Cir. 1980). The moving party has the burden to establish that it is entitled to summary judgment; no defense is required where an insufficient showing is made. Lopez, 938 F.2d at 1517. The nonmoving party need only oppose a summary judgment motion once the moving party has met its burden. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 159. Facts The following facts in defendants’ statement of uncontested facts do stand uncontested: 1. The Vega Baja District court adjudicated in criminal case number T99-0866 that plaintiff was guilty of driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. The conviction, after trial, was based on a police report (99-2-392-0542) stating that plaintiff Rafael Rosado crashed (rear-ended) defendants’ vehicle. The tests performed on plaintiff showed an intoxication level of .258%. 2. Defendants filed a civil action for damages against plaintiffs based on the accident caused by Rafael Maldonado Rosado and subject of the above described criminal conviction, Case number DDP 99-0877. 3. Judgment by stipulation was entered on June 7, 2001, settling the claim for $15,000.
- 4 - The following facts appear uncontested from the record and the cross motions for summary judgment: 4. Plaintiffs filed a voluntary Chapter 13 petition on June 19, 2001. Plaintiffs included the defendants in the schedules as unsecured creditors in the amount of $15,000. 5. After completion of all plan payments, plaintiffs were granted a discharge under § 1328(a) on October 24, 2005. 6. On October 17, 2008 Plaintiffs filed a complaint based on alleged violations of the discharge injunction pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §524(a) of the Bankruptcy Code committed by the Defendants and that they should be held in civil contempt for their reckless disregard of this court’s discharge order. 7. Plaintiffs allege the following facts occurred pre-petition: (I) “[o]n or about the date of March 5, 1999, Plaintiff Rafael A. Maldonado Rosado was involved in a traffic accident with Defendants Víctor Manuel Cruz Colón and Lydia Castro Soberal” (Docket No. 1, paragraph 6); (ii) “[o]n or about the date of September 14, 1999 co-defendants Víctor Manuel Colón and Lydia Castro Soberal filed complaint for damages before the State Superior Court of Bayamón under case DDP 1999-0877 (404).” (Docket No. 1, paragraph 7); (iii) on May 4, 2001 Víctor Manuel Cruz Colón and Lydia Castro Soberal through their respective legal representative, Luis M. Morell Morell and Plaintiffs-Debtors entered into a joint stipulation (“Estipulación Sobre Transacción y Solicitud de Sentencia,” Docket No. 1, Exhibit 1) to settle a tort claim by which Debtors were obliged to pay $15,000.00 to Víctor Cruz Colón and Lydia Castro Soberal; and (iv) the state court entered the judgment upon stipulation (“Sentencia Por Estipulación,” Docket No. 1, Exhibit 2) in case number DDP 1999-0877 (404) on May 23, 2001 and the same was registered and notified on June 7, 2001. Discussion The dispositive statutory provision in this case is 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(9). As stated in this court’s order of October 2010: In a proceeding to determine nondischargeability under Section 523(a)(9), the claimant must prove the following three (3) elements: (1) an existing debt based on 1 -5 and (3) which was being operated unlawfully under state law due to debtor’s intoxication. Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer, 4 Collier on Bankruptcy 9523.15 (15" ed. 2009). A claimant must prove the above-referenced elements by a preponderance of the evidence. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 111 S. Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed. 2d 755 (1991). A claimant need not establish a causal link between debtor’s intoxication and the death or personal injury. See In re Wagner, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22769 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2007); Le Merle v. Thornton (In re Thornton), 2004 Bankr. Lexis 1289 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. July 30, 2004); In re Kupinsky, 133 B.R. 993, 998 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1991); Contreras v. Dale (In re Dale), 199 B.R. 1014, 1022 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995); Whitson v. Middleton, 898 F, 2d. 950, 953 (4™ Cir. 1990). Legal records from a prior state court proceeding in which there is a finding with respect to debtor’s liability may provide a sufficient basis for the bankruptcy court to ascertain that such claim is nondischargeable pursuant to Section 523(a)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code. See In re Pahule, 849 F, 2d. 1056 (7" Cir. 1988). However, if the legal records from a prior state proceeding are insufficient to prove nondischargeability of a debt, the claimant may submit to the bankruptcy court additional evidence to substantiate the necessary elements in a nondischargeability action under Section 523(a)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code. Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer, 4 Collier on Bankruptcy 9523.15 (15™ ed. 2009). The discharge is one of the basic reasons for filing a bankruptcy petition. However, not al 1g || debts survive a discharge. The statutory provision governing the debts that are not discharged i section 523. The Bankruptcy Code treats the discharge of a debt as self-effectuating in fou exceptions, these are the debts included in sections 523(a)(2, 4, 6, and 15). The debts will b 91 discharged unless a creditor files an adversary proceeding to determine that the debt is not discharge: under one of these subparagraphs. Actions to determine the dischargeability of a debt ar 93 procedurally governed by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007. The bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdictio 74 to determine the dischargeability of debts under sections 523(a)(2,4,6, and 15). The other exceptions including 523(a)(9), survive the discharge absent a court determination. The uncontested facts show that the defendants’ claim meets the requirements of sectio: 97 523(a)(Q). The debt is the result of a personal injury caused by the plaintiffs while operating a moto 2g || vehicle, unlawfully as per the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico due to debtor’s intoxication Since there was no action to determine the dischargeability of a debt meeting the requirement
- 6 of section 523(a)(9), the same survived the discharge. Conclusion Based on the above findings and conclusions, the court hereby grants defendants’ motion fo summary judgment and orders that judgment be entered dismissing the complaint. Dated this 15th of July, 2011, in San Juan, Puerto Rico.
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