In re: Rafael Fernandez Quesada

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Puerto Rico·Decided June 3, 2014·No. 13-02057·Unknown

Opinion

1 IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR 2 THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

3 4 IN RE: CASE NO. 13-02057 BKT 5 Chapter 13 6 RAFAEL FERNANDEZ QUESADA

7 FILED & ENTERED ON 6/3/2014 8 Debtor(s) 9

10 OPINION AND ORDER 11 12 Before the court is Debtor’s motion requesting reconsideration of the April 1, 2014 order 13 [Dkt. No. 218] and the opposition filed by MMM Healthcare, Inc. and PMC Medicare Choice, Inc. 14 (“MMM/PMC”, “creditors” or “claimant”) [Dkt. No. 223]. Also before the court is Debtor’s 15 16 renewed objection to Claim No. 20 [Dkt No. 220] and creditors’ opposition thereto [Dkt No. 227]. 17 For the reasons stated herein, Debtor’s request for reconsideration and renewed objection to Claim 18 No. 20 are hereby DENIED. 19 20 I. Background 21 On April 1, 2014 the court entered an order denying Debtor’s objection to Claim No. 20 [Dkt 22 No. 213]. Claim No. 20 seeks to recover damages resulting from the breach of an executory 23 24 contract. Said claim was allowed as general unsecured. As a result, confirmation of Debtor’s 25 amended plan was denied as unfeasible [Dkt No. 213]. The amended plan was insufficiently funded

because it failed to take into account Claim No. 20. In his request for reconsideration, Debtor argues that the letter included by MMM/PMC in support of Claim No. 20 does not constitute evidence of the alleged damages suffered by claimant as 1 a result of the rejection of the executory contract. Debtor sustains that no evidence of the alleged 2 damages for the rejection of the contract was included in support of Claim No. 20. Debtor further 3 4 argues that no damages were suffered by MMM/PMC due to the rejection of the contract. Debtor 5 also filed an objection to Claim No. 20 asserting that the claim fails to comply with Fed. R. Bank. P. 6 3001(c), inasmuch as no evidence of damages was included in support of the claim. 7 8 MMM/PMC’s limited opposition to Debtor’s request for reconsideration and to the renewed 9 objection to Claim No. 20 is that Debtor’s arguments were not previously raised, thus waived. 10 Claimants further state that Debtor has not presented a manifest error of law or newly discovered 11 12 evidence that would merit reconsideration. Nonetheless, MMM/PMC claims that Debtor is 13 rehashing its theories. 14 Claim No. 20 in controversy, pertains to a damages claim resulting from the rejection of an 15 16 executory contract between MMM/PMC and Debtor as a medical service provider. The rejection 17 was approved by the court on March 24, 2014 [Dkt No. 205]. In its April 1, 2014 order, the court 18 addressed Debtor’s original opposition to the allowance of Claim No. 20, which was grounded on the 19 20 court previously disallowing Claim No. 17 as a late filed claim [Dkt No. 213]. It was Debtor’s 21 position at the time that the arguments (and evidence) presented by MMM/PMC in support of its 22 Claim No. 20 were the same as the ones used in support of Claim No. 17 [Dkt No. 191]. Debtor’s 23 24 contention was that because Claim 17 was disallowed, the court’s ruling became the law of the case 25 and prevented the court from further considering the arguments in support of Claim No. 20 [Dkt No.

213]. In his original objection to Claim No. 20, Debtor discussed its rights to terminate the executory contract. However, Debtor challenged the idea that the rejection entailed a resulting damages claim [Dkt No. 213]. In his original objection to Claim No. 20, Debtor never questioned 1 the validity or adequacy of the evidence in support of Claim No. 20. Now, at reconsideration and 2 renewed objection to Claim No. 20, Debtor questions for the first time the evidence submitted by 3 4 MMM/PMC in support of its claim [Dkt No. 218 & 220]. 5 II. Discussion 6 Courts often entertain motions for reconsideration under either Rules 59 or 60 of the Federal 7 8 Rules of Civil Procedure, depending on the time when such motion is served. See Perez–Perez v. 9 Popular Leasing Rental, Inc., 993 F.3d 281, 284 (1st Cir.1993). The First Circuit has recognized that 10 “[a] motion for reconsideration does not provide a vehicle for a party to undo its own procedural 11 12 failures and it certainly does not allow a party to introduce new evidence or advance new arguments 13 that could or should have been presented to the district court prior to judgment.” Marks 2–Zet–Ernst 14 Marks GMBH & Co. KG v. Presstek, Inc., 455 F.3d 7, 15–16 (1st Cir.2006); In re PMC Mktg. 15 16 Corp., 09-02048, 2013 WL 4602763 (Bankr. D.P.R. Aug. 29, 2013). 17 Accordingly, a Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration usually cannot be granted absent highly 18 unusual circumstances, unless the court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed 19 20 clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law. See Prescott v. Higgins, 538 21 F.3d 32, 45 (1st Cir.2008); see also Rivera Surillo & Co. v. Falconer Glass Indus., Inc., 37 F.3d 25, 22 29 (1st Cir.1994)(citing F.D.I.C. Ins. Co. v. World University, Inc., 978 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir.1992); 23 24 Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir.2009) 25 (quoting 389 Orange Street Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir.1999)). Under a Rule

60(b) motion for reconsideration, a court may relieve a party from a final judgment, order or proceeding only if the moving party can establish within a reasonable time under extraordinary circumstances: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered 1 evidence; (3) fraud; (4) a void judgment; (5) a satisfied or discharged judgment; or (6) any other 2 reason justifying relief from the judgment. Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d 1386, 1387 (9th 3 4 Cir.1985); Twentieth Century–Fox Film Corp. v. Dunnahoo, 637 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir.1981) 5 (internal citations omitted) (“Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) must be requested within a reasonable time, 6 and is available only under extraordinary circumstances.”). 7 8 Thus, for judicial economy purposes, counsel in a motion for reconsideration must set forth 9 the following: (1) genuine reasons why the court should revisit its prior order; and (2) compelling 10 facts or law in support of reversing the prior decision. See Frasure v. United States, 256 F.Supp.2d 11 12 1180, 1183 (D.Nev.2003). Accordingly, a motion for reconsideration must not be used as a vehicle to 13 re-litigate matters already litigated and decided by the Court. See Standard Quimica de Venezuela v. 14 Central Hispano Int'l, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 202 n. 4 (D.P.R.1999). A motion for reconsideration is 15 16 unavailable if said request simply brings a point of disagreement between the court and the litigant, 17 or re-argues theories already properly disposed of by the Court. See e.g. Waye v. First Citizen's 18 National Bank, 846 F.Supp. 310, 314 n. 3 (M.D.Pa.1994); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Holmes, 846 19 20 F.Supp. 1310, 1316 (S.D.Tex.1994) (footnotes omitted). Summarily, Rule 59(e) and 60(b) and are 21 not “intended to give an unhappy litigant one additional chance to sway the judge.” Durkin v. Taylor, 22 444 F.Supp. 879, 889 (E.D.Va.1977). 23 24 The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to bring to the court’s attention newly 25 discovered evidence that was not available at the time of the entry of the order, changes in existing

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Related

Backlund v. Barnhart
778 F.2d 1386 (Ninth Circuit, 1985)
Waye v. First Citizen's National Bank
846 F. Supp. 310 (M.D. Pennsylvania, 1994)
Durkin v. Taylor
444 F. Supp. 879 (E.D. Virginia, 1977)
ALLARIE v. Donnelly
256 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D. Maine, 2003)
389 Orange Street Partners v. Arnold
179 F.3d 656 (Ninth Circuit, 1999)
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Dunnahoo
637 F.2d 1338 (Ninth Circuit, 1981)